#as both a response to clement's procastination and as better fitting that sort of dogmatic idiosyncracy

[fideidefenswhore]

I hope this isn't stupid, but did Henry really do the Great Matter the right way? I just feel if he'd used a normal argument instead of making it a religion problem it'd be easier for him. If he said "I have no son, so I want to make a new marriage and get one, to protect my people from war" then wasn't that a reason other kings had, and they got annulments? That would be just a fact and everyone at the time knew no son had problems. Sure Catherine would still fight but she couldn't really say he was wrong. But instead if he says it's all Leviticus and God's mad it gives her the out to say she never slept with Arthur so God's not counting that as a real marriage. Then Henry has to say she's lying and so she looks the injured party and right to be offended, and nobody knows what to believe so it just drags out hoping someone dies.

Precedentially and in hindsight, making it a "religion problem" might not have been the best course; but I think it was genuinely his belief and also he had been so highly respected as "Defender of the Faith" (literally) up to that point that he saw an opportunity for fame and acclaim in (what he believed to be) the "righteousness" of his case, and a way to shore up the image, power, and prestige of the English monarchy; even when it became clear it would be one from a position of defiance. We have to place his belief in the context of his acclaim as a scholar and theologian up through the 1520s...it was bold, but so was Henry, and while the common narrative is that his case was facile; after further reading I found that to be reductive:

"In Henry’s obsession with an idiosyncratic interpretation of natural law and his apparent indifference to the strength of his own case on Deuteronomy we may discern a litigant who seems determined to snatch defeat from the jaws of possible victory. Nevertheless it is hard to resist the conclusion that the biblical texts themselves support Henry’s claim that his marriage contravened divine law as expounded by Moses. [...] In the field of legal codes Henry’s view, whether treated as a matter of divine or human law, held a strong position. Among other examples the Council of Neo-Caesarea and the regional Council of Agde followed the Levitical injunction by forbidding the marriage of men to their brothers’ widows. Faced with such arguments, Bishop Fisher usually asserted that the prohibitions did not specifically forbid all dispensations – yet nor did they specifically allow any. As on the Leviticus/Deuteronomy dilemma, Fisher reasoned that in cases of ambiguity the pope should interpret the matter. Yet such a papal interpretation had been given by Innocent III in a rider to his judgement on the Livonian issue discussed below: that, whatever the validity of pagan marriages to which the Deuteronomical exception might apply, a man’s marriage to the widow of a deceased childless brother should not be permitted to baptised Christians." HADWIN JF. Leviticus, Deuteronomy and Henry VIII. The Journal of Ecclesiastical History. 2019

I don't think there's really anything he could've done to assure a 'secure' outcome, tbh (besides the possible counterfactual of applying for an annulment circa, say, 1520 rather than 1527, he did seem to have a better understanding and alliance with Leo X). The final judgement from Clement was that Henry had lived too long in matrimony with Catherine by principle of the dispensation granted to be able to legitimately protest the dispensation.

Precedent ran against Henry in the specific matter of Popes erasing former dispensations. That was not something they had done; but arguably Popes did reverse decisions of their predecessors in other matters, or sometimes reverse their own decisions-- there are many cases, for instance, of Popes granting annulments and then reversing them. This can make better sense of Henry's decision to reify the legitimacy of both his annulment with Catherine and his marriage with Anne via Parliament, even before the Pope has made declaration (because, even if he had made one in his favour, it might not have stuck...the sands were always shifting, too, even if, say, Clement had died without declaration and his successor had been an anti-Imperial candidate, like the later Paul IV, that did rule in his favour, was it not possible he himself would die and his successor reverse that decision? It is plausible to consider, also, a counterfactual where Henry made his application late 1525 or 1526, had it granted January 1527, and Imperial troops stormed as they did by May, pressurizing Clement to reverse...):

"And here it must be acknowledged that, while a substantial case could be built to support Henry’s challenge on the issue of the bull, the fact of that issue had significantly changed the situation and the canonical context within which it might be viewed. On the question of possible rescission of the bull the critics seem to have been right: on balance, precedent would appear to run against the king. Neither a dissolution nor an annulment would seem likely to have been granted. No previous marriage had been ended on the grounds that a pope had acted ultra vires; nor, as David d’Avray notes, ‘was any dispensation to my knowledge … ever revoked because the alleged political ills that it was meant to cure were later shown to be imaginary’. The application of the principle of dissimulatio – the turning of a blind eye to the legal weaknesses of a long-standing union in view of the greater good that would accrue by leaving well alone – could also have favoured the queen’s cause; a similar canonical rule held that ‘doubtful cases ought to be resolved in favour of the marriage’. Most significant of all might be the maxim asserted by Gilles Bellemère in the count of Armagnac’s case, that if the pope asks for advice before taking action, he should be told that the dispensation should not be granted; however, if he has already acted, then he should not be opposed. Thus, even if Henry had succeeded in convincing an impartial court of the impropriety of Julius II’s granting the dispensation, all [of his] lengthy campaign might well have gained him not that triumphant solution for which he had striven but merely the cold comfort of a Pyrrhic victory." HADWIN JF. Leviticus, Deuteronomy and Henry VIII. The Journal of Ecclesiastical History. 2019

And, that's actually a misconception; it was probably the predominant of his arguments/case, but hardly the only one or aspect:

"Like many other litigants, Henry adopted a ‘scatter-fire’ approach to his task of seeking an annulment, attacking a vast array of targets, hoping that at least one shot might reach its mark. His opponents tended to follow suit, thus a comprehensive analysis of each pellet might seem desirable to do the parties full justice. This has not been attempted in the present study. Instead it has seemed best to concentrate on three of the most serious and most often cited defences of the queen’s case, those based on the questions Henry asked of the universities in 1530-1, thus setting the agenda for the debate. The first of these was that, while forbidden by the texts of Leviticus, marriage to a brother’s widow was prohibited by the Church only if the previous marriage had been consummated, whereas Katherine insisted that she came to Henry 'virgo intacta'. Secondly, it was argued that the Levitical prohibition should be interpreted as being limited by the command in Deuteronomy requiring a man to marry a childless brother’s widow, exactly what Henry had done. Lastly, the king’s critics cited a number of what they considered relevant precdents for the dispensation granted to Henry and Katherine by papal bull in 1503.

Each [argument of the Queen's side] appears to have serious weaknesses. The strict application of canonical procedures in the case would appear to favour a verdict that Arthur and Katherine had indeed consummated their union. On Deuteronomy, not only had the Church generally regarded the command as obsolete and inapplicable to Christians but the contentious verse does not on close examination cover Henry’s case at all. Finally, none of the oft-cited papal dispensations involved a clear-cut breach of the Levitical injunctions: the bull really does seem to have broken new ground and might not have been issued had all the facts been known." HADWIN JF. Leviticus, Deuteronomy and Henry VIII. The Journal of Ecclesiastical History. 2019

Royals being anti or pro papal tended to be a matter of political timing, and this wasn't unique to Henry VIII. Hell, Mary I's spouse was excommunicated (not just threatened with excommunication, as her father had been circa the Great Matter era) by Paul IV because he had sent the Duke of Alva to occupy the papal states in retaliation for his alliance with France, and deprived her councilor and Archbishop of Cantebury, Reginald Pole, of his legateship and ordered him to return to Rome to answer charges of heresy ; and she chose to defend them rather than repudiate them in kind.

So, for the matter of claiming Catherine wasn't a virgin when he married her...I don't think he anticipated that she'd confess otherwise to Campeggio and unseal the confession; or use the trial of Blackfriars for the opportunity to repeat her own claim otherwise and then refuse to attend the rest of the hearing of evidence. For the hearing in Dunstable in 1533, she refused to attend, as well, and so did her supporters, so there's some revionism in the narrative that the Henrician side of the divide refused to hear her own evidence and supporters. They clearly did not regard it highly; arguably they gave it short shrift, but the political tactic of refusing to acknowledge the legitimacy of any proceedings or hearings outside strict papal jurisdiction (not that all of Catherine's supporters adhered so strictly to that, when it suited them...see: Trial of Zaragoza) by Catherine and her supporters precludes the accusation, reified by Marian Parliament, that Henry and Cranmer "refused to hear evidence" from oppostion. This was a convenient fiction, underrating agency and choice and emphasizing a narrative of corruption vs "godly truth".

But at the same time, I think that aspect of it was a matter of principle for both of them and yet a nothingburger both legally and politically: it was impossible to prove or disprove. There was ambiguity on the matter because the dispensaton covered any possibility ("forsan"); even Clement's declaration did not really fully vindicate her side because he didn't comment on the matter of her virginity upon her marriage to Henry. It was, ultimately, a non sequitur. Henry pursued it because he vehemently believed it was true, and that the proof was in his deceased children by the marriage, that they had died because of the Levitical 'curse', for lack of better word...

And Henry had legal/canonical precedent on his side (see excerpt from JF Hadwin's excellent article on the case above, and this one: "[...] the canonical procedures for determining non-consummation suits would have worked against her. As in any such dispute, witnesses were questioned. Not surprisingly, their stories differed according to their nationality: like the decisions of the universities this was a case of what Hans Thieme delightfully described as cuius regio, eius opinio. English ones remembered a raunchy young prince boasting of his having ‘been this night in the midst of Spain’. Most of the interrogation records of the queen’s Spanish servants have been lost, but they seem to have agreed with the implications of the leading questions that they were fed by recollecting only an immature wimp. Canonical rules, however, held that in such controversies, the husband’s view was to be preferred to the wife’s. Furthermore, in the absence of sound evidence to the contrary, in any marriage that had lasted more than a few days, consummation [would] be presumed. This is why neither Mendoza, the Spanish ambassador, nor his successor, Chapuys, was enthusiastic about Katherine’s claim and probably why Campeggio felt relief that the question was not to be argued at Rome. As Gardiner had warned the queen earlier, presumption would run against her: rightly or wrongly, in any court operating under standard canonical rules and procedures, she would probably have lost this argument."), but not circumstance.

My unpopular judgement is that Henry was actually far more judicious in his timing of the Great Matter than he's given credit for; as early as 1529 he's saying he's "about to undertake the annates", he delays the cessation of paying the annates until Easter 1533; he waits to pass the Act of Kings alone nominating Archbishops and consecrating bishops until Cranmer is elected Archbishop by the Pope (a fait accompli, because it does mean that Cranmer's annulment of his marriage can be viewed as an act of the papacy, by extension; and forces Clement's hand...arguably this backfired, but not fully, he did not excommunicate Cranmer, probably because doing that to someone he had so recently promoted would call his judgement into question); and he doesn't pass the Act in Absolute Restraint of Annates until 1534, after Clement declares for the validity of his marriage with Catherine. Was the timing different (annates are forbidden by law irrevocably, and then Clement declared for the marriage), one could argue otherwise (that Henry had been too hasty); but Clement could've secured annates from England for the rest of Henry's reign had he done the opposite, or possibly delayed their total annihilation had he just continued to not declare on the matter.