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You Were Right About COVID, and Then You Weren’t
Olga Khazan
The Atlantic
Originally posted 3 MAY 22
Here are two excerpts:
Tenelle Porter, a psychologist at UC Davis, studies so-called intellectual humility, or the recognition that we have imperfect information and thus our beliefs might be wrong. Practicing intellectual humility, she says, is harder when you’re very active on the internet, or when you’re operating in a cutthroat culture. That might be why it pains me—a very online person working in the very competitive culture of journalism—to say that I was incredibly wrong about COVID at first. In late February 2020, when Smith was sounding the alarm among his co-workers, I had drinks with a colleague who asked me if I was worried about “this new coronavirus thing.”
“No!” I said. After all, I had covered swine flu, which blew over quickly and wasn’t very deadly.
A few days later, my mom called and asked me the same question. “People in Italy are staying inside their houses,” she pointed out.
“Yeah,” I said. “But SARS and MERS both stayed pretty localized to the regions they originally struck.”
Then, a few weeks later, when we were already working from home and buying dried beans, a friend asked me if she should be worried about her wedding, which was scheduled for October 2020.
“Are you kidding?” I said. “They will have figured out a vaccine or something by then.” Her wedding finally took place this month.
(cut)
Thinking like a scientist, or a scout, means “recognizing that every single one of your opinions is a hypothesis waiting to be tested. And every decision you make is an experiment where you forgot to have a control group,” Grant said. The best way to hold opinions or make predictions is to determine what you think given the state of the evidence—and then decide what it would take for you to change your mind. Not only are you committing to staying open-minded; you’re committing to the possibility that you might be wrong.
Because the coronavirus has proved volatile and unpredictable, we should evaluate it as a scientist would. We can’t hold so tightly to prior beliefs that we allow them to guide our behavior when the facts on the ground change. This might mean that we lose our masks one month and don them again the next, or reschedule an indoor party until after case numbers decrease. It might mean supporting strict lockdowns in the spring of 2020 but not in the spring of 2022. It might even mean closing schools again, if a new variant seems to attack children. We should think of masks and other COVID precautions not as shibboleths but like rain boots and umbrellas, as Ashish Jha, the White House coronavirus-response coordinator, has put it. There’s no sense in being pro- or anti-umbrella. You just take it out when it’s raining.
The info is here.
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No convincing evidence outgroups are denied uniquely human characteristics: Distinguishing intergroup preference from trait-based dehumanization
F. E. Enock, J. C. Flavell. et al. (2021).
Cognition
Volume 212, July 2021, 104682
Abstract
According to the dual model, outgroup members can be dehumanized by being thought to possess uniquely and characteristically human traits to a lesser extent than ingroup members. However, previous research on this topic has tended to investigate the attribution of human traits that are socially desirable in nature such as warmth, civility and rationality. As a result, it has not yet been possible to determine whether this form of dehumanization is distinct from intergroup preference and stereotyping. We first establish that participants associate undesirable (e.g., corrupt, jealous) as well as desirable (e.g., open-minded, generous) traits with humans. We then go on to show that participants tend to attribute desirable human traits more strongly to ingroup members but undesirable human traits more strongly to outgroup members. This pattern holds across three different intergroup contexts for which dehumanization effects have previously been reported: political opponents, immigrants and criminals. Taken together, these studies cast doubt on the claim that a trait-based account of representing others as ‘less human’ holds value in the study of intergroup bias.
Highlights
• The dual model predicts outgroups are attributed human traits to a lesser extent.
• To date, predominantly desirable traits have been investigated, creating a confound.
• We test attributions of desirable and undesirable human traits to social groups.
• Attributions of undesirable human traits were stronger for outgroups than ingroups.
• We find no support for the predictions of the dual model of dehumanization.
From the General Discussion
The dual model argues that there are two sense of humanness: human uniqueness and human nature. Uniquely human traits can be summarised as civility, refinement, moral sensibility, rationality, and maturity. Human nature traits can be summarised as emotional responsiveness, interpersonal warmth, cognitive openness, agency, and depth (Haslam, 2006). However, the traits that supposedly characterise ‘humanness’ within this model are broadly socially desirable (Over, 2020a; Over, 2020b). We showed that people also associate some undesirable traits with the concept ‘human’. As well as considering humans to be refined and cultured, people also consider humans to be corrupt, selfish and cruel.
Results from our pretest provided us with grounds for re-examining predictions made by the dual model of dehumanization about the nature of intergroup bias in trait attributions. The dual model account holds that lesser attribution of human specific traits to outgroup members represents a psychological process of dehumanization that is separable from ingroup preference. However, as the human specific attributes summarised by the model are positive and socially desirable, it is possible that previous findings are better explained in terms of ingroup preference, the process of attributing positive qualities to ingroup members to a greater extent than to outgroup members.
The research is here.
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Disrupting the System Constructively: Testing the Effectiveness of Nonnormative Nonviolent Collective Action
Shuman, E. (2020, June 21).
PsyArXiv
https://ift.tt/tEi8oJd
Abstract
Collective action research tends to focus on motivations of the disadvantaged group, rather than on which tactics are effective at driving the advantaged group to make concessions to the disadvantaged. We focused on the potential of nonnormative nonviolent action as a tactic to generate support for concessions among advantaged group members who are resistant to social change. We propose that this tactic, relative to normative nonviolent and to violent action, is particularly effective because it reflects constructive disruption: a delicate balance between disruption (which can put pressure on the advantaged group to respond), and perceived constructive intentions (which can help ensure that the response to action is a conciliatory one). We test these hypotheses across four contexts (total N = 3650). Studies 1-3 demonstrate that nonnormative nonviolent action (compared to inaction, normative nonviolent action, and violent action) is uniquely effective at increasing support for concessions to the disadvantaged among resistant advantaged group members (compared to advantaged group members more open to social change). Study 3 shows that constructive disruption mediates this effect. Study 4 shows that perceiving a real-world ongoing protest as constructively disruptive predicts support for the disadvantaged, while Study 5 examines these processes longitudinally over 2 months in the context of an ongoing social movement. Taken together, we show that nonnormative nonviolent action can be an effective tactic for generating support for concessions to the disadvantaged among those who are most resistant because it generates constructive disruption.
From the General Discussion
Practical Implications
Based on this research, which collective action tactic should disadvantaged groups choose to advance their status? While a simple reading of these findings might suggest that nonnormative nonviolent action is the “most effective” form of action, a closer reading of these findings and other research (Saguy & Szekeres, 2018; Teixeira et al., 2020; Thomas & Louis, 2014) would suggest that what type of action is most effective depends on the goal. We demonstrate that nonnormative nonviolent action is effective for generating support for concessions to the protest that would advance its policy goals from those who were more resistant. On the other hand, other prior research has found that normative nonviolent action was more effective at turning sympathizers into active supporters (Teixeira et al., 2020; Thomas & Louis, 2014)16. Thus, which action tactic will be most useful to the disadvantaged may depend on the goal: If they are facing resistance from the advantaged blocking the achievement of their goals, nonnormative nonviolent action may be more effective. However, if the disadvantaged are seeking to build a movement that includes members of the advantaged group, then normative nonviolent action will likely be more effective. The question is thus not which tactic is “most effective”, but which tactic is most effective to achieve which goal for what audience.
The research is here.
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Their own worst enemy? Collective narcissists are willing to conspire against their in-group
M. Biddlestone, A. Cichocka,
M. Główczewski, & A. Cislak
The British Psychological Society
Accepted: 11 April 2022
Abstract
Collective narcissism – a belief in in-group greatness that is not appreciated by others – is associated with using one's group for personal benefits. Across one pilot and four studies, we demonstrated that collective narcissism predicts readiness to conspire against in-group members (rmeta-analysis = .24). In Study 1, conducted in Poland (N = 361), collective narcissism measured in the context of national identity predicted readiness to engage in secret surveillance against one's own country's citizens. In Study 2 (N = 174; pre-registered), collective narcissism in UK workplace teams predicted intentions to engage in conspiracies against co-workers. In Study 3 (N = 471; pre-registered), US national narcissism predicted intentions to conspire against fellow citizens. Furthermore, conspiracy intentions accounted for the relationship between collective narcissism and beliefs in conspiracy theories about the in-group. Finally, in Study 4 (N = 1064; pre-registered), we corroborated the link between Polish national narcissism and conspiracy intentions against fellow citizens, further showing that these intentions were only directed towards group members that were perceived as moderately or strongly typical of the national in-group (but not when perceived in-group typicality was low). In-group identification was either negatively related (Studies 1 and 2) or unrelated (Studies 3 and 4) to conspiracy intentions (rmeta-analysis = .04). We discuss implications for research on conspiracy theories and populism.
Practitioner points
Analysts should monitor cases of public endorsement of collective narcissism, which is a belief that one’s in-group (e.g. nation, organisation, or political party) is exceptional but underappreciated by others.
As we show, collective narcissism is associated with a willingness to conspire against fellow in-group members and with support for in-group surveillance policies.
Thus, groups cherishing such a defensive form of in-group identity are threatened from the inside, thereby warranting education aimed at identifying and avoiding potential exploitation from otherwise trusted members within their own groups.
From the General Discussion
Importantly, given the correlational nature of our studies, causality was not established. It is then also possible that in-group conspiracy beliefs affected conspiracy intentions. For example, intentions to engage in conspiracies within one's group might be a response to a conviction that malevolent forces operate within one's society. Such beliefs and intentions might in fact form a positive feedback loop, which fuels a culture of intragroup suspicion and paranoia, making conspiracy narratives about the in- group more believable and further frustrating personal needs (see also Douglas et al., 2017). This also implies that the conspiracies those high in collective narcissism appear willing to engage in are unlikely to satisfy the frustrated personal needs they purport to serve.
A pdf is here.
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Humans first: Why people value animals less than humans
L. Caviola, S. Schubert, G. Kahane, & N. S.Faber
Cognition
Volume 225, August 2022, 105139
Abstract
People routinely give humans moral priority over other animals. Is such moral anthropocentrism based in perceived differences in mental capacity between humans and non-humans or merely because humans favor other members of their own species? We investigated this question in six studies (N = 2217). We found that most participants prioritized humans over animals even when the animals were described as having equal or more advanced mental capacities than the humans. This applied to both mental capacity at the level of specific individuals (Studies 1a-b) and at the level typical for the respective species (Study 2). The key driver behind moral anthropocentrism was thus mere species-membership (speciesism). However, all else equal, participants still gave more moral weight to individuals with higher mental capacities (individual mental capacity principle), suggesting that the belief that humans have higher mental capacities than animals is part of the reason that they give humans moral priority. Notably, participants found mental capacity more important for animals than for humans—a tendency which can itself be regarded as speciesist. We also explored possible sub-factors driving speciesism. We found that many participants judged that all individuals (not only humans) should prioritize members of their own species over members of other species (species-relativism; Studies 3a-b). However, some participants also exhibited a tendency to see humans as having superior value in an absolute sense (pro-human species-absolutism, Studies 3–4). Overall, our work demonstrates that speciesism plays a central role in explaining moral anthropocentrism and may be itself divided into multiple sub-factors.
From the General Discussion
The distal sources of moral anthropocentrism
So far, we have discussed how the factors of moral anthropocentrism are related to each other. We now turn to briefly discuss what ultimate factors may explain moral anthropocentrism, though at present there is little evidence that directly bears on this question. However, evolutionary considerations suggest a preliminary, even if inevitably speculative, account of the ultimate sources of moral anthropocentrism. Such an explanation could also shed light on the role of the sub-factors of speciesism.
There is extensive evidence that people categorize individuals into different groups (cf. Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971), identify with their own group (Hornsey, 2008; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), and prioritize members of their ingroup over members of their outgroup (Balliet, Wu, & De Dreu, 2014; Crimston et al., 2016; Fu et al., 2012; Sherif, 1961; Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 2000; for bounded generalized reciprocity theory, cf. Yamagishi & Mifune, 2008). Ingroup favoritism is expressed in many different contexts. People have, for example, a tendency to favor others who share their ethnicity, nationality, religion, or political affiliation. (Rand et al., 2009; Whitt & Wilson, 2007). It has been argued that ingroup favoritism is an innate tendency since it can promote safety and help to encourage mutual cooperation among ingroup members (Gaertner & Insko, 2000). It seems, therefore, that there are good reasons to assume that speciesism is a form of ingroup favoritism analogous to ingroup favoritism among human groups.
While typical human ingroups would be far smaller than humanity itself, our similarity to other humans would be salient in contexts where a choice needs to be made between a human and a non-human. Since the differences between humans and animals are perceived as vast—in terms of biology, physical appearance, mental capacities, and behavior—and the boundaries between the groups so wide and clear, one would expect ingroup favoritism between humans and animals to be particularly strong. Indeed, research suggests that perceived similarity with outgroup members can reduce ingroup favoritism—as long as they are seen as non-threatening (Henderson-King, Henderson-King, Zhermer, Posokhova, & Chiker, 1997). Similarly, it has been shown that people have more positive reactions towards animals that are perceived as biologically, physically, mentally, or behaviorally more similar to humans than animals that are dissimilar (Burghardt & Herzog, 1989; Kellert & Berry, 1980).
The research is here.
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Bigotry and the human–animal divide: (Dis)belief in human evolution and bigoted attitudes across different cultures
Syropoulos, S., Lifshin, U., et al. (2022).
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology.
Advance online publication.
https://ift.tt/mJ3Ofho
Abstract
The current investigation tested if people’s basic belief in the notion that human beings have developed from other animals (i.e., belief in evolution) can predict human-to-human prejudice and intergroup hostility. Using data from the American General Social Survey and Pew Research Center (Studies 1–4), and from three online samples (Studies 5, 7, 8) we tested this hypothesis across 45 countries, in diverse populations and religious settings, across time, in nationally representative data (N = 60,703), and with more comprehensive measures in online crowdsourced data (N = 2,846). Supporting the hypothesis, low belief in human evolution was associated with higher levels of prejudice, racist attitudes, and support for discriminatory behaviors against Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer (LGBTQ), Blacks, and immigrants in the United States (Study 1), with higher ingroup biases, prejudicial attitudes toward outgroups, and less support for conflict resolution in samples collected from 19 Eastern European countries (Study 2), 25 Muslim countries (Study 3), and Israel (Study 4). Further, among Americans, lower belief in evolution was associated with greater prejudice and militaristic attitudes toward political outgroups (Study 5). Finally, perceived similarity to animals (a construct distinct from belief in evolution, Study 6) partially mediated the link between belief in evolution and prejudice (Studies 7 and 8), even when controlling for religious beliefs, political views, and other demographic variables, and were also observed for nondominant groups (i.e., religious and racial minorities). Overall, these findings highlight the importance of belief in human evolution as a potentially key individual-difference variable predicting racism and prejudice.
General Discussion
The current set of studies tested the hypothesis that believing that human beings evolved from animals, relates to (decreased) human-to-human prejudice and discrimination and negative attitudes towards various outgroups. In Study 1, we tested and found support for this hypothesis using data from the American GSS (Smith et al., 1972-2018). Across all the years in which a measure of belief in human evolution was included, it was consistently associated with less prejudice, less racist attitudes and decreased support for discriminatory behaviors against blacks and other minorities among white and presumably primarily heterosexual Americans. These results held when controlling for measures of religiosity, level of education and political views, and were not explained by other measures related to common knowledge, or attitudes towards animal rights (see Supplementary Materials). In Studies 2-4, we further tested if belief in human evolution predicted ingroup bias and negative attitudes towards outgroups in nationally representative samples of 45 countries obtained from the Pew Research Center, including data collected from Eastern Europe (19 countries), Muslim countries (25 countries), and Israel. In support of the hypothesis, belief in human evolution was mostly-consistently associated with decreased discrimination towards outgroups, a finding that held even after controlling for key demographic characteristics, such as religiosity and conservative political beliefs. In Study 4, Israelis who believe in human evolution were more likely to support a peaceful resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict compared to those did not believe.
A pdf of the research is here.
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Morals as Luxury Goods and Political Polarization
B. Enke, M. Polborn, and Alex Wu
NBER Working Paper No. 30001
April 2022
JEL No. D03,D72
Abstract
This paper develops a theory of political behavior in which moral values are a luxury good: the relative weight that voters place on moral rather than material considerations increases in income. This idea both generates new testable implications and ties together a broad set of empirical regularities about political polarization in the U.S. The model predicts (i) the emergence of economically left-wing elites; (ii) that more rich than poor people vote against their material interests; (iii) that within-party heterogeneity is larger among Democrats than Republicans; and (iv) widely-discussed realignment patterns: rich moral liberals who swing Democrat, and poor moral conservatives who swing Republican. Assuming that parties set policies by aggregating their supporters’ preferences, the model also predicts increasing social party polarization over time, such that poor moral conservatives swing Republican even though their relative incomes decreased. We relate these predictions to known stylized facts, and test our new predictions empirically.
Conclusion
This paper has shown that the simple idea of income-dependent utility weights – which is bolstered by a large body of evidence on “modernization” or “postmaterialism” – generates a host of new testable predictions and sheds light on various widely-emphasized stylized facts about the nature of political polarization and realignment patterns in the U.S. In particular, our approach offers a new lens through which the increased salience of moral and cultural dimensions of political conflict can be understood.
One aspect of polarization that we only briefly and informally touched upon is affective polarization: the stylized fact that people’s dislike of supporters of the other party has strongly increased over time (Iyengar, Sood and Lelkes, 2012; Iyengar et al., 2019). In our interpretation, this reflects that the distribution of moral values of Republican and Democrat voters have diverged over time as a result of sorting processes that are triggered by our account of morals as luxury goods. However, while much psychological research suggests that people get angry if others don’t share their basic moral convictions (Haidt, 2012), more research is needed to establish a direct link between increased voter sorting based on moral values and affective polarization.
The research can be downloaded here.
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The death penalty: The past and uncertain future of executions in America
C. Geidner, J. Lambert & K. Philo
Grid News
Originally posted 28 APR 22
Overview
South Carolina may soon carry out the United States’ first executions by firing squad in more than a decade. State officials have said that they plan to execute Richard Moore and Brad Sigmon using guns, the first such use of a firing squad since Ronnie Gardner was shot to death by the state of Utah on June 18, 2010.
Last week, nine days before Moore was to be executed, South Carolina’s Supreme Court put the execution on hold, but there’s no way of knowing how long that will last. Days later, the court also put Sigmon’s execution — scheduled for May — on hold. Although the court did not explain its reasoning, both men have an ongoing challenge to the state’s execution protocol, including its planned use of a firing squad.
How did we get here?
More than 45 years after the Supreme Court allowed executions to resume in the United States after a four-year hiatus, America is in a monthlong period in which five states planned to carry out six executions — the most in several years.
The situation offers a window into changing attitudes toward the death penalty and the complex brew of factors that have made these executions harder to carry out but also harder to challenge in courts. And the individual stories behind some of these current cases serve as a reminder of the well-documented racial bias in the way death sentences are handed down.
The death penalty’s popularity with the public has diminished in recent decades, and the overall number of new death sentences and executions has dropped significantly.
That’s due in part to the increased difficulty of carrying out lethal injection executions after death penalty opponents made it substantially harder for states to obtain the necessary drugs. States responded in part by adopting untried drug combinations. A series of botched executions followed — including the longest execution in U.S. history, when Arizona spent nearly two hours trying to kill Joseph Wood by using 15 doses of its execution drugs on the man before he died.
During that same time, the Supreme Court has made it more difficult to challenge any method of execution, setting a high bar for a method to be disallowed and by requiring challengers to identify an alternative method of execution.
Robert Dunham, the executive director of the Death Penalty Information Center, a nonpartisan organization that maintains a comprehensive database of U.S. executions, told Grid that part of the current influx of execution dates is a result of most states halting executions during the first year of the pandemic, before a covid vaccine was available.
This past week, Texas carried out its first execution of the year when it executed 78-year-old Carl Buntion. Tennessee also had planned an execution for last week, but it was called off with an announcement that highlighted two key elements of the modern death penalty: secrecy and errors. Hours before the state was slated to execute Oscar Franklin Smith by lethal injection, Gov. Bill Lee (R), citing “an oversight in preparation for lethal injection,” announced a reprieve. The execution will not happen before June, but state officials have not yet said anything more about what led to the last-minute reprieve.
The info is here.
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Ethics and Psychology turned 9 today!
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About one-fifth of lawyers and staffers considered suicide at some point in their careers, new survey says.
Debra Cassens Weiss
American Bar Association Journal
Originally posted 10 MAY 22
A new survey of lawyers and staff members hailing mostly from BigLaw has found that anxiety, depression and isolation remain at concerning levels, despite a slight decrease in the percentages since the survey last year.
The Mental Health Survey by Law.com and ALM Intelligence found that 67% of the respondents reported anxiety, 35% reported depression and 44% reported isolation, according to an article by Law.com.
The survey, conducted in March and April, asked respondents from around the world about their mental health and law firm environments in 2021.
The percentage of respondents who contemplated suicide at some point in their professional careers was 19%, the article reports.
In addition, 2.4% of the respondents said they had a drug problem, and 9.4% said they had an issue with alcoholic drinking.
About 74% of the respondents thought that their work environment contributed to their mental health issues. When asked about the factors that had a negative impact on mental health, top concerns were always being on call (72%), billable hour pressure (59%), client demands (57%), lack of sleep (55%) and lean staffing (49.5%).
The survey asked about the impact of remote work for the first time. About 59% said remote work increased their quality of life; about 62% said it increased the quality of home-based relationships; about 54% said it led to an increase in their billable hours; and 50% said it improved personal finances. But 76% said remote work hurt the quality of interpersonal relationships with colleagues.
The info is here.
A well being toolkit for lawyer and legal employers is here.
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Cooperation as a signal of time preferences
Lie-Panis, J., & André, J. (2021, June 23).
https://ift.tt/hm2gKt1
Abstract
Many evolutionary models explain why we cooperate with non kin, but few explain why cooperative behavior and trust vary. Here, we introduce a model of cooperation as a signal of time preferences, which addresses this variability. At equilibrium in our model, (i) future-oriented individuals are more motivated to cooperate, (ii) future-oriented populations have access to a wider range of cooperative opportunities, and (iii) spontaneous and inconspicuous cooperation reveal stronger preference for the future, and therefore inspire more trust. Our theory sheds light on the variability of cooperative behavior and trust. Since affluence tends to align with time preferences, results (i) and (ii) explain why cooperation is often associated with affluence, in surveys and field studies. Time preferences also explain why we trust others based on proxies for impulsivity, and, following result (iii), why uncalculating, subtle and one-shot cooperators are deemed particularly trustworthy. Time preferences provide a powerful and parsimonious explanatory lens, through which we can better understand the variability of trust and cooperation.
From the Discussion Section
Trust depends on revealed time preferences
Result (iii) helps explain why we infer trustworthiness from traits which appear unrelated to cooperation, but happen to predict time preferences. We trust known partners and strangers based on how impulsive we perceive them to be (Peetz & Kammrath, 2013; Righetti & Finkenauer, 2011); impulsivity being associated to both time preferences and cooperativeness in laboratory experiments (Aguilar-Pardo et al., 2013; Burks et al., 2009; Cohen et al., 2014; Martinsson et al., 2014; Myrseth et al., 2015; Restubog et al., 2010). Other studies show we infer cooperative motivation from a wide variety of proxies for partner self-control, including indicators of their indulgence in harmless sensual pleasures (for a review see Fitouchi et al., 2021), as well as proxies for environmental affluence (Moon et al., 2018; Williams et al., 2016).
Time preferences further offer a parsimonious explanation for why different forms of cooperation inspire more trust than others. When probability of observation p or cost-benefit ratio r/c are small in our model, helpful behavior reveals large time horizon- and cooperators may be perceived as relatively genuine or disinterested. We derive two different types of conclusion from this principle. (Inconspicuous and/or spontaneous cooperation)
The research is here.
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How Plain Talk Helps You "Walk the Walk"
Brett Beasley
Notre Dame Center for Ethical Leadership
Originally posted April 2022
Here is an excerpt:
How Unclear Values Cloud Our Moral Vision
Was Orwell right? Some may disagree with his take on the link between bad writing and bad politics. But it appears that Orwell's theory applies well to something he never considered: Corporate values statements. A new study shows that unclear writing in values statements matters. Unclarity sends a signal that a corporation can't be trusted. And, according to the study's authors, it's a reliable signal, too. They find that corporations that hide behind fuzzy, unclear values often do have something to hide.
The team of researchers behind the study, led by David Markowitz (Oregon), considered the values statements of 188 S&P 500 manufacturing companies. Markowitz was joined by Maryam Kouchaki (Northwestern), Jeffrey T. Hancock (Stanford), and Francesca Gino (Harvard).
They drew inspiration from earlier studies that had shown that companies with negative annual earnings write in a less clear manner in their reports to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). They reasoned that a similar process might occur with ethics as well.
Together the team was able to chronicle which companies had ethics infractions (like environmental violations, fraud, and anticompetitive activity). They also determined which codes of conduct were "linguistically obfuscated." These codes were full of abstraction, jargon, and long, overly complex explanations.
The results of the study proved their hypothesis correct: Companies with ethics infractions did resort to unclear language in order to hide them.
The researchers began to ask additional questions. They wanted to know if unclear language actually works. Does it effectively hide a company's problems? They showed corporate values statements to study participants and asked about their perceptions of the companies behind them. The participants saw the companies with clearly-written values statements as more moral, warmer, and more trustworthy, compared to those with jargon-laden values statements.
The Deception Spiral
Then the researchers decided to go a step further. They had shown that unclear language is often a consequence of unethical behavior. Now they wanted to see if it could cause unethical behavior as well. This would help them determine if something like the vicious cycle Orwell theorized really could exist.
This time, they took their work to the lab. They showed study participants values statements and then handed participants a list with scrambled words like “TTISRA” and “LONSEM.” They asked participants to unscramble the words and gave them opportunities to earn money. They introduced an element of competition as well. They could earn bonuses for unscrambling a greater number of words than 80% of the participants in their group.
At the same time, the researchers laid a trap. “TTISRA,” could be unscrambled to spell “ARTIST.” “LONSEM” could become “LEMONS.” But they included some words like OPOER, ALVNO, and ANHDU, which do not spell a word no matter how participants rearranged the letters. This trap enabled them to measure whether people cheated during the activity. If the participants said they unscramble the words without solutions, the researchers concluded they must have cheated in reporting their score.
The participants who had seen the unclear statements were more likely to cave to the temptation. Those who had seen the clear statement tended to stay on the moral path. Most importantly, this meant that the researchers had found clear support for a cycle similar to the one Orwell had described. This "deception spiral" as they call it, meant that unethical behavior can lead to unclear statements about values. And unclear statements about values can, in turn, contribute even more to unethical behavior.
The info is here.
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The ConTraSt database for analysing and comparing empirical studies of consciousness theories
Yaron, I., Melloni, L., Pitts, M. et al.
Nat Hum Behav (2022).
https://ift.tt/zCqplu2
Abstract
Understanding how consciousness arises from neural activity remains one of the biggest challenges for neuroscience. Numerous theories have been proposed in recent years, each gaining independent empirical support. Currently, there is no comprehensive, quantitative and theory-neutral overview of the field that enables an evaluation of how theoretical frameworks interact with empirical research. We provide a bird’s eye view of studies that interpreted their findings in light of at least one of four leading neuroscientific theories of consciousness (N = 412 experiments), asking how methodological choices of the researchers might affect the final conclusions. We found that supporting a specific theory can be predicted solely from methodological choices, irrespective of findings. Furthermore, most studies interpret their findings post hoc, rather than a priori testing critical predictions of the theories. Our results highlight challenges for the field and provide researchers with an open-access website (https://ContrastDB.tau.ac.il) to further analyse trends in the neuroscience of consciousness.
Discussion
Several key conclusions can be drawn from our analyses of these 412 experiments: First, the field seems highly skewed towards confirmatory, as opposed to disconfirmatory, evidence which might explain the failure to exclude theories and converge on an accepted, or at least widely favored, account. This effect is relatively stable over time. Second, theory-driven studies, aimed at testing the predictions of the theories, are rather scarce, and even rarer are studies testing more than one theory, or pitting theories against each other – only 7% of the experiments directly compared two or more theories’ predictions. Though there seems to be an increasing number of experiments that test predictions a-priori in recent years, a large number of studies continue to interpret their findings post-hoc in light of the theories. Third, a close
relation was found between methodological choices made by researchers and the theoretical interpretations of their findings. That is, based only on some methodological choices of the researchers (e.g., using report vs. no-report paradigms, or studying content vs. state consciousness), we could predict if the experiment will end up supporting each of the theories.
A pdf is here.
Editor's note: Consistent with other forms of confirmation bias: the design of the experiment largely determines its result. Consciousness remains a mystery, and in the eye of the scientific beholder.
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Artificial Intelligence, Humanistic Ethics
John Tasioulas
AI & Society
Spring 2022
Abstract
Ethics is concerned with what it is to live a flourishing life and what it is we morally owe to others. The optimizing mindset prevalent among computer scientists and economists, among other powerful actors, has led to an approach focused on maximizing the fulfillment of human preferences, an approach that has acquired considerable influence in the ethics of AI. But this preference-based utilitarianism is open to serious objections. This essay sketches an alternative, “humanistic” ethics for AI that is sensitive to aspects of human engagement with the ethical often missed by the dominant approach. Three elements of this humanistic approach are outlined: its commitment to a plurality of values, its stress on the importance of the procedures we adopt, not just the outcomes they yield, and the centrality it accords to individual and collective participation in our understanding of human well-being and morality. The essay concludes with thoughts on how the prospect of artificial general intelligence bears on this humanistic outlook.
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I have mainly focused on narrow AI, conceived as AI-powered technology that can perform limited tasks (such as facial recognition or medical diagnosis) that typically require intelligence when performed by humans. This is partly because serious doubt surrounds the likelihood of artificial general intelligence emerging within any realistically foreseeable time frame, partly because the operative notion of “intelligence” in discussions of AGI (artificial general intelligence) is problematic, and partly because a focus on AGI often distracts us from the more immediate questions of narrow AI.
With these caveats in place, however, one can admit that thought experiments about AGI can help bring into focus two questions fundamental to any humanistic ethic: What is the ultimate source of human dignity, understood as the inherent value attaching to each and every human being? And how can we relate human dignity to the value inhering in nonhuman beings? Toward the end of Kazuo Ishiguro’s novel Klara and the Sun, the eponymous narrator, an “Artificial Friend,” speculates that human dignity–the “human heart” that “makes each of us special and individual”–has its source not in something within us, but in the love of others for us. But a threat of circularity looms for this boot-strapping humanism, for how can the love of others endow us with value unless those others already have value? Moreover, if the source of human dignity is contingent on the varying attitudes of others, how can it apply equally to every human being? Are the unloved bereft of the “human heart”?
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Free will without consciousness?
L. Mudrik, I. G. Arie, et al.
Trends in Cognitive Sciences
Available online 12 April 2022
Abstract
Findings demonstrating decision-related neural activity preceding volitional actions have dominated the discussion about how science can inform the free will debate. These discussions have largely ignored studies suggesting that decisions might be influenced or biased by various unconscious processes. If these effects are indeed real, do they render subjects’ decisions less free or even unfree? Here, we argue that, while unconscious influences on decision-making do not threaten the existence of free will in general, they provide important information about limitations on freedom in specific circumstances. We demonstrate that aspects of this long-lasting controversy are empirically testable and provide insight into their bearing on degrees of freedom, laying the groundwork for future scientific-philosophical approaches.
Highlights
A growing body of literature argues for unconscious effects on decision-making.
We review a body of such studies while acknowledging methodological limitations, and categorize the types of unconscious influence reported.
These effects intuitively challenge free will, despite being generally overlooked in the free will literature. To what extent can decisions be free if they are affected by unconscious factors?
Our analysis suggests that unconscious influences on behavior affect degrees of control or reasons-responsiveness. We argue that they do not threaten the existence of free will in general, but only the degree to which we can be free in specific circumstances.
Concluding remarks
Current findings of unconscious effects on decision-making do not threaten the existence of free will in general. Yet, the results still show ways in which our freedom can be compromised under specific circumstances. More experimental and philosophical work is needed to delineate the limits and scope of these effects on our freedom (see Outstanding questions). We have evolved to be the decision-makers that we are; thus, our decisions are affected by biases, internal states, and external contexts. However, we can at least sometimes resist those, if we want, and this ability to resist influences contrary to our preferences and reasons is considered a central feature of freedom. As long as this ability is preserved, and the reviewed findings do not suggest otherwise, we are still free, at least usually and to a significant degree.
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Unemployment, Behavioral Health, And Suicide
R. Ramchand, L. Ayer, & S. O'Connor
Health Affairs
Originally posted 7 APR 22
Key Points:
A large body of research, most of which is ecological, has investigated the relationship between job loss or unemployment rates and mental health, substance use, and suicide.
Groups historically experiencing health disparities (for example, Black and Hispanic populations and those without a high school or college degree) have been differently affected by unemployment during the COVID-19 pandemic. Similarly, preliminary evidence from three states suggests that suicide has disproportionately affected Americans who are members of racial and ethnic minority groups over the course of the pandemic.
COVID-19 has affected the workforce in unique ways that differentiate the pandemic from previous economic downturns. However, previous research indicates that increases in suicide rates associated with economic downturns were driven by regional variation in unemployment, availability of unemployment benefits, and duration and magnitude of changes in unemployment.
Policy mitigation strategies may have offset the potential impact of unemployment fluctuations on suicide rates during the pandemic. Policies include expanded unemployment benefits and food assistance, as well as tax credits and subsidies that reduced child care and health care costs.
Research is needed to disentangle which populations experienced the most benefit when these strategies were present and which had the greatest risk when they were discontinued.
Evidence-based strategies that expand the mental health workforce and integrate mental health supports into employment and training settings may be promising ways to help workers as they navigate persistent changes to workforce demands.
Suicide In The United States
A recent Health Affairs Health Policy Brief provides an overview of suicide in the United States. In 2019, 47,511 Americans intentionally ended their lives, making suicide the tenth leading cause of death. This is likely an underestimate—in 2019, 75,795 Americans died of poisonings, the majority of which were drug poisonings categorized as unintentional, although some were likely suicide overdoses that were misclassified.
Suicide is a growing national concern despite the fact that the national suicide rate decreased between 2018 and 2019 and again in 2020. This decrease comes after nearly twenty years of the national suicide rate increasing annually, and it was not observed in some minority racial and ethnic groups. In addition, although suicide rates decreased between 2018 and 2020, the drug overdose death rate increased.
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The “Equal-Opportunity Jerk” Defense: Rudeness Can Obfuscate Gender Bias
Belmi, P., Jun, S., & Adams, G. S. (2022).
Psychological Science, 33(3), 397–411.
https://ift.tt/5PhNos1
Abstract
To address sexism, people must first recognize it. In this research, we identified a barrier that makes sexism hard to recognize: rudeness toward men. We found that observers judge a sexist perpetrator as less sexist if he is rude toward men. This occurs because rudeness toward men creates the illusion of gender blindness. We documented this phenomenon in five preregistered studies consisting of online adult participants and adult students from professional schools (total N = 4,663). These attributions are problematic because sexism and rudeness are not mutually exclusive. Men who hold sexist beliefs about women can be—and often are—rude toward other men. These attributions also discourage observers from holding perpetrators accountable for gender bias. Thus, rudeness toward men gives sexist perpetrators plausible deniability. It protects them and prevents the first perceptual step necessary to address sexism.
Statement of Relevance
Sexism can be challenging to identify and eventually root out. However, we contend that even blatant forms of sexism are sometimes difficult to recognize. In this research, we demonstrated how rudeness can makes blatant forms of sexism harder to identify. We found that a man does not seem sexist if he treats everyone—both men and women—poorly. This is problematic because sexism and rudeness are not mutually exclusive. Men who are sexist can be—and often are—rude toward other men. We found that rudeness obscures the recognition of sexism by creating the perception that the sexist perpetrator does not
notice or pay attention to gender when dealing with other people. This misleads observers into thinking that an intervention such as gender-bias training is less necessary. Rudeness can therefore protect sexist perpetrators, making their prejudice harder to recognize and correct.
From the Discussion
It has been noted that overtly discriminatory conduct—characterized by blatant antipathy, antiquated
beliefs about women, and endorsement of pejorative stereotypes—is becoming less common because of
sweeping changes in antidiscrimination laws, practices, and ideologies in the United States (Brief et al., 1997; Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998; Swim et al., 1995). However, blatant, unambiguous, and obvious forms of sexist conduct continue to exist in society (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998) and within organizations in particular (e.g., Cortina, 2008). Our findings suggest that one reason for their persistence is that observers may not recognize that everyday acts of rudeness can serve as a convenient mask for bias against women (Cortina, 2008). This has an important practical implication: When a sexist manager is rude toward men, it may appear as though he is not sexist. Thus, women victimized by his behavior will have a more difficult time proving that he is sexist. Rudeness can therefore protect perpetrators.
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