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Article 386 Family Code of the Philippines E.O. No. 209 s. 1987

Student # 7

by : Hilda D. Garcia

Article 386.

The judicial declaration of absence shall not take effect until six months after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation. (186a)

Judicial Declaration of Absence

Necessary for interested persons to be able to protect their rights, interests and benefits in connection with the person who has disappeared.

Necessary to protect the interest of the absentee.

Can be a sufficient cause for an involuntary judicial separation of property between spouses.

Who may seek judicial declaration of absentee:

Testamentary Heirs – a person/persons instituted by the testator to succeed his or her properties

Intestate Heirs – the legitimate and illegitimate relatives of the deceased, the spouse, and the collateral relatives

Interested Party – those who have over the property of the absentee some right subordinated to the conditions of the absentee’s death

Case Digest:

In re Instate of the deceased Marciana Escaño. ANGELITA JONES vs. FELIX HORTIGUELA, as administrator, widower and heir

G.R. No. L-43701 March 6, 1937

Ponente: CONCEPCION, J.:

FACTS:

Marciana married Arthur Jones. After 4 years of marriage, Arthur left the country and was never heard of thereafter. Marciana instituted a judicial declaration of absentee for her husband. Court declared Arthur as an absentee with the proviso that said judicial declaration of absencewould not take effect until six months after its publication in the official newspapers [Art. 186, Old Civil Code]. The court then issued another order for the taking effect of the declaration of absence, publication thereof having been made in the Official Gazette and in “El Ideal.”

Marciana then married Felix Hortiguela. Marciana Escaño had died intestate. Her widower Felix Hortiguela was appointed judicial administrator of her entire estate, and Angelita Jones, her daughter by her first marriage, were declared her only heirs.

Angelita filed a motion alleging that she was the only heir of Marciana and that the marriage between Mariana and Felix is null and void. Since the said marriage is invalid, Felix was not entitled to share in usufruct.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage of Mariana and Felix is null and void.

RULING:

No. In accordance with the Civil Code, the absence of Marciana Escaño’s former husband should be counted from January 10, 1918, the date on which the last news concerning Arthur W. Jones was received, and from said date to May 6, 1927, more than nine years elapsed. Said marriage is, therefore, valid and lawful.

For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believe at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

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Article 368 Family Code of the Philippines E.O. No. 209 s. 1987

Student # 7

by : Hilda D. Garcia

Article 368.

Illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 shall bear the surname of the mother.

Use of Surnames.

Under the Family Code, illegitimate children must use the surname of their mothers even if the father has admitted paternity and has consented to the registration of the child under his name.

Change of Name.

While an illegitimate child of a woman maybe allowed to bear the surname of its stepfather without the benefit of adoption, a legitimate child had by a prior marriage may not. To allow said child to adopt the surname of its mother’s second husband, who is not its father, could result in confusion as to its paternity. It could also create the suspicion that the child who was born during the coverture of the mother the first husband was in fact sired by the second husband, thus bringing its legitimate status into discredit.

Case Digest:

Marissa Mossesgeld vs. Civil Registrar General

G.R. No. 111455, 23 December 1998

Ponente: Justice Pardo

Facts: In 1989, Marissa Mossesgeld (single), gave birth to a baby boy. The father, Eleazar Calasan (lawyer, married), signed the birth certificate of the child as the informant, indicating therein the child’s name as Jonathan Mossesgeld Calasan. In addition, Eleazar executed an affidavit admitting paternity of the child. The person in charge at the hospital refused to place Calasan as the child’s surname in the certificate of live birth; hence, Eleazar himself submitted the certificate to the office of the local civil registrar of Mandaluyong, for registration. The local civil registrar denied the registration on the basis of Circular No. 4, dated October 11, 1988, of the Civil Registrar General, providing that under Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate children born on or after August 3, 1988, shall use the surname of their mother. Eleazar filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig a petition for mandamus to compel the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong to register the certificate of live birth of his alleged illegitimate son using his surname. The RTC denied the petition. Later, he filed a motion for leave to amend petition and to admit amended petition, substituting the child’s mother Marissa A. Mossesgeld as the petitioner. The MR was denied. The CA affirmed the decision.

Issue:

Does mandamus lie to compel the Local Civil Registrar to register a certificate of live birth of an illegitimate child using the alleged father’s surname where the latter admitted paternity?

Ruling:

No. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides that “illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code.” This is the rule regardless of whether or not the father admits paternity. Consequently, the Local Civil Registrar correctly refused to register the certificate of live birth of petitioner’s illegitimate child using the surname of the alleged father, even with the latter’s consent. Of course, the putative father, though a much married man, may legally adopt his own illegitimate child. In case of adoption, the child shall be considered a legitimate child of the adopter, entitled to use his surname. The Family Code has effectively repealed the provisions of Article 366 of the Civil Code of the Philippines giving a natural child acknowledged by both parents the right to use the surname of the father. The Family Code has limited the classification of children to legitimate and illegitimate, thereby eliminating the category of acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal fiction. Mandamus will not lie to compel the local civil registrar to register the certificate of live birth of an illegitimate child using the father’s surname, even with the consent of the latter. Mandamus does not lie to compel the performance of an act prohibited by law.

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Article 244 Family Code of the Philippines E.O. No. 209 s. 1987

Student # 7

by : Hilda D. Garcia

Article 244.

In case of non-appearance of the spouse whose consent is sought, the court shall inquire into the reasons for his or her failure to appear, and shall require such appearance, if possible. (n)

Case Digest

BENJAMIN BUGAYONG vs. LEONILA GINEZ

G.R. No. L-10033 December 28, 1956

Ponente: Felix,J:

Facts:

Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the United States Navy, was married to Leonila Ginez in 1949 at Asingan, Pangasinan. In July 1951, Benjamin began receiving letters informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his wife. In August 1952, Benjamin went to Pangasinan and looked for his wife whom he met in the house of one Mrs. Malalang, Leonila's godmother. She came along with him and both proceeded to the house of Pedro, Benjamin's cousin, where they stayed and lived for 1 night and 1 day as husband and wife. The next day they passed the night in their house as husband and wife. On the second day, Benjamin tried to verify from his wife the truth of the information he received that she had committed adultery but Leonila, instead of answering his query, merely packed up and left, which he took as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity imputed on her.

Benjamin then filed a case for legal separation. Leonila filed an answer vehemently denying the averments of the complaint and setting up affirmative defenses. After Benjamin testified, Leonila's counsel moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of condonation.

Issue:

Does Benjamin's attitude of sleeping with his wife for 2 nights despite his alleged belief that she was unfaithful to him, amount to a condonation of her previous and supposed adulterous acts?

Ruling:

Yes. Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation. A detailed examination of the testimony of the plaintiff-husband, clearly shows that there was a condonation on the part of the husband for the supposed "acts of infidelity amounting to adultery" committed by defendant-wife. Admitting for the sake of argument that the infidelities amounting to adultery were committed by the defendant, a reconciliation was effected between her and the plaintiff.

The act of the latter in persuading her to come along with him, and the fact that she went with him and consented to be brought to the house of his cousin Pedro Bugayong and together they slept there as husband and wife for one day and one night, and the further fact that in the second night they again slept together in their house likewise as husband and wife — all these facts have no other meaning in the opinion of this court than that a reconciliation between them was effected and that there was a condonation of the wife by the husband. The reconciliation occurred almost ten months after he came to know of the acts of infidelity amounting to adultery. It has been held in a long line of decisions of the various supreme courts of the different states of the U. S. that 'a single voluntary act of sexual intercourse by the innocent spouse after discovery of the offense is ordinarily sufficient to constitute condonation, especially as against the husband'. In the lights of the facts testified to by the plaintiff-husband, of the legal provisions above quoted, and of the various decisions above-cited, the inevitable conclusion is that there is condonation.

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Article 226 Family Code of the Philippines E.O. No. 209 s. 1987

Student # 7

by : Hilda D. Garcia

Article 226.

The property of the unemancipated child earned or acquired with his work or industry or by onerous or gratuitous title shall belong to the child in ownership and shall be devoted exclusively to the latter’s support and education, unless the title or transfer provides otherwise.

The right of the parents over the fruits and income of the child’s property shall be limited primarily to the child’s support and secondarily to the collective daily needs of the family. (321a, 323a)

There is no more complete usufruct that the parents exercise over the properties of their minor child. This has been eradicated by the Family Code. Under Article 584 of the Civil Code, the parents are usufructuaries of their children’s property. Usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving its form and substance, unless the title constituting it or the law otherwise provides.

The right to use the properties and fruits granted to parents over the properties of their children has been removed by the Family Code because the law now mandates that the child’s properties shall be devoted exclusively to the support and education of the child. If at all the parents can use the fruits, the right is secondary and it must be collectively for the daily needs of the family. They cannot use the income and fruits of their children’s properties for their own use.

Case Digest:

Santiago Blanco v. Fructuosa Esquierdo, et al.,

December 29, 1960

Ponente: David,J.

SUMMARY:

Esquierdo mortgaged a parcel of land to secured a loan from DBP. The land was registered in her name. The trial court cancelled the certificate after the siblings of deceased Blanco (Esquierdo’s common law husband) filed the petition on the ground that the certificate was procured thru fraud. DBP filed an appeal as an innocent mortgagee for valuable consideration. The Court ruled in favor of DBP.

FACTS:

A parcel of land in Negros Occidental was originally registered in the name of the “Heir of Maximiano Blanco” as evidenced by an OCT. The OCT was issued pursuant to a homestead application of Maximiano Blanco, before he died. After his death, his common law wife, Fructuosa Esquierdo and his surviving brothers and sisters took joint possession of the land. The Register of Deeds issued a TCT in Esquierdo’s name pursuant to a judicial adjudication as she is the only heir of Blanco. After learning of the transfer title, the sibling of Blanco filed the present proceedings with the CFI. They alleged that Blanco died single without leaving any heir except them. Esquierdo secured the issuance of TCT in her name thru fraud, or by means false and fraudulent representations made by her in the affidavit adjudicating the entire property to herself. Development Bank of the Philippines (formerly Rehabilitation Finance Corporation) was included as party defendant because Esquierdo mortgaged the land.

ISSUE:

Whether or not DBP is entitled to the protection accorded to “innocent purchasers for value” which phrase, according to Sec. 38 of the Land Registration Law.

RULING:

YES. CFI made no finding that DBP was a party to the fraudulent transfer of the land to Esquierdo. There is nothing alleged in the complaint which may implicate DBP in the fraud or justify a finding that it acted in bad faith. The certificate of title was in the name of Esquierdo when the land was mortgaged by her to DBP. Such being the case, DBP as the mortgagee had the right to rly on what appeared in the certificate and in absence of anything to excite suspicion, it was under no obligation to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the mortgagor appearing on the face of said certificate. Being thus an innocent mortgagee for value, its right or lien upon the land mortgaged must be respected and protected, even if the mortgagor obtained her title there thru fraud. In this connection, it will be noted that the deceased Maximiano Blanco died way back in 1930 and the certificate of title pursuant to his homestead application was issued in the name of his heirs sometime in 1934.

The siblings, however, took no steps for the settlement of their late brother's estate, and instead merely took possession of the land in question jointly with Fructuosa Esquierdo. They also appear to have entrusted the owner's certificate to said Fructuosa Esquierdo thus making it possible for her to fraudulently secure a transfer certificate of title in her name. This should be emphasized, for in several cases it is what impelled this Court to apply the principle of equity that "as between two innocent persons, oneof whom must suffer the consequences of a breach of trust, the one who made it possible by his act of confidence must bear the loss."(De Lara, et al. vs. Ayroso, supra.)

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Article 208 Family Code of the Philippines E.O. No. 209 s. 1987

Student # 7

by : Hilda D. Garcia

Article 208.

In case of contractual support or that given by will, the excess in amount beyond that required for legal support shall be subject to levy on attachment or execution.

Furthermore, contractual support shall be subject to adjustment whenever modification is necessary due to changes in circumstances manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties. (n)

The law contemplates of a contractual support or that support which is given through a will. While the law does not allow the attachment or levy on legal support, however, it allows attachment or levy of the excess of a contractual support over and above legal support. It also says that contractual support can be adjusted when necessary due to changes in the circumstances manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties.

Case Digest:

AUGUSTUS CAEZAR R. GAN, Petitioner, vs.

HON. ANTONIO C. REYES , Respondents.

G.R. No. 145527 : May 28, 2002

Ponente: BELLOSILLO, J.:

DOCTRINE: Absoluta sententia expositore non indiget

or to the plain words of a legal provision we should make no further explanation.

FACTS:

After declining the demand for support for their “love child” and denying paternity thereof, Bernadette Pondevida, instituted a complaint against Agustus Gan in behalf of their daughter Francheska Pondevida praying for support from respondent. Bernadette was quite apprehensive that she would not be able to send Francheska to school.2.

Gan moved to dismiss the petition saying that Francheska’s birth certificate indicated an “unknown” father thus there was no legal basis for the claim of support. His motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court. Despite denial, Gan failed to file his answer and the trial court declared him in default. As such, he was ordered to recognize Francheska as his illegitimate child entitled to filiation and support. Bernadette moved for execution of judgment which the trial court granted by issuing a writ of execution, citing as reason Francheska’s immediate need forschooling.3.

Gan appealed with CA invoking trial court’s absence of a good reason for immediate enforcement and technicalities in the issuance of writ of execution. CA dismissed the petition on the ratiocination that under Sec 4, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure judgments for support are immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal. Hence this petition with SC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lower courts erred in issuing and enforcing the writ of execution

RULING:

No. Petition is DENIED and the writ of execution issued by the lower court is AFFIRMED.

There is no evidence to justify the setting aside of the writ on the ground that it was issued beyond the legitimate bounds of judicial discretion. Sec 4, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly states that, unless ordered by the trial court, judgments in actions for support are immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal.

This is an exception to the general rule which provides that the taking of an appeal stays the execution of the judgment and that advance executions will only be allowed if there are urgent reasons therefor. To consider then petitioner's argument that there should be good reasons for the advance execution of a judgment would violate the clear and explicit language of the rule mandating immediate execution.2.

Petitioner is reminded that to the plain words of a legal provision we should make no further explanation. Absoluta sententia expositore non indiget. Indeed, the interpretation which petitioner attempts to foist upon us would only lead to absurdity, its acceptance negating the plain meaning of the provision subject of the petition.

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Article 190 Family Code of the Philippines E.O. No. 209 s. 1987

Student # 7

by : Hilda D. Garcia

Article 190.

Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted shall be governed by the following rules:

(1) Legitimate and illegitimate children and descendants and the surviving spouse of the adopted shall inherit from the adopted, in accordance with the ordinary rules of legal or intestate succession;

(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants of the adopted concur with the adopters, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half to be inherited by the parents or ascendants and the other half, by the adopters;

(3) When the surviving spouse or the illegitimate children of the adopted concur with the adopters, they shall divide the entire estate in equal shares, one-half to be inherited by the spouse or the illegitimate children of the adopted and the other half, by the adopters;

(4) When the adopters concur with the illegitimate children and the surviving spouse of the adopted, they shall divide the entire estate in equal shares, one-third to be inherited by the illegitimate children, one-third by the surviving spouse, and one third by the adopters;

(5) When only the adopters survive, they shall inherit the entire estate; and

(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then the ordinary rules of legal or intestate succession shall apply. (39[4]a, P.D. No. 603)

Case Digest:

SLOBODAN BOBANOVIC and DIANNE ELIZABETH CUNNINGHAM BOBANOVIC, petitioners, vs. HON. SYLVIA P. MONTES, (in her capacity as MINISTER OF SOCIAL SERVICES and DEVELOPMENT), respondent.

G.R. No. 71370 July 7, 1986

Ledesma, Saludo & Associates for petitioners.

ALAMPAY, J.:

FACTS:

On Nov. 28, 1984, a petition to adopt the minor Adam Christopher Sales was filed by spouses Slobodan Bobanovic and Dianne Elizabeth Cunningham Bobanovic, both Australian citizens with established residence at 3 Rethel Close Keilor Downs, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia but who then were temporarily residing at No. 08 Aries, Bel-Air, Makati, Metro Manila.

They are childless since their marriage on Nov. 16, 1979 due to primary infertility on the part of the wife.

Adam Christopher Sales also known as Adam Christopher Bobanovic was born on Apr. 5, 1984 to Lulu Sales as shown in his birth certificate.

He was given to care and custody of the petitioners by his natural mother on Nov. 19, 1984, as shown by the Deed of Surrender and Waiver and gave her written consent to this adoption.

ISSUE:

Whether or not MSSD (Minister of Social Services and Development) will grant and issue travel clearance to petitioner’s adopted child.

RULING:

Yes. Aliens who are either non-resident or residents but whose government the Republic of the Philippines has broken diplomatic relations which are the only ones disqualified to adopt under Article 335 of the Civil Code.

It is logical effect of the decree of adoption that the adopted minor should be allowed to travel to Australia to join his adoptive parents.

Adoptions statues, being humane, and salutary, hold the interest and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration and are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, need or orphaned children and give them protection of society and family in the person of the adopter as well as to allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts.

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Article 172 Family Code of the Philippines E.O. No. 209 s. 1987

Student # 7

by : Hilda D. Garcia

Article 172.

The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned;

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (265a, 266a, 267a)

Proof of filiation

The Supreme Court in a case made the observation that: “Parentage, lineage and legitimacy cannot be made to depend upon parental authority or bodily marks of similarity. There is scarcely a family among any of the nationalities where there are a number of children, when one or more of them, due to heredity perhaps, do not resemble either of the immediate parents.

Lineage cannot depend wholly upon the presence or absence of paternal similarity of physical appearance (Chun Chong vs. Collector of Customs, 38 Phil. 815; Chun Yeng vs. Collector of Customs, 28 Phil. 95).

With advances in medical science, filiation may now be established through forensic DNA (Deoxyribonucleic acid) and this has changed the judicial landscape. Hence, the Supreme Court has expressed its confidence in the value and admissibility of DNA in Tijing vs. CA, G.R. No. 125901, March 8, 2001 where it said: “Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using the DNA test for identification and parentage testing. . . As the appropriate case comes, court should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented since to reject it is to deny progress.”

Proof of Filiation can be prove by the following evidences:

1. Record of birth

2. Order of Court

3. Authentic Writing

4. Private Writing

5. Open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child.

6. Other means to prove filiation rejected blood tests, pictures, baptismal certificates

Case Digest:

Ernestina Bernabe vs. Carolina Alejo

G.R. No. 140500 – 374 SCRA 180

Ponente: Justice Panganiban

Application of Laws – No retroactive effect if vested rights are impaired

FACTS:

The late Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with Carolina Alejo. The son was born on September 18, 1981 and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died on August 13, 1993 leaving Ernestina as the sole surviving heir. Thereafter, Carolina in behalf of Adrian filed the aforesaid complaint praying that Adrian be declared as acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe.

The RTC dismissed the complaint ruling that under the provision of the Family Code, the death of the putative father had barred the action. On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that in the interest of justice, Adrian should be allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe since the boy was born in 1981; his rights are governed by Article 283 of the Civil Code. Hence, appeal was interposed in the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Family Code shall have retroactive effect.

HELD:

Applying recent jurisprudence, the Supreme Court hold that Article 285 of the Civil Code is a substantive law as it gives Adrian the right to file his petition for recognition within 4 years from attaining majority age. Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair or take Adrian’s right to file an action for recognition because that right had already vested prior to its enactment.

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Article 154 Family Code of the Philippines

E.O. No. 209 s. 1987

Student # 7

by : Hilda D. Garcia

Article 154.

The beneficiaries of a family home are:

(1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and

(2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for legal support. (226a)

Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially as was required in the Civil Code. If the family actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors should take the necessary precautions to protect their interest before extending credit to the spouses or to the head of the family who owns the home.

Case Digest:

Florante F. Manacop vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 104875, November 13, 1992

Ponente: Justice Melo

Facts:

Floranted Manacop and his wife Euaceli purchased a residential lot with a bungalow located in Quezon City. The petitioner failed to pay the sub-contract cost of pursuant to a deed of assignment signed between petitioner’s corporation and private respondent herein (FF Cruz & Co).

The latter filed a complaint for the recovery for the sum of money with a prayer for preliminary attachment against the former.

Issue:

Whether or not the subject property is indeed exempted from attachment.

Ruling:

No. The residential house and lot of petitioner became a family home by operation of law under Article 153 of the Family Code. Such provision does not mean that said article has a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences, petitioner’s included, are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and henceforth, are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. Since petitioner incurred debt in 1987, it preceded the effectivity of the Code and his property is therefore not exempt form attachment.

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Article 136 Family Code of the Philippines

E.O. No. 209 s. 1987

Student # 7

by : Hilda D. Garcia

Article 136.

The spouse may jointly file a verified petition with the court for the voluntary dissolution of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, and for the separation of their common properties. All creditors of the absolute community or of the conjugal partnership of gains, as well as the personal creditors of the spouse, shall be listed in the petition and notified of the filing thereof. The court shall take measures to protect the creditors and other persons with pecuniary interest. (191a)

Case Digest:

GUILLERMA TUMLOS,, Petitioner, vs.

SPOUSES MARIO FERNANDEZ and LOURDES FERNANDEZ, Respondents.

G.R. No. 137650. April 12, 2000

Ponente: PANGANIBAN,J:

FACTS:

Mario and Lourdes Fernandez was the plaintiff for this civil case. Guillerma, Toto and Gina Tumlos were being the petitioners. The spouses are the said owner of an apartment located in Valenzuela, Metro Manila. That through their tolerance they allowed the defendants to occupy the apartment building without payment of rent for seven years. That Guillierma and others promise to pay monthly rentals of 1,600 php and 1000 php respectively as agreed upon but not complied. The couple demanded the payment and prayed that the defendants be ordered to vacate the place. Only Guillierma Tumlos filed an answer to the complaint. She averred that the Fernandez Spouses has no cause of action against her. Since she claimed that she was a CO-OWNER of the subject premises as evidenced by a contract to sell it was stated that she is co-vendee of the property in question with the one of the spouses Mario. It was allegedly that Mario and Guillierma had an affair that during their co-habitation of almost 10 years they got 2 children and acquired the apartment-builiding and for those time Guillierma stands as a administrator and collects all the rentals from all tenants.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Guillierma’s claimed as a co-owner in the said property and her capacity to act as administrator correct.

RULING:

NO. The court states that the Guillierma as being a co-owner and as administrator are erred because the article that govern is article 148 not 144 which states that “in cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Artilce, only the properties acquires by both of the parties through, their actual joint contribution of money,property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions, in absence of proofs to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding article.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.”

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Article 118 Family Code of the Phiippines

E.O. No. 209 s. 1987

Student # 7

by : Hilda D. Garcia

Article 118.

Property bought on installments paid partly from exclusive funds of either or both spouses and partly from conjugal funds belongs to the buyer or buyers if full ownership was vested before the marriage and to the conjugal partnership if such ownership was vested during the marriage. In either case, any amount advanced by the partnership or by either or both spouses shall be reimbursed by the owner or owners upon liquidation of the partnership. (n)

Illustrative Example:

Property acquired on installments. X bought a house and lot on installment basis from Y for P150,000.00. He paid P120,000 but there is a stipulation that upon the execution of the contract, ownership shall be vested upon X. A few months later, X married Z. During the marriage, the amount of P20,000.00 was paid out of conjugal funds. Who owns the house and lot? X is the owner, because ownership was vested in him before the marriage. The fact that the amount was paid on installment basis does not matter. What matters is the stipulation that the ownership shall be vested before the marriage. Under Article 1478 of the Civil Code, the parties may stipulate that ownership of the thing shall not pass to the purchaser until he has fully paid the price. Conversely, they can agree that even if the price has not yet been fully paid, ownership shall be acquired by the vendee.

Article 1498 of the Civil Code provides that when the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot be inferred.

If the ownership in the case above-cited is vested during the marriage, the house and lot are owned by the conjugal partnership. The law, however, requires that in either case, X must reimburse the conjugal partnership for whatever he advanced or paid. In the same vein, in the second case, the conjugal partnership shall reimburse X the amount of P120,000.00 he paid to Y. (See Art. 118, Family Code).

Case Digest:

BA FINANCE CORPORATION,petitioner,vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, AUGUSTO YULO, LILY YULO (doing business under the name and style of A & L INDUSTRIES),respondents.

G.R. No. L-61464 May 28, 1988

Ponente: Justice Gutierrez Jr.

Facts:

Augusto Yulo secured a loan from the BA Finance (petitioner) in the amount of P591,003.59 as evidenced by a promissory note he signed in his own behalf and as a representative of A&L Industries. Augusto presented an alleged special power of attorney executed by his wife, Lily Yulo, who managed the business and under whose name the said business was registered. She allegedly authorized the husband to procure the loan and sign the promissory note. When the obligation became due and demandable, Augusto failed to pay the same. The petitioner prayed for the issuance of a writ of attachment alleging that said spouses were guilty of fraud and non-payment of their debt. Private respondent Lily Yulo filed her answer with counterclaim, alleging that although Augusto Yulo and she are husband and wife, first, the Augusto had abandoned her and their children five (5) months before the filing of the complaint; second, that they were already separated when the promissory note was executed; third, that her signature in the special power of attorney was forged because she had never authorized Augusto Yulo in any capacity to transact any business for and in behalf of A & L Industries, which is owned by her as a single proprietor, fourth, that she never got a single centavo from the loan; and that as a result of the illegal attachment of her properties, which constituted the assets of the A & L Industries, the latter closed its business and was taken over by the new owner.

Issue:

Whether or not A&L Industries can be held liable for the obligations contracted by her husband.

Ruling:

Yes. A&L Industries is a single proprietorship, whose registered owner is Lily Yulo. The said proprietorship was established during the marriage and assets were also acquired during the same. Hence, it is presumed that the property forms part of the conjugal partnership of the spouses and be held liable for the obligations contracted by the husband. However, for the property to be liable, the obligation contracted by the husband must have beneficial consequences conjugal partnership. The obligation contracted by Augusto was for his own benefit because at the time he incurred such obligation, he had already abandoned his family and left their conjugal home. He likewise made it appear that he was duly authorized by his wife in behalf of the company to procure such loan from the petitioner. Clearly, there must be the requisite showing that some advantage accrued to the welfare of the spouses. Under Art. 94 (2 & 3) of the Civil code, the absolute community of property shall be liable for:(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the community, or by both spouses, or by one spouse with the consent of the other;(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited. Apparently, there was no consent from Lily since it was found out that her signatures were forged. The decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE and the petitioner is ordered to pay the private respondent Lily Yulo the amount of SIX HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS (P660,000.00) as actual damages. The remaining properties subject of the attachment are ordered released in favor of the petitioner.

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Article 100 Family Code of the Philippines

E.O. No. 209 s. 1987

Student # 7

by : Hilda D. Garcia

Article 100. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime of absolute community except that:

(1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to be supported;

(2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a summary proceeding;

(3) In the absence of sufficient community property, the separate property of both spouses shall be solidarity liable for the support of the family.

The spouse present shall, upon proper petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter’s share.

(178a)

Article 100 merely means that the absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership shall still remain in spite of the separation in fact of the husband and wife.

If one of the spouses leaves the conjugal dwelling without any justifiable reason, he/she cannot ask for support.

There are other consequences of the separation in fact of the spouses, such as:

(1) the separate properties of the husband and wife shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family if there are no sufficient properties of the community property;

(2) the present spouse may petition the court that he be authorized to administer and encumber specific separate properties of the other spouse and use the fruits to satisfy

his or her share.

If the husband brings a concubine in the conjugal dwelling, maltreats her, insults her, or forces her to live with persons whose habits, character, and language are offensive to her dignity, or compels her to be merely subordinate to his mother, the same may justify the wife to live separately from him and pray for separate maintenance for her. Property acquired during the marriage, even if spouses are separated, is presumed to be conjugal.

Case Digest:

Spouses Ricky and Anita Wong, et al. vs.

Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC), et al.

G.R. No. 70082, August 19, 1991

Ponente: Justice C. Fernan

Facts:

Romarico and Katrina are married. They have three children,but they have been living separately from each other most of the time. During the marriage, Romarico acquired a lot consisting of 1,787 square meters. In 1972, while in Hong Kong, Katrina entered into a contract with Anita Wong, whereby she consigned to her pieces of jewelry worth P321,830.95. When she failed to return the jewelries, Anita demanded the payment where Katrina issued a check for P55,000.00. When it bounced, she was sued criminally, but since the obligation was purely civil in nature, a suit for collection of sum of money was filed against her. Judgment was rendered against Katrina. When it became final and executory, the parcel of land was levied upon and sold at a public auction.

Issues:

Whether or not the property is conjugal or not.

Ruling:

Yes. The property has been acquired during the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership (Cuenca vs. Cuenca, 168 SCRA 335), even though Romarico and Katrina had been living separately. (Flores vs. Escudero, 92 Phil. 786). The presumption of the conjugal nature of the properties subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the properties are

exclusively owned by Romarico. (Ahern vs. Julian, 39 Phil. 607). While there is proof that Romarico acquired the properties with money he had borrowed from an officemate, it is unclear where he obtained the money to repay the loan. If he paid it out of his salaries, then the money is part of the conjugal assets and not exclusively his. Proof on this matter is of paramount importance considering that in the determination of the nature of a property acquired by a person during coverture, the controlling factor is the source of the money utilized in the purchase.

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Article 82 Family Code of the Philippines E.O. No. 209 s. 1987 Student # 7 by : Hilda D. Garcia

Article 82.

DONATIONS BY REASON OF MARRIAGE ARE THOSE WHICH ARE MADE BEFORE ITS CELEBRATION, IN CONSIDERATION OF THE SAME, AND IN FAVOR OF ONE OR BOTH OF THE FUTURE SPOUSE

DONATION PROPTER NUPTIAS

DEFINITION

• a marriage gift or settlement required by law of the husband or his family early during the later Roman Empire and that was required by Justinian to be equal to the wife’s dowry but permitted to be made after and used for expenses of the marriage —formerly called when made before the marriage donatio ante nuptias.

Requisites of donations propter nuptias.

In order that donations propter nuptias may be valid, the following requisites must be present:

1. they must be made before the celebration of the marriage;

2. they must be made in consideration of the marriages;

3. they must be made in favor of one or both of the future spouses.

Under Article 87 of the Family Code, the spouses cannot donate or grant gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, during the existence of the marriage, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give during family celebrations or rejoicing.

Case Digest:

Bonifacia Mateo, et al. v. Gervasio Lagua, et al.

G.R. No. L-26270, October 30, 1969

Ponente: Justice J.B.L. Reyes

Cipriano Lagua and his wife Alejandra Dumlao, in a public instrument, donated the two parcels of land to their son Alejandro Lagua, in consideration of the latter’s marriage to Bonifacia Mateo. The couple took possession of the properties, but the Certificates of Title remained in the donor’s name. Cipriano Lagua later executed a deed of sale of the same two parcels of land in favor of his younger son, Gervasio. A TCT were issued to Gervasio. Bonifacia Mateo and her daughter, Anatalia, sought the annulment of the deed of sale in favor of Gervasio Lagua and for recovery of possession of the properties which was granted by the court. The decision became final, and Bonifacia Mateo, and her daughter, Anatalia Lagua, were installed in possession of the land.

Gervasio Lagua and Cipriano Lagua, filed a complaint for annulment of the donation of the two lots, insofar as one-half portion thereof was concerned claiming that in donating the two lots, said plaintiff not only neglected leaving something for his own support but also prejudiced the legitime of his forced heir, plaintiff Gervasio Lagua. While the cases were pending, plaintiff Cipriano Lagua died. The Court of Appeals held that the donation to Alejandro Lagua of the 2 lots prejudiced the legitime of Cipriano’s other heir, Gervasio Lagua. The donation was thus declared inofficious, and defendants-appellees were ordered to reconvey to plaintiff Gervasio Lagua a portion of 494.15 square meters to be taken from any convenient part of the lots.

ISSUE:

Is the court of appeals ruling on the inofficiousness of the donation proper?

RULING:

No. ART. 908 of the civil code provides that to determine the legitime, the value of the property left at the death of the testator shall be considered, deducting all debts, and charges, which shall not include those imposed in the will. To the net value of the hereditary estate, shall be added the value of all donations by the testator that are subject to collation, at the time he made them. In other words, before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be taken first. The net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting a payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation would be added to it.

With the partible estate thus determined, the legitimes of the compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes. Certainly, in order that a donation may be reduced for being inofficious, there must be proof that the value of the donated property exceeds that of the disposable free portion plus the donee’s share as legitime in the properties of the donor. In the present case, it can hardly be said that, with the evidence then before the court, it was in any position to rule on the inofficiousness of the donation involved here, and to order its reduction and reconveyance of the deducted portion to the respondents.

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Article 64 Family Code of the Philippines E.O. No. 209 s. 1987 Student # 7 by : Hilda D. Garcia

Article 64

After the finality of the decree of legal separation, the innocent spouse may revoke the donations made by him or by her in favor of the offending spouse, as well as the designation of the latter as beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable. The revocation of the donations shall be recorded in the registries of property in the places where the properties are located. Alienations, liens and encumbrances registered in good faith before the recording of the complaint for revocation in the registries of property shall be respected. The revocation of or change in the designation of the insurance beneficiary shall take effect upon written notification thereof to the insured.

The action to revoke the donation under this article must be brought within five years from the time the decree of legal separation has become final.(107a)

Unlocking of Difficulties:

* LEGAL SEPARATION – judicially authorized separation from bed and board — a mensa et thoro — but the spouses remain married. There are at least 10 grounds under the Family Code by which legal separation can be effected (Article 55, Family Code)

* DONATION – an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it (Article 725, Civil Code)

*BENEFICIARY – any person or entity (like a charity) who is to receive assets or profits from an estate, a trust, an insurance policy or any instrument in which there is distribution.

* ALIENATION – the capacity for a piece of property or a property right to be sold or otherwise transferred from one party to another.

* LIEN – an encumbrance that attaches to a certain transaction or specific property for the satisfaction of a debt or performance of an obligation or other duty that is created by operation of law, e.g., by agreement of the parties in a contract, as in a mortgage lien

* ENCUMBRANCE – a lien or claim on the title or possession of property which thus burdens its use or sale, or transfer

DONATIONS AND BENEFICIARY IN INSURANCE.

Donations and the act of the innocent party in designating the guilty spouse as a beneficiary in an insurance are essentially acts of liberality and the law gives the option to the innocent party whether he or she will revoke the donation or the designation as beneficiary of the guilty party in an insurance.

In case of donations, if the innocent spouse decides to revoke a donation, he or she must file an action for revocation within five years from the time the decree of legal separation has become final.

However, if the donation is void, such as in the case of a donation in violation of Article 87, the right to bring an action to declare the nullity of the donation does not prescribe.

Article 87 provides that “every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing”.

The Law provides for other effects of legal separation, such as:

1.the innocent spouse may revoke donations made by him/her to the offending spouse;

2.the innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the guilty spouse as beneficiary in any insurance policy even if such designation is stipulated as irrevocable;

The revocation of the donation must be recorded in the proper registry of property where the property is located. This is to protect the parties against the rights of innocent third persons.

Case Digest:

BRIGIDO B. QUIAO, Petitioner, vs. RITA C. QUIAO, KITCHIE C. QUIAO, LOTIS C. QUIAO, PETCHIE C. QUIAO, represented by their mother RITA QUIAO, Respondents.

G.R. No 176556 July 4, 2012

REYES, J.:

Facts:

Petitioner Brigido Quiao was married to respondent Rita Quiao in 1977 and got four children. They had no separate properties prior to their marriage.

In 2000, Rita filed a complaint against Brigido for legal separation for cohabiting with another woman. Subsequently, the RTC rendered a decision in 2005 declaring the legal separation of the parties pursuant to Article 55, thereby awarding the custody of their three minor children in favor of Rita, who is the innocent spouse.

The properties accrued by the spouses shall be divided equally between them subject to the respective legitimes of their children; however, Brigido’s share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership shall be forfeited in favor of their children in accordance to par. 9 of Article 129 of the Family Code.

A few months thereafter, Rita filed a motion for execution, which was granted by the trial court. By 2006, Brigido paid Rita with regards to the earlier decision; the writ was partially executed.

After more than nine months, Brigido filed a motion for clarification asking the RTC to define “Nets Profits Earned.” In answer, the court held that the phrase denotes “the remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each of the spouses and debts.”

Upon a motion for reconsideration, it initially set aside its previous decision stating that net profit earned shall be computed in accordance with par. 4 of Article 102 of the Family Code. However, it later reverted to its original Order, setting aside the last ruling.

Issue:

Whether or not the offending spouse acquired vested rights over ½ of the properties in the conjugal partnership.

Held:

In the case at bar, since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses have no separate properties, there is nothing to return to any of them.

The listed properties are considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the listed properties should be divided equally between the spouses and/or their respective heirs. However, since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.

So, as not to be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no separate property which may be accounted for in the guilty party’s favor.

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Article 47 Family Code of the Philippines E.O. No. 209 s. 1987

Student # 7

by : Hilda D. Garcia

Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following persons and within the periods indicated herein:

(1) For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by the party whose parent or guardian did not give his or her consent, within five years after attaining the age of twenty-one, or by the parent or guardian or person having legal charge of the minor, at any time before such party has reached the age of twenty-one

(2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by the same spouse, who had no knowledge of the other’s insanity; or by any relative or guardian or person having legal charge of the insane, at any time before the death of either party, or by the insane spouse during a lucid interval or after regaining sanity

(3) For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years after the discovery of the fraud;

(4) For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years from the time the force, intimidation or undue influence disappeared or ceased;

(5) For causes mentioned in number 5 and 6 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years after the marriage.

The law enumerates the persons who may file an action for the annulment of marriage and the periods within which the action must be filed. If the actions are not filed within the periods prescribed by law, the same would prescribe.

NATURE OF ANNULMENT CASE.

Annulment cases are actions in rem, for they concern the status of the parties, and status affects or binds the whole world. The “res” is the relation between the said parties, or their marriage tie. Jurisdiction over the same by the proper Regional Trial.

GROUNDS, PARTIES, PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD.

A prescriptive period is the time within which a case can be filed in court. After the lapse of the prescriptive period, the case cannot be filed anymore- Hereunder is a tabulation of the grounds, parties and prescriptive period for bringing an action for annulment

In case- of insanity, if the spouse knew that his or her spouse has already been insane previous to the marriage the spouse cannot file the suit for annulment as he or she is already estopped- If the sane spouse only knew of the insanity after the marriage ceremony, he or she is given legal standing to file the suit at ; anytime prior to the death of the insane spouse.

CASE DIGEST:

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.

Ponente: PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS:

The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the respondent Roridel Molina to Reynaldo Molina void in the ground of psychological incapacity. The couple got married in 1985, after a year, Reynaldo manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility both as husband and a father preferring to spend more time with friends whom he squandered his money, depends on his parents for aid and assistance and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances. In 1986, the couple had an intense quarrel and as a result their relationship was estranged. Roridel quit her work and went to live with her parents in Baguio City in 1987 and a few weeks later, Reynaldo left her and their child. Since then he abandoned them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

RULING:

The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. What constitutes psychological incapacity is not mere showing of irreconcilable differences and confliction personalities. It is indispensable that the parties must exhibit inclinations which would not meet the essential marital responsibilites and duties due to some psychological illness. Reynaldo’s action at the time of the marriage did not manifest such characteristics that would comprise grounds for psychological incapacity. The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she and her husband cannot get along with each other and had not shown gravity of the problem neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. In addition, the expert testimony by Dr Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility which is not considered as psychological incapacity.

The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological incapacity laid set forth in this case:

*burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff

*root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined

*such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage

*such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying with the essentials of marital obligations of marriage

*such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code

*decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic Church must be respected

*court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act on behalf of the state.

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Article 28 Family Code of the Philippines E.O. No. 209 s. 1987

Student # 7

by: Hilda D. Garcia

Article 28. If the residence of either party is so located that there is no means of transportation to enable such party to appear personally before the local civil registrar, the marriage may be solemnized without necessity of a marriage license.

In Article 28 of the Family Code, the law refers to a place which is so far from the office of the local civil registrar that the parties o the marriage cannot appear before him due to lack of transportation. A person who has the authority to solemnize marriage can solemnize it without the necessity of marriage license, provided hat he must take steps to ascertain the ages and relationship of the parties or that no legal impediment to marry one anther exists.

Case Digest:

RAQUEL G. KHO, Petitioner,  vs.  REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND

VERONICA B. KHO, Respondents.

Ponente: Peralta, J.

G.R. No. 187462 June 1, 2016

FACTS:

In the afternoon of May 31, 1972, petitioner Raquel’s parents instructed the clerk in the office of the municipal treasurer to arrange and prepare the necessary papers required for the intended marriage between petitioner and respondent Veronica to take place at around midnight of June 1, 1972 so as to exclude the public from witnessing the marriage ceremony. Petitioner and respondent thereafter exchanged marital vows in a marriage ceremony which actually took place at around 3:00 o’clock before dawn of June 1, 1972.

Twenty-five (25) years later, petitioner filed an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage between him and respondent on the ground of the absence of marriage license. He argued that he has never gone to the office of the Local Civil Registrar to apply for marriage license and had not seen much less signed any papers or documents in connection with the procurement of a marriage license. He presented a Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar which attested to the fact that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar has neither record nor copy of a marriage license issued to petitioner and respondent with respect to their marriage celebrated on June 1, 1972.

ISSUE:

Is the Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar attesting to the fact that it has no record or copy of the marriage license adequate to prove the non-issuance of such license, thus, sufficient to declare the marriage null and void?

HELD:

Yes. The marriage of petitioner and respondent was celebrated on June 1, 1972, prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Hence, the Civil Code governs their union. Accordingly, Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract which include “a marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character”.

Article 80(3) of the Civil Code also makes it clear that a marriage performed without the corresponding marriage license is void. In this case, petitioner was able to present a Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar attesting that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar has no record or copy of any marriage license ever issued in favor of petitioner and respondent.

Thus, on the basis of such Certification, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and respondent has been overcome and it becomes the burden of respondent to prove that their marriage is valid as it is she who alleges such validity. However, the respondent was not able to discharge that burden. Respondent failed to present their alleged marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. In addition, the Certificate of Marriage issued by the officiating priest does not contain any entry regarding the said marriage license. As the marriage license, an essential requisite under the Civil Code, is clearly absent and the marriage cannot be characterized as among the exceptions, the marriage of petitioner and respondent is void ab initio.

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Article 4 of Family Code of the Philippines E.O. No. 209 s. 1987

Student # 7

by: Hilda D. Garcia

Article 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.

An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. (n)

*Article 35. A military commander of a unit, who is a commissioned officer, shall likewise have authority to solemnize marriages in articulo mortis between persons within the zone of military operation, whether members of the armed forces or civilians.

*Article 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:

(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife;

(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;

(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;

(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;

(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or

(6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable. (85a)

Legal Capacity

Legal capacity means that the parties must have attained the age requirement and that the parties must have attained the age requirement and that there should be no legal impediment to marry each other. The marriageable age is 18.

· If a man and a woman at the age of seventeenth (17) marry each other with the consent of their parents, the marriage is void because they must be eighteen (18) years of age as required by Article 5 of the Family Code. They have no legal capacity.

· The concept of legal capacity here refers to the age of the parties to the marriage as well as a situation where there should be no pre-existing marriage of either or both parties to the marriage r what is known as legal impediment.

Void marriage as a legal impediment to remarry

· One question has been asked: If there is a prior existing marriage of A and B, but it is void, can anyone of them just get married?

Answer: The answer is NO. this is because of the present rule that there is a need to have a void marriage to be declared void. In fact, Article 39 of the Family Code provides that the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe.

Since there is a need for a prior declaration of nullity of a void marriage , that void marriage can be considered a legal impediment to contract a subsequent marriage because of the presumption of its validity prior to its declaration on nullity.

Legal Impediment

The rule that if there is an existing marriage, there can be no subsequent valid marriage is not an absolute rule. For under Article 41 of the Family Code, if one of the spouses has been absent from the conjugal dwelling for two (2) or four (4) years, depending upon the circumstances of the absence, the present spouse may marry again, but he has to file a summary action for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse.

Authority of Solemnizing Officer

The law ( Article 7, Family Code) enumerates the authorities who can solemnize marriages, Justice of the Supreme Court,The Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan (whole country), Regional Trial Court and Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Court judges (within its jurisdiction).

Case Digest

A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390. April 11, 2002

MERCEDITA MATA ARANES, petitioner, vs. JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO, respondent..

Puno, J,:

Facts

The MTC Judge of Balatan, Camarines Sur solemnized a marriage in Naua, Camarines Sur. It is likewise solemnized without a marriage license. After the death of the husband, Domingo Orobia, her right to inherent vast properties left by he r husband was not recognized. She asked that the judge be sanctioned. The judge explained that when the he discovered that there was no license, he wanted to stop the ceremonies but he was prevailed upon to pursue it as there was already an influx of visitors. So, he continued out of human compassion and if he reset it, it might aggravate the condition of the man.

Issue

Whether or not the actuation of the judge proper?

Ruling

The answer is NO. The authority of the regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize the marriages is confined in their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.

In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage.

Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license. In Navarro vs Domagtoy,259 SCRA 129, we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.

While the requirement of authority is prescribed by the law for a marriage to be valid, yet, its defect or infirmity does not got to into the validity of the marriage, but it merely affects the liability of the solemnizing officer. The reason is obvious, as authority is only a formal requisite of marriage.

Summary of Article 4, Family Code

1. Legal capacity is clearly stated to be followed.

a. Age requirements

b. Parties must be opposite sex

c. Absence of Impediments mentioned in Article 37 and 38

2. Consent of Marriage were vital in licensing it.

3. Authority of solemnizing officer must clearly followed as mentioned in the article.

4. The validity of marriage license must be checked.

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Article 31 of the Civil Code of the Philippines / Republic Act No. 386

Student # 7

by: Hilda D. Garcia

Article 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.

Preliminary

This article refers to a civil action which is no longer based on the criminal liability of the defendant, but on an obligation arising from other sources, like law, contracts, quasi-contracts and quasi-delicts (Article 1157, NCC)

INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION

It is a civil action that arises from any other source of obligation except from a crime or felony. They may be filed at any time, even when there is a criminal prosecution.

Independent civil action exists on a parallel reality with the criminal prosecution. The acquittal or conviction of the accused in the criminal action has no bearing, no impact on the outcome of the independent civil action.

CASE DIGEST:

G. R. No. 135462. December 7, 2001]

SOUTH CITY HOMES, INC., FORTUNE MOTORS (PHILS.), PALAWAN LUMBER MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. BA FINANCE CORPORATION, respondent.

PARDO, J.:

FACTS

Canlubang Automotive Resources Corporation (CARCO) delivered motor vehicles to Fortune Motors Corporation on the basis of trust receipts or drafts executed by Fortune, with South City Homes, Palawan Lumber Manufacturing Corporation, and Fortune's President Joseph Chua as sureties. CARCO assigned/discounted the Trust Receipts or drafts to BA Finance Corporation, which assumed payment of the vehicles but retained the right to collect such payment from Fortune and the Sureties. BA Finance demanded payment from the sureties after Fortune failed to pay the amounts due under the drafts and remit the proceeds of motor vehicles sold or return those that remained unsold in accordance with the terms of the trust receipts agreements. When the account was still unpaid, BA Finance filed a complaint for a sum of money with a preliminary attachment. A motion to dismiss was filed by a defendant, who claimed that their obligations to the creditor (CARCO) were extinguished by the assignment of the drafts and trust receipts to BA Finance without their knowledge and consent, and that a novation was effected in accordance with the legal provision on conventional subrogation, thereby extinguishing the liability of the sureties.However, BA Finance failed to immediately demand the return of the goods under the trust receipt agreements or exercise the courses of action by entruster as provided for in PD 115; and that there were no principal obligations at the time the suretyship agreement agreements were entered into, rendering them null and void. The dismissal motion was denied. The RTC and CA ruled that South City st Homes must pay amounts due under the 6 drafts and True receipts jointly and severally with Fortune Motors, Palawan Lumber, and Joseph Chua.

ISSUE

Whether or not, in the event of the entrustee's breach of his obligations under the trust receipt agreement, the entruster must cancel the trust and take possession of the goods in order to enforce his rights thereunder.

RULING

No. In the event of default by the entrustee on his obligation under the trust receipt agreement, it is not absolutely necessary that the entruster cancel the trust and take possession of the goods to be able to enforce his rights thereunder. Significantly, the law uses the word “may” in granting the entruster the right to cancel the trust and take possession of the goods. 1 Consequently, the entruster has the discretion to avail of such right or seek any alternative action, such as third party claim or a separate civil action which it deems best to protect its right, at any time upon default or failure of the entrustee to comply with any of the terms and conditions of the Trust Agreement.

Summary of Article 31

1. Obligations arise from law, contracts, quasi contracts, delicts and quasi delicts.

2. Independent Civil actions are distinct and separate from the criminal prosecution and they are bound only by prohibition on double recovery.

3. A single act or omission can give rise to multiple causes of action, based on different sources of obligation.