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ARTICLE 39 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

ARTICLE 39 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINESEXPLANATION: The court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State in all cases of declaration of absolute nullity of marriage to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to ensure that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON, Petitioners, vs. MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON, Respondent.

G.R. No. 189121  July 31, 2013

PEREZ, J.:

FACTS:

                In  1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City. In her Petition docketed as SP Proc. No. M-3957, Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito).

Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss. The petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death Certificate,  Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, the petition for settlement of decedent’s estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñas City.

ISSUE:

                Was the venue of Elise’s petition improperly laid?

RULING:

NO. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death:

Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Emphasis supplied).

The term "resides" connotes "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Piñas City. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.

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ARTICLE 221 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

This article explains that the guardian of the child shall be civilly liable incase that there are injuries and damages cause by acts and omission of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.

CASE DIGEST

PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito Elcano, deceased, plaintiffs-appellants, vs. REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said minor, defendants-appellees.

G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977

BARREDO, J.:

FACTS: Petitioners Pedro and Patricia Elcano sought an action for damages against Defendants Reginald and Marvin Hill for the killing of Agapito Elcano, Petitoner’s son, by then minor but married Reginald Hill. Reginald was acquitted of the criminal offense because he lacked the intent to kills, coupled with mistake. Hence, Petitioners sought for damages for the death of their son. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the action is barred by prior judgement of acquittal, which is final and in res judicata. Though initially denied, the action was eventually dismissed upon motion for reconsideration of the Defendants.

Petitioners filed an appeal before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the action for damages is barred by the prior of judgement of acquittal of Reginald Hill.

RULING: The Court ruled in favor of Petitioners. An application of the case of Barredo v. Garcia finds that the present case falls under Article 2176 (formerly Art. 1903) of the Civil Code whereby fault or negligencia covers not only acts “not punishable by law” but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.

The extinction of liability under Rule 111 of the Rules of Court refers only to civil liability arising from criminal offense, but the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Culpa aquiliana involves voluntary or intentional acts which may be punishable by law.

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ARTICLE 213 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

This article explains that, in case that there is a separation between the parents of the children, parental authority shall be decided by the court and the court shall consider the choice of the child over 7 years old unless the chosen is unfit or don't have the capacity to take care of the child.

CASE DIGEST

REYMOND B. LAXAMANA, Petitioner, v. MA. LOURDES * D. LAXAMANA, Respondent.

G.R. No. 144763. September 3, 2002

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

FACTS: Everything went well for the family until petitioner became drug dependent. He was confined and he undergone psychological treatments. However, respondent claimed petitioner was not fully rehabilitated. His drug dependence worsened and it became difficult for respondent and her children to live with him being violent and irritable.

Respondent and her 3 children abandoned petitioner and transferred to the house of her relatives.

The petitioner filed the instant petition for habeas corpus praying for custody of his three children. Respondent opposed the petition, citing the drug dependence of petitioner.

ISSUE: Does estoppel operate in cases resolving disputes which involved the family and youth?

RULING: No. In the case at bar, the petitioner is not estopped from questioning the absence of a trial considering that said psychiatric report, which was the court’s primary basis in awarding custody to respondent, is insufficient to justify the decision. The fundamental policy of the State to promote and protect the welfare of children shall not be disregarded by mere technicality in resolving disputes which involve the family and the youth. While petitioner may have a history of drug dependence, the records are inadequate as to his moral, financial and social well-being. The results of the psychiatric evaluation showing that he is not yet “completely cured” may render him unfit to take custody of the children, but there is no evidence to show that respondent is unfit to provide the children with adequate support, education, as well as moral and intellectual training and development.

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ARTICLE 182 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

EXPLANATION: This article explains that only those who are prejudiced in their rights may challenge legitimacy within five years of the accrual of their cause of action.

CASE DIGEST:

Grimes v. Grimes

207 N.C. 778 February 27, 1935

SCHENCK, J.

FACTS:

T. J. Grimes died intestate, 7 August, 1933. There was born to him by his first marriage five (5) children, namely, J. C. Grimes, W. T. Grimes, Paul I. Grimes, Mrs. Lena Grimes Palmer, and Mrs. W.L. Cripliver. Mrs. Palmer died prior to her father, the intestate, and left surviving her six (6) children, as follows, Thomas Palmer, Elizabeth Palmer, J. B. Palmer, Jr., Albert Palmer, Sarah Palmer, and William Palmer (Grimes).

W. T. Grimes died intestate and without issue on 4 July, 1931. Prior to his death, to wit, on 16 August, 1924, he, along with his wife, Annie G. Grimes, adopted for life William Palmer, infant son of his deceased sister, Mrs. Lena Grimes Palmer, and a grandson of T. J. Grimes.

At the time of the death of T. J. Grimes he was survived by his children: J. C. Grimes, Paul I. Grimes, Mrs. W.L. Cripliver, and by the heirs at law (children) of Mrs. Lena Grimes Palmer, his deceased daughter, and by his second wife, Lizzie Grimes.

The judgment of the Superior Court adjudged that William Palmer Grimes, minor, is not entitled to inherit or share in the estate of T. J. Grimes, deceased, as the adopted son of W. T. Grimes, deceased, and that the only interest and share of the said William Palmer Grimes in the estate of T. J. Grimes is the interest and share to which the said William Palmer Grimes is entitled as one of the grandchildren of the said T. J. Grimes, deceased, which share is by descent through Lena Grimes Palmer, mother of the said William Palmer Grimes and daughter of T. J. Grimes, deceased. To this judgment Annie G. Grimes, the guardian of William Palmer Grimes, appealed to the Supreme Court, assigning errors.

ISSUE: Does an adopted child for life inherit that portion of the estate of his natural grandfather which his adoptive father, who died intestate, would have inherited as a son had he not predeceased said grandfather? 

RULING: a negative answer is found in the construction of Public Laws 1933, ch. 207, sec. 5, amending C. S., 185, the pertinent portion of which is as follows: "Such order granting letters of adoption, when made, shall have the effect forthwith to establish the relation of parent and child between the petitioner and the child during the minority, or for the life of such child, according to the prayer of the petition, with all the duties, powers, and rights belonging to the relationship of parent and child, and in case the adoption be for the life of the child, and the petitioner die intestate, such order shall have the further effect to enable such child to inherit the real estate and entitle it to the personal estate of the petitioner in the same manner and to the same extent such child would have been entitled to if such child had been the actual child of the person adopting it".

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ARTICLE 172 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

The first paragraph in Article 172 explain the filiation of legitimate children and it includes the following:

The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment;

An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

And the legitimate filiation shall be proved of the following:

The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

CASE DIGEST

EUGENIO SAN JUAN GERONIMO, Petitioner, v. KAREN SANTOS, Respondent.

G.R. No. 197099, September 28, 2015

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

FACTS: Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo, the defendants, executed a document declaring themselves as the only heirs of spouses Rufino and Caridad Geronimo. Consequently, they took possession and were able to transfer the tax declaration of the subject property to their names.

Karen Santos, on the other hand, claims to be the only child of deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo. She filed a complaint for the annulment of document and recovery of the possession against the defendants, brothers of his father. She alleged that with the death of her parents, the property belonging to her parents was passed on to her by the law of intestacy. 

The defendant denied the allegation that the plaintiff was the only child and sole heir of their brother stating that the deceased Rufino and Caridad were childless and took in as their ward Karen, the child of Caridad’s sister. To strengthen their defense, they claimed that the birth certificate of the plaintiff was a simulated document. The birth certificate had alterations as confirmed by an NSO representative.

They alleged that it is impossible for Rufino and Caridad to register the plaintiff in Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur because they never lived or sojourned in that place. Also, Caridad, an elementary teacher in Bulacan, never filed a maternity leave during the period of her service, as supported by a certification from the Schools Division Superintendent.

The RTC ruled that the respondent is a legitimate child of the putative parents. The trial court found that respondent’s filiation was duly established by the certificate of live birth which was presented in evidence. It dismissed the petitioners’ claim that the certificate was tampered. It further stated that even granting arguendo that the birth certificate is questionable, the filiation of respondent has already been sufficiently proven by evidence of her open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child under Article 172 of the Family Code.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that under Article 170, the action to impugn the legitimacy of the child must be reckoned from either of these two dates: the date the child was born to the mother during the marriage, or the date when the birth of such child was recorded in the civil registry. The appellate court found no evidence or admission that Caridad indeed gave birth to respondent on a specific date.

It further resolved that the birth certificate presented in this case does not qualify as the valid registration of birth in the civil register because it was not signed by the physician or midwife in attendance at the child’s birth or the parents of the newborn child, contrary to what the law required. However, the CA ultimately ruled that the respondent was able to prove her filiation via open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child as supported by secondary evidence presented.

The evidence consists of the following: (1) the plaintiff was allowed by her putative parents to bear their family name Geronimo; (2) they supported her and sent her to school paying for her tuition and other school expenses; (3) she was the beneficiary of the burial benefits of Caridad before the GSIS; (4) after the death of Rufino, Caridad applied for and was appointed legal guardian of the person and property of the plaintiff from the estate left by Rufino; and (5) both Caridad and the plaintiff executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Rufino on the basis of the fact that they are both the legal heirs of the deceased.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in allowing the introduction of secondary evidence and rendered judgement notwithstanding the existence of primary evidence of birth certificate.

RULING: No. Secondary evidence may be admitted only in a direct action under Article 172 because the said provision of law is meant to be instituted as a separate action, and proof of filiation cannot be raised as a collateral issue as in the instant case which is an action for annulment of document and recovery of possession. However, this rule is applicable only to actions where the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child is at issue.

In the case at bar, filiation is not an issue. What petitioner alleges is that the respondent is not a child of the deceased spouses at all. Thus, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals correctly admitted secondary evidence similar to the proof admissible under Art. 172 of the Family Code.

However, the Supreme Court ruled that the lower court’s declaration that the respondent is a legitimate child and sole heir of the deceased spouses is based on misapprehension of facts. The irregularities consisting of the superimposed entries on the date of birth and the name of the informant made the document questionable, as supported by the corroborating testimony of the NSO representative. In addition, even the respondent herself did not offer any evidence to explain such irregularities. These irregularities and the totality of the circumstances surrounding the alleged birth of respondent are sufficient to overthrow the presumption of regularity attached to the respondent’s birth.

With the declaration that the birth certificate is a nullity or falsity ruled then the respondent is not the child of Rufino, and therefore not entitled to inherit from the estate.

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ARTICLE 172 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

The first paragraph in Article 172 explain the filiation of legitimate children and it includes the following:

The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment;

An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

And the legitimate filiation shall be proved of the following:

The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

CASE DIGEST

ANTONIA L. DE JESUS, ET AL., plaintiff-appellant, vs. CESAR SYQUIA, defendant-appellant.

G.R. No. L-39110             November 28, 1933

STREET, J.:

FACTS: Antonia Loanco was hired as cashier in the barbershop of Vicente Mendoza, Cesar Syquia’s brother-in-law. Cesar then courted Antonia, and the latter became pregnant with a baby boy who was born on June 17, 1931. During Antonia’s pregnancy, Cesar was always visiting her. On February 1931, he wrote a letter to the priest who was to christen the baby boy, saying

Rev. Father,

The baby due in June is mine and I should like for my name to be given to it.

He wrote this on the eve of his departure on a trip to China and Japan. While he was abroad, Cesar wrote several letters to Antonia Loanco, showing paternal interest in the situation and cautioning her to keep in good condition in order that junior might be strong. The baby boy, however, was not named Cesar Syquia, Jr., but Ismael Loanco. After giving birth, Cesar took Antonia to a house in Manila, and they lived together for about a year in regular family style. Cesar paid for all the household expenses during their living together. Then Antonia became pregnant for the second time. However, Cesar got married to another woman.

The purpose of the petition filed by Antonia and her mother is to recover from Cesar Php30,000 as damages for the breach of promise to marry, to compel Syquia to recognize Ismael and Pacita (Antonia’s second child) as natural children, and to make him pay for the maintenance of the children worth Php500 per month.

ISSUES:

1. Is the note to the priest a proof of acknowledgment of paternity within the meaning of Article 135 (1) of the (Old) Civil Code?

2. Does the acknowledgment referred to in Article 135 of the Old Civil Code need to be made in a single document?

3. Can Antonia be granted payment for damages because of breach of promise to marry?

RULINGS:

1. Yes. Article 135 (1) states

ART. 135. The father may be compelled to acknowledge his natural child in the following cases:

When an indisputable paper written by him, expressly acknowledging his paternity, is in existence

A child, upon being conceived, becomes a bearer of legal rights and capable of being dealt with as a living person. The problem of the recognition of the child even before he was born is no different from that when he is already born. The words used by Syquia in his letter are not capable of two constructions, and the identity of the baby was clear.

2. No. There is no requirement in the law that the writing shall be addressed to one or any particular individual. The only requirement is that the writing should be indubitable. Thus, the many letters Cesar Syquia wrote may be made proof to his acknowledgment of Ismael Loanco.

3. No. Such promise to marry was not satisfactorily proved and the action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in civil law apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by plaintiff upon the faith of such promise.

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ARTICLE 166 AND 172 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

EXPLANATION ART. 166 - Only the following grounds may be used to question a child's legitimacy:

(1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual relations with his wife during the first 120 days of the 300 days preceding the child's birth because of: (a) the husband's physical inability to have sexual relations with his wife; (b) the husband and wife were living apart in such a way that sexual intercourse was impossible; or (c) the husband's serious illness, which completely prevented sexual intercourse;

(2) That it is proven, except in the case provided in the second paragraph of Article 164, that the child could not have been the husband's for biological or other scientific reasons; or

(3) That, in the case of children conceived by artificial insemination, either parent's written authorization or ratification was obtained by mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence.

EXPLANATION ART. 172 - Any of the following can establish the filiation of legitimate children: (1) A birth record found in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) A declaration of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent in question.

In the absence of the aforementioned evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be established. as demonstrated by:

(1) Continuous and open possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means permitted by the Rules of Court and applicable special laws.

CASE DIGEST

CHUN CHONG on behalf of Chun Lei and Chun Ken, Petitioner-Appellant, vs. THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, Respondent-Appellee.

G.R. No. L-13236 October 21, 1918

JOHNSON, J.:

FACTS: It appears from the record that the said Chun Chong, Chun Lei and Chun Ken arrived at the port of manila on the steamship Loongsang, January 2, 1917, and requested permission to land in the Philippine Islands. They were detained as aliens and their right to land was inquired into by a board of special inquiry. Said board, after hearing the evidence decided ( a) that Chun Chong was a citizen of the United States and was therefore entitled to enter the Philippine Islands; ( b) that Chun Lei and Chun Ken were Chinese aliens, were without the necessary credentials and were not entitled to enter the Philippine Islands. From that conclusion, an appeal was taken to the Insular Collector of Customs, and the decision of the said board was affirmed. later, Chun Chong, on behalf of Chun Lei and Chun Ken, presented a petition for the writ of habeas corpus in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila against the Insular Collector of Customs alleging ( a) that he is a citizen of the United States; ( b) that he is the father of the said Chun Lei and Chun Ken who were, respectively, of the ages of 27 and 20 years; and ( c) that the said children were illegally detained and deprived of their liberty by the Insular Collector of Customs. To the said petition was attached the record made by the Department of Customs.

After a consideration of said record, the lower court reached the conclusion that the decision of the Department of Customs denying the admission of the said Chun Lei and Chun Ken should be and was affirmed. From that decision, the petitioner appealed to this court

ISSUE: Whether or not Chun lei and Chun Ken are the legitimate minor sons of Chun Chong

RULING: Therefore, the judgment of the lower court, as well as that of the Department of Customs, ordering the deportation of Chun Lei and Chun Ken, is hereby revoked and it is hereby ordered and decreed that said persons have a right to enter the territory of the United States, and without any finding as to costs.

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ARTICLE 148 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

EXPLANATION: Only the properties acquired by both parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned in common by them in proportion to their respective contributions in cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article. Their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal in the absence of evidence to the contrary. The same rule and presumption apply to joint deposits of money and credit evidences.

CASE DIGEST

ERLINDA A. AGAPAY, petitioner, vs. CARLINA (CORNELIA) V. PALANG and HERMINIA P. DELA CRUZ, respondents.

G.R. No. 116668 July 28, 1997

ROMERO, J.:

DOCTRINE: Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. 

FACTS: Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage on July 16, 1949 with private respondent Carlina Vallesterol in Pangasinan. A few months after the wedding, Palang left to work in Hawaii and had attempted to divorce Carlina. When he returned for good in 1972, he refused to live with private respondents, instead stayed alone in a house in Pangasinan.

On 1973, the then sixty-three-year-old Miguel contracted his second marriage with nineteen-year-old Erlinda Agapay. The two jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at Pangasinan issued in their names. 

In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of Concubinage upon Carlina’s complaint. Two years later, Miguel died. Carlina Palang and her daughter instituted an action for recovery of ownership and possession with damages against petitioner. Private respondents wants to get the riceland back allegedly purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with petitioner. 

ISSUE: Whether or not the riceland in question is owned by petitioner Erlinda Agapay?

RULING: No, the riceland is not owned by Agapay and should revert to the conjugal partnership property of the deceased Miguel and private respondent Carlina Palang. Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. 

In the case at bar, Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store but failed to persuade us that she actually contributed money to buy the subject riceland. Worth noting is the fact that on the date of conveyance, May 17, 1973, petitioner was only around twenty years of age and Miguel Palang was already sixty-four and a pensioner of the U.S. Government. Considering her youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that in 1973 she contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase price of subject property.

Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the riceland in Binalonan, Pangasinan, we find no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same.

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ARTICLE 125 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Walang kabiyak ang maaring gumawa ng donasyon ng conjugal partnership property kung walang pahintulot ng isa't isa. Maari lamang magbigay ng kaunting donasyon ng conjugal partnership property ng walang pahintulot ng isa't isa kung ito ay ibabahagi sa charity, sa okasyon ng kasiyahan o pagdadalamhati ng pamilya.

CASE DIGEST

FLORDELIZA CALPATURA FLORA, DOMINADOR CALPATURA and TOMAS CALPATURA, JR., Heirs of TOMAS CALPATURA, SR., Petitioners, vs. ROBERTO, ERLINDA, DANIEL, GLORIA, PATRICIO, JR. and EDNA, all surnamed PRADO and NARCISA PRADO, Respondents.

G.R. No. 156879               January 20, 2004

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

FACTS: On December 19, 1959, Patricio Prado, Sr. died leaving a residential land situated in Quezon City. Narcisa subsequently married Bonifacio Calpatura. In order to support her six (6) minor children with her first husband, Narcisa and her brother-in-law, Tomas Calpatura, Sr., executed an Agreement of Purchase and Sale whereby the former agreed to sell to the latter the northern half portion of the property for the sum of P10,500.00. Subsequently, Narcisa executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Tomas over the said property.

Tomas’ daughter, Flordeliza Calpatura Flora, then built a two-storey duplex with firewall on the northern half portion of the property. Respondents, who occupied the southern half portion of the land, did not object to the construction. Likewise, Maximo Calpatura, the son of Tomas’ cousin, built a small house on the northern portion of the property.

On April 8, 1991, respondents filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of sale and delivery of possession of the northern half portion of the subject property against petitioners Flordeliza Calpatura Flora, Dominador Calpatura and Tomas Calpatura, Jr. before the Regional Trial Court. Respondents alleged the following:

The transaction embodied in the Agreement to Purchase and Sale between Narcisa and Tomas was one of mortgage and not of sale;

That Narcisa’s children tried to redeem the mortgaged property but they learned that the blank document which their mother had signed was transformed into a Deed of Absolute Sale;

That Narcisa could not have sold the northern half portion of the property considering that she was prohibited from selling the same within a period of 25 years from its acquisition, pursuant to the condition annotated at the back of the title; 

That Narcisa, as natural guardian of her children, had no authority to sell the northern half portion of the property which she and her children co-owned; and

That only P5,000.00 out of the consideration of P10,500.00 was paid by Tomas.

In their answer, petitioners countered:

That Narcisa owned 9/14 of the property, consisting of ½ as her share in the conjugal partnership with her first husband and 1/7 as her share in the estate of her deceased husband;

That the consideration of the sale in the amount of P10,500.00 had been fully paid as of April 1, 1968;

That Narcisa sold her conjugal share in order to support her minor children;

That Narcisa’s claim was barred by laches and prescription; and

That the Philippine Homesite and Housing Corporation, not the respondents, was the real party in interest to question the sale within the prohibited period.

On April 2, 1997, the court a quo dismissed the complaint upon its finding that: the sale was valid; the Agreement to Purchase and Sale and the Deed of Absolute Sale were duly executed; that the sum of P10,500.00 as selling price for the subject property was fully paid there being no demand for the payment of the remaining balance; that the introduction of improvements thereon by the petitioners was without objection from the respondents; and that Roberto and Erlinda failed to contest the transaction within four years after the discovery of the alleged fraud and reaching the majority age in violation of Article 1391 of the Civil Code.

Petitioners appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. A Decision was then rendered by the Court of Appeals declaring that respondents were co-owners of the subject property, thus the sale was valid only insofar as Narcisa’s 1/7 undivided share thereon was concerned.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. Hence this petition for review.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the subject property is a conjugal or paraphernal property;

Whether or not the transaction is a sale or a mortgage;

Whether or not Narcisa could sell the northern half portion of the property.

RULING:

The property is a conjugal property. Article 160 of the Civil Code, which was in effect at the time the sale was entered into, provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non in order for the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership to operate. In the instant case, while Narcisa testified during cross-examination that she bought the subject property from People’s Homesite Housing Corporation with her own funds, she, however admitted in the Agreement of Purchase and Sale and the Deed of Absolute Sale that the property was her conjugal share with her first husband, Patricio, Sr. A verbal assertion that she bought the land with her own funds is inadmissible to qualify the terms of a written agreement under the parole evidence rule. 

The transaction is a sale. The Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Narcisa in favor of Tomas is contained in a notarized document. A public document executed and attested through the intervention of a notary public is evidence of the facts in a clear, unequivocal manner therein expressed. In order to contradict the presumption of regularity of a public document, evidence must be clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant. It is well-settled that in civil cases, the party that alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. Except for the bare allegation that the transaction was one of mortgage and not of sale, respondents failed to adduce evidence in support thereof. While the deed of sale between Tomas and Narcisa was never registered nor annotated on the title, respondents had knowledge of the possession of petitioners of the northern half portion of the property. Obviously, respondents recognized the ownership of Tomas, petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest.

No. The property being conjugal, upon the death of Patricio Prado, Sr., one-half of the subject property was automatically reserved to the surviving spouse, Narcisa, as her share in the conjugal partnership. Particio’s rights to the other half, in turn, were transmitted upon his death to his heirs, which includes his widow Narcisa, who is entitled to the same share as that of each of the legitimate children. Thus, as a result of the death of Patricio, a regime of co-ownership arose between Narcisa and the other heirs in relation to the property. The remaining one-half was transmitted to his heirs by intestate succession. By the law on intestate succession, his six children and Narcisa Prado inherited the same at one-seventh (1/7) each pro indiviso. Inasmuch as Narcisa inherited one-seventh (1/7) of her husband's conjugal share in the said property and is the owner of one-half (1/2) thereof as her conjugal share, she owns a total of 9/14 of the subject property. Narcisa and her children are deemed co-owners with the subject property. Hence, she could validly convey her total undivided share in the entire property to Tomas. However, while Narcisa could validly sell one half of the subject property, her share being 9/14 of the same, she could not have particularly conveyed the northern portion thereof before the partition, the terms of which was still to be determined by the parties in a partition.

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ARTICLE 116 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

This article is under the Section 3. Conjugal Partnership Property

According to Philippine law, when two people wed, a portion or all of their and their spouse's assets becomes conjugal property. The married couple becomes co-owners of properties owned separately at the time of marriage as well as those accumulated later during the course of their marital relationship.

This article explain that unless proven otherwise, all property acquired during the marriage is presumed to be conjugal, regardless of whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted for, or registered in the name of one or both spouses.

CASE DIGEST

FRANCISCO LIM, Petitioner, vs. EQUITABLE PCI BANK, now known as the BANCO DE ORO UNIBANK, INC.,* Respondent.

G.R. No. 183918               January 15, 2014

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

DOCTRINE: Marriage; Property Relations; Conjugal Property – All property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal, unless it is shown that it is owned exclusively by the husband or the wife; that this presumption is not overcome by the fact that the property is registered in the name of the husband or the wife alone; and that the consent of both spouses is required before a conjugal property may be mortgaged.  This presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved.

FACTS: Petitioner Francisco Lim executed an SPA in favor of his brother Franco to mortgage his share in a property in order to secure a loan. This first loan extended by BDO in 1989 was fully paid by Franco in 1992. However in 1996, Franco and their mother obtained another loan over the same property which they failed to pay.

Respondent Bank tried to foreclose the property due to the non-payment of the loan. Petitioner thus tried to get a TRO and for the foreclosure and to secure a cancellation of the SPA executed in favor of his brother. Petitioner alleged that he did not authorize Franco to mortgage the subject property to respondent and that his signatures in the Real Estate Mortgage and the Surety Agreement were forged.

the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner. It ruled that petitioner was able to prove by preponderance of evidence that he did not participate in the execution of the mortgage contract giving rise to the presumption that his signature was forged.

The CA reversed the RTC Decision. It ruled that petitioner’s mere allegation that his signature in the mortgage contract was forged is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity of the notarized document.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Petitioner was able to prove that the SPA was forged.

2. Whether or not Respondent Bank was failed to exercise due diligence when granting the loan without the signature of Petitioner's wife in the mortgage contract.

RULING:

1. NO. Petitioner was not able to prove that his signature was forged. No evidence was ever presented to prove the allegation: the alleged forged signature was never compared with the genuine signatures of petitioner as no sample signatures were submitted.

2. NO. Respondent exercised due diligence. The nature of the property was never raised as an issue. Hence, the absence of his wife’s signature on the mortgage contract also has no bearing in this case.

All property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal, unless it is shown that it is owned exclusively by the husband or the wife; that this presumption is not overcome by the fact that the property is registered in the name of the husband or the wife alone; and that the consent of both spouses is required before a conjugal property may be mortgaged.  However, we find it iniquitous to apply the foregoing presumption especially since the nature of the mortgaged property was never raised as an issue before the RTC, the CA, and even before this Court. In fact, petitioner never alleged in his Complaint that the said property was conjugal in nature. Hence, respondent had no opportunity to rebut the said presumption.

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ARTICLE 108 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

EXPLANATION: This article explain that the rules on the contract of partnership shall govern the conjugal partnership in everything that is not explicitly determined in this Chapter or by the married people in their marriage settlements.

CASE DIGEST

RAMON C. ONG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, FRANCISCO BOIX and ARSENIO CAMINO AS DEPUTY SHERIFF OF CAMARINES NORTE, respondents.

G.R. No. L-63025 November 29, 1991

PARAS, J.:

FACTS: Teodora Ong is the wife of Ramon Ong, petitioner. She conducted her own logging business. In furtherance of said business, she loaned 2,827.83 from Francisco Boix, private respondent. Due to mismanagement, she defaulted on her obligation. Boix filed a complaint, based on the promissory notes issued by Teodora. Judgment was rendered in favor of Boix, he then moved to execute the judgment. The Sheriff of Camarines Norte (private co-respondent) levied and attached a parcel of land. An auction sale was held and Boix was adjudged the highest bidder and a writ of possession was issued.Ramon filed a motion with the CFI of Manila to quash the writ of possession and was denied. He then brought the case to the CA to annul the auction sale, alleging that the property is conjugal and thus could not be held liable for personal debts contracted by the wife. The CA found that the subject property is paraphernal property, it was declared in the name of Teodora Ong, while the house erected thereon was declared in the name of Ramon Ong and Teodora Ong.

ISSUE: Whether the parcel of land is exclusive property of the wife or part of the conjugal partnership.

RULING: Yes, it is exclusive property. The mere use of the husband’s surname in the tax declaration is not sufficient proof that the said property was acquired during the marriage and therefore conjugal. It is undisputed that the parcel of land was declared solely in the wife’s name but the house built thereon was declared in the name of the spouses. When the property is registered in the name of the spouse only and there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by said spouse, this is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse. The party who invokes the presumption that all property of the marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage.

Under Art. 117 of the Civil Code, the wife is entitled to engage in business although the husband may object. The wife’s exclusive (paraphernal) properties, as well as those of their conjugal partnership, shall be liable for obligations incurred by the wife in the course of her business.

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ARTICLE 95 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Anomang pagkatalo o mawala sa mag asawa sa pamamagitang ng huwego o paligsahan o pag pusta katulad ng betting, sweepstakes o anumang uri ng sugal, ito man ay may permisyon o wala ng batas ay hindi sagutin ng komunidad kundi sagutin ng kungsinoman ang natalo ngunit anoman pagkapanalo ay magiging kabahagi ang community property.

CASE DIGEST

TEOFISTA P. TINITIGAN, EFREN TINITIGAN, ELSA TINITIGAN and SEVERINO TINITIGAN, JR., petitioners, vs. SEVERINO TINITIGAN, SR. and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

G.R. No. L-45418 October 30, 1980

MAKASIAR, J.:

FACTS: Payuran and her 3 children leased to United Elec Corp a factory building with the land. The consent of Tinitigan Sr. (husband of Payuran) was not secured. Consequently he filed a complaint for Annulment of Ownership & Contract of Lease at CFI Rizal. The complaint was later amended to include “restrain defendants from encumbering or disposing property in the name of Molave Development Corp & those in their name as husband and wife. Te court enjoined Payuran from doing any act to dispose the property. The case was then set for hearing primarily on the the issue of preliminary injunction. The contract of lease was settled amicably. However Tinitigan Sr. sought judicial approval of sale of 2 rented house and lot which are conjugal which was tenanted by Quintin Lim. The court granted. An MR was filed by Payuran because allegedly the Loring property is suitable for condo site therefore command a higher price. Two days thereafter, Payuran filed a legal separation case at CFI Pasay. The parties agreed to the continuation of the administration of the conjugal property by Payuran subject to certain conditions, one of which the Loring property shall be subject to the decision of CFI Rizal. Meanwhile Judge of CFI Rizal denied petitioners MR for lack of merit. They appealed but was denied on the ground that the order appealed from is merely interlocutory. Payuran and children then filed a petition for certiorari at the CA which affirmed the same, hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court where respondent Judge (judge of CFI Rizal) sits did not acquire jurisdiction over the Loring property hence cannot grant authority to sell.

RULING: CFI Rizal did acquire jurisdiction over the Loring property. The amended complaint prayed among others to restrain defendant from encumbering or disposing of the property. This in effect brings the Loring property under the jurisdiction of the court (CFI Rizal). Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law. It is determined by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. It cannot be made dependent upon the defenses. The Filing of the legal separation case after the order of denial is a tactical maneuver to frustrate the order. The administration of property is given to Payuran but such is not absolute. It was subject to a condition. The CFI Pasay even recognized the jurisdiction primarily acquired by CFI Rizal. Jurisdiction once acquired continue until the case is finally terminated.

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ARTICLE 60 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Ang legal na pag hihiwalay ay hindi ibabase sa anumang istupulasyon ng katunayan o pag amin.

EXPLANATION: This Article explains that any admission or confession made by the defendant outside of court is admissible as evidence. It simply prohibits a divorce decree based on a confession of judgment. Confession of judgment occurs when the defendant appears in court and admits the plaintiff's right to judgment or files a pleading expressly agreeing to the plaintiff's demand.

CASE DIGEST

JOSE DE OCAMPO, petitioner, vs. SERAFINA FLORENCIANO, respondent.

G.R. No. L-13553             February 23, 1960

BENGZON, J.:

FACTS: The record shows that on July 5, 1955, the complaint for legal separation was filed. As amended, it described their marriage performed in 1938, and the commission of adultery by Serafina, in March 1951 with Jose Arcalas, and in June 1955 with Nelson Orzame. Because the defendant made no answer, the court defaulted her, and pursuant to Art. 101 above, directed the provincial fiscal to investigate whether or not collusion existed between the parties. The fiscal examined the defendant under oath, and then reported to the Court that there was no collusion. The plaintiff presented his evidence consisting of the testimony of Vicente Medina, Ernesto de Ocampo, Cesar Enriquez, Mateo Damo, Jose de Ocampo and Capt. Serafin Gubat. ART. 100.—The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, a legal separation cannot be claimed by either of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition.

ART. 101.—No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not a collusion between the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.

ISSUE: Whether or not Art 101 completely prohibits decree of legal separation upon confession or stipulation of facts.

RULING: No. As we understand the article, it does not exclude, as evidence, any admission or confession made by the defendant outside of the court. It merely prohibits a decree of separation upon a confession of judgment. Confession of judgment usually happens when the defendant appears in court and confesses the right of plaintiff to judgment or files a pleading expressly agreeing to the plaintiff’s demand.

Yet, even supposing that the above statement of defendant constituted practically a confession of judgment, inasmuch as there is evidence of the adultery independently of such statement, the decree may and should be granted, since it would not be based on her confession, but upon evidence presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based exclusively or mainly on defendant’s confession. If a confession defeats the action ipso facto, any defendant who opposes the separation will immediately confess judgment, purposely to prevent it. The mere circumstance that defendants told the Fiscal that she “like also” to be legally separated from her husband, is no obstacle to the successful prosecution of the action. When she refused to answer the complaint, she indicated her willingness to be separated. Yet, the law does not order the dismissal. Allowing the proceeding to continue, it takes precautions against collusion, which implies more than consent or lack of opposition to the agreement.

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ARTICLE 42 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

EXPLANATION: The later marriage alluded to in the previous Article shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the absent spouse's affidavit of reappearance, unless there is a judgment annulling or declaring the previous marriage void ab initio.

At the request of any interested person, a sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined if such fact is disputed.

CASE DIGEST

CELERINA J. SANTOS, Petitioner, v. RICARDO T. SANTOS, Respondent.

G.R. No. 187061, October 08, 2014

LEONEN, J.:

FACTS: Petitioner Maria Teresa and respondent Rodolfo De La Fuente, Jr. (Rodolfo) first met when they were students at the University of Sto. Tomas. Soon thereafter, they became sweethearts. While they were still sweethearts, Maria Teresa already noticed that Rodolfo was an introvert and was prone to jealousy. She also observed that Rodolfo appeared to have no ambition in life and felt insecure of his siblings, who excelled in their studies and careers. Maria Teresa and Rodolfo got married and had two children.

Rodolfo’s attitude worsened as they went on with their marital life. He was jealous of everyone who talked to Maria Teresa, and would even skip work at his family’s printing press to stalk her. Rodolfo’s jealousy was so severe that he once poked a gun at his own 15-year old cousin who was staying at their house because he suspected his cousin of being Maria Teresa’s lover. In addition, Rodolfo treated Maria Teresa like a sex slave. They would have sex four (4) or five (5) times a day. One day, the couple quarreled because Rodolfo suspected that Maria Teresa was having an affair. In the heat of their quarrel, Rodolfo poked a gun at Maria Teresa’s head. Maria Teresa, with their two (2) daughters in tow, left Rodolfo and their conjugal home after the gun poking incident. Maria Teresa never saw Rodolfo again after that, and she supported their children by herself. Maria Teresa filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Teresa and Rodolfo should be nullified based on psychological incapacity.

RULING: Yes. The 1995 case of Santos v. Court of Appeals was the first case that attempted to lay down the standards for determining psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Santos declared that “psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.” Furthermore, the incapacity “should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.” Dr. Lopez’s testimony, as corroborated by petitioner, sufficiently proved that respondent suffered from psychological incapacity. Respondent’s paranoid personality disorder made him distrustful and prone to extreme jealousy and acts of depravity, incapacitating him to fully comprehend and assume the essential obligations of marriage.

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ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Ang Artikulo 36 ay nagpapaliwanag na ang kasal ng dalawang tao na wala sa wastong pag-iisip o may kakulangan sa pag iisip ay walang bisa kahit pa ito ay nalaman na lamang sa pagkatapos ng seremonya ng kasal.

CASE DIGEST

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. REGHIS M. ROMERO II and OLIVIA LAGMAN ROMERO, Respondents.

G.R. No. 209180 February 24, 2016

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:

Reghis and Olivia were married on May 11, 1972 at the Mary the Queen Parish in San Juan City and were blessed with two (2) children, namely, Michael and Nathaniel, born in 1973 and 1975, respectively. The couple first met in Baguio City in 1971 when Reghis helped Olivia and her family who were stranded along Kennon Road. Since then, Reghis developed a closeness with Olivia’s family, especially with the latter’s parents who tried to play matchmakers for Reghis and Olivia. In the desire to please Olivia’s parents, Reghis courted Olivia and, eventually, they became sweethearts.

Reghis was still a student at the time, determined to finish his studies and provide for the financial needs of his siblings and parents. Thus, less than a year into their relationship, Reghis tried to break-up with Olivia because he felt that her demanding attitude would prevent him from reaching his personal and family goals. Olivia, however, refused to end their relationship and insisted on staying with Reghis at the latter’s dormitory overnight. Reghis declined and, instead, made arrangements with his friends so that Olivia could sleep in a female dormitory. The next day, Reghis brought Olivia home and while nothing happened between them the previous night, Olivia’s parents believed that they had eloped and planned for them to get married. Reghis initially objected to the planned marriage as he was unemployed and still unprepared. However, Olivia’s parents assured him that they would shoulder all expenses and would support them until they are financially able. As Olivia’s parents had treated him with nothing but kindness, Reghis agreed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the RTC's declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity.

RULING: Yes, in a Decision dated November 5, 2008, the RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage between Reghis and Olivia null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. It relied on the findings and testimony of Dr. Basilio, holding that Reghis suffered from a disorder that rendered him unable to perform the obligations of love, respect and fidelity towards Olivia as it gave him a strong obsession to succeed in his career, to the exclusion of his responsibilities as a father and husband. It also concurred with Dr. Basilio’s observation that Reghis is still deeply attached to his parents and siblings such that he pursues his business ventures for their benefit. Likewise, it agreed that Reghis’ behavioral disorder existed even before his marriage or even his adolescent years and that the same is incurable.

Anent the issue of res judicata, the RTC remarked that there is no identity of causes of action between the petitions previously filed, which ascribed psychological incapacity on Olivia’s part, and the present case which is brought on the ground of Reghis’ own psychological incapacity.

The Republic and Olivia moved for reconsideration, which was, however, denied by the RTC in a Resolution dated July 3, 2009. Undaunted, both appealed29 to the CA.

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ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Ang Artikulo 26 ay nagsasaad na ang kasal na ginanap sa labas ng bansa (Pilipinas) ay nakapaloob sa batas kung saang bansa naganap ang kasal at mananatiling balido at may bisa din sa Pilipinas maliban sa mga nabanggit sa Artikulo 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 at 38.

Ang kasal ng isang Pilipina o Pilipino sa ibang lahi ay may bisa at kung napag desisyunan nila na mag hiwalay at ang kanilang legal na paghihiwalay ang ginanap sa ibang bansa at ang asawa na ibang lahi ang nag pawalang bisa ng kasal ang Pilipina o Pilipino ay may karapatan muli na magpakasal.

CASE DIGEST

In the Matter of the Claim for Attorney’s Fees. CLARO M. RECTO, claimant-Appellee, vs. ESPERANZA P. DE HARDEN and FRED M. HARDEN, Defendants-Appellants.

G.R. No. L-6897.  November 29, 1956

CONCEPCION, J.:

FACTS: Esperanza Harden contracted the legal services of Atty. Claro M. Recto as embodied in the Contract of Professional Services entered into between them. it is in connection with the action which she intended to file against her husband Fred M. Harden for the purpose of securing an increase in the amount of support being received by her from the conjugal partnership of her and said Fred M. Harden, and for the purpose likewise of protecting and preserving her rights in the properties of the said conjugal partnership in contemplation of the divorce suit which she intent to file against him in the competent Court of California and of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership between them.

Pursuant to the agreement, Atty. Recto commenced a civil action against Fred Harden in the CFI of Manila. As prayed for in the complaint, the court issued the writ of preliminary injunction against Fred restraining him from disposing the assets of the conjugal partnership in fraud of Esperanza. Subsequently, Japanese forces invaded the Philippines and placed the latter under military occupation. During the liberation the records of the case were destroyed but the same were reconstituted at the instance of Atty. Recto. Thereafter, the CFI rendered a decision in favor of Esperanza to which Fred appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Contract of Professional Services (CPS) is void.

RULING: The contention that the contract is in violation of Articles 1304, 1352 and 1409 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is not tenable. It is not borne out either by the language of the contract between them or by the intent of the parties thereto. Its purpose was not to secure a divorce or to facilitate or promote the procurement of a divorce. It merely sought to protect the interest of Mrs. Harden in the conjugal partnership, during the pendency of a divorce suit she intended to file in the United States.

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ARTICLE 1 OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Ang Article 1 ay tumutukoy sa kahalagahan at importansya ng kasal. Nakasaad sa artikulo na ito na ang pagpapakasal ay isang permanenteng pag iisang dibdib ng babae at lalaki at dito mag sisimula ang pagbuo at ang pundasyon ng pamilya. Ipinapahayag din sa Artikulo na ito ang mga kahihinatnan at mga insidente na tumutukoy sa isang pamilya na nakapaloob sa batas.

CASE DIGEST:

OMASA VDA. DE JACOB, as Special Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Deceased Alfredo E. Jacob, petitioner

VS.

COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO PILAPIL, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS for the Province of Camarines Sur, and JUAN F. TRIVINO as publisher of "Balalong," respondents.

G. R. No. 135216 August 19, 1999

Topic: Adoption and Custody of minors

DOCTRINE:

The contents of a document may be proven by competent evidence other than the document itself, provided that the offeror establishes its due execution and its subsequent loss or destruction. Accordingly, the fact of marriage may be shown by extrinsic evidence other than the marriage contract.

FACTS:

Plaintiff-appellant claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and was named Special Administratix for the deceased's various estates under a reconstructed Marriage Contract.

On the other side, defendant-appellee Pedro Pilapil claimed to be Alfredo's legally adopted son. He presented to the court a copy of a decree of adoption, signed by a judge.

Pilapil claims that the marriage between petitioner and Dr. Alfredo Jacob was null and void from the start because there was no marriage license or ceremony. On the other hand, petitioner claims that their marriage was allegedly solemnized in the 1970s.

However, she was unable to produce the original copy of the Marriage Contract, claiming that it was misplaced when the solemnizing priest allegedly gave it to Jose Centenera for registration.

Based on the evidence presented, the trial court ruled for Pilapil sustaining his claim as the legally adopted child and sole heir of deceased Alfredo and declaring the reconstructed Marriage Contract as spurious and non-existent. CA affirmed trial court’s ruling.

ISSUE:

Whether defendant Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of Alfredo E. Jacob.(NO)

RULING:

No, he is not. The burden of proof in establishing adoption falls on the individual alleging such a relationship, which Pilapil did not satisfy.

The key in resolving this controversy is the establishment of authenticity of Judge Moya’s signature.

During his deposition, Judge Moya said that he did not recall issuing the Order of Adoption. In addition, he categorically stated that the signature therein was not his. Despite having glaucoma, Judge Moya was able to read the newspapers and even read the document shown to him by the defense counsel.

This declaration was backed by the testimony of a handwriting expert, who determined that the disputed signature and Judge Moya's regular signature were not written by the same individual.

Also, Pilapil's actions indicated that he did not acknowledge his own supposed adoption, as shown by the documents he signed and subsequent acts.

There was no evidence that Alfredo Jacob considered him as an adopted child. Similarly, according to public records, there was no record of Pedro Pilapil being adopted by Dr. Jacob.