#Pakistan missile development

[milfstalin]

from that drop site news article,

In conversations with U.S. officials around that time, Bajwa agreed to a longstanding U.S. demand to curtail Pakistan’s ballistic missile program in order to alleviate Washington’s concerns about the possibility that Pakistani long-range missiles could one day threaten Israel. This concession was previously reported by Pakistani journalists and later confirmed by sources to Drop Site News.

jeez i wonder why the us would want to keep that particular state with nuclear weapons away from its colony with nuclear weapons.

[mariacallous]

The recent conflicts in the Middle East have ignited open debate among Iran’s political elite over whether the country should weaponize its vast nuclear program. The rationale for doing so, from Iranian leadership’s perspective, appears more convincing than ever.

Above all, Iran needs to reestablish deterrence equilibrium with its longtime foes Israel and the United States. Traditionally, to deter its adversaries from attacking or implementing regime change, Tehran relied on a three-pronged approach focused on missiles, militias, and a nuclear program.

To offset its weak air force, Iran invested heavily in its missiles program, making its arsenal one of the most advanced in the region. Iran also anchors its asymmetric warfare strategy through the so-called “forward defense” policy of using militarized nonstate actors to encircle Israel and the U.S. regional military presence and to mobilize these forces to attack if required. Iran has cultivated its relations with groups that are hostile to the United States and Israel, building the so-called Axis of Resistance, providing them with arms—including sophisticated missiles and drones—as well as training and financial support.

However, Iran’s missiles capabilities and the Axis of Resistance have taken a hit in recent months. The Israeli onslaught against Iran’s most trusted partner, Hezbollah in Lebanon, has delivered a blow to its arsenal, fighters, and command and control structure. Iran was left humiliated by Israel’s ability to assassinate Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh while he was in Tehran this summer. Following the killing of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar this month, Israel seems determined to keep upping the ante to establish a new regional order.

Although Hamas and Hezbollah will continue to undermine Israeli security, the ability of these groups to mobilize in defense of Iran seems severely diminished while they fight for their own survival. Meanwhile, the United States has doubled down on its efforts to shield Israel, moving new anti-missile systems into the country, together with American troops to operate them, in a bid to defang future attacks from Iran and its allies.

Perhaps Iran’s biggest Achilles’s heel is its self-restraint. Over the past year, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has repeatedly held back from a direct war with Israel and the United States. He has also shied away from triggering a full assault by the Axis of Resistance front. Israel has interpreted this restraint as a weakness and exploited it.

This shift in regional deterrence has strengthened the argument in Tehran favoring a nuclear umbrella. Iran has already obtained nuclear threshold status, placing it at the tipping point of weaponization. Iran can develop enough material for a nuclear bomb in just over a week, with some experts assessing that it could build a nuclear warhead to carry these bombs within several months. In the same way that India and Pakistan achieved a relative cold peace, Tehran may look to check Israeli behavior through rebalancing the nuclear playing field.

Another argument for why Iran could dash for the bomb is that the country has already paid the high cost of becoming a nuclear weapons state without receiving the perceived benefits of having the bomb.

Ever since the Trump administration withdrew from the 2015 nuclear deal, which Iran was in full compliance with at the time, the United States has imposed its largest-scale sanctions to date against Iran. Western relations with Tehran further plummeted over Iran’s abysmal human rights record, its regional posture, and military assistance to Russia during its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Given the anti-Iran sentiment across Western capitals, the Iranian leadership would be correct to conclude that major U.S. sanctions relief of the type seen in 2015 is not on the horizon. If Iran is already being treated as a nuclear pariah state by the West, then why not secure the perceived security benefits of going nuclear?

Finally, the broader geopolitical conditions today mean the costs associated with Iran becoming a nuclear state are lower than a decade ago. Tensions between world powers now make it increasingly unlikely that Russia, and possibly China, will stand in Iran’s way. Tehran can also capitalize on the Ukraine war by pushing to trade its military equipment—which Moscow desperately needs—for Russian nuclear know-how, technology, and defense at the U.N. Security Council. The United States already fears this could be happening.

Against this backdrop, those inside Iran favoring nuclear weaponization likely see two choices ahead: either Iran’s nuclear facilities are eventually destroyed by Israel and the United States first, and then Tehran stumbles toward nuclear weapons over a longer timeframe with depleted resources, or Iran starts the weaponization now while it has advanced nuclear capabilities and Israel is bogged down in Gaza and Lebanon. Iranian strategists may be swayed for the latter option when faced with a weakened Axis of Resistance, a formidable Israeli-U.S. military force and an Israel poised to strike at Iranian nuclear sites. Despite the strong likelihood that the country will be bombed throughout this process by Israel and the United States, Iran’s leadership may conclude it can bear the brunt of military action and come out of it stronger.

Following the hits Iran has taken to its deterrence capabilities, there is an acute risk of Iran reaching for the bomb. Western governments should act now to shape the internal debate inside Iran to avoid this outcome. A nuclear Iran can act with greater impunity at home and abroad. It will almost certainly trigger a nuclear arms race across the Middle East. This outcome would make a region close to Europe even more dangerous, not just because of the increased risk of violent conflict among states but also the risk of terrorist groups gaining access to nuclear weapons.

Western governments need to warn Iran’s leaders that if they decide to weaponize the country’s nuclear program, it will backfire. Becoming a nuclear state will likely offer Iran’s leaders greater guarantees against large-scale military intervention and externally imposed regime change. But it will expose Iran to vicious cycles of military strikes, cyberattacks, and assassinations. Future Iranian nuclear weapons will not deter Israel against striking Iran—just as Tehran was not deterred against taking the unprecedented step this year of barraging Israel, itself a nuclear power, with missiles.

Over the past year, Europe and the United States have not seriously pursued a political off-ramp with Tehran. The United States has been trapped—by both Israeli and Iranian conduct—into an escalation cycle and seems willing to only play a military card. Absent a political agenda, Iran’s dash to the bomb is becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. History reveals that the more the United States and Israel carry out attacks inside Iran, the more Iran inches closer to the bomb.

The instances when Washington and Europe have shifted Iranian calculations away from weaponization involved serious diplomacy. The new Iranian government comprises technocrats who have a long history of supporting negotiations with Europe and the United States and have implemented the deals struck. Iran’s new reform-minded president, Masoud Pezeshkian, has amplified his government’s openness to diplomacy with the West—and this intent must now be put to the test.

In this diplomatic endeavor, a coalition of willing Western governments should ally themselves with Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Iraq, which among them have notable influence with Iran, Israel, and the United States. A new track of pursuing diplomacy with Iran within a coalition of regional actors is the best door opener for the West to prevent the Iran-Israel war spiraling out of control and to wedge open wider space to reduce tensions on other issues.

While there is considerable distrust between Iran and the West at this moment, both sides need to engage in transactional hard-nosed diplomacy to make a course correction. Otherwise, the current path will lead to the worst of all worlds.

[stele3]

[nicklloydnow]

“Russia said it would revoke its ratification of a major international nuclear-test-ban pact, a move that threatens to exacerbate global instability brought on by the war in Ukraine.

The step comes at a time when no arms talks between the U.S. and Russia are under way, Moscow has suspended its participation in the New START strategic-arms treaty, and ties between Washington and Moscow have reached lows not seen since the Cold War.

(…)

Though the treaty isn’t legally in force because not enough nations have ratified it, major powers including Russia, the U.S. and China say they are abiding by its terms.

A State Department spokesman said that the Russian move “needlessly endangers the global norm against nuclear explosive testing,” and that the U.S. remains committed to observing a moratorium.

Some former U.S. officials noted the revocation comes at a time when Russian military experts have been discussing whether Moscow should resume tests to confirm the effectiveness of some of Moscow’s new nuclear weapon systems.

“The Russians are clearly having a debate about resuming nuclear testing and this is moving them one step closer to such a move,” said Lynn Rusten, a former U.S. arms control official who is now a vice president of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a nonprofit organization on security issues.

“If Russia were to test, other states would follow,” she added. “It would open the door for China to resume testing, for India and Pakistan and other states to follow.”

(…)

The U.S., which was the first nation to sign the treaty, has observed a moratorium on nuclear tests since 1992. But it never ratified the agreement in the face of congressional objections over verification and other issues. China, whose last nuclear test was in 1996, has also signed but not ratified the treaty.

A total of 187 nations have signed the accord and 178 have ratified it. For it to take legal effect, eight nations would need to ratify it: China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and the U.S.

(…)

The U.S. has said that Russia has likely undertaken experiments that exceed that “zero yield standard” at its site at Novaya Zemlya, a remote archipelago in the Arctic Circle, an allegation Moscow has denied.

(…)

On Thursday at the Valdai Discussion Club, Putin said Russia had almost finished working on new types of strategic weapons and that it had successfully tested the Burevestnik, a global-range nuclear-powered cruise missile, and finished work on the Sarmat, an intercontinental ballistic missile that carries a heavy nuclear payload.

“As a rule, specialists say, [with] a new weapon it’s necessary to make sure that a special warhead will work smoothly, and tests need to be carried out,” Putin said.”

“Satellite imagery and aviation data suggest that Russia may be preparing to test an experimental nuclear-powered cruise missile — or may have recently tested one — with a theoretical range of thousands of miles.

Movements of aircraft and vehicles at and near a base in Russia’s remote Arctic region are consistent with preparations that were made for tests of the missile, known as the Burevestnik or SSC-X-9 Skyfall, in 2017 and 2018, according to a New York Times analysis.

(…)

Russia previously conducted 13 known tests between 2017 and 2019, all of which were unsuccessful, according to a report from the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a nonprofit group focused on arms control. And mishaps can be deadly. A missile launched in 2019 crashed and eventually exploded during a recovery attempt, killing seven people, according to U.S. officials.

“It is exotic — it is dangerous in its testing and development phase,” Daryl G. Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, said. Whether the Burevestnik has been tested again since 2019 isn’t clear, but even with a successful launch, the missile would still be years away from “operational deployment,” Mr. Kimball added.

In previous tests, the missile failed to fly a distance anywhere close to the designed range, estimated to be around 14,000 miles. U.S. officials assessed that during its most successful test flight, lasting just more than two minutes, the missile flew 22 miles before crashing into the sea. In another test, the missile’s nuclear reactor failed to activate, causing it to go down only a few miles from the launch site. For a test to succeed, the missile’s nuclear reactor would need to initiate in flight, so that the missile can cover much more ground.

According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative report, the missile is a “second-strike, strategic-range weapon,” intended to be launched after a wave of nuclear strikes have devastated targets in Russia. The missile could carry a conventional warhead but, in practice, would likely carry a nuclear payload, albeit a smaller one than most other nuclear-capable weapons. If used in wartime, the missile could have the potential to destroy large urban areas and military targets, experts say.

(…)

The Burevestnik is one of six strategic weapons, along with others such as the Kinzhal ballistic missile and the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle, that Mr. Putin introduced in a 2018 speech. He asserted that the weapons could overpower and outmaneuver existing U.S. defenses. Addressing the West, he said, “You have failed to contain Russia.”

Visual evidence of testing preparations includes before-and-after satellite images.

Imagery taken on the morning of Sept. 20 shows numerous vehicles present on a launchpad at the base, including a truck with a trailer that appears to correspond to the dimensions of the missile. A weather shelter that typically covers the specific launch site had been moved about 50 feet. By the afternoon, the trailer was gone and the shelter was moved back to its original position.

Additional imagery captured on Sept. 28 shows the launchpad active again, with a similar trailer present and the shelter again drawn back.

On Aug. 31, the Russian authorities issued an aviation notice for a “temporary danger area,” advising pilots to avoid part of the Barents Sea off the coast and 12 miles from the launch site, known as Pankovo. The notice has since been extended several times and, as of Sunday, was scheduled to be in force through Oct. 6. Russia issued a similar notice before a Burevestnik test in 2019.

Additionally, two Russian aircraft specifically used for collecting data from missile launches were parked about 100 miles south of the launch site in early August, at the Rogachevo air base, according to analysis of satellite images by Bellona, a Norwegian environmental organization. The aircraft are owned by Rosatom, the Russian atomic energy company. They remained at that base at least through Sept. 26, according to additional satellite imagery. During Burevestnik tests in 2018, aircraft of the same type were also in the vicinity.

(…)

The highly secretive nature of the Burevestnik missile initiative and the remote launch location make it difficult to determine if a test is forthcoming or if the weapon may have already been recently retested — or perhaps both. While launch tests of the Burevestnik have been conducted at the Arctic base in the past, Russia could also test just the missile’s rocket motor or a component of the missile itself.

(…)

Experts said the missile is dangerous not only in its ability to carry a powerful nuclear warhead but in its potential to release harmful radioactive emissions if the missile were to explode or malfunction during a test.

If put into use, the Burevestnik would be considered part of Russia’s nuclear arsenal, making it subject to a nuclear arms reduction treaty that Moscow signed in 2011. That agreement limits the total number of warheads and delivery vehicles the country can deploy.

But with the treaty, known as New START, set to expire in February 2026, the missile could contribute to “the leading edge of an uncontrolled arms race” if no new agreement were to replace the expiring treaty, Mr. Kimball said.

Ultimately, he said, a test of the missile would be a “sign that Russia is moving in the wrong direction.””

“President Vladimir Putin has said Russia successfully completed the testing of a new nuclear-powered strategic missile and could revoke its ratification of a nuclear test ban treaty, raising fears that Moscow could resume nuclear testing for the first time in decades.

The Russian leader’s renewed nuclear talk on Thursday came against the backdrop of escalating rhetoric among Kremlin hawks, with a prominent propagandist drawing criticism this week for claims Russia should detonate a nuclear weapon over Siberia to send a message to the West.

(…)

“The last successful test of the Burevestnik, a global-range cruise missile with a nuclear propulsion system, was carried out,” Putin said.

The question now, Putin said, was about resolving some “purely administrative and bureaucratic” procedures in order to move on to mass production of these weapons and putting them on combat duty. “We will do this soon,” he added.

(…)

“This is a stupid weapon system, designed by stupid people for operational reasons that are not tremendously useful,” William Alberque, the director of strategy, technology and arms control at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, told NBC News.

(…)

Since the start of his war in Ukraine, the Russian leader has repeatedly threatened to unleash the country’s powerful nuclear arsenal should its sovereignty or territorial integrity be threatened.

It’s part of the country’s so-called nuclear doctrine, which Putin said Thursday there was no reason to update, when asked if the threshold for employing nuclear weapons should be lowered to restrain the West. “No person in his right mind and clear memory” would think of using nuclear weapons against Russia, Putin said.

He added that he was not ready to say whether nuclear testing is actually needed, but threatened to revoke Moscow’s ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which bans all nuclear explosions, whether for military or peaceful purposes. It would mirror Washington signing but not ratifying the treaty, Putin added.

(…)

It comes just months after Russia suspended its involvement in the last remaining arms control treaty with the U.S., which limits nuclear stocks.

Putin did not specify when or where the alleged testing of the Burevestnik missile took place.

But the New York Times reported earlier this week, citing satellite imagery and aviation data, that Russia may be preparing to test an experimental nuclear-powered cruise missile, or may have recently tested one.

(…)

A suspected failed test of Burevestnik in 2019 killed five scientists and caused a radiation spike in a nearby city.

Technologically, the weapon is not that much of a challenge, said Alberque, but safely deploying it is much more difficult. “There is a reason the U.S. abandoned this technology in the Cold War. It’s just a bad idea,” he added.

The failed test in 2019 illustrates the dangers of this technology, he added.

Talking about its testing may primarily be an attempt to intimidate the West and force concessions on Ukraine, but Moscow withdrawing from the nuclear test ban treaty would be a huge deal, Alberque said. Russia is part of the global monitoring system that helps detect nuclear explosions and losing Russian sensors would deal “a hammer blow” to that ability, he added.

According to the United Nations, the Soviet Union’s last nuclear test took place in late 1990, so the resumption of nuclear testing by Putin’s Russia would be a major development that could further escalate global tensions.

(…)

Margarita Simonyan, the editor-in-chief of Russia’s English-language RT network, suggested Sunday that there is no need for nuclear strikes on Washington when a thermonuclear explosion over Russian territory, like Siberia in Russia’s far east, would knock out all radioelectronics and satellite systems, in a major blow to the West. “Nothing so terrible would happen” to the area or locals, she said, adding that it’s one of the “most humane” options she sees available.”

[ptrcbtmn]

The Cuban Revolution broke out during Eisenhower's second term, resulting in the replacement of pro-U.S. military dictator Fulgencio Batista with Fidel Castro. In response to the revolution, the Eisenhower administration broke ties with Cuba and Eisenhower approved a CIA operation to carry out a campaign of terrorist attacks and sabotage, kill civilians, and cause economic damage. The CIA also trained and commanded pilots to bomb civilian airfields. The CIA began preparations for an invasion of Cuba by Cuban expatriates, ultimately resulting in the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion after Eisenhower left office.

Eisenhower did provide France with bombers and non-combat personnel. After a few months with no success by the French, he added other aircraft to drop napalm for clearing purposes.

.The Pact of Madrid, signed on September 23, 1953, by Francoist Spain and the United States, was a significant effort to break international isolation of Spain, together with the Concordat of 1953. This development came at a time when other victorious Allies and much of the rest of the world remained hostile[a] to a fascist regime sympathetic to the cause of the former Axis powers and established with Nazi assistance. This accord took the form of three separate executive agreements that pledged the United States to furnish economic and military aid to Spain.

On 1 May 1960, a United States U-2 spy plane was shot down by the Soviet Air Defence Forces while conducting photographic aerial reconnaissance deep inside Soviet territory. Flown by American pilot Francis Gary Powers, the aircraft had taken off from Peshawar, Pakistan, and crashed near Sverdlovsk (present-day Yekaterinburg), after being hit by a surface-to-air missile. Powers parachuted to the ground and was captured.

Initially, American authorities acknowledged the incident as the loss of a civilian weather research aircraft operated by NASA, but were forced to admit the mission's true purpose a few days later after the Soviet government produced the captured pilot and parts of the U-2's surveillance equipment, including photographs of Soviet military bases.

The incident occurred during the tenures of American president Dwight D. Eisenhower and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, around two weeks before the scheduled opening of an east–west summit in Paris, France. Khrushchev and Eisenhower had met face-to-face at Camp David in Maryland in September 1959, and the seeming thaw in U.S.-Soviet relations had raised hopes globally for a peaceful resolution to the Cold War. The U-2 incident shattered the amiable "Spirit of Camp David" that had prevailed for eight months, prompting the cancellation of the summit in Paris and embarrassing the U.S. on the international stage. The Pakistani government issued a formal apology to the Soviet Union for its role in the mission.

Fuck off

1956 Republican Platform

[darkmaga-returns]

The future of Indo-US relations under Trump 2.0 will ultimately play the largest role in determining the degree of tumult that South Asia experiences next year.

South Asia is generally thought of as a comparatively stable region whose primary problems are socio-economic development, which shouldn’t be underestimated but isn’t the same as the geopolitical turbulence that West Asia and Europe have recently experienced. That might be about to change. From Afghanistan to Myanmar, the latter of which can be included in South Asia due to its former role in the British Raj, the entire region is bracing itself for a tumultuous 2025.

Beginning with Afghanistan, the latest tit-for-tat attacks between the Afghan Taliban and Pakistan across the Durand Line bode ill for the future of their bilateral relations. Kabul never recognized the British-imposed border between Afghanistan and what later became Pakistan. It’s also accused by Islamabad of harboring the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, also known as the “Pakistani Taliban”, which is a designated terrorist group. The Afghan Taliban, meanwhile, accused Pakistan of killing civilians in its latest strike.

At the same time, Pakistan’s relations with the US are also deteriorating. The Biden Administration imposed new sanctions on its ballistic missile program, unprecedentedly targeting a state agency, while the State Department just condemned a military court’s conviction of 25 civilians. Returning US President Donald Trump’s envoy for special missions Richard Grenell is also advocating for the release of imprisoned former Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan. Ties will likely become more complicated.

[andrewtheprophet]

Trump Prepares for Nuclear War: Revelation 16

White House briefs Trump administration on nuclear threats White House warns weakened Iran could strike back with a nuclear bomb Finer: Pakistan developing a long-range missile capable of hitting the US Trump has a chance for diplomacy with a weakened Iran: White House Tom DempseyUpdated: DEC 24, 2024 / 07:47 AM CST WASHINGTON (NewsNation) — With less than a month until Inauguration Day, the…

[pakscimission]

No compromise on Pakistan’s nuclear program: Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif

Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif said there will be no compromise on Pakistan’s nuclear program. The premier believes there is no need to impose restrictions on Pakistan’s ballistic missile development. Pakistan’s nuclear program is only for defense purposes and would not be utilized aggressively, the prime minister stated while speaking to the federal cabinet today. The PM also said that there…

[aqurette]

Pakistan Is Developing Long-Range Missile

“Weeks before it leaves office, the Biden administration said that Pakistan is developing a long-range ballistic missile that could eventually provide nuclear-armed Islamabad with a weapon capable of striking the US.” Read it at the Wall Street Journal. https://aqurette.com/diary/2024/12/23/pakistan-is-developi

[samacharapp]

Pakistan New Missile: Pakistan launched SMASH killer missile, how big a threat is it for India? Know here

Pakistan has successfully tested its indigenous ship-launched ballistic missile, which is capable of attacking sea and land. However, India is ready to counter this missile. 

Pakistan New Missile: Pakistan recently successfully tested an indigenous ship-launched ballistic missile with a range of 350 kilometers. This missile is capable of hitting both land and sea targets. This test is part of Pakistan's effort to strengthen its strategic capabilities and strike a military balance with India. However, the Indian Navy is already prepared to face such threats.

Pakistan has launched an indigenously developed ship-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) after decades. It is a ship-launched ballistic missile. This missile can strike up to a distance of 350 kilometers. This capability can be a threat to India's western region and Indian Navy ships. This missile can be launched from ships deployed in the sea, which enables it to attack marine and terrestrial targets with precision.

Strategic importance

Ballistic missiles from ship-launched platforms provide Pakistan with a second-strike capability in case of war. This is a new strategic challenge for India.

Danger for India?

Pakistan's new missile can target Indian Navy's warships and coastal areas. Especially in the Arabian Sea, Indian ships and important economic assets can be at risk. This missile of Pakistan can have the capability to carry nuclear weapons. Due to which it can prove to be more dangerous. This missile can carry out precise attacks on both land and sea, due to which the security of India's maritime border can become the biggest challenge.

How is India's preparation?

India has state-of-the-art air defense systems like the S-400 Triumph, which can intercept ballistic missiles. The Indian Navy's submarines and ships are far more advanced and well-equipped than Pakistan. Nuclear submarine platforms like INS Arihant make India capable and strong at sea.

News is originally taken from: https://bit.ly/49aAX5t

Samachar App: watch the live latest news of India and the world, business updates, cricket scores, etc. Download the Samachar App now to keep up with daily breaking news.    Like and Follow us on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram

[mariacallous]

On March 15, 2019, floodwaters breached the gates of Offutt Air Force Base. Two days later, one-third of the base was inundated—and at least $1 billion worth of damage done.

Offutt is perhaps best known as the home of U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), the central node of the country’s nuclear command-and-control system. While the flood stopped short of STRATCOM headquarters, this incident paints an all-too-clear picture about the potentially catastrophic ways climate change and nuclear weapons could intersect.

Most nuclear-armed states are undertaking significant efforts to modernize their nuclear programs. Their goal? Ensuring their arsenals remain viable deterrents for decades to come, prepared to address a changing geostrategic environment. But can their arsenals continue to deter in a rapidly changing geophysical environment?

Climate change could hit every leg of the U.S. nuclear triad hard. Sea level rise, extreme flooding, and extreme heat could challenge U.S. ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and bomber aircraft; the infrastructure for their basing; and the personnel who operate them.

At the Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay, for example, rising sea levels and flooding could significantly affect the Navy’s capacity to service and maintain the submarines. Under various climate change scenarios, rising waters could inundate facilities throughout the base, disrupting SSBN servicing and crew exchanges and compromising roads connecting a key missile facility to the waterfront—potentially delaying the transport and maintenance of the submarines’ nuclear missiles. These issues would only get worse if climate change effects prevented the submarines from entering port. Since Kings Bay is one of only two bases equipped to support SSBNs, this could have serious repercussions for the broader health and stealth of the fleet.

Elsewhere, warming temperatures may accelerate extreme flooding that could limit access to ICBM silos and facilities at Minot Air Force Base—not to mention displace base personnel and their families, such as with what occurred during the devastating Souris River flood of 2011. This could disrupt the base’s staffing and maintenance operations, with potential cascading effects for the ICBM leg of the triad if delays in critical, time-sensitive maintenance such as the replacement of limited-life components reduce the reliability of some missiles.

Projected increases in extreme heat conditions and flash flooding at Whiteman Air Force Base—home to the nation’s B-2 stealth nuclear bombers—pose potential risks to the aircraft. These climate effects could limit the times and conditions under which the bombers can freely take off from or land at Whiteman, which could have implications for the readiness of the larger bomber fleet, especially if the aircraft couldn’t access relevant nuclear weapons storage sites.

But the impact could be even more significant in other nuclear states that are already feeling the effects of extreme climate hazards—and have less robust infrastructure than the United States. Take North Korea and Pakistan, both of which have experienced severe flooding in recent years. In 2020, the Kuryong River in North Korea spilled its banks and threatened the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center, which contains many nuclear weapons-related development and production facilities. Because key reactors were offline at the time, flood-induced damage to the dam that helps ensure a constant reservoir for the reactors’ cooling systems didn’t inflict much harm—but projections suggest North Korea might not be so lucky in the future.

In a worst-case scenario, a flood could disrupt online reactors from functioning safely or even damage on-site facilities that store nuclear materials, which, if not contained, could release radioactive hazards into the environment.

In 2022, record-breaking floods in Pakistan submerged a third of the country, wreaking havoc on food security, health care, and critical infrastructure. While the country’s nuclear energy facilities were spared, southern regions, where experts suspect nuclear weapons sites are located, were among the most devastated. Climate change is only expected to cause more extreme precipitation events, bringing further risk with it.

And these aren’t the only states at risk, nor are floodwaters the only danger. Wildfires that have previously threatened Russia’s nuclear sites are likely to get worse with more extreme heat. The United Kingdom, which relies only on SSBNs operated out of a single coastal base, may be particularly vulnerable to the effects of sea level rise. And India’s coastal nuclear facilities are projected to face more intense cyclones as global temperatures rise.

A shifting world will also likely affect where nuclear weapons are deployed. Leading climate security experts have been warning about rising temperatures and tensions in the Arctic for years. Russia has already been bolstering its Arctic military infrastructure, including through an increasing concentration of nuclear assets in the region—as well as displays of nuclear capabilities.

Meanwhile, the United States may look to increase its own Arctic nuclear activity. For instance, it is not currently known to conduct SSBN patrols in the region, likely because of associated challenges—to launch a nuclear weapon, a submarine would have to break through thick layers of ice, a time-consuming maneuver that risks damage to the multibillion-dollar submarines. An ice-free Arctic environment, however, might change Washington’s calculus, leading it to expand its deterrent patrols to the region due to potential operational advantages such as reduced attack warning times.

And yet, climate change may also present new opportunities for risk reduction. If all nuclear-armed states are vulnerable to climate impacts on their nuclear arsenals, they may be mutually interested in adopting measures to reduce associated risks. At minimum, this could entail a dialogue on best practices for assessing and mitigating climate change challenges to their nuclear programs. The dialogue could open up avenues for cooperation, such as sharing the latest climate research, to help states better prepare to address these common challenges.

More ambitiously, common climate change vulnerabilities could also incentivize arms control, as nuclear-armed states will face mounting financial pressures in ensuring the safety, reliability, and resilience of their arsenals to climate change impacts. The U.S. Department of Defense, for example, estimates that taking measures to increase just one base’s resilience to coastal flooding alone would cost at least $44.65 million. Accounting for all the measures necessary to increase the resilience of all their nuclear facilities and systems, states may find it mutually beneficial—and fiscally necessary—to reduce the size of their arsenals.

Climate change is very unlikely to undermine the complex web of facilities, bases, and operations involved in nuclear programs and their deterrence missions. But even small incidents and accidents are potentially devastating. After all, increased force vulnerability is widely recognized as a driver of escalation risks.

More concerted efforts must be made to assess these challenges—and potential opportunities—and equip states with the knowledge and insight they need to mitigate and adapt. Given the already high stakes and risks of nuclear weapons, failing to do so is not an option.

[ncwondwl]

NESCOM is responsible for the research and development of various advanced technologies, including nescom jobs pakistan aerospace, nuclear technology, missile systems, and other defense-related innovations.

[niikwaonunoo]

BIS Adds 24 New Entities and Removes One from Entity List and Extends Deadline for Comments to New Semiconductor Rules

On December 8, 2022, the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) issued a notice in the Federal Register adding 24 entities under 26 entries and removing one entity from the Entity List. The entities are from Latvia, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, Switzerland, and the United Arab Emirates.

Entities assisting Russia

The following entities were added to the Entity List because of their significant contributions to Russia’s military and defense industries:

LatviaFiber Optic Solutions

RussiaAO Kraftway Corporation PSC

AO PKK Milandr

AO Scientific Research Center for Electronic Computing

LLC Fibersense

Milandr EK OOO

Milandr ICC JSC

Milur IS, OOO

(OOO) Microelectronic Production Complex (MPK) Milandr

Ruselectronics JSC

Scientific Production Company Optolink

SwitzerlandMilur SA

These entities also received a Footnote 3 designation because they are considered military end-users and as such, are also subject to the Russia/Belarus-Military End User Foreign Direct Product Rule found in 15 C.F.R. § 734.9(g). For a comprehensive explanation on the Russia/Belarus-Military End User Foreign Direct Product Rule, see our previous blog posts here, here, and here.

Entities assisting Iran

BIS also added Falcon Trading International Trading Company, Hawk Electronic Supply, Merlin Trading Company, and Pulse Tech International Company under the destination of Singapore for the companies’ roles in supplying or attempting to supply products to sanctioned Iranian company Pardazan System Namad Arman (PASNA).

Nuclear capabilities and non-proliferation considerations

Finally, BIS added several companies from Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates because of those entities’ contributions and roles in unsafeguarded nuclear actions and missile proliferation-related activities. Those entities include:

Pakistan

Dynamic Engineering Corporation

EnerQuip Private, Ltd.

NAR Technologies General Trading LLC

Rainbow Solutions

TROJANS

Universal Drilling Engineers

United Arab Emirates

EnerQuip Ltd. (UAE)

NAR Technologies General Trading LLC

TROJANS

Zan Enterprises FZE

Applicable Restrictions and License Review Policies

The above additions to the Entity List restrict access to all items subject to the EAR. As a result, the EAR will require licensing from BIS in order for any person to export, reexport or transfer (in-country) any item subject to the EAR in transactions involving these listed entities.  The license review policy is based on the rationale for the addition to the Entity List. Those entities added based on their support for Russia’s military and defense sectors will be reviewed based on a policy of denial for all items subject to the EAR except for food and medicine designated as EAR99, which will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis. For those entities added based on their transactions with Iran, the license review policy is a presumption of denial. Finally, those entities added based on their contributions and roles in unsafeguarded nuclear actions and missile proliferation-related activities will be reviewed based on the standards outlined in § 744.2(d) and in § 744.3(d) of the EAR, with the exception of licenses for transactions with Dynamic Engineering Corporation, which will only be reviewed according to the standards outlined in § 744.2(d).

BIS Extends Deadline for Comments to New Semiconductor Rules

On December 7, 2022, BIS issued a notice in the Federal Register stating that it is extending the deadline for public comment on the new semiconductor rules to January 31, 2022. BIS extended the deadline to allow more time for the public to review the interim final rule, issued on October 13, 2022, and to allow the public to consider BIS’s outreach efforts when preparing their comments.

Husch Blackwell’s Export Controls and Economic Sanctions Team continues to closely monitor all sanctions and export controls developments concerning Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine and will provide further updates as conditions change. Interested readers can also review content covering previous Russia, Belarus and Ukraine sanctions developments at the Husch Blackwell Russia Sanctions Resource Library.