#Erlinger v. United States | Explore Tumblr posts and blogs

masterofd1saster · 8 months ago

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CJ court watch - 4 good cases on 21jun24

None of the cases was a great surprise, in numerical order the cases were

Smith v. Arizona, a 6th Amendment confrontation case, United States v. Rahimi, a 2d Amendment case, Department of State v. Muñoz, a liberty interests case, and Erlinger v. United States, a jury trial right case.

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Smith v. Arizona, 602 U. S. __ (2024)

The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause guarantees a criminal defendant the right to confront the witnesses against him. The Clause bars the admission at trial of “testimonial statements” of an absent witness unless she is “unavailable to testify, and the defendant ha[s] had a prior opportunity” to cross-examine her. *** And that prohibition applies in full to forensic evidence. So a prosecutor cannot introduce an absent laboratory analyst’s testimonial out-of-court statements to prove the results of forensic testing.*** The question presented here concerns the application of those principles to a case in which an expert witness restates an absent lab analyst’s factual assertions to support his own opinion testimony.***

In December 2019, Arizona law enforcement officers executed a search warrant on a property in the foothills of Yuma County. Inside a shed on the property, they found petitioner Jason Smith. They also found a large quantity of what appeared to be drugs and drug-related items. As a result, Smith was charged with possessing dangerous drugs (methamphetamine) for sale; possessing marijuana for sale; possessing narcotic drugs (cannabis) for sale; and possessing drug paraphernalia. He pleaded not guilty, and the case was set for trial.*** But with three weeks to go, the State called an audible, replacing Rast with a different DPS analyst as its expert witness. In the time between testing and trial, Rast had stopped working at the lab, for unexplained reasons. And the State chose not to rely on the now-former employee as a witness. So the prosecutors filed an amendment to their “final pre-trial conference statement” striking out the name Elizabeth Rast and adding “Greggory Longoni, forensic scientist (substitute expert).”***

Because he had not participated in the Smith case, Longoni prepared for trial by reviewing Rast’s report and notes. And when Longoni took the stand, he referred to those materials and related what was in them, item by item by item. *** After thus telling the jury what Rast’s records conveyed about her testing of the items, Longoni offered an “independent opinion” of their identity. Id., at 46a–47a, 49a. More specifically, the opinions he offered were: that Item 26 was “a usable quantity of marijuana,” that Items 20A and 20B were “usable quantit[ies] of methamphetamine,” and that Item 28 was “[a] usable quantity of cannabis.”***

Hearsay means a statement made out of court which a party offers to prove the truth of what was said or written in the statement. In other words, if Pa Walton testifies that Ma Walton had said "John Boy killed me," and the prosecutor offers it to prove that John Boy killed her, that would be hearsay. If John Boy is charged with killing her at dinner time, but he calls Olivia to testify that she heard Ma say "goodnight, John Boy" at bed time, John Boy could offer it to proved that she was alive at bedtime, and Olivia's testimony would not be hearsay.

But truth is everything when it comes to the kind of basis testimony presented here. If an expert for the prosecution conveys an out-of-court statement in support of his opinion, and the statement supports that opinion only if true, then the statement has been offered for the truth of what it asserts. How could it be otherwise? “The whole point” of the prosecutor’s eliciting such a statement is “to establish—because of the [statement’s] truth—a basis for the jury to credit the testifying expert’s” opinion.*** Or said a bit differently, the truth of the basis testimony is what makes it useful to the prosecutor; that is what supplies the predicate for—and thus gives value to—the state expert’s opinion. So “[t]here is no meaningful distinction between disclosing an out-of-court statement” to “explain the basis of an expert’s opinion” and “disclosing that statement for its truth.”

Rast’s statements thus came in for their truth, and no less because they were admitted to show the basis of Longoni’s expert opinions. All those opinions were predicated on the truth of Rast’s factual statements. Longoni could opine that the tested substances were marijuana, methamphetamine, and cannabis only because he accepted the truth of what Rast had reported about her work in the lab— that she had performed certain tests according to certain protocols and gotten certain results. And likewise, the jury could credit Longoni’s opinions identifying the substances only because it too accepted the truth of what Rast reported about her lab work (as conveyed by Longoni). If Rast had lied about all those matters, Longoni’s expert opinion would have counted for nothing, and the jury would have been in no position to convict. So the State’s basis evidence—more precisely, the truth of the statements on which its expert relied—propped up its whole case. But the maker of those statements was not in the courtroom, and Smith could not ask her any questions. Approving that practice would make our decisions in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming a dead letter, and allow for easy evasion of the Confrontation Clause***

The Court vacated the Arizona judgment and sent the case back to consider some additional aspects of the case that not previously been addressed.

The decision to vacate was 9-0, although some justices clearly did not like some things in the opinion of the court. I agree with Justice Gorsuch more than the opinion of the court or any of the concurrences.

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United States v. Rahimi, 602 U. S. __ (2024)

*** In December 2019, Rahimi met his girlfriend, C. M., for lunch in a parking lot. C. M. is also the mother of Rahimi’s young child, A. R. During the meal, Rahimi and C. M. began arguing, and Rahimi became enraged.

He physically abused her and fired a shot from a pistol, and she sought and received a restraining order.

The order, entered with the consent of both parties, included a finding that Rahimi had committed “family violence.” App. 2. It also found that this violence was “likely to occur again” and that Rahimi posed “a credible threat” to the “physical safety” of C. M. or A. R. Id., at 2–3. Based on these findings, the order prohibited Rahimi from threatening C. M. or her family for two years or contacting C. M. during that period except to discuss A. R.***

Accordingly, 18 U. S. C. §922(g)(8) prohibited him from possessing a firearm. He didn't care. The Supreme Court noted him firing at others or threatening others with a firearm at least six different times. The 2d Cir. thought that he might have a 2d Amendment right to possess a firearm, but its analysis was weak, and the Supreme Court reversed.

In Bruen, we directed courts to examine our “historical tradition of firearm regulation” to help delineate the contours of the right. Id., at 17. We explained that if a challenged regulation fits within that tradition, it is lawful under the Second Amendment. We also clarified that when the Government regulates arms-bearing conduct, as when the Government regulates other constitutional rights, it bears the burden to “justify its regulation.”***

if laws at the founding regulated firearm use to address particular problems, that will be a strong indicator that contemporary laws imposing similar restrictions for similar reasons fall within a permissible category of regulations. Even when a law regulates arms-bearing for a permissible reason, though, it may not be compatible with the right if it does so to an extent beyond what was done at the founding****

By the time of the founding, *** regulations targeting individuals who physically threatened others persisted. Such conduct was often addressed through ordinary criminal laws and civil actions, such as prohibitions on fighting or private suits against individuals who threatened others****

Finally, in holding that Section 922(g)(8) is constitutional as applied to Rahimi, we reject the Government’s contention that Rahimi may be disarmed simply because he is not “responsible.” *** “Responsible” is a vague term. It is unclear what such a rule would entail. Nor does such a line derive from our case law. In Heller and Bruen, we used the term “responsible” to describe the class of ordinary citizens who undoubtedly enjoy the Second Amendment right. *** But those decisions did not define the term and said nothing about the status of citizens who were not “responsible.” The question was simply not presented.***

There were many concurrences qualifying the opinion of the court, but only J. Thomas dissented.

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Department of State v. Muñoz, 602 U. S. __ (2024)

Sandra Muñoz wanted a visa so her husband could join her in the U.S. State declined her request because her husband was a member of MS-13. She argued that

The right to live with her noncitizen spouse in the United States is implicit in the “liberty” protected by the Fifth Amendment; the denial of her husband’s visa deprived her of this interest, thereby triggering her right to due process; the consular officer violated her right to due process by declining to disclose the basis for finding [her husband] inadmissible***

The 9th Cir., of course, thought Ms Munoz had a right to bring her man to the States. The Supreme Court begged to differ.

“For more than a century, this Court has recognized that the admission and exclusion of foreign nationals is a ‘fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial control.’” *** Congress may delegate to executive officials the discretionary authority to admit noncitizens “immune from judicial inquiry or interference.” *** When it does so, the action of an executive officer “to admit or to exclude an alien” “is final and conclusive.” ***The Judicial Branch has no role to play “unless expressly authorized by law.” *** The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) does not authorize judicial review of a consular officer’s denial of a visa; thus, as a rule, the federal courts cannot review those decisions. This principle is known as the doctrine of consular nonreviewability.***

[There is one narrow exception, when the denial affects a citizen's liberty interests.]

we hold that a citizen does not have a fundamental liberty interest in her noncitizen spouse being admitted to the country*** while Congress has made it easier for spouses to immigrate, it has never made spousal immigration a matter of right. On the contrary, qualifications and restrictions have long been the norm*** As the State Department observes, Muñoz’s claim to a procedural due process right in someone else’s legal proceeding would have unsettling collateral consequences. Consider where her logic leads: Could a wife challenge her husband’s ��assignment to a remote prison or to an overseas military deployment, even though prisoners and service members themselves cannot bring such challenges”? *** Could a citizen assert procedural rights in the removal proceeding of her spouse? *** Muñoz’s position would usher in a new strain of constitutional law, for the Constitution does not ordinarily prevent the government from taking actions that “indirectly or incidentally” burden a citizen’s legal rights.***

J. Gorsuch concurred. The three left wing justices dissented. The court's opinion closed with the familiar words

The judgment of the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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Erlinger v. United States, 602 U. S. __ (2024)

This case concerns the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. ACCA imposes lengthy mandatory prison terms on certain defendants who have previously committed three violent felonies or serious drug offenses on separate occasions. The question we face is whether a judge may decide that a defendant’s past offenses were committed on separate occasions under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, or whether the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require a unanimous jury to make that determination beyond a reasonable doubt.***

Paul Erlinger had many violent felony convictions, and he pleaded guilty. The only issue was whether any three of the convictions were committed on separate occasions. If you've ever heard of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466 (2000), you'd know how this case was going to turn out.

The Sixth Amendment promises that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused” has “the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury.” Inhering in that guarantee is an assurance that a guilty verdict will issue only from a unanimous jury. *** The Fifth Amendment further promises that the government may not deprive individuals of their liberty without “due process of law.” It is a promise that safeguards for criminal defendants those procedural protections well established at common law, including the “ancient rule” that the government must prove to a jury every one of its charges beyond a reasonable doubt. *** The Fifth and Sixth Amendments placed the jury at the heart of our criminal justice system. From the start, those provisions were understood to require the government to include in its criminal charges “‘all the facts and circumstances which constitute the offence.’” *** Should an “indictment or ‘accusation . . . lack any particular fact which the laws ma[d]e essential to the punishment,’ it was treated as ‘no accusation’ at all.” *** And at all times the “‘truth of every accusation’” against a defendant had to be “‘confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of [his] equals and neighbours.’”

I guess the point here is that prosecutors must allege the prior convictions and their separateness in indictments. If the defendant wants to plead guilty, prosecutors should probably include those facts in the plea agreement and stipulation.

Weird ideological 6-3 breakdown: J. Jackson joined J.J. Alito and Kavanaugh in dissenting.

#Supreme Court

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