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bulgariastreets · 9 months

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A Precipitated Conflict and Strategic Errors

Prelude to Chaos

In mid-October, after the Allies declared war on Turkey, the Balkans witnessed a tumultuous series of events. Bulgaria, at the forefront of the conflict, achieved significant victories in the Odrin region of Thrace. However, strategic blunders and shifting alliances would soon plunge the region into further chaos.

Bulgarian Campaigns

As three Bulgarian armies secured victories in Thrace, success smiled upon the Serbs and Greeks in Macedonian and Albanian territories. The Ottoman Empire, facing mounting losses, sought a truce. King Ferdinand, acting as Commander-in-Chief, made a strategic error driven by his eagerness to enter Constantinople swiftly. Ordering an attack on the heavily fortified Turkish position at Chataldja, mere kilometers from Constantinople, proved a hasty move that would alter the course of events.

Stalled Offensive and Shifting Tides

Unfortunately, the offensive at Chataldja faced resistance, emboldening the Turkish government. London peace negotiations faltered in December, and Germany threw its support behind the new Turkish regime. The fate of the war hung once again on the battlefield, and in the ensuing months, Bulgarian troops tightened their grip. Prolonged and bloody battles led to a breakthrough, compelling Turkey to sign a peace treaty in London on May 17, 1913.

Disputes over Territory

Despite the victorious outcome, internal strife plagued the Allies. Disagreements over the division of conquered territory emerged. Secret negotiations between Serbia and Greece signaled the virtual termination of the Balkan Alliance. The autumn of 1912 saw diplomatic maneuvers that foreshadowed Bulgaria’s predicament Private Turkey Tours.

Bulgaria’s Assault on Former Allies

In a historical breach of the Constitution, King Ferdinand I launched an offensive on June 16, 1913, against former allies—the Serbian and Greek armies occupying Macedonia. The move, marked by miscalculations, exposed Bulgaria to a coalition that now included Romania and Turkey.

Bulgaria’s Historical Irresponsibility

With battles erupting on four fronts, Bulgaria found itself in a precarious position. The precipitant step proved historically irresponsible, considering the exhaustion of the Bulgarian army post-Balkan War. Adding to the complexity, Russia, a key player, showed little sympathy for Bulgarian claims and harbored favorable sentiments for Serbia.

The Unraveling of Alliances

The Balkan Wars, initially marked by triumphs and territorial gains, descended into discord and internal strife. Bulgaria’s ill-fated offensive, driven by strategic errors and a fractured alliance, painted a tumultuous picture of the region’s complex geopolitical landscape.

#A Precipitated Conflict and Strategic Errors

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hotbulgaria · 9 months

Photo

A Precipitated Conflict and Strategic Errors

Prelude to Chaos

Bulgarian Campaigns

Stalled Offensive and Shifting Tides

Disputes over Territory

Bulgaria’s Assault on Former Allies

Bulgaria’s Historical Irresponsibility

The Unraveling of Alliances

#A Precipitated Conflict and Strategic Errors

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bulgariant · 9 months

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A Precipitated Conflict and Strategic Errors

Prelude to Chaos

Bulgarian Campaigns

Stalled Offensive and Shifting Tides

Disputes over Territory

Bulgaria’s Assault on Former Allies

Bulgaria’s Historical Irresponsibility

The Unraveling of Alliances

#A Precipitated Conflict and Strategic Errors

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bulgariablo · 9 months

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A Precipitated Conflict and Strategic Errors

Prelude to Chaos

Bulgarian Campaigns

Stalled Offensive and Shifting Tides

Disputes over Territory

Bulgaria’s Assault on Former Allies

Bulgaria’s Historical Irresponsibility

The Unraveling of Alliances

#A Precipitated Conflict and Strategic Errors

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blgrll · 9 months

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A Precipitated Conflict and Strategic Errors

Prelude to Chaos

Bulgarian Campaigns

Stalled Offensive and Shifting Tides

Disputes over Territory

Bulgaria’s Assault on Former Allies

Bulgaria’s Historical Irresponsibility

The Unraveling of Alliances

#A Precipitated Conflict and Strategic Errors

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everybg · 9 months

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A Precipitated Conflict and Strategic Errors

Prelude to Chaos

Bulgarian Campaigns

Stalled Offensive and Shifting Tides

Disputes over Territory

Bulgaria’s Assault on Former Allies

Bulgaria’s Historical Irresponsibility

The Unraveling of Alliances

#A Precipitated Conflict and Strategic Errors

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communistbulgaria · 9 months

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A Precipitated Conflict and Strategic Errors

Prelude to Chaos

Bulgarian Campaigns

Stalled Offensive and Shifting Tides

Disputes over Territory

Bulgaria’s Assault on Former Allies

Bulgaria’s Historical Irresponsibility

The Unraveling of Alliances

#A Precipitated Conflict and Strategic Errors

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mybulgaria · 9 months

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A Precipitated Conflict and Strategic Errors

Prelude to Chaos

Bulgarian Campaigns

Stalled Offensive and Shifting Tides

Disputes over Territory

Bulgaria’s Assault on Former Allies

Bulgaria’s Historical Irresponsibility

The Unraveling of Alliances

#A Precipitated Conflict and Strategic Errors

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bulgariaifos · 9 months

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A Precipitated Conflict and Strategic Errors

Prelude to Chaos

Bulgarian Campaigns

Stalled Offensive and Shifting Tides

Disputes over Territory

Bulgaria’s Assault on Former Allies

Bulgaria’s Historical Irresponsibility

The Unraveling of Alliances

#A Precipitated Conflict and Strategic Errors

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bansko · 9 months

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A Precipitated Conflict and Strategic Errors

Prelude to Chaos

Bulgarian Campaigns

Stalled Offensive and Shifting Tides

Disputes over Territory

Bulgaria’s Assault on Former Allies

Bulgaria’s Historical Irresponsibility

The Unraveling of Alliances

#A Precipitated Conflict and Strategic Errors

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bulgariahistory · 9 months

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A Precipitated Conflict and Strategic Errors

Prelude to Chaos

Bulgarian Campaigns

Stalled Offensive and Shifting Tides

Disputes over Territory

Bulgaria’s Assault on Former Allies

Bulgaria’s Historical Irresponsibility

The Unraveling of Alliances

#A Precipitated Conflict and Strategic Errors

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sciencespies · 3 years

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U.S. generals planning for a space war they see as all but inevitable

https://sciencespies.com/space/u-s-generals-planning-for-a-space-war-they-see-as-all-but-inevitable/

U.S. generals planning for a space war they see as all but inevitable

A ship in the Pacific Ocean carrying a high-power laser takes aim at a U.S. spy satellite, blinding its sensors and denying the United States critical eyes in the sky.

This is one scenario that military officials and civilian leaders fear could lead to escalation and wider conflict as rival nations like China and Russia step up development and deployments of anti-satellite weapons.

If a satellite came under attack, depending on the circumstances, “the appropriate measures can be taken,” said Lt. Gen. John Shaw, deputy commander of U.S. Space Command.

Lt. Gen. John Shaw, deputy commander of U.S. Space Command. Credit: Tom Kimmell Photography

The space battlefield is not science fiction and anti-satellite weapons are going to be a reality in future armed conflicts, Shaw said at the recent 36th Space Symposium in Colorado Springs.

U.S. Space Command is responsible for military operations in the space domain, which starts at the Kármán line, some 100 kilometers (62 miles) above the Earth’s surface. This puts Space Command in charge of protecting U.S. satellites from attacks and figuring out how to respond if hostile acts do occur.

Military space assets like satellites and ground systems typically have been considered “support” equipment that provide valuable services such as communications, navigation data and early warning of missile launches. But as the Pentagon has grown increasingly dependent on space, satellites are becoming strategic assets and coveted targets for adversaries.

“It is impossible to overstate the importance of space-based systems to national security,” Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall said in a keynote speech at the symposium.

Shaw noted that Gen. John Hyten, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “likes to talk about satellites as being ‘big fat juicy targets.’”

“I agree with that,” said Shaw. “But how do we change that? How do we make it more difficult for a potential adversary to think they could succeed in depriving us of our space capabilities?”

Those questions are now being debated as Space Command develops what Shaw describes as “space warfighting doctrine.” A laser blinding a satellite is just an example of the types of attacks the U.S. has to prepare for, said Shaw. If that happened, the Defense Department would have to decide how to respond to that threat. Conceivably, naval or aerial forces would be called upon to take retaliatory action.

“[W]e are only starting to grapple with… what space warfighting really means,” Shaw said.

U.S. in a ‘long-term strategic competition’

A competition for space dominance between the United States and rival powers China and Russia prompted the Trump administration and Congress in 2019 to re-establish U.S. Space Command — which had been deactivated since 2002 — and create the U.S. Space Force as an independent service branch.

Kendall, who was sworn in late July as the civilian leader of the Air Force and the Space Force, said the United States is in a “long-term strategic competition” with China. The implications for space are significant, he said, as “China has moved aggressively to weaponize space.”

The Space Force will invest in new capabilities to deter and win if deterrence fails, Kendall said. Any type of escalation can result in miscalculations and human errors which is why a space war is a “conflict that no one wants,” he said.

The U.S. military’s space weapons that presumably would deter China from firing the first shot against a satellite are classified. In a rare disclosure, the Space Force last year said it deployed an advanced ground-based communications jammer made by L3Harris that could be used as an “offensive weapon” to disrupt enemies’ satellite transmissions.

Chris Kubasik, L3Harris vice chairman and CEO, said there should be more awareness of the risks of an attack against a satellite precipitating a broader conflict.

“I think it’s the biggest threat facing our nation,” Kubasik said at the Space Symposium. A war in space would be “detrimental to society” because satellites play such a central role in everyday life for most people. “If you think of the impact of a war in space and how it impacts something as simple as our cellphones, navigation, supply chain, logistics, healthcare. I think it is a serious issue. And I think we have to continue to talk about it.”

Public awareness and education about the nation’s dependence on space are needed to help DoD “get the funding to make sure that we deter or defeat our adversaries in space,” he said.

Unlike conflicts on Earth, a space war is not easy to visualize. “I call it an invisible war with invisible hardware that people can’t see, it’s a little different than being here on the ground,” said Kubasik.

Travis Langster, vice president and general manager of Comspoc. Credit: Tom Kimmell Photography

First shot could be against satcom

The military’s reliance on commercial satellites for communications makes these systems one of the most likely targets of enemy jammers and cyber disruptions, said Travis Langster, vice president and general manager of Comspoc, a company that monitors space traffic and tracks orbital activities.

“Given the plethora of commercial space, based on the observations and activities we’ve seen at Comspoc, the target of that first shot is likely to be a commercial satellite,” Langster said during a Space Symposium panel discussion. By launching an electronic or cyberattack against a commercial satellite that is used by DoD for military operations, an enemy would be “trying to send a very specific message” that it does not draw a line between commercial and military space assets.

The most likely scenario is a “reversible attack,” meaning some temporary loss of a space-based service, said Langster. “In this day and age, the first shot will likely be a cyberattack.”

Carey Smith, CEO of defense and cybersecurity contractor Parsons, said space-based networks already are under attack.

“Jamming is occurring today; there’s obviously cyber attacks that are occurring across the infrastructure,” she said. And there have been many documented attempts to interfere with communications signals in war zones where U.S. forces operate.

Carey Smith, CEO of defense and cybersecurity contractor Parsons. Credit: Tom Kimmell Photography

But the question is whether these activities will escalate and lead to broader conflict. “I think the path to war in space is really based upon a space arms race, and we’ve been fortunate that we’ve been able to delay it up until this point, but it is perhaps imminent,” she added.

A key reason why the space race is accelerating is that technology is advancing so rapidly, Smith said. A second reason is the absence of “binding commitments on what the operating norms are going to be in space,” she said. “And without that, we’re very likely to have a space war.”

The only foundation of international space law that currently exists, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, is outdated and doesn’t address most space security issues that could set off a war, Smith noted.

The treaty bans the stationing of weapons of mass destruction in outer space, prohibits military activities on celestial bodies and contains legally binding rules governing the peaceful exploration and use of space. But a new set of rules is needed for the current space age, Smith said. “We really haven’t addressed some of the very difficult questions. Can a nation tailgate another nation’s satellite? Is preemptive self defense going to be permissible? Are we going to ban any form of weapons in space?”

Frank Backes, senior vice president of space and defense contractor Kratos, echoed that sentiment.

“We’ve seen very intentional interference within regional conflicts to take military systems offline,” he said. Of particular concern to the Pentagon are disruptions to satellite communications networks that are used to operate unmanned surveillance aircraft. Drones rely on GPS and satellite communications systems to track and strike targets.

“Those types of reversible effects have already entered into the space layer, but I agree with Carrie Smith. It is the space race that is turning space into a warfighting domain,” said Backes. “What that looks like going forward definitely could be devastating to our commercial and international use of space.”

DoD wants resilient space architecture

Experts point out that there are increasingly more ways to permanently or temporarily damage satellites so it would be virtually impossible for DoD to defend against a multitude of weapons.

China and Russia, for example, have direct-ascent weapons that are launched on a sub-orbital trajectory to strike a satellite in orbit. They also have co-orbital weapons that are placed into orbit and then later maneuvered toward their intended target.

Additionally, China and Russia are deploying non-kinetic space weapons, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies. These include lasers that can be used to temporarily dazzle or permanently blind sensors on satellites, and jamming devices that interfere with the communications to or from satellites by generating noise in the same radio frequencies.

In the face of these threats, the United States aims to make space networks more resilient by using a diversity of satellites in different orbits,complicating an adversary’s ability to launch an effective attack.

Kendall said resiliency “isn’t just about the individual satellite, it’s about the architecture.”

DoD’s Space Development Agency is looking to demonstrate what it hopes will be a more resilient space architecture. The agency is working to deploy a proliferated constellation of small satellites in low Earth orbit as an alternative to the traditional large, expensive spacecraft that DoD has traditionally flown in higher orbits but much smaller numbers.

“We’re getting away from ‘juicy targets’,” said SDA Director Derek Tournear. The idea of a proliferated architecture is to have enough satellites in orbit that “we can handle some attrition.”

This article originally appeared in the September 2021 issue of SpaceNews magazine.

#Space

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yngwrthr · 6 years

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“Victory of the Workers in Russia

‘The shortest path to linking up with the revolution in Austro-Hungary passes through Kiev: just as the roads through Pskov and Vilna lead us to the German revolution.’ These words of Trotsky define the character of the great offensives which the Red Army launches at this moment in the Baltic countries and in the Ukraine.

What are the forces in play at this moment? On 15 September the Red Army numbered 452,509 combat troops and 95,000 auxiliary or rearguard troops. By around the spring of 1919 it will reach and surpass the total of a million fighting men. Let us now try to reckon the enemy forces: between 30,000 and 40,000 Allied soldiers (British, American, Italian, Serbian and French) were in occupation of Archangel, Onega, Kem and Murmansk; 40,000 Finns were threatening Petrograd and Karelia; in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania the White Guard resistance was 30,000 to 40,000 strong, with assistance from the German volunteer corps (30,000 men) under von der Goltz. The Polish army was being mustered, and would be over 50,000 in the spring. 20,000 French and Greek troops occupied Odessa and Kherson. 40,000 Czechoslovaks were spread out along the Trans-Siberian Railway. Three Japanese divisions and 7,000 Americans were operating in the Far East. To these 300,000 foreign bayonets there must be added the forces of Russia’s counter-revolution: the Don Cossack army, 50,000 men; Kuban Cossacks, 80,000; Kolchak’s ‘national army’, 100,000 (by the spring); Denikin’s volunteer army in the Kuban, 10,000 to 15,000; the troops of the Ukrainian Directorate, 10,000 to 15,000; the counter-revolutionary bands of the Ukraine, over 20,000: all making a total of over 250,000 men.

The two sides were therefore scarcely equal. The forces of counter-revolution are far better armed and provisioned but are dispersed and divided, and often reluctant to fight (this is the case with the foreign troops). The Reds, passionately defending their single stretch of territory, have control over the vast railway net-work that converges towards Moscow. The Allies are disunited: the Reds enjoy the formidable unity of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Red offensives are pushed to a victorious conclusion on all fronts. Pskov, the gateway to.the Baltic countries, is taken on 20 November. Narva, the key to Estonia, falls on the 28th; Minsk, the capital of White Russia, on 9 December. The collapse of the Germans entails the bankruptcy of the nationalist semi-governments in the Baltic states. In Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia, Soviet governments are constituted and are granted recognition in a decree from Vee-Tsik on 23 December. Ufa is captured on 31 December; Kharkov and Riga, 3 January; Vilna, 8 January; Mittau on the 9th; Shenkursk, on the River Dvina in the Arctic Circle, and Ekaterinoslav, in the heart of the southern Ukraine, on the 26th. Through Uralsk, Orenburg and Iletsk, the way was clear again to link up with Turkestan, itself in the throes of civil war.

The return of the Ukraine and the Baltic states to the Soviet fatherland appears as the first international consequence of the German revolution. But, at the very hour when the Russian proletariat is making ready, through the force of its victories, to join hands with the proletariat of Germany, the latter is going down in. defeat on the barricades of Berlin. The murder of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg signals the crushing of the proletarian revolution in central Europe.

[...]

Defeat of the Workers of Germany

...A bloody provocation lit the tinder for the explosion. Emil Eichhorn, a courageous revolutionary of the USPD, had filled the post of Chief of the Berlin Police since the beginning of the revolution. [40] He had turned the Polizeipräsidium into a proletarian stronghold. Permanent conflict existed between this revolutionary headquarter, the government and the Social-Democratic commandant of Berlin, Otto Wels. A workers’ demonstration which Eichhorn had authorized was met in the centre of Berlin, on Wels’s orders, by volleys of firing from the troops. Noske’s appointment was thus countersigned in the streets by the blood of sixteen dead workers. The government announced the dismissal of Eichhorn, who refused to resign a post he held not by grace of the ministers, but from the revolution. [41] These provocations precipitated the entry of the proletariat into the streets at a time when, as Karl Radek wrote to the Central Committee of the recently formed Communist Party of Germany, the Soviets had no more than a nominal existence, and had still not experienced any political struggle which could release the power of the masses: these, in consequence, remained in bondage to the influence of the Social-Democrats. In these conditions it was out of the question to think of the seizure of power by the proletariat. [42] Radek’s advice was to avoid the clash and to undertake an agitational campaign unmasking the treason of the People’s Commissaries and the Executive of the Workers’ Councils; the aim of this campaign would be to seek fresh elections for the Councils, thus enabling the revolutionary proletariat, as it prepared the offensive, to conquer the organs of power by legal means. The Central Committee hesitated. Liebknecht was drawn along by the mass current: without consulting the Central Committee he signed a manifesto, along with the Independents Schultze and Lebedour, deposing Ebert and Scheidemann from the government. Not only was this a grave lapse of discipline; it committed the very error that the Bolsheviks had been stern enough to avoid during the troubles of July 1917, when they held back the Petrograd masses who yearned to engage in a premature battle against Kerensky. The inexperience of the proletariat’s best leaders here became one of the prime causes of its defeat. Liebknecht, without his party, initiated an untimely insurrection which he was unable to guide. The Central Committee, surprised by the turn of events, issued neither insurrectionary slogans nor strategic directives. 200,000 determined proletarians, a magnificent army ready for any sacrifice, who would have been formidable if only they had been backed by a well-led party, marked time for several long hours along the damp avenues of the Tiergarten. [43] Nobody gave them any orders. No Revolutionary Committee knew how to make use of their energy. ‘The leaders were in conference, in conference, in conference,’ wrote Rosa Luxemburg on the following day. ‘No, these masses were not ready for the seizure of power, or their initiative would have discovered others to stand at their head, and their first revolutionary action would have been to compel the leaders to stop their interminable conferences in the Polizeipräsidium.’ [44] The testimony of Noske confirms this judgement: ‘If these crowds, instead of being led by prattlers, had possessed resolute leaders, conscious of where they were going, they would have been masters of Berlin before midday ... [45]

No revolutionary leaders worthy of the name. A Communist party that was too young, too inexperienced, without cadres, without a Central Committee capable of daring initiative. Masses of workers marching to do battle, but themselves too subservient to the traditions of Social-Democratic discipline to make up with their own action for the deficiencies of leadership and party. The understandable impatience and great personal courage of Liebknecht, who is afraid to let the hour of action pass. Rosa, clearsighted but powerless. Thus did the immediate causes of defeat congeal together. The insurrection was quelled by Noske’s monarchist bands, composed in the main of officers.

Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, denounced by Vorwärts as the instigators of civil war, were arrested on 15 January after the street-fighting, and perished the same day. Liebknecht was taken in the evening to the Tiergarten and shot from behind ‘while attempting to escape’. Rosa Luxemburg was taken from the hotel where she was being detained, and put into a saloon car; there, her skull was shattered with a revolver-shot by Lieutenant Vogel. Her corpse was thrown into a nearby canal. The murderers of Liebknecht and Luxemburg went scot-free.

#Serge #Russian Revolution #German Revolution #communism #German social-democracy

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blgrll · 9 months

Photo

A Precipitated Conflict and Strategic Errors

Prelude to Chaos

Bulgarian Campaigns

Stalled Offensive and Shifting Tides

Disputes over Territory

Bulgaria’s Assault on Former Allies

Bulgaria’s Historical Irresponsibility

The Unraveling of Alliances

#A Precipitated Conflict and Strategic Errors

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globaltotal · 8 years

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IS THIS THE RIGHT TIME TO RELIEVE THE BUILDING PRESSURE IN THE BALTICS? RALPH S. CLEMDECEMBER 20, 2016

“War, children, it’s just a shot away, it’s just a shot away.”

— The Rolling Stones

With relations between Russia and the United States and its NATO allies having reached the lowest point since the collapse of the Soviet Union, we should all be greatly concerned that both sides are fielding destabilizing weapons upgrades while also deploying their military forces in a more forward posture. Nowhere is this more evident than in the Baltic Sea region. It is here that one finds a major concentration of military power in a very small space fraught with historical tragedy and contemporary geopolitical angst. Both NATO and Russia have placed a very high strategic value on this region and have steadily raised the stakes involved, following a classic security dilemma script. Packing ever-larger amounts of increasingly sophisticated and lethal military hardware into a space this size under heightened political pressures leaves very little margin for error, for which the consequences might be catastrophic.

Whether the present situation constitutes a “new Cold War” or not, extant geopolitical tensions must certainly give one pause, assuming that the avoidance of actual conflict is a mutually agreeable goal. But some, including Mark Stout writing recently in War on the Rocks, posit a full-blown, “inadvertent” war between Russia and NATO as made more likely by the election of Donald Trump, owing to the latter’s “coziness with Russian President Vladimir Putin” and his apparent low regard for the NATO alliance in general. Sir Richard Shirreff, until 2014 Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (making him the highest ranking European officer in the alliance), in a recent and widely reviewed book envisions a fictional war with Russia in 2017 made inevitable by naïve European politicians who impose severe cuts in their defense budgets and otherwise accommodate a predatory Russia.

These warnings miss the mark when it comes to what actually matters for minimizing the chance of fighting between the two sides: the urgent need to reverse the trend of rapidly increasing deployments, operational tempo, and exercises involving their respective military forces. With a new U.S. president suggesting a more conciliatory stance vis-à-vis Moscow taking office in one month, the time may be right for a proposal of ways to reduce the dangerous friction and the mutual perception (or misperception) of threat inherent in the present situation.

NATO’s Path to Here: The Inertia of Unfolding Events

All problematic geopolitical situations have antecedents, including the present one in the Baltic region. Thus, it might seem overly simplistic to call out the Russian invasion and annexation of the Ukrainian region of Crimea in early 2014 as the catalyst that led us to this particular place and time of potential conflict. The Crimean crisis itself has deep historical roots and was also precipitated by prior events and the national security dynamics of a number of states both within and external to Eastern Europe and Russia. It is, nevertheless, the fact that both the United States and the European Union responded to Russia’s invasion and annexation of Crimea by imposing a series of economic sanctions. More importantly, NATO also began to significantly bolster its military forces in its member states adjoining or close to Russia. President Barack Obama underscored America’s commitment to the alliance’s collective defense of all of its members in a speech, not coincidentally, in Tallinn, Estonia, on September 3, 2014. At its summit meeting in Wales shortly thereafter, NATO approved a “Readiness Action Plan” intended to respond “…to the challenges posed by Russia and their strategic implications.” The plan added, “No one should doubt NATO’s resolve if the security of any of its members were to be threatened.” Further, approval was granted to establish a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force “to respond to challenges that arise, particularly at the periphery of NATO’s territory.” That definition would, of course, include the NATO Baltic states. At its next summit in Warsaw in 2016, NATO agreed to take further steps to establish an “enhanced forward presence” with battalion-sized units rotating into Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia beginning in early 2017. The fact that these units will rotate rather than be permanently based is a nuance that will not alter Russian perception of escalation.

NATO took other steps to enhance their military posture in the Baltic zone. The size of NATO’s Baltic training exercises in the region increased dramatically after the Crimea crisis. What was once the largest of these took place in 2013 and involved some 6,000 personnel. By 2015 and 2016, exercises exceeded 30,000 and were much more ambitious in scope. The Baltic Air Policing mission, established when the three Baltic states joined NATO in 2004, has been progressively upgraded. NATO (especially U.S.) air forces have significantly increased their presence in the Baltic region through various exercises and training deployments. In August 2015, the U.S. Air Force deployed its premier air superiority fighter, the F-22 Raptor, to Europe for the first time as a means of “sending a message to Russia.” Ongoing upgrades for NATO aircraft and associated weapons provide ever greater operational capabilities. The recent announcement that the United States will sell the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) to the Polish Air Force is a case in point. It will allow a Polish F-16 to attack a target from a distance beyond the reach of Russian air defenses.

Beginning in FY 2015, the United States enacted the European Reassurance Initiative, which provides operational and infrastructure funding for American forces in Europe, in particular Eastern Europe. The funding for this initiative has increased significantly, with the amount requested for FY 2017 being over three times that approved in FY 2015. Furthermore, according to the Pentagon, the rationale for the initiative has shifted from “reassurance” to “deterrence” in light of “the potential for Russia to further advance its military adventurism into NATO countries.” The deployment to Eastern Europe of an armored brigade combat team drawn from U.S. bases as part of the ongoing Operation Atlantic Resolve is evidence of this conceptual shift. A battalion from these deployments will typically move forward into the Baltic states with its organic tanks, armored fighting vehicles, and other equipment. Although U.S. infantry and airborne troops have made any number of deployments to the region, as one Army officer put it: “We may take slightly longer to deploy than lighter forces, but there is nothing like a tank if you really want to achieve effect.” Be assured that the Russians have taken notice but perhaps not with the deterring effect intended. Indeed, the question of what constitutes conventional deterrence in the present NATO-Russia context has been widely discussed in War on the Rocks and elsewhere, and suffice it to say here that forces sufficient to give sufficient pause to Russian General Staff planners far exceeds what is presently contemplated and certainly what is politically feasible.

It’s Kaliningrad, Stupid: Russia’s Baltic Moves

As many have noted, the realities of geography and the balance of military forces favor Russia when it comes to a potential conflict with NATO in the Baltic Sea region. Russia’s superior land and airpower capabilities in this space render the geographically exposed and militarily weak NATO Baltic states indefensible over the short term, even with reinforcements deployed there from other alliance countries. Further, Moscow has introduced qualitatively advanced weaponry into the region — especially air defenses and short-range ballistic missiles — that would definitely make this a “high-end fight.” Russia’s exclave of Kaliningrad on the Baltic coast between Lithuania and Poland poses a huge strategic problem for NATO, as it is heavily defended and would have to be neutralized before any longer term efforts to re-take the NATO Baltic states could proceed.

Putin and his national security establishment know, of course, that they have created a geopolitical challenge here for the alliance and they can adjust the temperature of it with relatively little effort. This they do regularly by several means. First, the Russian armed forces conduct large military exercises, often in areas adjacent to the Baltic states. Short-notice drills in particular increase the anxiety level in neighboring countries. Secondly, the Russians make their own forward deployments — in particular to Kaliningrad — with no attempt to disguise the fact that they have done so. They have transferred nuclear-capable Iskander-M missiles and S-400 surface-to-air missiles, which raised the threat level for NATO forces in the Baltic region. Russian defense officials state that such force enhancements are in response to NATO actions and in some cases are merely a part of exercises, but recent open source research revealed that construction is well underway for the permanent basing of an Iskander brigade in Kaliningrad. Finally, Russia has ramped up its air operations in the Baltic region and elsewhere. As Michael Kofman wrote last year in War on the Rocks, Russia has made very effective use of a relatively low cost tool, making these sorties “the hallmark of a targeted policy of aggravation” that especially irritates the United States. On occasion, the Russians will punctuate their message by making very low passes over NATO warships in the Baltic Sea — at times in a manner simulating an attack — or by intercepting U.S. intelligence collection aircraft, closing to distances seen by the Pentagon as unsafe.

It’s Time to Go to Vienna

Stephen M. Walt famously and cynically remarked that he could see the leadership in Brussels as being secretly pleased that Putin had moved against Ukraine because it served to reinvigorate the alliance. As noted above, since the storm over Crimea broke, NATO has indeed had the bit between its teeth, and the primary vector in which they are headed is northeast to Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Given that, and the fact that Russia has replied in kind, we find ourselves in this geopolitical standoff between increasingly more rancorous parties. Is now not the time to pause and consider ways to step back from this dangerous upward spiral of military equipage and activity in the Baltic region, and perhaps build on any success there toward a wider reduction in tensions — dare we say a rapprochement?

There already exists an overarching structure to facilitate NATO-Russia engagement: the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, or OSCE. Further, the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) provides a forum for taking on concerns of both parties. Lastly, the Vienna Document on Confidence-and Security-Building Measures, an OSCE template, requires the signatory parties to share information on their military forces and events involving them, the latest version of which is from 2011. As Ian Anthony has made clear, the Vienna Document is in need of updating, and taking on incremental and immediately relevant tasks such as airspace and maritime de-confliction agreements, as daunting as even those will be, just might open the door to larger issues of security assurance and mutual transparency of operations if political trust can be restored. The fact that NATO and Russia cannot yet agree on a requirement for all aircraft operating in Baltic regional airspace to fly with their transponders on does not augur well for success, but at least such discussions continue and might achieve better results in a new political climate.

Against the backdrop of Russian hacking and Moscow’s role in the humanitarian disaster in Syria, there is no denying that any proposal to engage the Kremlin on just about any subject at this time might seem seriously out of touch with reality. But it should be recalled that several major arms reduction and other high-stakes national security agreements were forged during the real Cold War. Indeed, in its communique following the Warsaw Summit, NATO stated that it remains “open to a periodic, focused and meaningful dialogue with a Russia willing to engage on the basis of reciprocity in the NRC, with a view to avoiding misunderstanding, miscalculation, and unintended escalation, and to increase transparency and predictability” and “to constructively engage” on updating the Vienna Document.

Right now is the time to start talking about that in earnest.

Ralph S. Clem is Emeritus Professor of Geography at Florida International University, and is a retired Air Force Reserve intelligence officer.

Image: U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Syreetta Watts

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communistbulgaria · 9 months

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