#Also. When I say the politics of uselessness are complicated I mean ~contextually and in MDZS in general not really as undermining tht poin

[adhdo5]

I was prompted to post these a bit ago bc of my madness posting abt the Xiyao laundry audioextra upload someone posted like last week and I think there is really a lot there in the Xiyao laundry thing in general (hashtag release the Yunping tapes) and not all of it is smth I see ~talked abt as much as I think it deserves SO . Collected thoughts on Xiyao laundry

OK so like Yeah they're cute. I absolutely get why people's primary reaction to this is that it's cute and I think this is not even wrong. The politics of uselessness r complicated and I Will be returning to this but a legitimate angle of this is that LXC, who has spent his life largely defined by the fact that he pretty much excels at everything expected of him, has nothing expected of him and gets to be incompetent at something he ~feels obligated to do and have that not actually be a fail state, still get offered the same kindness regardless of his ability to be exceedingly capable/responsible etc.; meanwhile MY, who historically has had pretty much no one ever gaf about whether he's struggling or overworked or generally about him as a person (and the audiodrama extra version even has a bit where MY's coworkers are shit talking him including talking abt how he's probably not even actually doing any work), has someone earnestly caring about that, if ineffectually, and materially recognizing his workload as important and effortful and trying to help him with it. That is I think legitimately kind of sweet! Especially if one interprets the "he didn't even know who I was" line as true and as in the audiodrama extra this is set b4 MY figures it out! They appreciate each other in ways they don't usually get to be appreciated and it's nontransactional in this way and ;x;

HOWEVER. #Nuance. There's Other Angles.

I've talked abt this before inc on my blog but I do kind of never get tired of thinking abt it: there's a reason LXC is incapable of doing laundry and it's not just inexperience it's that he is physically incapable of the task bc of his cultivator strength!!!!! And the disparity of cultivation level is explicitly a class thing w/ JGY wrt 3zun especially!!! No matter his intention Zewu-jun CANNOT SULLY HIS HANDS WITH THE TASK bangs my head against a wall. It's such an innocuous detail yet it captures how from even this early on in their relationship and in this context it's not ignorable how much LXC is in fact a nobleman where JGY is not and this is a literal physical difference and it's in his very flesh and it has explicitly destructive results. See again vampire AU posting

And going off that it's notable how this does in fact also end up creating more work and while MY doesn't begrudge that in the moment and it's pettier here and arguably inextricable with the first point (LXC is not only incapable here he's actively bad at something, he actively makes smth worse and he's forgiven for it and that's genuinely kind of nice) it's it's also worth noting more grimly given how their relationship ends. It's not just destructive it's destructive to MY specifically

And on the notes of "inextricable from first point but also tragic" – it's sweet tht LXC gets no external consequences for this (yet lol) but is that really something he can Accept. It is an arguably underexamined element of Sunshot Xiyao how fucking miserable LXC is; he might be in an environment where this isn't fucking him up but he did bring his complexes here and you don't suddenly know how to accept that kind of grace yknow – and, and this is tangentially related to the stuff I was posting earlier today, this is one of the first of several kinds of vulnerability that LXC's almost only able to experience with MY/JGY. Considering how much that's arguably a running theme for them and considering where that leads that's also quite Foreshadowing Dismal!!

This is an audio drama exclusive but the way in the audiodrama extra ver that MY realizes who LXC is here and then ~lies about it is also crunchy as helllllll

AND between the coworkers thing in the audiodrama extra and the added scenes in the donghua and this and the notion in general (which comes from MXTX's post) that it's important they do the laundry themselves bc the robes would give LXC away it's a highlight of how genuinely precarious this is for MY which is another thing that both makes it more sweet and more. Despair.

It's just so lovely how it is both indicative of how genuinely good they are to and for each other, the ways in which they're meaningfully and significantly compassionate and helpful to one another, and also of the ways in which their situation here is precarious and high-stress and dangerous as fuck, AND also the ways in which they hurt each other so so bad, and how all of those things are largely different facets of the same qualities and the same significances. And That's My Post. Stream Apple Pie by the Scary Jokes

[maxksx]

Will the social sciences ever become hard sciences?

The term “hard science” as opposed to “soft science” has no clear definition. But roughly speaking, the less the predictive power and the smaller the statistical significance, the softer the science. Physics, without doubt, is the hard core of the sciences, followed by the other natural sciences and the life sciences. The higher the complexity of the systems a research area is dealing with, the softer it tends to be. The social sciences are at the soft end of the spectrum.

To me the very purpose of research is making science increasingly harder. If you don’t want to improve on predictive power, what’s the point of science to begin with? 

The social sciences are soft mainly because data that quantifies the behavior of social, political, and economic systems is hard to come by: it’s huge amounts, difficult to obtain and even more difficult to handle. Historically, these research areas therefore worked with narratives relating plausible causal relations. Needless to say, as computing power skyrockets, increasingly larger data sets can be handled. So the social sciences are finally on the track to become useful. Or so you’d think if you’re a physicist.

But interestingly, there is a large opposition to this trend of hardening the social sciences, and this opposition is particularly pronounced towards physicists who take their knowledge to work on data about social systems. You can see this opposition in the comment section to every popular science article on the topic. “Social engineering!” they will yell accusingly.

It isn’t so surprising that social scientists themselves are unhappy because the boat of inadequate skills is sinking in the data sea and physics envy won’t keep it afloat. More interesting than the paddling social scientists is the public opposition to the idea that the behavior of social systems can be modeled, understood, and predicted. This opposition is an echo of the desperate belief in free will that ignores all evidence to the contrary. The desperation in both cases is based on unfounded fears, but unfortunately it results in a forward defense.

And so the world is full with people who argue that they must have free will because they believe they have free will, the ultimate confirmation bias. And when it comes to social systems they’ll snort at the physicists “People are not elementary particles”. That worries me, worries me more than their clinging to the belief in free will, because the only way we can solve the problems that mankind faces today – the global problems in highly connected and multi-layered political, social, economic and ecological networks – is to better understand and learn how to improve the systems that govern our lives.

That people are not elementary particles is not a particularly deep insight, but it collects several valid points of criticism:

People are too difficult. You can’t predict them. Humans are made of a many elementary particles and even though you don’t have to know the exact motion of every single one of these particles, a person still has an awful lot of degrees of freedom and needs to be described by a lot of parameters. That’s a complicated way of saying people can do more things than electrons, and it isn’t always clear exactly why they do what they do. That is correct of course, but this objection fails to take into account that not all possible courses of action are always relevant. If it was true that people have too many possible ways to act to gather any useful knowledge about their behavior our world would be entirely dysfunctional. Our societies work only because people are to a large degree predictable. If you go shopping you expect certain behaviors of other people. You expect them to be dressed, you expect them to walk forwards, you expect them to read labels and put things into a cart. There, I’ve made a prediction about human behavior! Yawn, you say, I could have told you that. Sure you could, because making predictions about other people’s behavior is pretty much what we do all day. Modeling social systems is just a scientific version of this. This objection that people are just too complicated is also weak because, as a matter of fact, humans can and have been modeled with quite simple systems. This is particularly effective in situations when intuitive reaction trumps conscious deliberation. Existing examples are traffic flows or the density of crowds when they have to pass through narrow passages. So, yes, people are difficult and they can do strange things, more things than any model can presently capture. But modeling a system is always an oversimplification. The only way to find out whether that simplification works is to actually test it with data.

People have free will. You cannot predict what they will do. To begin with it is highly questionable that people have free will. But leaving this aside for a moment, this objection confuses the predictability of individual behavior with the statistical trend of large numbers of people. Maybe you don’t feel like going to work tomorrow, but most people will go. Maybe you like to take walks in the pouring rain, but most people don’t. The existence of free will is in no conflict with discovering correlations between certain types of behavior or preferences in groups. It’s the same difference that doesn’t allow you to tell when your children will speak the first word or make the first step, but that almost certainly by the age of three they’ll have mastered it.

People can understand the models and this knowledge makes predictions useless. This objection always stuns me. If that was true, why then isn’t obesity cured by telling people it will remain a problem? Why are the highways still clogged at 5pm if I predict they will be clogged? Why will people drink more beer if it’s free even though they know it’s free to make them drink more? Because the fact that a prediction exists in most cases doesn’t constitute any good reason to change behavior. I can predict that you will almost certainly still be alive when you finish reading this blogpost because I know this prediction is exceedingly unlikely to make you want to prove it wrong. Yes, there are cases when people’s knowledge of a prediction changes their behavior – self-fulfilling prophecies are the best-known examples of this. But this is the exception rather than the rule. In an earlier blogpost, I referred to this as societal fixed points. These are configurations in which the backreaction of the model into the system does not change the prediction. The simplest example is a model whose predictions few people know or care about.

Effects don’t scale and don’t transfer. This objection is the most subtle one. It posits that the social sciences aren’t really sciences until you can do and reproduce the outcome of “experiments”, which may be designed or naturally occurring. The typical social experiment that lends itself to analysis will be in relatively small and well-controlled communities (say, testing the implementation of a new policy). But then you have to extrapolate from this how the results will be in larger and potentially very different communities. Increasing the size of the system might bring in entirely new effects that you didn’t even know of (doesn’t scale), and there are a lot of cultural variables that your experimental outcome might have depended on that you didn’t know of and thus cannot adjust for (doesn’t transfer). As a consequence, repeating the experiment elsewhere will not reproduce the outcome. Indeed, this is likely to happen and I think it is the major challenge in this type of research. For complex relations it will take a long time to identify the relevant environmental parameters and to learn how to account for their variation. The more parameters there are and the more relevant they are, the less the predictive value of a model will be. If there are too many parameters that have to be accounted for it basically means doing experiments is the only thing we can ever do. It seems plausible to me, even likely, that there are types of social behavior that fall into this category, and that will leave us with questions that we just cannot answer. However, whether or not a certain trend can or cannot be modeled we will only know by trying. We know that there are cases where it can be done. Geoffry West’s city theory I find a beautiful example where quite simple laws can be found in the midst of all these cultural and contextual differences.

In summary.

The social sciences will never be as “hard” as the natural sciences because there is much more variation among people than among particles and among cities than among molecules. But the social sciences have become harder already and there is no reason why this trend shouldn’t continue. I certainly hope it will continue because we need this knowledge to collectively solve the problems we have collectively created.