#also effects saudi & emirati influence on the country

[mariacallous]

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s appearance at the Arab League summit on May 19 capped a monthslong effort to reintegrate the dictator, and his country, into the politics and economics of the Middle East. This process wasn’t encouraged by the United States, which continued to oppose Assad—but      it wasn’t exclusively the product of a decline in U.S. influence in the region relative to China and Russia, either. Instead, it’s been the result of a shift in priorities among countries in the region. Though some regional actors, primarily Qatar, object to mending ties with the regime, others, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), are shifting towards pragmatism after years of funding anti-Assad militias.

Some nations in the region, such as Oman and Iraq, never cut ties with the Assad regime. Of those who did, the UAE began its campaign for normalization back in 2018, when it reopened its embassy in Damascus, Syria’s capital. Jordan has also made its own efforts to work with Syria on border security, but the greater wealth and regional power of Saudi Arabia and the UAE confer proportionate influence on regional dynamics; the Saudi government in Riyadh invited Assad to the Arab League summit and may be pushing Cairo to normalize its own ties to Damascus, though there has been regional pushback on both fronts.

“At a time in which Arab states such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia are asserting their autonomy from Washington and diversifying their partnerships on the international stage, Abu Dhabi [UAE] and Riyadh’s relationships with Russia are increasingly important to the Emirati and Saudi leadership,” said Giorgio Cafiero, the CEO of Gulf State Analytics. “Normalizing relations with Syria serves to bring these [Gulf Cooperation Council] members closer to Moscow, but of course this is not their only motivation for warming up to Damascus.”

Indeed, rather than merely being the proxy battleground of a 21st-century Cold War with the United States on one side and Russia and China on the other, the Syrian regime is at the center of questions of regional stability and security, on a range of issues from the drug trade to managing relations with Iran.

Assad has been internationally isolated since the regime began ruthlessly cracking down on its domestic uprising during the Arab Spring; but its isolation became more pronounced in 2019, when the United States enacted the Caesar sanctions, which targeted individuals and entities doing business with the regime, including in the petroleum and natural gas industries. Syria’s economy was in deep distress by 2020, with an estimated 80 percent of people living in poverty and 40 percent unemployed, according to New York Times reporting. The effect of sanctions, a decade of war and a terrorist insurgency, and regional economic crisis had decimated Syria’s economy.

The spiraling economy and isolation made way for Syria’s illicit captagon trade and cemented the influence of Iran and Russia.

A 2022 report from the New Lines Institute on Jordan’s attempts to normalize relations with Syria detailed the challenges of those efforts, particularly in relation to the captagon trade. Though accurate details about captagon production and trade are difficult to determine, the drug likely brings in billions for the regime. Assad and his network, including many members of his family, control captagon production; then, smugglers take it through a variety of routes, including through Jordan, to markets in the Gulf countries.

“What the actual figure is is difficult to estimate, but I would say [what] the Assad regime gets to their own pockets is, I believe, no less than a billion dollars, while the market value of that industry could be over $10 billion,” Karam Shaar, an independent analyst on Syria’s politics and economy, said. “However you look at it, this actually exceeds Syria’s legal exports. That’s playing a pivotal role in the way countries in the region are looking at Syria and how to deal with it.”

The counterfeit captagon makes its way throughout the region. It travels primarily through Jordan and Lebanon, but Saudi Arabia reported the highest number of seizures from 2015 to 2019—in 2019, nearly 146 million tablets, compared to 23 million in Jordan, the next highest reported amount, according to a 2021 UN report. Though Arab nations may hope to control the illicit captagon trade through negotiations with Damascus and investing in a licit Syrian economy, there’s no reason to believe that the Assad regime is willing to give up what has become lucrative business, should widespread normalization be on the horizon.

Wealthy Gulf nations and the countries that rely on them may also try to blunt Iran’s influence over Syria and in the region, by mending ties with Damascus and working with Tehran. But, as Aron Lund, a fellow at Century International and Middle East analyst at the Swedish Defense Research Agency said, this isn’t the first time they’ve made such attempts.

“There were repeated attempts to ‘flip’ Syria, before the war, to move away from Iran and into the Saudi-led sphere,” Lund said in an interview. But the nations attempting that maneuver “were just frustrated, time and time again, and I think probably they realize at this point, first of all, that Assad is not going to budge on core issues like Iran. He needs Iran; he’s not going to step away from Iran. And he’s not going to be a reliable negotiator that delivers everything that he promises to do.”

Iran and Syria have made strange bedfellows for decades; though the hard-line Islamic Republic and the nominally secular Assad regime may superficially have little in common, they have long shared similar ideologies regarding Israel and the United States and both countries’ influence in the region overall. The Syrian civil war has shown the strength of that relationship and its importance to the survival of the Assad regime.

Iran provided Syria with military assistance against Israel in 1982, kicking off the longstanding interdependence between the two nations. Iran provided the Syrian regime with weapons, training, and other military assistance against Israel and, throughout the civil war, opposition forces. Meanwhile, Syria is a key transport route to get weapons and supplies to Hezbollah, the Iran-supported Shia militia based in southern Lebanon.

In 2006, the two countries signed a mutual defense pact, which at the time seemed little more than show; however, during the Syrian civil war, assistance from Iran and Russia has proven to be devastatingly useful to the Assad regime. Prior to the war, Iran also took advantage of Syria’s opening economy, investing billions in infrastructure and other projects there in 2007. Iran extended a $1 billion line of credit to Syria in 2015, and $3.6 billion in 2013 to buy goods such as fuel and consumer products, including food, Reuters reported.

Iran is again investing in Syria; the two nations signed multi-year agreements related to infrastructure and trade earlier this month. As one of the key factors keeping the Assad regime intact and in power over the past 12 years, Iran’s primacy of place in Syria is unlikely to change.

“Iran is deeply embedded,” Natasha Hall, a senior fellow with the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said. “They’re not going anywhere.”

Other countries might in the future see opportunities to make money rebuilding in Syria, after more than a decade of war as well as February’s devastating earthquakes in both Turkey and Syria, which reduced much of the country to rubble. The UAE in particular may see opportunities for construction projects.

Ultimately the political stability that Saudi Arabia and the UAE are seeking from Assad will come in the form of autocracy, which has now been cemented as the regional norm. Though leaders such as Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi aren’t mass murderers like Assad, none of the countries seeking to renew ties with Syria are democracies. In a sense, welcoming Assad back into the fold marks, with grave and craven finality, the end of the Arab Spring.

But there are still countries in the region that have yet to welcome Assad. Qatar and Egypt, in particular, have their own specific and dynamic reasons for ambivalence toward Syria.

Qatar is the most significant—that is, the wealthiest—stumbling block to Syria’s regional reintegration. As Cafiero noted in a recent piece for the Stimson Center, Qatar certainly seems keen to preserve its relationship with the United States and the broader West, hence its position on Syria. But Qatar also vocally and practically supported anti-Assad forces. It’s also less likely to bow to pressure from Gulf powers after the UAE initiated a blockade against it in 2017; that crisis was resolved in 2021, but Qatar came out of it more closely aligned with the United States, Cafiero wrote. Still, pressure from Turkey and Iran could eventually push Qatar to accept reconciliation with Syria down the line.

As for Egypt, Sisi “doesn’t seem to have clearly defined objectives in seeking to normalize relations with Assad, but Cairo has been uncomfortable for some time with the idea of a regional regime being ostracized for authoritarian rule and committing brutalities,” Dareen Khalifa, senior Syria analyst at the International Crisis Group, wrote in an email. “That said, Sisi has been keen not to take unilateral steps toward Assad (which is part of his overall cautious foreign policy approach that aims to maintain a balancing act with all key regional and international actors).”

Egypt may also try to extract funding from its Saudi and Emirati benefactors in exchange for renewing relations with Assad; though Egyptian officials have met with their Syrian counterparts, there’s been no official announcement about what the outcome of those meetings will be.

The United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union have clearly stated that they’re not interested in a relationship with Damascus and won’t remove sanctions. But they’re not going to stop other countries from renewing ties either, diplomats in the MENA region have reported, even though there is as yet no plan to pursue an agreement ending the war.

For Assad, the normalization trend legitimizes his criminal, repressive rule, and although there are reportedly some expectations on the table for renewing ties—that the regime will stem the captagon flow, repatriate refugees, manage violence at the borders, and move away from Iran’s orbit—there are currently no milestones, no timeline, no metrics for success, and no enforcement mechanisms to ensure the regime makes any changes in its behavior toward either its neighbors or the Syrian people.

The Assads—both Bashar and his father Hafez, the previous president—have terrorized generations of Syrians, with no long-term consequences and no justice for murdered, tortured, and displaced people.

Under Hafez al-Assad, government forces killed as many as      40,000 people      in the 1982 siege on the city of Hama;     thousands of people were disappeared or held as political prisoners and tortured in the notorious Tadmor military prison. There has still been no fact-finding mission and no effort      toward justice for the victims and their families. Under Bashar al-Assad, it’s estimated that half a million people have been killed and 6.9 million people displaced internally; approximately 14.6 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance; and in May alone, the Syrian Network for Human Rights recorded at least 226 arbitrary arrests, including of women and children.

With Arab countries taking a pragmatic approach and the rest of the world essentially turning its back, the chance of accountability and lasting peace for Syria’s people is as good as nonexistent. While some Syrians are hoping for a move—any move—to help stabilize the cratered economy and bring a peaceful resolution to the war, many see normalization as a betrayal unlikely to yield results.

“When we first protested in 2011, we didn’t ask permission from anyone, and we didn’t take into [consideration] the regional and international environment surrounding Syria,” Ibrahim Aboud, a displaced person from Maarat al-Numan city in Idlib province, told Al Jazeera in May. “We are determined to achieve the goals of the revolution and liberate Syria from the Assad regime and its thugs.”

[ruminativerabbi]

Israelis and Emiratis

This week’s surprise announcement that the United Arab Emirates and Israel have decided to establish full diplomatic relations, including the cultural and commercial ties that such relations traditionally bring in their wake, caught me completely off guard—and everybody else in the world too apparently except for the players directly involved. Who saw that coming? And yet, now that I’ve had time to think about it a bit, I see this not only as something that was probably inevitable, at least eventually, but as a move that has the potential to alter the political reality in the Middle East in a way that could possibly actually lead to a peaceful resolution of one of the most traditionally intractable face-offs on the planet, the Israeli-Palestinian dispute.

It’s hard even to know where to start in assessing the potential impact of the agreement, but probably most important of all is that it makes it crystal clear that the Sunni Arab world is not going to refuse to make common cause with the one country in the region, Israel, that can and does stand up to Iran in its relentless effort to extend its malign, imperialist influence into Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen merely because the Palestinians don’t wish them to. The Gulf States feel vulnerable because that’s precisely what they are—and the UAE decision to recognize Israel is simply their way to make themselves feel less vulnerable and more in control of their own destiny. Nor is it at all likely that this is the sole deal of its kind in the offing: most of the experts I’ve read this last week seem to agree that it is now only a matter of time before Oman, Bahrein, Kuwait, and even Saudi Arabia follow suit and establish formal relationship with Israel. (Morocco and Sudan won’t be far behind.) It’s hard to imagine a more dramatic shift than the one constituted by this week’s agreement. It really is a whole new world out there.

The message the UAE-Israel deal sends out directly to the Palestinians is key. For decades, the Palestinian leadership has presumed the right to turn down whatever is offered to them—and there have been so many offers over the years that it’s hard even for experts to keep them all straight—not because of any specific detail included or not included, but merely because entering into a peace arrangement with Israel would obviously require the Palestinians to agree to live in peace with their neighbors, something they have never been able to bring themselves to do.

I have returned to this theme many times in this space. Well over 100 nations have already recognized the non-existent nation of Palestine, so it’s not like the Palestinians have to worry if their state will be internationally recognized. Indeed, the Palestinians could easily proclaim their independence tomorrow, like the Israelis did in 1948, and then get on with the business of nation-building. Yes, they’d have to work through various issues with the Israelis, including some thorny ones regarding a future Jewish presence in the new Palestinian state, but once all that was successfully done the Palestinians would still have to bring themselves to live in peace with the Israelis next door. And that is what they appear unwilling or unable to bring themselves to do.

The UAE-Israel speaks directly to that set of issues.

First, it makes it clear that the Palestinians do not have a veto over other nations’ decisions to act in their own best interests. They had an inkling of that sentiment in 1979 when Sadat came to Jerusalem and Egypt established diplomatic relations with Israel, and then again in 1994 when Jordan followed suit. But 1994 was quite some time ago and things have changed considerably in the Near East since then. The Palestinians are eager to describe the UAE decision as a stab in their collective back. But a more realistic appraisal would be that the decision simply constitutes an instance of a nation declining to pass up a chance to prosper through a judicious alliance merely because of a different people’s intransigency.

Second, it makes it clear that the threat posed by the Iranians to the neighboring states of the Middle East is serious and real…and not only in Western eyes but in the eyes of the players on the ground in the region. In other words, this week’s agreement signals that the nations who see themselves as future victims of Iranian expansionism are not going to sacrifice their nations on the altar of somebody else’s national aspirations…and particularly not when those aspirations could be brought to fruition easily and effectively in a matter of days or weeks if there were any real desire to live in peace and to prosper not as a nation of perennial victims, but as a free, independent, autonomous player in the forum of nations.

Third, the Palestinians have always acted as though time were on their side, as though all they had to do was wait long enough and Israel would just go away and their problems would be solved. The UAE deal signals that the opposite is actually the case, that time is specifically not on their side, and that the time has clearly come to act if they want to resolve their conflict with Israel effectively and fairly. The Palestinian story is a tragic one that began with their leaders’ failure to seize the moment in 1948 and establish the “other” state that the Partition Plan for British Palestine was supposed to create. That was already seventy-two years ago, however, and yet they remain mired in tactical decisions that failed them in the 1940s and are still failing them. Clearly, at least some of the Arab world is tired of waiting for the Palestinians to act in their own best interests.

And, finally, the UAE-Israel agreement makes it clear that the oft-insisted-upon fantasy that Israeli cannot live in peace with any Arab nation until it caves into the demands of the Palestinians, no matter how radical or unimaginable, is simply not true. It probably wasn’t ever really true. But now it’s clearer than ever that the moment for the Palestinians to move forward as an independent state is upon them…if they have the courage to seize the day and make the requisite compromises any deal will inevitably entail.

What the Palestinians have to learn, the Europeans also need to take to heart. The endless EU-based rhetoric based on the assumption that the key to Israeli-Arab relations is resolving the Palestinian conflict needs to be set aside and replaced with words reflective of a new reality. If the member states of the EU want to contribute to peace in the Middle East, in fact, they need to press the Palestinians to realize that their problems are being dwarfed in the region by the hegemonic aggression of the world’s two largest non-Arab Muslim states, Iran and Turkey. And that the smaller states in the region see that aggression not only as irritating or destabilizing, but as an existential threat. Since peoples who are facing existential threats generally do what it take to address those threats regardless of what bystanders think appropriate or reasonable, the time has clearly come to press the Palestinians to negotiate a just peace and then to move ahead from there into the future.

Suddenly, all sorts of dreams I’ve had for years are becoming slightly more possible. Could Lebanon ever live in peace with Israel? Not with the Iranian-backed Hezbollah pulling the strings, but what if Lebanon suddenly found the wherewithal to become free of foreign influence? What then? Would a seriously isolated Iran be willing to renegotiate the so-called Iran Deal of 2015 and agree actually to turn away from the possibility of becoming a nuclear power? Could the people of Syria ever seize the real reigns of power in their country, get rid of the Iranians camped out on their territory, and establish the kind of close ties with Jordan, Lebanon, and Israel that should have long ago made that specific part of the Near East into the economic powerhouse it could and should be? The irony, of course, is that these developments—pie-in-the-sky though they may sound now—these developments would only bring prosperity and autonomy to the Palestinians too, who would then be part of a thriving economic region.

In the meantime, exciting things are happening. The Israeli and UAE foreign ministers have had their first phone call and are apparently going to meet in person soon. Embassies are going to be opened, ambassadors appointed. Omer Adam, the Israeli singer, was invited personally by the royal family of the UAE to perform in Abu Dhabi. Israeli President Reuven Rivlin formally invited the Emirati crown prince, Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, to visit Israel. It is expected that it is only a matter of time, possibly only weeks, before direct flights begin between Tel Aviv and Abu Dhabi.

Americans should be proud of the role our government played in this enormous break-through. But the lion’s share of the credit goes to the Emiratis themselves who found the courage to act in their own best interests. That their move could conceivably lead the Palestinians to abandon their traditional intransigency and negotiate a just and real peace deal with Israel—that really would be the icing on the cake. Whether that will happen, none can say. But it was a pretty good week for the Middle East, and particularly for Israel and for the UAE, and for that we should all be grateful.

[yobaba30]

Thank you, Seth Abramson

(THREAD) BREAKING: The NYT just published the biggest political news since the Mueller Report was published: we now know at least 3 of the federal probes still ongoing post-Mueller—and all involve election interference. I hope you will REPOST and read on 

1/ POST-MUELLER INVESTIGATION #1, per the NYT: "Investigators are still examining the campaign contacts of an Israeli specialist in social media manipulation who has worked for Prince Mohammed [bin Zayed of the UAE]." (NB: I'll list the three investigations, then explain them.)

2/ POST-MUELLER INVESTIGATION #2, per the NYT: "Investigators are still examining...a Lebanese-American businessman [George Nader] who acted as [a pre-election] emissary [for Mohammed bin Zayed of the UAE, also known as "MBZ"].

3/ POST-MUELLER INVESTIGATION #3, per the NYT: "Prosecutors are investigating whether another top Republican donor whose security company worked for the prince [Elliot Broidy, named RNC deputy finance chair post-election by Trump] should legally have registered as [MBZ's] agent."

4/ (The NEW YORK TIMES has also implied that a *fourth* investigation is ongoing—but because the reference to it mentions the "special counsel," I've held off on saying that the TIMES is "officially" reporting it as ongoing. In the next tweet I'll summarize its contours, though.)

5/ POST-MUELLER INVESTIGATION #4, per the NYT (see prior tweet for note): "[Prosecutors] also questioned Rashid al-Malik, an Emirati real-estate developer close to MBZ and...the head of Emirati intelligence. Mr. al-Malik is also close to Mr. Trump’s friend Tom Barrack... (cont.)

6/ ...and investigators are asking whether al-Malik was part of an illegal [UAE] influence scheme, according to two people familiar with the matter." From PROOF OF CONSPIRACY research, I know the key al-Malik intel involves pre-election contact with Barrack—and possibly Manafort.

7/ Those who read this feed know that I've long been saying—and saying, too, that those most fully "in the know" are saying—that the pre-election crimes most likely to implicate Trump and his family involve bribery and aiding and abetting, and *not just Russia* but other nations.

8/ The Mueller Report is a must-read for every American, despite being long and complex. Once you've read it—and this is the hard part—you have to understand that, for all the terrible stuff you just read, it's only a narrow window on a much larger story still being investigated.

9/ The MIDDLE EAST EYE is a London-based British media outlet run by a longtime editor at THE GUARDIAN—one of the most respected media outlets in the United Kingdom. 15 months ago it broke harrowing news of a multinational conspiracy to elect Donald Trump.                                                                                                                                                                EXCLUSIVE: The secret yacht summit that realigned the Middle East | Middle East Eye                        Arab leaders from UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Jordan plotted to counter Turkey and Iran, and replace the GCC and Arab League                        https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/exclusive-secret-yacht-summit-realigned-middle-east                                                            

10/ Beginning then—in March 2018—journalists around the world began investigating this conspiracy. I know not just because I've written a book about the "Red Sea Conspiracy," but because major-media journalists from all over have contacted me to say they're working on this, too.

11/  There are 3 reasons you've heard little about this: 1)  The best reporting on it is in foreign media. 2)  Our media consistently "buries the lede" in reporting on the story—as it considers America not ready for it. 3)  The story is so complex it's taken over a year to research.

12/  I'll now tell you the basic facts of the story that has emerged: 1)  Six nations hatched a plot to elect Trump. The plot was hatched in 2015; the nations involved were Russia, Israel, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt. The leaders of these countries were all involved. 13/ 2)  Three of these six nations—Russia, Israel, the UAE—had infiltrated deep into the Trump campaign by March 2016: Russia through Dimitri Simes; the UAE through Yousef al-Otaiba; Israel through Kushner, Groner, and Birnbaum. The campaign understood the plan these nations had. 14/ 3)  The plan was simple: historic detentes between the US and Russia and the Sunni Arab Gulf states and Israel; the US drops all sanctions on Russia and Russia agrees to withdraw support for Iran, thus clearing a path for a new Arab-Israeli alliance to remake the Middle East. 15/   4)  The Trump campaign became aware of the plan via *many* interlocutors: Kushner; Flynn; Nader; Manafort; al-Otaiba; Simes; Birnbaum; Barrack; others. The plan was seen as a "grand bargain" and sometimes called that—other times it was called "the Middle East Marshall Plan." 16/ 5)  Russia began operations in what would become the plot (through the GRU and IRA) in 2014, at a time it was in a *massive* new joint investment program with the UAE and there were regular high-level Moscow/Abu Dhabi contacts. The UAE and Russia knew Trump would run by 2013. 17/ 6)  By March 2016, Russia had become the first nation with a "man in"—Dimitri Simes. (Though you could argue Kushner saw himself as an unofficial agent of Israel prior to that). By April 2016, Israel had a "man in"—via Birnbaum. By May 2017, UAE had a "man in"—with al-Otaiba. 18/ 7)  Saudi Arabia (whose leader, MBS, is a mentee of the UAE's MBZ); Egypt (whose leader, el-Sisi, is in power because of the UAE's MBZ); and Bahrain (whose leader is basically along for the ride), did not *need* their own agents, as they effectively were using the Emiratis'. 18/ 7)  The conspirators spent March through July trying to get access directly to the Trumps, though Jared Kushner was conspiring with Simes, al-Otaiba, and Netanyahu's office by late spring. On August 3, 2016, agents of Israel, Russia, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia got to Trump Jr. 19/ 8)  At that August 3 Trump Tower meeting, both the family and campaign were represented: the family via Don Jr., the campaign via Trump's chief domestic policy adviser, Stephen Miller. Four nations offered the Trump campaign illegal pre-election assistance; Don Jr. said yes.

20/ I've given you the most basic contours. The full story (at least as I've written it) takes 500 pages and 3,500+ endnotes. It can't be relayed on Social Media. But it is fully sourced, and sourced with the top media outlets in the world (particularly in the US, the UK, and Israel). PS/ Many may wonder, "What's the connection between the Mueller Report and this?" The answer: Mueller's report is a prequel, following 2 of 7 characters—the US and Russia—in what was, in the event, a full five-act play. It's the TALES OF BEEDLE THE BARD to Rowling's HARRY POTTER.

[antoine-roquentin]

Thirteen hours before Secretary of State Rex Tillerson learned from the presidential Twitter feed that he was being fired, he did something that President Donald Trump had been unwilling to do. Following a phone call with his British counterpart, Tillerson condemned a deadly nerve agent attack in the U.K., saying that he had “full confidence in the U.K.’s investigation and its assessment that Russia was likely responsible.”

White House Press Secretary Sarah Sanders had called the attack “reckless, indiscriminate, and irresponsible,” but stopped short of blaming Russia, leading numerous media outlets to speculate that Tillerson was fired for criticizing Russia.

But in the months that followed his departure, press reports strongly suggested that the countries lobbying hardest for Tillerson’s removal were Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, both of which were frustrated by Tillerson’s attempts to mediate and end their blockade of Qatar. One report in the New York Times even suggested that the UAE ambassador to Washington knew that Tillerson would be forced out three months before he was fired in March.

The Intercept has learned of a previously unreported episode that stoked the UAE and Saudi Arabia’s anger at Tillerson and that may have played a key role in his removal. In the summer of 2017, several months before the Gulf allies started pushing for his ouster, Tillerson intervened to stop a secret Saudi-led, UAE-backed plan to invade and essentially conquer Qatar, according to one current member of the U.S. intelligence community and two former State Department officials, all of whom declined to be named, citing the sensitivity of the matter.

In the days and weeks after Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain cut diplomatic ties with Qatar and closed down their land, sea, and air borders with the country, Tillerson made a series of phone calls urging Saudi officials not to take military action against the country. The flurry of calls in June 2017 has been reported, but State Department and press accounts at the time described them as part of a broad-strokes effort to resolve tensions in the Gulf, not as an attempt by Tillerson to avert a Saudi-led military operation.

In the calls, Tillerson, who dealt extensively with the Qatari government as the CEO of Exxon Mobil, urged Saudi King Salman, then-Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, and Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir not to attack Qatar or otherwise escalate hostilities, the sources told The Intercept. Tillerson also encouraged Defense Secretary Jim Mattis to call his counterparts in Saudi Arabia to explain the dangers of such an invasion. Al Udeid Air Base near Doha, Qatar’s capital city, is the forward headquarters of U.S. Central Command and home to some 10,000 American troops.

Pressure from Tillerson caused Mohammed bin Salman, the de facto ruler of the country, to back down, concerned that the invasion would damage Saudi Arabia’s long-term relationship with the U.S. But Tillerson’s intervention enraged Mohammed bin Zayed, the crown prince of Abu Dhabi and effective ruler of that country, according to the U.S. intelligence official and a source close to the Emirati royal family, who declined to be identified, citing concerns about his safety.

Later that June, Mohammed bin Salman would be named crown prince, leapfrogging over his cousin to become next in line for the throne after his elderly father. His ascension signaled his growing influence over the kingdom’s affairs.

Qatari intelligence agents working inside Saudi Arabia discovered the plan in the early summer of 2017, according to the U.S. intelligence official. Tillerson acted after the Qatari government notified him and the U.S. embassy in Doha. Several months later, intelligence reporting by the U.S. and U.K. confirmed the existence of the plan.

The plan, which was largely devised by the Saudi and UAE crown princes and was likely some weeks away from being implemented, involved Saudi ground troops crossing the land border into Qatar, and, with military support from the UAE, advancing roughly 70 miles toward Doha. Circumventing the U.S. air base, Saudi forces would then seize the capital.

On June 20, State Department spokesperson Heather Nauert told reporters that Tillerson had “more than 20 calls and meetings with Gulf and other regional and intermediate actors,” including three phone calls and two meetings with Jubeir. “The more time goes by, the more doubt is raised about the actions taken by Saudi Arabia and the UAE,” she said....

According to one news report, Tillerson was frustrated with the White House for undercutting him, and his aides suspected that the line in Trump’s prepared Rose Garden remarks had been written by UAE Ambassador Yousef Al Otaiba, a powerful D.C. player who maintained “almost constant phone and email contact” with Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner, according to Politico. 

At the time, Kushner was personally handling much of the administration’s diplomacy with the Gulf states, and the leaders of Saudi Arabia and the UAE were choosing to go through him instead of the U.S. defense or intelligence establishments. Kushner communicated directly with the crown princes of Saudi Arabia and the UAE using the encrypted messaging service WhatsApp.

Some Gulf watchers speculate that the incentive for the planned invasion may have been partly financial. Saudi Arabia’s “cradle to grave” welfare system relies on high oil prices, which plummeted in 2014 and have not fully recovered. Since the current king came to power in 2015, the country has spent more than a third of its $737 billion in reserves, and last year, the Saudi economy entered a painful recession. In response, the government has looked for ways to raise money, including by selling shares in the state-owned oil company, Saudi Aramco.

“It’s unsustainable,” said Bruce Riedel, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute and 30-year CIA officer, in a lecture last November. “In the three years since [King Salman] ascended to the throne, one third of Saudi Arabia’s reserves have already been spent. You don’t need to have an MBA from the Wharton school to figure out what that means six years from now.”

If the Saudis had succeeded in seizing Doha, they would potentially have been able to gain access to the country’s $320 billion sovereign wealth fund. In November of last year, months after the plan collapsed, the Saudi crown prince rounded up and detained dozens of his relatives in the Ritz-Carlton Riyadh, forcing them to sign over billions in privately held assets. The government justified the detentions as a corruption crackdown, but it allowed the state to recoup billions in assets for government use.

Beginning in the fall of 2017, the crown princes in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi began lobbying the White House for Tillerson’s removal, according to the source close to the Emirati royal family and another source who is close to the Saudi royal family.

american-gulf collusion is of course bipartisan and doesn’t merit any investigation

[diarrheaworldstarhiphop]

Earlier this month, Syrian regime forces hoisted their flag above the southern town of Daraa and celebrated. Although there is more bloodletting to come, the symbolism was hard to miss. The uprising that began in that town on March 6, 2011, has finally been crushed, and the civil war that has engulfed the country and destabilized parts of the Middle East as well as Europe will be over sooner rather than later. Bashar al-Assad, the man who was supposed to fall in “a matter of time,” has prevailed with the help of Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah over his own people.

Washington is too busy over the furor of the day to reflect on the fact that there are approximately 500,000 fewer Syrians today than there were when a group of boys spray-painted “The people demand the fall of the regime” on buildings in Daraa more than seven years ago. But now that the Syria conflict has been decided, it’s worth thinking about the purpose and place of the United States in the new Middle East. The first order of business is to dispose of the shibboleths that have long been at the core of U.S. foreign policy in the region and have contributed to its confusion and paralysis in Syria and beyond.

There probably isn’t anyone inside the Beltway who hasn’t been told at some point in their career about the dangers of reasoning by analogy. But that doesn’t mean such lessons have been regularly heeded. The Syrian uprising came at a fantastical time in the Middle East when freedom, it seemed, was breaking out everywhere. The demonstration of people power that began in Daraa—coming so soon after the fall of longtime leaders in Tunisia and Egypt—was moving. It also clouded the judgment of diplomats, policymakers, analysts, and journalists, rendering them unable to discern the differences between the region’s Assads and Ben Alis or between the structure of the Syrian regime and that of the Egyptian one.

And because the policy community did not expect the Syrian leader to last very long, it was caught flat-footed when Assad pursued his most obvious and crudely effective strategy: a militarization of the uprising. In time, Syria’s competing militias, jihadis, and regional powers, compounded by Russia’s intervention, made it hard to identify U.S. interests in the conflict. So, Washington condemned the bloodshed, sent aid to refugees, halfheartedly trained “vetted” rebels, and bombed the Islamic State, but it otherwise stayed out of Syria’s civil conflict. Lest anyone believe that this was a policy particular to U.S. President Barack Obama and his aim to get out of, not into Middle Eastern conflicts, his successor’s policy is not substantially different, with the exception that President Donald Trump is explicit about leaving Syria to Moscow after destroying the Islamic State. While the bodies continued to pile up, all Washington could muster was expressions of concern over another problem from hell. Syria is, of course, different from Rwanda, Darfur, and Srebrenica—to suggest otherwise would be reasoning by analogy—but it is another case of killing on an industrial scale that paralyzed Washington. It seems that even those well versed in history cannot avoid repeating it.

Many of the analysts and policymakers who preferred that the United States stay out or minimize its role in Syria came to that position honestly. They looked at the 2003 invasion of Iraq and decried how it destabilized the region, empowered Iran, damaged relations with Washington’s allies, and fueled extremist violence, undermining the U.S. position in the region. It seems lost on the same group that U.S. inaction in Syria did the same: contributed to regional instability, empowered Iran, spoiled relations with regional friends, and boosted transnational terrorist groups. The decision to stay away may have nonetheless been good politics, but it came at a noticeable cost to Washington’s position in the Middle East.

(Prat note: lmao at FP thinking the US policy in syria was that of inaction)

The waning of U.S. power and influence that Syria has both laid bare and hastened is a development that the policy community has given little thought to, because it was not supposed to happen. By every traditional measure of power, the United States, after all, has no peer. But power is only useful in its application, and Washington has proved either unable or unwilling to shape events in the Middle East as it had in the past—which is to say, it has abdicated its own influence. That may be a positive development. No one wants a repeat of Iraq. In Washington’s place, Moscow has stepped in to offer itself as a better, more competent partner to Middle Eastern countries. There haven’t been many takers yet beyond the Syrians, but there nevertheless seems to be a lot of interest, and the conflict in Syria is the principal reason why.

Contrast the way in which Russian President Vladimir Putin came to the rescue of an ally in crisis—Assad—with the way U.S. allies in the region perceive Obama to have helped push Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak from office after 30 years, much of it spent carrying Washington’s water around in the region. The Egyptians, Saudis, Emiratis, Israelis, and others may not like Assad very much, but Russia’s initial forceful response to prevent the Syrian dictator from falling and then Moscow’s efforts to will Assad to apparent victory have made an impression on them. Syria is now the centerpiece and pivot of Russia’s strategy to reassert itself as a global power, and its renewed influence in the Middle East stretches from Damascus eastward through the Kurdistan Regional Government to Iran and from the Syrian capital south to Egypt before arcing west to Libya.

Israel, Turkey, and the Gulf States still look to Washington for leadership but have also begun seeking help securing their interests at the Kremlin. The Israeli prime minister has become a fixture at Putin’s side; the Turkish president and his Russian counterpart are, along with Iran’s leaders, partners in Syria; King Salman made the first ever visit by a Saudi monarch to Moscow in October 2017; and the Emiratis believe the Russians should be “at the table” for discussions of regional importance. The era when the United States determined the rules of the game in the Middle East and maintained a regional order that made it relatively easier and less expensive to exercise U.S. power lasted 25 years. It is now over.

Finally, the situation in Syria reveals the profound ambivalence of Americans toward the Middle East and the declining importance of what U.S. officials have long considered Washington’s interests there: oil, Israel, and U.S. dominance of the area to ensure the other two. Americans wonder why U.S. military bases dot the Persian Gulf if the United States is poised to become the world’s largest producer of oil. After two inconclusive wars in 17 years, no one can offer Americans a compelling reason why the Assad regime is their problem. Israel remains popular, but over 70 years it has proved that it can handle itself. Obama and Trump ran on platforms of retrenchment, and they won. The immobility over Syria is a function of the policy community’s impulse to just do something and the politics that make that impossible.

Perhaps now that the Assad-Putin-Khamenei side of the Syrian conflict has won, there will be an opportunity for Americans to debate what is important in the Middle East and why. It will not be easy, however. Congress is polarized and paralyzed. The Trump administration approach to the region is determined by the president’s gut. He has continued Obama-era policies of fighting extremist groups, but then he broke with his predecessors and moved the U.S. Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem. Trump breached the Iran nuclear deal, though he has done very little since about Iran other than talk tough. He wants to leave Syria “very soon,” even as his national security advisor vows to stay as long as Iran remains.

Despite and because of this incoherence, now is the time to have a debate about the Middle East. There is a compelling argument to be made that American interests demand an active U.S. role in the region; there is an equally compelling argument that U.S. goals can be secured without the wars, social engineering projects, peace processes, and sit-downs in Geneva. In between is what U.S. policy in the Middle East looks like now: ambivalence and inertia. Under these circumstances, Syria, Russia, and Iran will continue to win.

[newsmanmdgn]

Belarus Hijacked a Commercial Plane

Russia’s power over Belarus is in the spotlight after plane ‘hijacking’ incident

Reported yesterday: Belarus hijacked a passenger plane in order to arrest a foe of its government

As global leaders expressed outrage at Belarus’ “hijacking” of a Ryanair plane and the detention of an opposition activist, Russia was notable for its vociferous defense of the country. Now, analysts are saying Moscow stands to benefit from Belarus’ further estrangement from the West.

Belarus on Sunday ordered a Ryanair flight carrying prominent Belarusian opposition activist Roman Protasevich to divert to its capital Minsk, whereupon the activist was detained. Russia described the uproar in the U.S. and Europe as “shocking” and accused the West of having double standards.

Russia has been steadily increasing its power and influence over its neighbor Belarus, but the countries’ leaders President Vladimir Putin and President Alexander Lukashenko are somewhat uncomfortable allies — it’s arguable that any allegiance is fragile at best, and borne out of necessity.

For Belarus, Russia is a powerful economic and political partner and a source of support, having backed Lukashenko’s leadership

CNBC

If there's one thing Rocky IV taught me, it's that you can never trust the Russian government.

I'll stand by those teachings 'til the day I die.

More – Detained Belarusian dissident appears in video as fury mounts over hijacking of Ryanair flight

Blinken says US will aid Gaza without helping Hamas

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken vowed Tuesday to “rally international support” to aid Gaza following a devastating war there while keeping any assistance out of the hands of its militant Hamas rulers, as he began a regional tour to shore up last week’s cease-fire.

The 11-day war between Israel and Hamas killed more than 250 people, mostly Palestinians, and caused widespread destruction in the impoverished coastal territory. The truce that came into effect Friday has so far held, but it did not address any of the underlying issues in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, something Blinken acknowledged after meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

“We know that to prevent a return to violence, we have to use the space created to address a larger set of underlying issues and challenges. And that begins with tackling the grave humanitarian situation in Gaza and starting to rebuild,” he said.

AP

It's about time.

Mysterious air base being built on volcanic island off Yemen

A mysterious air base is being built on a volcanic island off Yemen that sits in one of the world’s crucial maritime chokepoints for both energy shipments and commercial cargo.

While no country has claimed the Mayun Island air base in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, shipping traffic associated with a prior attempt to build a massive runway across the 5.6-kilometer (3.5 mile)-long island years ago links back to the United Arab Emirates.

Officials in Yemen’s internationally recognized government now say the Emiratis are behind this latest effort as well, even though the UAE announced in 2019 it was withdrawing its troops from a Saudi-led military campaign battling Yemen’s Houthi rebels.

“This does seem to be a longer-term strategic aim to establish a relatively permanent presence,” said Jeremy Binnie, the Mideast editor at the open-source intelligence company Janes who has followed construction on Mayun for years. It’s “possibly not just about the Yemen war and you’ve got to see the shipping situation as fairly key there.”

AP

Not gonna lie: I put this here mainly for the headline.

The White House Is Partnering With Dating Apps To Get Horny People Vaccinated

In a national effort to get through to horny but vaccine-hesitant Americans, the White House announced Friday that it is joining forces with dating apps to encourage people to get their COVID-19 vaccines so that they can go forth and fuck freely this summer.

Vaccinated users on Tinder, Hinge, Bumble, and Badoo will have access to some premium features for free. OkCupid, Chispa, BLK, and Match are giving out a free “Boost” to those who've been vaccinated so that their profiles are more likely to be seen first. Plenty of Fish is also offering free credits to vaccinated members for its livestreaming feature.

Buzzfeed News

Not gonna lie, Part Deux: I put this here ONLY for the headline.

The Climate Real Estate Bubble: Is the U.S. on the Verge of Another Financial Crisis?

Increasingly, experts see a collective threat to the U.S. economy. As the risks of owning a home in places affected by climate change stack up, economists and policymakers say climate-induced flight from threatened areas could shock the U.S. economy as home prices plummet, lending dries up and the local tax base diminishes in hard-hit regions.

“The degree of capital reallocation and the speed of that is going to be larger and happen more quickly than most market participants expect,” Brian Deese, President Joe Biden’s chief economic adviser, told TIME last year when he was the head of sustainable investing at BlackRock. Zimmerman calls herself “the canary in the coal mine.” She may be one of the first, but if the U.S. doesn’t heed her warnings, she won’t be the last.

Time

I'll go out on a limb here (while trees still exist): Real estate prices will plummet long before the climate change makes it happen. Prices are so inflated right now (in so many asset classes), and asset bubbles are popping up all over the place. Like all bubbles, some will burst and others will deflate slowly.

Look at student debt, credit card debt, housing prices, stock indexes, precious metals, and cryptocurrencies.

Political artist John Sims detained, handcuffed by S.C. police in his gallery apartment

“When a police culture suffocates the voice of justice, why should I trust the police with my body? Why? If resisting and cooperating bring the same outcome — death — what am I to do, especially if good cops cannot stand up to bad cops? When there are no internal moral checks and balances, you become a pack of animals in an uncivilized wilderness motivated by fear and the naked power to punish and destroy,” Sims said last June in a commentary in the Orlando Sentinel. “You become the judge, jury and looter of Black bodies. You become a virus of racism and white supremacy. You become the face of a broken America.”

Yahoo!

Thanks for the story, Mike. I think it sums up well what we all want to say about police violence on Black people.

The article was originally published here! Belarus Hijacked a Commercial Plane

[mideastsoccer]

US intelligence report leaves Saudi Arabia with no good geopolitical choices

The Biden administration’s publication of a US intelligence report that holds Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman responsible for the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi creates a fundamental challenge to the kingdom’s geopolitical ambitions.

The challenge lies in whether and how Saudi Arabia will seek to further diversify its alliances with other world powers in response to the report and US human rights pressure.

Saudi and United Arab Emirates options are limited by that fact that they cannot fully replace the United States as a mainstay of their defence as well as their quest for regional hegemony, even if the report revives perceptions of the US as unreliable and at odds with their policies.

As Saudi King Salman and Prince Mohammed contemplate their options, including strengthening relations with external players such as China and Russia, they may find that reliance on these forces could prove riskier than the pitfalls of the kingdom’s ties with the United States.

Core to Saudi as well as UAE considerations is likely to be the shaping of the ultimate balance of power between the kingdom and Iran in a swath of land stretching from the Atlantic coast of Africa to Central Asia’s border with China.

US officials privately suggest that regional jockeying in an environment in which world power is being rebalanced to create a new world order was the key driver of Saudi and UAE as well as Israeli opposition from day one to the 2015 nuclear accord with Iran that the United States together with Europe, China, and Russia negotiated. That remains the driver of criticism of US President Joe Biden’s efforts to revive the agreement.

“If forced to choose, Riyadh preferred an isolated Iran with a nuclear bomb to an internationally accepted Iran unarmed with the weapons of doom,” said Trita Parsi, executive vice president of the Washington-based Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and founder of the National Iranian American Council. Mr. Parsi was summing up Saudi and Emirati attitudes based on interviews with officials involved in the negotiations at a time that Mr. Biden was vice-president.

As a result, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Israel appear to remain determined to either foil a return of the United States to the accord, from which Mr. Biden’s predecessor, Donald J. Trump, withdrew, or ensure that it imposes conditions on Iran that would severely undermine its claim to regional hegemony.

In the ultimate analysis, the Gulf states and Israel share US objectives that include not only restricting Iran’s nuclear capabilities but also limiting its ballistic missiles program and ending support for non-state actors like Lebanon’s Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, and Yemen’s Houthis. The Middle Eastern states differ with the Biden administration on how to achieve those objectives and the sequencing of their pursuit.

Even so, the Gulf states are likely to realize as Saudi Arabia contemplates its next steps what Israel already knows: China and Russia’s commitment to the defence of Saudi Arabia or Israel are unlikely to match that of the United States given that they view an Iran unfettered by sanctions and international isolation as strategic in ways that only Turkey rather than other Middle Eastern states can match.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE will also have to recognize that they can attempt to influence US policies with the help of Israel’s powerful Washington lobby and influential US lobbying and public relations companies in ways that they are not able to do in autocratic China or authoritarian Russia.

No doubt, China and Russia will seek to exploit opportunities created by the United States’ recalibration of its relations with Saudi Arabia with arms sales as well as increased trade and investment.

But that will not alter the two countries’ long-term view of Iran as a country, albeit problematic, with attributes that the Gulf states cannot match even if it is momentarily in economic and political disrepair.

Those attributes include Iran’s geography as a gateway at the crossroads of Central Asia, the Middle East and Europe; ethnic, cultural, and religious ties with Central Asia and the Middle East as a result of history and empire; a deep-seated identity rooted in empire; some of the world’s foremost oil and gas reserves; a large, highly educated population of 83 million that constitutes a huge domestic market; a fundamentally diversified economy; and a battle-hardened military.

Iran also shares Chinese and Russian ambitions to contain US influence even if its aspirations at times clash with those of China and Russia.

“China’s BRI will on paper finance additional transit options for the transfer of goods from ports in southern to northern Iran and beyond to Turkey, Russia, or Europe. China has a number of transit options available to it, but Iranian territory is difficult to avoid for any south-north or east-west links,” said Iran scholar Alex Vatanka referring to Beijing’s infrastructure, transportation and energy-driven Belt and Road Initiative.

Compared to an unfettered Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE primarily offer geography related to some of the most strategic waterways through which much of the world’s oil and gas flows as well their positioning opposite the Horn of Africa and their energy reserves.

Moreover, Saudi Arabia’s position as a religious leader in the Muslim world built on its custodianship of Islam’s two holiest cities, Mecca and Medina, potentially could be challenged as the kingdom competes for leadership with other Middle Eastern and Asian Muslim-majority states.

On the principle of better the enemy that you know than the devil that you don’t, Saudi leaders may find that they are, in the best of scenarios, in response to changing US policies able to rattle cages by reaching out to China and Russia in ways that they have not until now, but that at the end of the day they are deprived of good choices.

That conclusion may be reinforced by the realization that the United States has signalled by not sanctioning Prince Mohammed that it does not wish to cut its umbilical cord with the kingdom. That message was also contained in the Biden administration’s earlier decision to halt the sale of weapons that Saudi Arabia could you for offensive operations in Yemen but not arms that it needs to defend its territory from external attack.

At the bottom line, Saudi Arabia’s best option to counter an Iran that poses a threat to the kingdom’s ambitions irrespective of whatever regime is in power would be to work with its allies to develop the kind of economic and social policies as well as governance that would enable it to capitalize on its assets to effectively compete. Containment of Iran is a short-term tactic that eventually will run its course.

Warned former British diplomat and Royal Dutch Shell executive Ian McCredie: “When the Ottoman Empire was dismantled in 1922, it created a vacuum which a series of powers have attempted to fill ever since. None has succeeded, and the result has been a century of wars, coups, and instability. Iran ruled all these lands before the Arab and Ottoman conquests. It could do so again.”

A podcast version of this story is available on Soundcloud, Itunes, Spotify, Stitcher, TuneIn, Spreaker, Pocket Casts, Tumblr, Podbean, Audecibel, Patreon and Castbox.

Dr. James M. Dorsey is an award-winning journalist and a senior fellow at Nanyang Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore and the National University of Singapore’s Middle East Institute.

[expatimes]

Sheikh Meshaal Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah nominated as Crown Prince by Amir

Lawmakers set to approve choice

KUWAIT CITY, Oct 7, (Agencies): Kuwait’s Deputy Chief of the National Guard, who spent years in the country’s security services, was nominated as Crown Prince on Wednesday, the Kuwaiti state news agency reported, a cautious selection at a turbulent time for Kuwait’s politics and the wider region. The nomination makes Sheikh Meshaal Al-Ahmed Al-Jaber Al-Sabah the possible heir apparent to the new Amir, 83-year-old Sheikh Nawaf Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah, who was propelled to power following the death of his half-brother. Although Sheikh Nawaf had a full year to choose a successor, he picked Sheikh Meshaal in a recordbreaking eight days, ending frenzied speculation that has gripped Kuwaiti social media.

Sheikh Mishaal Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah

Before Sheikh Meshaal can be officially named Crown Prince, lawmakers must approve the choice during their final session on Thursday, ahead of the formation of a new government – a rare vote for the region’s Arab monarchies in which the question of succession is typically decided behind palace doors. Following the session, Kuwait’s Parliament will dissolve itself ahead of elections tentatively set for late November.

At age 80, the low-profile Sheikh Meshaal, another half-brother of the late Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah, strengthens the royal family’s traditional ranks and is widely seen as a conventional and safe choice. While his health status remains unclear, he recently underwent a kidney transplant, according to a Washington Institute for Near-East Policy article from May 2018. Given his career building up the interior ministry for over a decade, very little is known about his policy preferences. Unlike other top contenders for the post, he has steered clear of the country’s tumultuous politics and the royal family’s public feuds over corruption allegations. Bader Al-Saif, an assistant professor of history at Kuwait University, described the Britisheducated minister as a rare senior member of the royal family and political old guard who remains untainted by the country’s corruption scandals.

Respected “He’s an insider and an outsider at the same time,” said Al-Saif, noting that the country’s National Guard remains a respected institution above the political fray. “The unchecked corruption requires introducing a name that is fresh, and has no associations.” Even so, Sheikh Meshaal is no newcomer to Kuwaiti government. He was a close confidant of Sheikh Sabah throughout his tenure, accompanying him on official diplomatic visits as well as to the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota, where the Amir received medical treatment after surgery and later died.

His selection delays any generational change in Kuwait, reinforcing the contrast with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, now in effect led by ambitious young princes. Under the late Sheikh Sabah, who commanded great respect as a seasoned diplomat in a region divided along political and sectarian lines, Kuwait managed to pursue independent foreign policies despite the pressures of more belligerent regional heavyweights. “Change will happen in an orderly, gradual way,” said Al- Saif. “This is the Kuwaiti way.” The choice of Sheikh Meshaal is also a sign that Kuwait will look inward in the years ahead.

A worsening coronavirus outbreak, escalating tensions between the Parliament and Cabinet and plunging oil prices have sharpened attention on Kuwait’s domestic grievances. Parliamentary gridlock has blocked the passage of a public debt law needed to raise $65 billion and mitigate the country’s looming liquidity crisis, and calls are growing for political reform.

Underscores Also Wednesday, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan arrived in Kuwait City, becoming the latest political figure to pay his respects to Sheikh Sabah, following visits from Saudi, Emirati, Qatari and other Arab officials. Erdogan’s meeting with the new ruling Amir further underscores the late Sheikh Sabah’s ability to navigate between regional political rivalries, with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates pitted against Iran and Qatar.

Erdogan later headed to Qatar, where he met with its ruling Amir. Turkey has backed the tiny Gulf state in the face of a yearslong blockade by its neighbors over its support for Islamists. Ankara and Doha are also on the same side in Libya’s spiraling proxy war, backing the UNsupported government in Tripoli. In 1960, Sheikh Meshaal graduated with a degree from the Hendon Police College in London.

Before becoming the Deputy Chief of the National Guard in 2004, he held several positions in the Ministry of Interior. Similar to the new Amir Sheikh Nawaf, Sheikh Meshaal has been active in enhancing the security and defence position of Kuwait, as well as other Arab states. Sheikh Meshaal is a strongwilled personality and carries a lot of influence inside the Al- Sabah family. On his arrival from the United States with the body of the late Amir, many members of the family greeted him at the airport in a sign of loyalty.

The post Sheikh Meshaal Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah nominated as Crown Prince by Amir appeared first on ARAB TIMES - KUWAIT NEWS.

#kuwait Read full article: https://expatimes.com/?p=11567&feed_id=9072

[newstfionline]

Saudis and Emiratis face the pitfalls of courting Trump

By Adam Taylor, Washington Post, May 23, 2018

President Obama may have been an internationally popular world leader, but that popularity didn’t extend to Arab governments. The problem wasn’t just the nuclear agreement with Iran, which they said allowed Tehran to dramatically expand its regional influence--it was also his broader skepticism about America’s Middle Eastern allies, which he rarely bothered to disguise.

In a now-infamous interview with the Atlantic, for example, Obama suggested that U.S. allies would “need to find an effective way to share the neighborhood and institute some sort of cold peace” with Iran. Asked whether Saudi Arabia was an ally, Obama smiled and gave a halfhearted reply: “It’s complicated.”

And so, ahead of the 2016 election, countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates saw a potential Trump presidency as an opportunity for a change. Last year, Somayya Jabarti, the editor of the Saudi Gazette newspaper, told The Washington Post that “under Trump, this could be a potential era for the restoration of relations.” A big question now, though, is whether these Gulf powers will come to regret placing their bets on the winning horse.

In the past few days there have been reports suggesting that their pro-Trump sentiment went far beyond moral support. The New York Times and the Associated Press reported this week that emissaries who claimed to be working on behalf of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan offered to first help the Trump campaign via a “social media manipulation effort,” as the Times put it, and later tried to influence Trump while in office.

As The Post has reported, one of the alleged emissaries--Lebanese American businessman George Nader--also helped organize a January 2017 meeting in the Seychelles between Erik Prince, the founder of the private security firm Blackwater, Emirati officials and a Russian banker close to Russian President Vladimir Putin. Nader is cooperating in the ongoing probe into Russia’s interference in the 2016 election led by special counsel Robert S. Mueller III.

Saudi and Emirati officials have pushed back on the Times and AP stories, and it is not clear whether Nader and his partner, Republican fundraiser Elliot Broidy, were as close to these crown princes as they claimed. Even so, there is little doubt that both Saudi Arabia and the Emirates have sought a close relationship with Trump despite his inexperience and frequent criticisms of the Muslim world.

For the Gulf states, a Hillary Clinton win would have been a problem. There was an obvious concern that the Democratic candidate could continue the Obama policies that so aggrieved then. Indeed, leaked emails published by WikiLeaks in 2016 showed her privately connecting Saudi Arabia to funding for the Islamic State, a charge that has long irked Riyadh.

Of course, Trump might seem an even more unlikely candidate for two Arab Muslim countries to back. The former businessman was vocally suspicious of all Muslims on the campaign trail, telling CNN that “Islam hates us” and calling for a ban on Muslims entering the country. He had also specifically criticized Saudi Arabia: During one presidential debate, Trump suggested that the people in the kingdom “kill women and treat women horribly.”

But the Trump campaign was also understaffed and overstretched. Spurned by the Washington foreign-policy establishment, it appointed a ragtag band of advisers on international affairs. Wily middlemen such as Nader and Broidy smelled an opportunity to spread their influence--and, more importantly, make money. Evidence published by the Associated Press suggests they sometimes treated the Trump clan with disdain: Jared Kushner, the president’s son-in-law who was tasked with coming up with a Middle East peace plan, was dubbed the “clown prince” in a message from Nader to Broidy.

No matter what role Nader and Broidy ultimately played, the early signs suggest that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have been among the biggest winners of the Trump presidency. For his first foreign trip in office, Trump bucked tradition by heading to Riyadh rather than Ottawa or Mexico City. While there, he offered high praise for his hosts and their allies, promising he wasn’t in town to “lecture” Muslims--possibly a swipe at Obama’s landmark 2009 speech in Cairo.

Trump put his clout behind Mohammed’s ambitious plans for domestic reform in Saudi Arabia, even backing him in a tweet during his controversial crackdown on rival princes. He initially supported the Saudi- and Emirati-led move to isolate Qatar and largely turned a blind eye to the alleged excesses of their military intervention in Yemen. And, last month, he took back one of the Obama policies the crown princes had abhorred and pulled the United States out of the Iran nuclear deal.

At the same time, however, Trump’s unpredictability and lack of an overarching foreign policy has thrown up unexpected roadblocks. The repeated attempt to block visitors to the United States from Muslim-majority nations, shifting the U.S. Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, the still-not-released Middle East peace proposal--none of these things may bother the crown princes, but all are divisive among the populations they control.

Meanwhile, Trump’s support for the Qatar blockade has also ebbed and flowed--perhaps because of Doha’s own influence games--and he has repeatedly suggested he wants to pull the United States out of Syria. But perhaps the biggest problem is that Trump may ultimately be even more dismissive of Gulf allies than his predecessor. If Saudi royals complained that Obama had implied they were “freeloaders,” Trump has gone further: demanding billions from them and suggesting that their nations “wouldn’t last a week” without U.S. protection.

The Mueller investigation may yet reveal more embarrassing details about the attempts made by Saudi Arabia and the UAE to find common ground with Trump--or a soft spot they can use to their benefit. The more information that comes out, the more the crown princes may wonder whether these efforts have been worth it.

[fullspectrum-cbd-oil]

UAE Loosens Saudi Alliance to Push Peacemaker Image

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have looked inseparable on the world stage, working together to project power in the Middle East and beyond, and courting U.S. President Donald Trump to counter common foe Iran.

From Egypt to Sudan and the Horn of Africa, the two Gulf monarchies have coordinated their use of financial clout and – in Yemen – military force to redraw the region’s political landscape to their advantage.

But this month, at his Mecca palace, Saudi King Salman took the unusual step of expressing “extreme irritation” with the UAE, his closest Arab partner, according to sources familiar with the matter.

The comment appears to be evidence of a fissure in the alliance, which is led in practice by the king’s son, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS), and the UAE de facto ruler Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan (MbZ).

A loosening of UAE-Saudi ties has implications far beyond bilateral ties. A rift could undermine Trump’s “maximum pressure” push against Tehran, damage Israeli-Palestinian peace efforts, and reverberate in other theaters of conflict, so extensive has the two partners’ influence been in a region critical to world oil supplies.

The immediate source of strain is Yemen’s ruinous war. Friction had been growing for months over the conflict, which was initially expected to last a few weeks but has dragged on for years and killed tens of thousands with no end in sight.

A wider cause is the UAE’s apparent decision to pivot toward narrower national interests, casting itself as the more mature partner that can stabilize the region, even if it means cutting losses and moving on without Riyadh.

The UAE also appears keen to salvage its image in Washington, where the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi deepened worries that the kingdom’s foreign policy was growing impulsive and interventionist.

“The UAE wants to be seen as the small country that facilitates peace and stability rather than an appendage to a triumphant expansionist Saudi,” said a source familiar with the government’s thinking.

“It is in a way (putting) their interests first, because they think if you have an expansionist Saudi, it’s going to engulf them,” the source added.

BOTH COUNTRIES “COMPLETELY ALIGNED”

The king’s annoyance was voiced in a conversation on Aug. 11 with President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, head of Yemen’s Saudi-backed government, according to two Yemeni sources and one other briefed on the meeting.

Hadi’s forces in Aden had just been routed by troops supported by the UAE, as nominal allies in the country’s south turned on each other in a power struggle.

Asked for comment, a Saudi official described that account as false and said: “Saudi Arabia and the UAE remain strategically aligned on the sources of instability in the Middle East and cooperate very closely to counter a wide array of security threats in the region and beyond. Bilateral relations between the two nations are unshakable.”

UAE authorities did not respond to questions about the remark. A UAE official earlier told Reuters both countries were “completely aligned” on Yemen and that with Iran, de-escalation was the only way forward.

Any divisions may worry the White House, which has invested much of its Middle East policy in the pair.

As fighting in Aden resumed on Wednesday, Saudi Arabia’s deputy defense minister met the U.S. secretary of state in Washington to discuss how to end the standoff, according to a State Department statement. The statement did not mention Riyadh’s relations with the UAE, which a U.S. official had said would also be on the agenda.

The White House did not respond to a request for comment.

Strains grew acute this summer over Yemen, after months of unease on other issues. When MbS and MbZ went to war in 2015 against Yemen’s Iran-aligned Houthi rebels and later imposed a boycott on Qatar, supporters hailed a new era of decisive action in a region more accustomed to time-consuming conciliation.

The two men also waded into conflicts in Egypt, Sudan and Libya. They sought to contain Iran and Islamists seen as threatening their dynastic rule following the 2011 Arab Spring.

But as Riyadh flexed muscles by cutting ties with Canada, briefly detaining Lebanon’s prime minister, and aggravating relations with Jordan and Morocco, the UAE saw its carefully crafted image as a stabilizing force imperiled by association.

UNPOPULAR WAR

Then, in June, the UAE scaled down its military presence in Yemen, saddling Riyadh with an unpopular war it had launched to neutralize the Houthis and prevent Iran from consolidating influence along the border.

A senior Emirati official said the move was a natural progression due to a U.N.-sponsored peace deal in the western port of Hodeidah.

But some diplomats said the UAE accepted there was no military solution and were sensitive to criticism of the humanitarian disaster and coalition air strikes that have killed civilians. They also said that rising Iran tensions precipitated the decision.

“It was not perceived in a positive way. The Saudis felt abandoned,” said a Western diplomat. Abu Dhabi says the move was coordinated with Riyadh in advance and reflected realities on the ground as the U.N. moved to pave the way for peace talks.

Another diplomat said the relationship was fracturing: “Their strategic interests are similar but don’t quite match.”

The UAE also downplayed divisions after separatists it backs seized Aden, interim seat of Hadi’s government, this month, but did not ask them to cede control and criticized Hadi’s government as “weak” and “ineffective”.

The Sunni Muslim Arab powers also appear divergent over Shi’ite foe Iran. They both pushed for a stronger U.S. stand against Tehran’s regional activities and missile capabilities, but the UAE struck a softer tone after tanker explosions in Gulf waters that Washington and Riyadh blamed on Iran.

Iran denies involvement, but some in the Gulf fear a direct confrontation that could endanger the UAE and its economy. The UAE, having built its reputation as a business haven, is more vulnerable than Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest oil exporter, and sees itself as a regional stabilizer.

HEDGING BETS

One source said it is hedging its bets as a small power: The UAE’s commercial hub Dubai has strong Iran trade ties.

“The honeymoon (with Saudi Arabia) is over,” said another source, pointing to Abu Dhabi’s recent overtures to Iran, including maritime security talks revived last month.

A Gulf source said the alliance was “very much alive and well” in terms of combating regional threats like Iran and Islamists, but acknowledged a rebalancing as situations evolved.

One of those situations may involve Iran’s role in Yemen: As Washington builds a maritime coalition to secure Gulf waters, Iran could stoke tensions through the Houthis to pressure Saudi Arabia and avoid risking a tanker war like that of the 1980s.

“Yemen now looks like ground zero for Iranian escalation,” said Matt Reed, vice president of energy consultancy Foreign Reports. “A tanker war risks becoming an international conflict, but Yemen is different.”

Riyadh accuses Iran of giving the Houthis missiles and drones to attack Saudi oil assets, a charge Tehran denies. It also fears spillover effects if Yemen fragments further.

By contrast, Abu Dhabi’s main concern is protecting the strategic Bab al-Mandeb waterway and keeping Islamists at bay.

“They are broadly strategically aligned. There are more similarities than differences, but we will start to see divergences,” said one diplomat.

(Editing by William Maclean and Sonya Hepinstall)

from IJR https://ift.tt/2ZqsTNx via IFTTT

[trunewsofficial]

President Trump Drops Sanctions Hammer on Mullahs

This afternoon, President Donald Trump signed an executive order titled “Imposing Sanctions with Respect to Iran,” which imposes new sanctions on the Islamic Republic’s Supreme Leader’s Office, as well as officials who work directly with Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The president was joined in the Oval Office for the signing of the executive order by Vice President Mike Pence and Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin. He said the order follows a “series of aggressive behaviors” by the Islamic Republic in recent weeks: “The Supreme Leader of Iran is one who ultimately is responsible for the hostile conduct of the regime. He’s respected within his country. His office oversees the regime’s most brutal instruments, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. “Sanctions imposed through the executive order that I’m about to sign will deny the Supreme Leader and the Supreme Leader’s Office, and those closely affiliated with him and the office, access to key financial resources and support. The assets of Ayatollah Khamenei and his office will not be spared from the sanctions. “These measures represent a strong and proportionate response to Iran’s increasingly provocative actions. We will continue to increase pressure on Tehran until the regime abandons its dangerous activities and its aspirations, including the pursuit of nuclear weapons, increased enrichment of uranium, development of ballistic missiles, engagement in and support for terrorism, fueling of foreign conflicts, and belligerent acts directed against the United States and its allies. “The agreement that was signed was a disaster. It was not doing what it was supposed to do. Many bad things were taking place. And, most importantly, it was so short-term that, within a very short number of years, they would be able to make nuclear weapons. And that’s unacceptable. Never can Iran have a nuclear weapon. “Also included in this is we want the stoppage immediately of their sponsoring of terrorism. They sponsor terrorism at a level that nobody has ever seen before, and that’s been over the last number of years. And they’ve taken all of that money that was given to them by the past administration, and much of it was given out to terrorist organizations. “In fact, I remember when John Kerry was asked a question about whether or not this money will be spent for terror. He actually said “yes” — or at least he was referring to some of it. But he said, “Yes, it will be used for terror,” if you can believe that. We’re giving them money. We’re saying, “Yes, it can be used for terror.” That was not a good answer, but that was the least of it, frankly. “So, America is a peace-loving nation. We do not seek conflict with Iran or any other country. I look forward to the day when sanctions can be finally lifted and Iran can become a peaceful, prosperous, and productive nation. That can go very quickly; it can be tomorrow. It can also be in years from now. “So I look forward to discussing whatever I have to discuss with anybody that wants to speak. In the meantime, who knows what’s going to happen. I can only tell you we cannot ever let Iran have a nuclear weapon. And it won’t happen. And secondly, and very importantly, we don’t want money going out to sponsor terror. They are the number-one sponsor of terror anywhere in the world. “So I’ll sign this order right now. And I want to thank our military. I want to thank all of the people that have been working with me over the last number of months on this. I think a lot of restraint has been shown by us. A lot of restraint. And that doesn’t mean we’re going to show it in the future. “But I felt that we want to give this a chance — give it a good chance, because I think Iran, potentially, has a phenomenal future. “Just — and I say that about North Korea, too. I’ve said it about North Korea. I think North Korea has a phenomenal future. And I think Iran also has a phenomenal future. And we’d would like to — I think a lot of people would like to see them get to work on that great future.” In addition to Khamenei, the president’s executive order also targeted the upper hierarchy of Iran’s elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ army, navy, and air force. These Iranian officials were also added to the Treasury Department Office of Foreign Asset Control’s Specially Designated Nationals list: • Yadollah Badin — commander of the IRGCN’s 3rd Naval District • Amir Hajizadeh — commander of the IRGC’s Aerospace Force • Abbas Gholamshahi — commander of the IRGCN’s 1st Naval District • Ali Ozma’i — commander of the IRGCN’s 5th Naval District • Mohammad Pakpour — commander of the IRGC’s Ground Forces • Mansur Ravankar — commander of the IRGCN’s 4th Naval District • Ali Reza Tangsiri — commander of the IRGC’s Navy • Ramezan Zirahi — commander of the IRGCN’s 2nd Naval District A statement from OFAC issued after the order was signed stated that those who were sanctioned “sit atop a bureaucracy that supervises the IRGC’s malicious regional activities.” These include Iran’s ballistic missile program, “harassment and sabotage of commercial vessels in international waters,” and its “destabilizing presence in Syria.” Treasury Secretary issued a separate statement, which read: “The United States is targeting those responsible for effectuating the Iranian regime’s destructive influence in the Middle East. IRGC commanders are responsible for the Iranian regime’s provocative attacks orchestrated in internationally recognized waters and airspace, as well as Iran’s malign activities in Syria. Treasury will continue to aggressively target the senior leaders and the financial apparatus sustaining this malign activity. This action is a warning to officials at all levels of the IRGC and the rest of the Iranian regime that we will continue to sanction those who export violence, sabotage, and terrorism.” The net effect of the sanctions is that all property and interests in property of Khamenei and the seven IRGC leaders must be blocked. Additionally, no American is allowed to do any business with them, or they may face sanctions themselves. Russia has announced that it will assist Iran in skirting the newly imposed sanctions. Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov did not specify exactly how Moscow intended to do that, but urged Washington and Tehran to talk out their differences. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov, however, took a much starker position, declaring the new sanctions illegal—even before they were announced. Amid reports President Trump opted to launch a cyber war against Iran when he canceled his military strikes against the Islamic Republic last week, DEBKAfile is reporting he has placed the entire operation into the hands of the CIA. It reports the first “shots” fired in this digital war occurred just hours after Iran downed an American spy drone over the Gulf of Oman, targeting Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps missile command centers and the computer systems of the Iranian spy agency deemed responsible for recent attacks on oil tankers. The CIA operation will also involve the deployment of covert forces within Iran to strike critical infrastructure and to stir up civil unrest in the Islamic Republic. But, DEBKAfile notes U.S. Cyber Command is “in the dark” about Iran’s cyber capabilities, and the plan carries the very real risk that Russia and China may come to its aid, taking it as an opportunity to test their own cyber capabilities against the U.S. Iran says the cyberattacks on its military have failed. Addressing the reports on his official Twitter account, Information and Communications Technology Minister Mohammad Javad Azari Jahromi says his country’s “national firewall” has prevented 33 million individual cyberattacks, adding the U.S. tried hard, but was not successful. An Iranian military official has warned the U.S. that his country’s military is more than capable of shooting another American spy drone out of the sky. According to the state-run Tasnim news agency, Islamic Republic of Iran Navy commander Rear Admiral Hossein Khanzadi says his country can deliver yet another “crushing response … and the enemy knows it.” Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has flown to Jeddah to meet with representatives of the Saudi and Emirati governments. His talks with Saudi King Salman included a summary of the latest round of sanctions against Iran that were announced today. Both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have pushed for a harsh response to what they call Iranian “provocations” in the Persian Gulf region. They have opposed new sanctions, which they say will have “no impact” on the Islamic Republic. Iran reportedly has asked to hold joint military exercises with neighboring Iraq in yet another move meant to forge an alliance between the two countries. Already, an Iranian diplomat has visited Mosul and the commander of Iran’s air defense forces has offered to help Baghdad with its own defenses. Iran is now providing electricity to Iraq in a deal signed back in February, part of nearly two dozen agreements later ratified by the Islamic Republic’s President Hassan Rouhani. These include railway connections and joint oil infrastructure projects that would result in the two Shi’ite majority countries becoming more closely integrated. (Photo Credit: The White House) source https://trunews.com/stream/president-trump-drops-sanctions-hammer-on-mullahs

[investmart007]

VIENNA | OPEC countries to pump more oil to contain price increase

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VIENNA | OPEC countries to pump more oil to contain price increase

VIENNA (AP) — The countries of the OPEC cartel agreed on Friday to pump 1 million barrels more crude oil per day, a move that should help contain the recent rise in global energy prices.

Questions remain, however, over the ability of some OPEC nations — Iran and Venezuela in particular — to increase production as they struggle with domestic turmoil and sanctions.

After a meeting in Vienna, Emirati Energy Minister Suhail al-Mazrouei said the cartel decided to fully comply with its existing production ceiling.

Because the group had been producing below that level, that means an increase in production of “a little bit less than 1 million barrels,” the Emirati minister said.

How that translates into effective production increases is uncertain, as some OPEC countries cannot easily ramp up production. Iran, for example, has been hit by U.S. sanctions that hinder its energy exports. Venezuela’s production has dropped amid domestic political instability.

Some analysts say that Friday’s deal could amount to an effective increase of just 600,000 barrels a day.

The price of oil jumped after the announcement, with the international benchmark, Brent, gaining $1.81 to $74.86 a barrel. Al-Mazrouei noted that the decision “is challenging for those countries that are struggling with keeping their level of production.” However, he indicated that some countries could pick up production if others lag.

“We will deal with it collectively,” he said.

Analysts say that OPEC’s deal should contribute to lower oil prices in the longer term.

U.S. shale oil production could rise and American demand for energy could decrease this year, further squeezing the price of oil, which in May hit its highest level in over three years.

“Longer term, this is a bit of a win for consumers,” said Jamie Webster, director of Boston Consulting Group’s Center for Energy Impact. “More oil on the market means relatively lower prices for consumers.”

Friday’s decision means the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries will observe the production level it agreed on in late 2016, when it cut output by 1.2 million barrels a day. In practice, its combined output was even less due to production problems. That has since then helped push up the price of oil by almost 50 percent.

Non-OPEC countries like Russia had agreed in 2016 to participate in OPEC’s effort to raise prices, cutting 600,000 barrels a day of their own production. They will discuss with OPEC on Saturday on whether to increase their own production.

While OPEC’s largest producer, Saudi Arabia, was open to higher production, Iran has been hesitant because sanctions imposed by U.S. President Donald Trump are making it difficult for the country to export its oil.

Trump has been calling publicly for the cartel to help lower prices by producing more. And after OPEC’s deal on Friday, Trump tweeted: “Hope OPEC will increase output substantially. Need to keep prices down!”

Some analysts note that while Trump has blamed OPEC, his policies have also helped increase the cost of oil by, for example, limiting exports from Iran.

Some analysts believe that Saudi Arabia needs a Brent price closer to $90 a barrel to cover its domestic spending but is feeling pressure from the United States to head off rising prices by boosting output. Russia may be happy to pump more oil and settle for prices in the $60s, according to Tamar Essner, chief energy analyst for Nasdaq. There are other considerations than dollars and rubles.

Daniel Yergin, the vice chairman of research firm IHS Markit and author of several books on the energy industry, says geopolitical factors are a big element in the oil production talks.

Yergin said Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates support the current, tougher U.S. policy toward Iran, Saudi Arabia’s rival for influence in the region. So they will want to support Trump’s call for higher production and lower prices. Iran will struggle to increase production, meaning it could lose market share and revenue to its rivals.

By KIYOKO METZLER By Associated Press

[newstfionline]

Report: China Is Driving Use of Armed Drones in Middle East

Associated Press, Dec. 17, 2018

BEIRUT--The use of armed drones in the Middle East, driven largely by sales from China, has grown significantly in the past few years with an increasing number of countries and other parties using them in regional conflicts to lethal effects, a new report said Monday.

The report by the Royal United Services Institute, or RUSI, found that more and more Mideast countries have acquired armed drones, either by importing them, such as Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, or by building them domestically like Israel, Iran and Turkey.

China has won sales in the Middle East and elsewhere by offering drones--otherwise known as UAVs or unmanned aerial vehicles--at lower prices and without the political conditions attached by the United States.

The Associated Press reported earlier this year that countries across the Middle East locked out of purchasing U.S.-made drones are being wooed by Chinese arms dealers, helping expand Chinese influence across a region vital to American security interest.

It noted the use of Chinese armed drones across Mideast battlefields, including in the war on Yemen, employed by the Emirati air force. Iran has also violated Israeli airspace with armed UAVs from bases in Syria, provoking armed Israeli response on the suspected bases.

The RUSI report, entitled “Armed Drones in the Middle East: Proliferation and Norms in the Region,” said that by capitalizing on the gap in the market over the past few years, Beijing has supplied armed drones to several countries that are not authorized to purchase them from the U.S., and at a dramatically cheaper price.

“China, a no-questions-asked exporter of drones, has played and is likely to continue playing a key role as a supplier of armed UAVs to the Middle East,” it said.

The report explored where and how each of the states have used their armed drones and whether they have changed the way these countries approach air power. It found that Iran, the UAE and Turkey all changed the way they employ airpower after they acquired armed drones.

For Turkey and the UAE, armed drones enabled them to conduct strikes in situations where they would not have risked using conventional aircraft, it said. Iran developed armed drones from the outset specifically to enable to project power beyond the reach of its air force, which is hamstrung by obsolete aircraft and sanctions, the report added.

The report said it remains to be seen whether and how the loosening of restrictions on the exportation of armed drones by the Trump administration will alter dynamics in the region. The administration in April permitted U.S. manufacturers to directly market and sell drones, including armed versions, although the government must still approve and license the sales.

Aniseh Bassiri Tabrizi, who authored the report along with Justin Bronk, said proliferation of armed drones in the Middle East is unlikely to stop and could in fact accelerate despite the changes introduced by the U.S. administration.

“Over the past two years the sales have increased massively and they are likely to increase even more,” she said. “This kind of collaboration is just going to grow especially in cases where countries don’t have the capacity to build them themselves.”

[thedeadshotnetwork]

Saudi Arabia has the best military equipment money can buy — but it's still not a threat to Iran Saudi Press Agency Saudi Arabia has some of the greatest military equipment money can buy, but its military is still not seen as a threat to its longtime rival Iran. Saudi Arabia's military has not proved capable of effectively fighting back Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen. Its arsenal is designed for a large conventional war — not proxy fighting. In the past few years, Saudi Arabia has led an intervention in Yemen's civil war, been the driving force behind a diplomatic crisis between Qatar and its neighbors, and involved itself in the politics of Lebanon. All of these things appear to have one common objective: to push back against the influence of Iran. But experts say Saudi Arabia's ambitions are limited by its military, which is considered an ineffective force even though the kingdom is one of the world's largest spenders on defense. "The fact is, Iran is better at doing this stuff," said Michael Knights, a Lafer fellow at The Washington Institute who specializes in the military and security affairs of Iraq, Iran, and the Persian Gulf. "There's nobody in the Iranian General Staff that's afraid of Saudi Arabia on the ground," Knights said. Saudi Arabia's struggles in Yemen — where its years-long conflict with the Houthi rebels has no end in sight — reveals its shortcomings against an adversary like Iran "What we are really talking about is how they stack up in a proxy war," Knights said. "It's what they are doing in the region nowadays." Reuters One of the largest spenders on defense Saudi Arabia's military faces two main problems. It is too large, making it more susceptible to organizational and quality issues, and its arsenal is designed for a large conventional war rather than the proxy wars of the 21st century. For all Saudi Arabia's military ineffectiveness, it's hard to blame the kingdom's equipment. Last year, Saudi Arabia was the fourth-largest spender on defense products in the world, just behind Russia. According to IHS Jane's, a British publishing company specializing in military, aerospace, and transportation topics, Saudi Arabia was the world's largest importer of weapons in 2014 . Data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute shows that Saudi Arabia was the second-largest importer of weapons in both 2015 and 2016 . Arms imports into the kingdom have increased by over 200% since 2012, according to the institute. The weaponry being bought is not low quality, either. The majority of Saudi Arabia's military hardware is bought from US companies. In fact, 13% of all US arms exports in 2016 were headed into the kingdom. Companies from the UK and Spain were the second- and third-largest sellers. Wikimedia commons The Royal Saudi Air Force arsenal includes Eurofighter Typhoons, perhaps the most advanced fighter jet fielded by European militaries, and American F-15 Eagles, the undisputed king of the skies for three decades and still formidable. The Saudis even have their own model of the Eagle — the F-15SA (Saudi Advanced), which just started being delivered this year. The Royal Saudi Land Forces, the Saudi army, have everything from M1A2 Abrams tanks and M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles to AH-64D Apache Longbow and UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters. Virtually every vessel in the Royal Saudi Navy was built in American shipyards, specifically for Saudi Arabia. Its newest frigates, the Al Riyadh class, are modified versions of France's La Fayette-class frigate. Saudi Arabia is one of the best-equipped nations in the world. Yet the Saudi military does not strike fear into the hearts of its adversaries, or would-be foes. Vice/YouTube The proxy war in Yemen Evidence of the Saudi military's shortcomings can be seen just south of the Saudi border in Yemen. Almost three years after Saudi Arabia, supported by other Gulf and Arab states, launched a military intervention to support Yemen's ousted president, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, Iran-backed Houthi rebels are still active and continue to hold Yemen's largest city and capital, Sana'a. Additionally, the Houthis have proved capable of launching high-profile attacks against the Saudis. Those include multiple cross-border raids into Saudi Arabia, successful attacks on Emirati and Saudi navy ships, and the launching of ballistic missiles into the heartland of the kingdom. In a more recent embarrassment, a report from The New York Times suggested that a ballistic missile fired by the Houthis that exploded at an airport in the Saudi capital of Riyadh was actually not shot down as previously claimed by the Saudi military. Wikimedia commons Why there has been no victory in Yemen The Saudis have had a hard task in Yemen. They have to operate in the Houthi heartland against a well-trained, well-funded, and well-supplied fighting force. Saudi Arabia, however, has not deployed significant land forces into Yemen that would be required to win on the battlefield. "We don't know if the Saudi military is able to have a significant impact on the Yemen war, because we've only seen the deployment of Saudi airpower," Knights told Business Insider. "Generally, an airpower-only campaign is not going to have a great impact — particularly in this type of complex terrain with an enemy who is very adept at hiding from airpower and often looks like civilians," he said. Reuters Knights estimates that 10,000 to 20,000 troops would be required to have the desired affect. Yet the Saudi military has not deployed its ground forces — most likely because the Saudi leadership knows that, as Knights says, they "suffer from significant weaknesses." These weaknesses include a lack of logistical equipment and experience needed to carry out such a campaign. "They have no experience in an expeditionary operation," he said, noting that the Desert Storm campaign against Iraq — which Saudi Arabia did contribute to — was largely an American effort. Additionally, Saudi ground forces as a whole are not trained well enough to where they would be able to perform successfully in large-scale operations. As such, a Saudi ground force in Yemen may cause more harm than good. Bilal Saab, the senior fellow and director of the Defense and Security Program at the Middle East Institute, told Business Insider that Saudi Arabia understood the potential harm of its ground forces. In an email, Saab said Saudi Arabia would not deploy large contingents of ground forces "because their casualties would be severe and they most probably would cause tremendous collateral damage in Yemen." Reuters What can be done In Knights' view, Saudi Arabia needs to downsize its military, focus on quality recruitment and training, and make units that are capable of fighting alongside and training local allies. Today, local militias and tribal groups form the majority of the ground force battling the Houthis, and few if any Saudi soldiers assist them — save for a few special forces units. "As a result," Knights says, "there is no credible military pressure on the Houthis." The proxy battle in Yemen is just one example of Iran's growing influence across the Middle East. Hezbollah, for instance, is better armed and organized than Lebanon’s official military. Hamas, engaged in ongoing conflict with Israel, is also publicly backed by Iran and a number of militias in Iraq's Popular Mobilization Units receive training, funding, and equipment from their neighboring country. Saudi Arabia's arsenal, though impressive, also needs to be built up with its desired applications in mind. For now, those seem to be proxy wars against an enemy that is rarely in uniform, as opposed to one fought against a conventional army from the Cold War era. NOW WATCH: Trump approved the largest weapons deal in US history — here's what Saudi Arabia is buying December 16, 2017 at 03:04PM

[foursproutwealth-blog]

Saudi Arabia has the best military equipment money can buy — but it's still not a threat to Iran

New Post has been published on http://foursprout.com/wealth/saudi-arabia-has-the-best-military-equipment-money-can-buy-but-its-still-not-a-threat-to-iran/

Saudi Arabia has the best military equipment money can buy — but it's still not a threat to Iran

Saudi Arabia has some of the greatest military equipment money can buy, but its military is still not seen as a threat to its longtime rival Iran.

Saudi Arabia’s military has not proved capable of effectively fighting back Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen.

Its arsenal is designed for a large conventional war — not proxy fighting.

In the past few years, Saudi Arabia has led an intervention in Yemen’s civil war, been the driving force behind a diplomatic crisis between Qatar and its neighbors, and involved itself in the politics of Lebanon.

All of these things appear to have one common objective: to push back against the influence of Iran.

But experts say Saudi Arabia’s ambitions are limited by its military, which is considered an ineffective force even though the kingdom is one of the world’s largest spenders on defense.

“The fact is, Iran is better at doing this stuff,” said Michael Knights, a Lafer fellow at The Washington Institute who specializes in the military and security affairs of Iraq, Iran, and the Persian Gulf.

“There’s nobody in the Iranian General Staff that’s afraid of Saudi Arabia on the ground,” Knights said.

Saudi Arabia’s struggles in Yemen — where its years-long conflict with the Houthi rebels has no end in sight — reveals its shortcomings against an adversary like Iran

“What we are really talking about is how they stack up in a proxy war,” Knights said. “It’s what they are doing in the region nowadays.”

One of the largest spenders on defense

Saudi Arabia’s military faces two main problems. It is too large, making it more susceptible to organizational and quality issues, and its arsenal is designed for a large conventional war rather than the proxy wars of the 21st century.

For all Saudi Arabia’s military ineffectiveness, it’s hard to blame the kingdom’s equipment. Last year, Saudi Arabia was the fourth-largest spender on defense products in the world, just behind Russia.

According to IHS Jane’s, a British publishing company specializing in military, aerospace, and transportation topics, Saudi Arabia was the world’s largest importer of weapons in 2014.

Data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute shows that Saudi Arabia was the second-largest importer of weapons in both 2015 and 2016. Arms imports into the kingdom have increased by over 200% since 2012, according to the institute.

The weaponry being bought is not low quality, either. The majority of Saudi Arabia’s military hardware is bought from US companies. In fact, 13% of all US arms exports in 2016 were headed into the kingdom. Companies from the UK and Spain were the second- and third-largest sellers.

The Royal Saudi Air Force arsenal includes Eurofighter Typhoons, perhaps the most advanced fighter jet fielded by European militaries, and American F-15 Eagles, the undisputed king of the skies for three decades and still formidable. The Saudis even have their own model of the Eagle — the F-15SA (Saudi Advanced), which just started being delivered this year.

The Royal Saudi Land Forces, the Saudi army, have everything from M1A2 Abrams tanks and M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles to AH-64D Apache Longbow and UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters.

Virtually every vessel in the Royal Saudi Navy was built in American shipyards, specifically for Saudi Arabia. Its newest frigates, the Al Riyadh class, are modified versions of France’s La Fayette-class frigate.

Saudi Arabia is one of the best-equipped nations in the world. Yet the Saudi military does not strike fear into the hearts of its adversaries, or would-be foes.

The proxy war in Yemen

Evidence of the Saudi military’s shortcomings can be seen just south of the Saudi border in Yemen.

Almost three years after Saudi Arabia, supported by other Gulf and Arab states, launched a military intervention to support Yemen’s ousted president, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, Iran-backed Houthi rebels are still active and continue to hold Yemen’s largest city and capital, Sana’a.

Additionally, the Houthis have proved capable of launching high-profile attacks against the Saudis. Those include multiple cross-border raids into Saudi Arabia, successful attacks on Emirati and Saudi navy ships, and the launching of ballistic missiles into the heartland of the kingdom.

In a more recent embarrassment, a report from The New York Times suggested that a ballistic missile fired by the Houthis that exploded at an airport in the Saudi capital of Riyadh was actually not shot down as previously claimed by the Saudi military.

Why there has been no victory in Yemen

The Saudis have had a hard task in Yemen. They have to operate in the Houthi heartland against a well-trained, well-funded, and well-supplied fighting force.

Saudi Arabia, however, has not deployed significant land forces into Yemen that would be required to win on the battlefield.

“We don’t know if the Saudi military is able to have a significant impact on the Yemen war, because we’ve only seen the deployment of Saudi airpower,” Knights told Business Insider.

“Generally, an airpower-only campaign is not going to have a great impact — particularly in this type of complex terrain with an enemy who is very adept at hiding from airpower and often looks like civilians,” he said.

Knights estimates that 10,000 to 20,000 troops would be required to have the desired affect. Yet the Saudi military has not deployed its ground forces — most likely because the Saudi leadership knows that, as Knights says, they “suffer from significant weaknesses.”

These weaknesses include a lack of logistical equipment and experience needed to carry out such a campaign.

“They have no experience in an expeditionary operation,” he said, noting that the Desert Storm campaign against Iraq — which Saudi Arabia did contribute to — was largely an American effort.

Additionally, Saudi ground forces as a whole are not trained well enough to where they would be able to perform successfully in large-scale operations. As such, a Saudi ground force in Yemen may cause more harm than good.

Bilal Saab, the senior fellow and director of the Defense and Security Program at the Middle East Institute, told Business Insider that Saudi Arabia understood the potential harm of its ground forces. In an email, Saab said Saudi Arabia would not deploy large contingents of ground forces “because their casualties would be severe and they most probably would cause tremendous collateral damage in Yemen.”

What can be done

In Knights’ view, Saudi Arabia needs to downsize its military, focus on quality recruitment and training, and make units that are capable of fighting alongside and training local allies.

Today, local militias and tribal groups form the majority of the ground force battling the Houthis, and few if any Saudi soldiers assist them — save for a few special forces units.

“As a result,” Knights says, “there is no credible military pressure on the Houthis.”

The proxy battle in Yemen is just one example of Iran’s growing influence across the Middle East. Hezbollah, for instance, is better armed and organized than Lebanon’s official military. Hamas, engaged in ongoing conflict with Israel, is also publicly backed by Iran and a number of militias in Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Units receive training, funding, and equipment from their neighboring country.

Saudi Arabia’s arsenal, though impressive, also needs to be built up with its desired applications in mind. For now, those seem to be proxy wars against an enemy that is rarely in uniform, as opposed to one fought against a conventional army from the Cold War era.

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Saudi Arabia has the best military equipment money can buy — but it's still not a threat to Iran

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Saudi Arabia has the best military equipment money can buy — but it's still not a threat to Iran

Saudi Arabia has some of the greatest military equipment money can buy, but its military is still not seen as a threat to its longtime rival Iran.

Saudi Arabia’s military has not proved capable of effectively fighting back Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen.

Its arsenal is designed for a large conventional war — not proxy fighting.

In the past few years, Saudi Arabia has led an intervention in Yemen’s civil war, been the driving force behind a diplomatic crisis between Qatar and its neighbors, and involved itself in the politics of Lebanon.

All of these things appear to have one common objective: to push back against the influence of Iran.

But experts say Saudi Arabia’s ambitions are limited by its military, which is considered an ineffective force even though the kingdom is one of the world’s largest spenders on defense.

“The fact is, Iran is better at doing this stuff,” said Michael Knights, a Lafer fellow at The Washington Institute who specializes in the military and security affairs of Iraq, Iran, and the Persian Gulf.

“There’s nobody in the Iranian General Staff that’s afraid of Saudi Arabia on the ground,” Knights said.

Saudi Arabia’s struggles in Yemen — where its years-long conflict with the Houthi rebels has no end in sight — reveals its shortcomings against an adversary like Iran

“What we are really talking about is how they stack up in a proxy war,” Knights said. “It’s what they are doing in the region nowadays.”

One of the largest spenders on defense

Saudi Arabia’s military faces two main problems. It is too large, making it more susceptible to organizational and quality issues, and its arsenal is designed for a large conventional war rather than the proxy wars of the 21st century.

For all Saudi Arabia’s military ineffectiveness, it’s hard to blame the kingdom’s equipment. Last year, Saudi Arabia was the fourth-largest spender on defense products in the world, just behind Russia.

According to IHS Jane’s, a British publishing company specializing in military, aerospace, and transportation topics, Saudi Arabia was the world’s largest importer of weapons in 2014.

Data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute shows that Saudi Arabia was the second-largest importer of weapons in both 2015 and 2016. Arms imports into the kingdom have increased by over 200% since 2012, according to the institute.

The weaponry being bought is not low quality, either. The majority of Saudi Arabia’s military hardware is bought from US companies. In fact, 13% of all US arms exports in 2016 were headed into the kingdom. Companies from the UK and Spain were the second- and third-largest sellers.

The Royal Saudi Air Force arsenal includes Eurofighter Typhoons, perhaps the most advanced fighter jet fielded by European militaries, and American F-15 Eagles, the undisputed king of the skies for three decades and still formidable. The Saudis even have their own model of the Eagle — the F-15SA (Saudi Advanced), which just started being delivered this year.

The Royal Saudi Land Forces, the Saudi army, have everything from M1A2 Abrams tanks and M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles to AH-64D Apache Longbow and UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters.

Virtually every vessel in the Royal Saudi Navy was built in American shipyards, specifically for Saudi Arabia. Its newest frigates, the Al Riyadh class, are modified versions of France’s La Fayette-class frigate.

Saudi Arabia is one of the best-equipped nations in the world. Yet the Saudi military does not strike fear into the hearts of its adversaries, or would-be foes.

The proxy war in Yemen

Evidence of the Saudi military’s shortcomings can be seen just south of the Saudi border in Yemen.

Almost three years after Saudi Arabia, supported by other Gulf and Arab states, launched a military intervention to support Yemen’s ousted president, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, Iran-backed Houthi rebels are still active and continue to hold Yemen’s largest city and capital, Sana’a.

Additionally, the Houthis have proved capable of launching high-profile attacks against the Saudis. Those include multiple cross-border raids into Saudi Arabia, successful attacks on Emirati and Saudi navy ships, and the launching of ballistic missiles into the heartland of the kingdom.

In a more recent embarrassment, a report from The New York Times suggested that a ballistic missile fired by the Houthis that exploded at an airport in the Saudi capital of Riyadh was actually not shot down as previously claimed by the Saudi military.

Why there has been no victory in Yemen

The Saudis have had a hard task in Yemen. They have to operate in the Houthi heartland against a well-trained, well-funded, and well-supplied fighting force.

Saudi Arabia, however, has not deployed significant land forces into Yemen that would be required to win on the battlefield.

“We don’t know if the Saudi military is able to have a significant impact on the Yemen war, because we’ve only seen the deployment of Saudi airpower,” Knights told Business Insider.

“Generally, an airpower-only campaign is not going to have a great impact — particularly in this type of complex terrain with an enemy who is very adept at hiding from airpower and often looks like civilians,” he said.

Knights estimates that 10,000 to 20,000 troops would be required to have the desired affect. Yet the Saudi military has not deployed its ground forces — most likely because the Saudi leadership knows that, as Knights says, they “suffer from significant weaknesses.”

These weaknesses include a lack of logistical equipment and experience needed to carry out such a campaign.

“They have no experience in an expeditionary operation,” he said, noting that the Desert Storm campaign against Iraq — which Saudi Arabia did contribute to — was largely an American effort.

Additionally, Saudi ground forces as a whole are not trained well enough to where they would be able to perform successfully in large-scale operations. As such, a Saudi ground force in Yemen may cause more harm than good.

Bilal Saab, the senior fellow and director of the Defense and Security Program at the Middle East Institute, told Business Insider that Saudi Arabia understood the potential harm of its ground forces. In an email, Saab said Saudi Arabia would not deploy large contingents of ground forces “because their casualties would be severe and they most probably would cause tremendous collateral damage in Yemen.”

What can be done

In Knights’ view, Saudi Arabia needs to downsize its military, focus on quality recruitment and training, and make units that are capable of fighting alongside and training local allies.

Today, local militias and tribal groups form the majority of the ground force battling the Houthis, and few if any Saudi soldiers assist them — save for a few special forces units.

“As a result,” Knights says, “there is no credible military pressure on the Houthis.”

The proxy battle in Yemen is just one example of Iran’s growing influence across the Middle East. Hezbollah, for instance, is better armed and organized than Lebanon’s official military. Hamas, engaged in ongoing conflict with Israel, is also publicly backed by Iran and a number of militias in Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Units receive training, funding, and equipment from their neighboring country.

Saudi Arabia’s arsenal, though impressive, also needs to be built up with its desired applications in mind. For now, those seem to be proxy wars against an enemy that is rarely in uniform, as opposed to one fought against a conventional army from the Cold War era.

SEE ALSO: Chinese drones may soon swarm the market — and that could be very bad for the US

Join the conversation about this story »

NOW WATCH: Trump approved the largest weapons deal in US history — here’s what Saudi Arabia is buying