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mariacallous · 10 months

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India’s Middle East policy under Prime Minister Narendra Modi is often seen as both successful and perplexing. The governing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), to which Modi belongs, has a nationalist Hindu-right bent, and yet India’s outreach toward the Persian Gulf region under the current government, particularly to the Arab world, has been a defining success over the past decade.

The ongoing war between Israel and Hamas, sparked by the latter’s audacious strike on Oct. 7, has brought under the spotlight New Delhi’s diplomatic balance between a “new” Middle East and its traditional support for the “old.” The new is defined by New Delhi’s increasingly close proximity to the security ecosystem of the United States, while the old is highlighted by a visible shift away from the idea of nonalignment. India’s participation in new tools of economic diplomacy—such as the I2U2 minilateral between India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the United States, as well as the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEEC) announced on sidelines of the G-20 summit in September—are evidence of these not-so-subtle changes in posture, led by a burgeoning consensus between New Delhi and Washington to push back against an increasingly aggressive China.

India has been a steadfast supporter of the Palestinian cause since its independence, viewing the crisis through moral support for Palestinian sovereignty and as an anti-colonial struggle. In 1975, India became the first non-Arab state to grant full diplomatic status to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Its then-chief, Yasser Arafat, regularly visited New Delhi. That relationship has become more complicated.

Last month, Modi condemned Hamas terrorism just weeks before the youth wing of Jamaat-e-Islami in the southern state of Kerala, which has close ties with the Gulf, hosted a virtual talk by former Hamas leader Khaled Mashal—showcasing the wide range of views that have long existed within India.

After decades of leaning toward the Arab world, in 1992, then-Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao established full diplomatic ties with Israel. This was done at a time of great change in the across the subcontinent, marked by the country’s economic liberalization following years of crisis. However, Israel was quietly building a strong foundation for this eventuality over the previous decades, supplying India with military aid in two crucial wars that it fought against Pakistan in 1971, before normalization, and then again in 1999, after full diplomatic ties were established.

This normalization forced India to perform a balancing act between three poles of power in the region: the Arab world, Israel, and Iran. All three remain important to Indian interests. The larger Arab world hosts more than 7 million Indian workers, who send back billions of dollars into the Indian economy as remittances; Israel remains a critical technology and defense partner; and Iran’s strategic location helps promote Indian interests in both Central Asia and a now much more volatile Afghanistan under a Taliban regime.

Fast-forward to 2023, and Indian foreign policy toward the region increasingly looks more pragmatic in design, balancing opportunities and challenges in an increasingly fractured global order, or what scholars Michael Kimmage and Hannah Notte have aptly termed “the age of great-power distraction.” As India’s economy rapidly grows, setting its sights on becoming the third largest in the world by 2030, so does its desire for influence. And the Middle East, from a foreign-policy perspective, is where a lot of this influence is being tested.

A recent spat between India and Qatar offers an interesting example for managing inflection points. In October, Doha announced a verdict of death sentences for eight former Indian Navy officials who were working for a private contractor involved with Qatar’s defense modernization. They were charged, according to reports, of spying on behalf of Israel. Since then, New Delhi has responded legally, appealing the Qatari court’s verdict while both countries continue to keep the judicial verdict confidential.

This is not the first time New Delhi has become embroiled in the regional fissures of the Middle East. In 2012 and 2021, Israeli diplomats were targeted in bombings in the capital, and in both cases, India hinted at Iranian involvement and having to delicately manage the situation behind closed doors—effectively telling Iran and Israel not to let their conflict spread to Indian soil.

Today, India is becoming more of an economic stakeholder in the Middle East, and by association, its security postures. This is not just the result of New Delhi’s reoriented foreign policy designs, but also depends on the personal involvement of Modi himself.

In 2017, Modi became the first Indian Prime Minister to visit Israel. Considering his brand of politics, he also visited Ramallah in the West Bank in 2018 to maintain India’s diplomatic consistency. He hosted Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in 2019 at the height of the Jamal Khashoggi murder scandal, when the Saudis were not welcome in most capitals. And finally, Modi has visited the United Arab Emirates (UAE) five times since taking charge in 2015, and is often found referring to UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan as “brother.”

Since the start of the Israel-Hamas war, Modi has talked to six regional leaders to put India’s position across, from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi. The Modi government has attempted to walk a fine line between Israel’s counterterrorism aims against Hamas and the Palestinian humanitarian crisis. Countering terrorism has been an important tool for Modi’s international diplomacy, coming from India’s efforts to isolate Pakistan internationally for its state-sponsored terrorism.

But Indian diplomacy in the Gulf also has another objective: strengthening India’s position on Kashmir, which defines the India-Pakistan conflict, and weakening Islamabad’s case within organizations such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). In February 2019, India’s then-Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj became the first Indian minister to be invited to speak at the organization since 1969, an event hailed as a major victory of Indian diplomacy; Pakistan was represented by an empty chair during Swaraj’s speech.

New Delhi’s other expanding relationship has been with the United States. In Asia, the institutionalization of mechanisms such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue has brought Washington and New Delhi closer than ever before as both look to work together to counter an increasingly erratic China. India’s buy-in with the United States has not been just about the Asian theater, but the Middle East as well, with measures such as the I2U2 and IMEEC taking shape.

However, India’s own domestic politics have often also presented a challenge. In 2022, comments made by a BJP spokesperson against the Prophet Mohammed invoked widespread condemnation by Islamic nations, including those building close partnerships with India. Previously, in private, Anti-Muslim narratives in Indian domestic politics have been an area of discussion between Arab states and New Delhi. During this period, India has also pushed back against reports by the U.S. State Department on what the department described as the country’s deteriorating religious freedoms, criticizing them as “biased.” Despite these differences, strategic cooperation has remained steadfast.

The establishment of I2U2 was a direct result of the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2021. Both Israel and the UAE have been quick to establish a strong economic bilateral relationship since then. The accords have also helped countries such as India to increase economic and political cooperation with greater ease.

It is important to note here that while the I2U2 is seen as an economic cooperation platform, all member states, have taken part in expansive military maneuvers in the region in some shape or form. And this includes India, where all three services of its armed forces, the Army, Navy, and the Air Force, have increased their outreach and participation.

Beyond the I2U2, the announcement of the IMEEC is New Delhi’s latest sign of alignment with U.S. geoeconomic objectives. Already positioned by some as a counter to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the idea is to connect the Middle East with Europe and India through a trade corridor that can rival the centrality of the Suez Canal.

But countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, central to IMEEC, are also members of the Belt and Road Initiative and have interest in developing close partnerships with Beijing. Propaganda outlets of the Chinese Communist Party have already labeled IMEEC as a mere “castle in the air” The European Union, the United States, and India alike have marketed the corridor as the next intracontinental highway for digital and economic connectivity. However, IMEEC is in nascent stages of development, and no blueprint is currently on offer on how it is going to function.

These new economic highways, minilaterals, and reoriented geopolitics are transforming Indian foreign policy from one that has always been risk-averse to one that is willing to be a little more adventurous. Today, India is much closer to the United States than it has been at any point in its independent history.

Between its increasingly West-centric defense and technology shopping list—a historical break away from having a predominantly Soviet-era military ecosystem that continues to rely on Russian know-how even today—and the India-U.S. 2+2 dialogues regularly setting new precedents, it is not that surprising to see India partner with the United States in theaters such as the Middle East, where the Abraham Accords have leveled the playing field in a limited fashion between Israel, the United States, and a part of the Arab world.

Simultaneously, a counterargument against deeper U.S. collaboration from India also comes from the time that India helped the United States with the Iran nuclear deal prior to its unceremonious end in 2018. New Delhi had let go of significant diplomatic access to align with U.S. requirements by ending nearly all oil imports from Iran, which has vast reserves, offers good deals, and is geographically conveniently located. This fed into the then-U.S. policy of strong sanctions against Tehran to push it to negotiate with the U.N. Security Council’s group of permanent members. Experiences such as the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the deal continue to fuel a strong undercurrent of distrust toward Washington in Indian political circles.

India’s own position of upholding its strategic autonomy and self-styled leadership of the global south may find it often at odds with its strategic role in the Middle East as a partner of the United States. One of India’s longest-serving successes in this region has been its embrace of nonalignment. The fact that the I2U2 was almost immediately identified by some observers as the Middle East Quad gave it a texture of being an extension of a core U.S. interest—that of containing China. While India has never officially used such terminology, these portrayals in the media were detrimental to the kind of neutrality that New Delhi still hopes to preserve.

Finally, India’s outlook toward the Middle East is looking beyond the traditional centrality of energy and migration. Today, from the beginning, it wants to be a partner in the region’s post-oil growth designs. Indian diplomats in the region, earlier almost exclusively bogged down with migrant matters, are now tasked to secure foreign direct investments from the large Arab sovereign wealth funds. Modi’s majority government, in power since 2015, has been palatable to Arab monarchs who do not have to navigate a labyrinth of India’s coalition politics looking for fast decision-making, which they are accustomed to.

Whether its own leaders like it or not, India has bought into aspects of future security architectures with its membership of the I2U2 and IMEEC in one of the world’s most flammable regions. This is a bold and commendable posture for an economy that will require significant global input for its challenging future economic goals. It is also palatable for the Middle East to have India as a major energy market to diversify its exports and offset Chinese influence over critical commodities such as oil and gas.

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ari0921 · 2 years

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「宮崎正弘の国際情勢解題」　

令和四年（２０２２）１０月３１日（月曜日）弐

　　　　　通巻第７５０７号　

　「I2U2」は「中東版クアッド」になるか？

　　シリアはロシア、イランは露と蜜月。中東に中国の影

＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊＊

　「I２U2」とは何か。

　Ｉがふたつはイスラエルとインド。「U」が二つは米国とＵＡＥ（アラブ首長国連邦）である。この四ヶ国で中東版「クアッド」を形成し、安全保障度を高めるという動きが、インドを基軸にバイデン政権内でお膳立てが進んでいると『サウスチャイナ・モーニングポスト』が報じた（10月31日、電子版）。

　問題は山のようにある。

　第一にバイデン政権のアフガニスタンからの無様な撤退を目撃し、中東諸国は米国の軍事戦略に大きな疑問を見いだしている。

　第二に米国とサウジアラビアとの関係にすきま風。バイデンのリヤド訪問をサウジは冷たくあしらい、むしろロシアとの距離を縮めた。この亀裂が「ペトロダラー体制」をぐらぐらに揺さぶる。

　ペトロダラー体制とは、1974年にキッシンジャーがサウジと取り決めたもので（１）石油決済をドル建てとする（２）余剰金をつかってサウジは米国国債を買う（３）その代償として米国はサウジに武器供与をつづける、という骨子である。

　この意義が減少し、サウジは中国とロシアからも武器を購入している。

　第三に中東の軍事、政治地図をみると軍事大国はイランとトルコであり、イスラエルは周辺諸国と握手してはいるが、潜在的な軍事脅威であること。

　イスラエルを滅ぼせと叫ぶイランとイスラム過激派が、その反イスラエル姿勢を変えていない。

　第四にイラクに介入した米国は、結局シーア派にバグダッド政権を明け渡してイランの脅威を増やしてしまった。アフガン以前の不手際だった。

　第五にシリアにネオコン主導で介入したが、チュンジア、リビア、エジプトとつづいた「アラブの春」はことごとく失敗し、米国の企図と結果は逆となったように、アサド独裁政権はロシア支援で存続している。

　第六にバイデン政権となってから、イスラエルとの関係がもつれ始めており、イスラエルもまた独自の行動をとる。具体的には米国のウクライナ支援要請に対して、イスラエルはゼレンスキー大統領に批判的で軍事支援をせず、人道支援と難民受け入れにとどめている。

第七に「Ｉ２Ｕ２」がインドを基軸にするとなると、中東諸国にとって、インドの政治的位置づけに変更が生じる。

つまり中国との関係を見直さざるを得なくなり、中東は最大顧客の中国の出方をさらに神経質に気にすることになるだろう。

かくして「Ｉ２Ｕ２」は構想倒れに終わるか、あるいはインドの裏交渉次第でどこまで具体化するか？

#宮崎正弘の国際情勢解題

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peterchiublack · 11 months

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經濟學人副總編（Tom Standage）談2023十趨勢：台灣是最大衝突點，不幸中有三大幸，天下編輯部/天下Web only整理，2023-01-09。 https://www.cw.com.tw/article/5124372 Tom Standage, deputy editor-in-chief of The Economist, talks about the ten trends in 2023: Taiwan is the biggest point of conflict, and there are three major blessings in misfortune. Ten trends to watch in the coming year A letter from Tom Standage, editor of “The World Ahead 2023”

Tom Standage, ,#The World Ahead

經濟學人副總編史丹德基談2023十趨勢：台灣是最大衝突點，不幸中有三大幸，《經濟學人》[2023.01.09] 《經濟學人》副總編輯、年��特刊《全球大趨勢》（The World Ahead）主編斯丹迪奇（Tom Standage），在2023天下經濟論壇（CWEF）揭曉今年最重要十大趨勢，從烏俄戰爭、台灣安危到驗收元宇宙。+

以下是演講摘要：

過去三年的世界由疫情主導，從現在開始的未來，則與一場等不到終點的戰爭息息相關。不過，全球動盪中，我們也看到三個不幸中的大幸。

▼趨勢1：烏俄戰爭取代疫情，成全球最關鍵事件

烏克蘭戰爭將取代新冠疫情，成為對全球影響力最大的關鍵事件。這場戰役先改變了能源供給，衝擊原物料價格並導致通膨，也決定各國央行升息幅度。2023年全球是否因此進入衰退，以及如果經濟衰退，會多嚴重和持續多久，全都要看烏克蘭。這場戰爭的發展勢態、持續的時間，會決定很多事情。 2023年烏克蘭在戰爭可能會有可觀進展，但紛爭不可能就此落幕。因為俄羅斯總統普丁無法佔領整個烏克蘭，既然達不到初衷，他現在唯一可做的，是一邊拖延戰爭，一邊期待有利於他的改變發生。普丁盼望三件事。第一，透過摧毀當地的電力、熱能、供水設施，逐漸擊垮烏克蘭人的意志。不過，這個計劃目前沒什麼成效，倒是鼓舞烏克蘭人更團結、更堅定把俄羅斯人趕出家門的意念。第二，普丁也希望歐洲的寒冬與壞景氣，會降低歐洲列國支持烏克蘭的意願，減少救濟。最後，我認為也是他最深的期待，則是川普重掌美國。川普若贏得2024年美國總統大選，美國就會從烏克蘭撤走援兵，而美國是烏克蘭現在最大盟友，包括金援與軍火。所以，我們認為普丁最大勝算，是全力拖延這場衝突。目前唯一的變數，是普丁失去政權，不過我們認為發生的機率不大，可能性大概只有10％。

▼趨勢2：高物價、全球衰退迫在眉睫

高物價將持續。全球現在面對的通膨，最初是因疫情而起，又遭烏俄衝突惡化。我們從擔心病毒，到擔心物價。全球央行升息的速度也比過去數十年都快，而且還擠在同個時間，2023年很多國家的經濟都將進入衰退。美國的衰退幅度相較和緩，歐洲會很嚴重，英國則會長久持續，而且衰退早就開始了，全世界都有感。此外，美國的高利率、強勢貨幣將影響全球。許多國家的債務都以美元計價，因此美元走強，這些國家的人民勢必會過得更艱苦。

▼趨勢3：戰爭加速能源轉型，「風光」使用創新高

烏俄戰爭加速各國使用再生能源的速度。這是2023年第一個不幸中的大幸。雖然現在有很多國家的煤炭使用量在成長，但這只是短時間的權宜之計。太陽能、風力發電等再生能源設備投產約需2年，我們最快要到2023年底才能看到能源來源的轉移。在戰爭爆發後，歐洲有19個國家在太陽能和風能的使用量上創下歷史新高。他們不想繼續仰賴俄羅斯天然氣。國際能源署署長比羅爾（Fatih Birol）認為，這場戰爭無疑是能源發展的轉折點，大幅加速綠能轉型。許多歐洲國家提高了2030年再生能源的目標佔比，我們預期會有更高的核能使用量，不管是透過延長既有核電廠的使用年限，或是蓋新廠。還有氫能。氫能在發動車的能耐上有限，但在工業上很實用，包括脫碳、製造鋼鐵與水泥，以及航空和海運。大量資金注入綠色科技下，歐美開始有聲音反對政府過度補助再生能源。我樂見其成，正是因為綠能科技的規模愈來愈大，我們才需要這些對話，也可看出我們正走在對的路上。

▼趨勢4：中國顛峰已過？經濟成長放緩、人口縮水

印度人口預計在4月超越中國，人口數來到14.3億人，登上全球最高。 2023年開始，中國人口也將開始下跌。習近平的清零政策、對科技業的打壓、房地產危機，正扼殺生育率。看看2022年，中國光是為了核酸檢測就花了250億美元（約7640億台幣），等同中國GDP的1.5%。另一方面，中國人口老化早開始、勞動人口年年降低，主因是一胎政策導致每年退休的人遠超過進入職場的人。不少人認為，中國過去幾年的追趕式經濟成長，恐怕一去不復返。中國經濟再也不可能超越美國。中國所主張的兩個價值——限制部份人權能使社會穩定、監控人民能換來高速經濟成長，如今都與現實不符，也大大削弱了中國式經濟體制能夠取代民主國家資本主義的說法。這是2023年第二個大幸。

▼趨勢5：分裂的美國，伴隨僵局與內鬥

美國兩大黨之間與黨內，可預期會有更多鬥爭。共和黨在期中選舉贏得眾議院，美國進入「分立政府」，無疑伴隨不少僵局與內鬥。兩黨席次差異微乎其微，少許政治人物握有巨權。共和黨將積極展開對民主黨的調查，可能搜查拜登的筆電資料。槍枝、墮胎、種族議題也將重回爭議，凸顯兩黨間的對立。黨內也將有許多衝突。川普已經宣布他想再次參選，可預期2024年總統大選初選，他將先槓上另一名共和黨候選人德桑提斯（Ron DeSantis）。同時，拜登也受到要他別再參選的壓力。即便他期中選舉表現不錯，但許多人認為不考慮連任的拜登，在接下來2年總統任期可以有更多貢獻、更容易得到共和黨在部份法案上的支持，包含打擊中國與大型科技公司，這兩件事是兩黨共識最高的議題，但打擊中國有點敏感，尤其是如果扯到台灣。

▼趨勢6：台灣，最顯著衝突爆點

烏俄戰爭改變中國的想法嗎？一方面，中國可能會覺得，歐美勢力光是顧及烏克蘭就分身乏術，現在會是攻擊台灣的絕佳時機；另一方面，烏克蘭也證明了，國家大小不是一切，就算是強權大國想攻打鄰近小國，也未必能心想事成。我們認為，2023年中國在台海發射飛彈的機率只有6分之1，但中國更可能會在東海、南海地區進行武力恐嚇，來測試美國與其盟友的態度。不過，台灣並不是中國唯一的衝突點。印度和中國之間也有邊境衝突，2020年曾有24名士兵因此喪命，怒火絕對有可能再度點燃。在歐洲，土耳其與希臘也有點緊張。兩國領袖即將迎來連任選舉，土耳其總統曾提及，希望奪回被希臘偷走的島嶼。如果他在2023年拿這件事拉抬選情，北大西洋公約組織（NATO）極有可能陷入危機，因為土耳其跟希臘都是會員國。

▼趨勢7：新聯盟出現，西方國家更團結

2019年，法國總統馬克宏曾稱NATO瀕臨「腦死」，歐盟則是危如累卵。如今，瑞典與芬蘭預計在2023年加入NATO，組織再度活化。烏克蘭也申請加入歐盟。這是我們今天談的第三個大幸：西方國家與盟友之間變得更加團結。這也提醒我們，守護民主至關重要。首先，美國把重心從中東移到亞太地區的新盟友，包括和印度、日本、澳洲組成的「四方安全對話」（Quad），以及結合澳洲、英國的「澳英美聯盟」（AUKUS）。另一方面，以俄羅斯為首的「集體安全條約組織」（CSTO）會員國近年爭吵不休，亞美尼亞甚至在最近一場會議後，拒絕簽署共同宣言。檢視各聯盟的健全程度，西方國家重拾信心，威權主義屈居劣勢。我自己最喜歡的新聯盟是I2U2，雖然名字聽起來很像搖滾樂團，但這個聯盟旨在共同發展糧食安全與乾淨能源，串連以色列、印度、阿拉伯聯合大公國與美國。這幾個國家很少聚在一起，可見糧食與能源安全已是普世問題。

▼趨勢8：報復性旅遊出現，但商旅不再

旅客將全力把過去3年被剝奪的旅遊時光補回來。 2022年，國際旅客入境數量提升6成，預計2023年會再成長3成，實際出遊次數會從2019年的18億次，稍稍降到16億次。不過，因為通膨的關係，旅遊支出將回到疫情前的水準，接近1.34兆美元（約40.9兆台幣）。參考911事件、全球金融危機的後續效應，我們預測商務旅遊持續疲軟，因為企業撙節預算，改採線上會議，商旅絕不會回到疫情前水準。不過，這是相關業者把握報復性旅遊的絕佳時機，絕對要打鐵趁熱。

▼趨勢9：元宇宙留或走？蘋果新裝置將是焦點

2023年也將揭曉在虛擬世界玩樂與工作的可行性。元宇宙將走入日常，還是淪為紅極一時的娛樂消遣？其一焦點事件是，蘋果將發表第一款頭戴式裝置。從智慧手機、平板到手錶，蘋果往往一出新品，就改變市場。我們很好奇，蘋果會怎麼稱呼這個新市場？元宇宙？混合實境？擴增實境？蘋果新產品瞄準的客群是開發人員，希望透過他們創造內容。如此一來，在2024、25年，當蘋果推出為一般消費者設計、更便宜的頭戴式裝置時，他們便已經有元宇宙的東西可以體驗。至於臉書改名為Meta，則阻礙了元宇宙發展，因為從沒聽過元宇宙（metaverse）的人，可能會以為它是臉書獨有，而忽略許多企業都在積極開發元宇宙。我們也會關注，Meta究竟會不會履行對元宇宙的承諾。

▼趨勢10：密鑰取代密碼，科技詞彙花樣多

2020年、21年，我們學了很多關於免疫學與疫苗的新詞彙。2022年，我們接觸了不少與軍事裝備、國際衝突有關的新術語。 2023年，我們需要持續學習更多軍事、環境相關的詞彙外，科技新詞也不遑多讓。畢竟，永遠都有新科技。密鑰（passkeys）是透過生物識別技術的數位鑰匙，無法被猜測、遺忘或偷竊。當你要登入某個app或網站時，只要你的手機或電腦在附近即能解鎖。現在已經有許多網站採用這套系統，不過電腦與手機上需要最新的軟體。隨著2023年有更多人更新軟體，密鑰也將更普及，防範釣魚攻擊、大幅減少網路犯罪。其次，加密貨幣熱度不再。「後量子加密法」（PQC，Post-Quantum Cryptography）強勢登場，如果你還不知道這個詞，請好好研究一下。我們也將聽到「生產力偏執狂」（productivity paranoia）一詞。這指的是當管理者與員工對遠距工作的效率有不同見解，所產生的偏執。微軟研究顯示，87%員工認為自己在家工作的效率與在公司一樣，但只有12％企業管理者認同。此認知差異導致不信任感與焦慮。員工擔心主管覺得他們在偷懶、主管也擔心員工真的在發懶。「生產力做戲」（productivity theater）現象會更常見，員工可能會迅速回復每一封email，即便只是寫「收到」或「感恩」，來證明自己有認真工作。

《經濟學人》一共選了23個新字，歡迎來經濟學人網站看看。不確定性才是新日常疫情的結束，也為過去政治與經濟穩定的時代畫下尾聲。如今的世界更不穩定，從地緣政治、經濟動盪、極端氣候到高速科技變化，從現在開始，不確定性才是新日常，沒人躲得過。

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blogynews · 1 year

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"Economic Initiatives Put at Stake as Israel-Hamas Conflict Unveils Surprising Twist, Reveals Top Official"

Recent hostilities between Israel and Hamas are posing a threat to two major initiatives between Israel and India. The I2U2 (India, Israel, US, and United Arab Emirates) and IMEC (India Middle East EU Economic Corridor) were designed to establish new partnerships for India’s economic recovery post-COVID. However, the Hamas attack on Israel has raised concerns about its ability to provide stable…

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blogynewz · 1 year

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"Economic Initiatives Put at Stake as Israel-Hamas Conflict Unveils Surprising Twist, Reveals Top Official"

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blogynewsz · 1 year

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"Economic Initiatives Put at Stake as Israel-Hamas Conflict Unveils Surprising Twist, Reveals Top Official"

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my-yasiuae · 1 year

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نيويورك - وام يواصل سمو الشيخ عبد الله بن زايد آل نهيان، وزير الخارجية، ووفد الدولة، مساعيهم في تعزيز الشراكات المستدامة مع دول العالم، على أساس الثقة والاحترام المتبادل والمصالح المشتركة، وذلك خلال اليوم الرابع من الأسبوع الرفيع المستوى للجمعية العامة للأمم المتحدة في دورتها الثامنة والسبعين. وأعرب سمو الشيخ عبد الله بن زايد خلال لقاءاته مع عدد من رؤساء الدول المشاركين في الدورة الحالية للجمعية العامة للأمم المتحدة عن حرص دولة الإمارات والتزامها بدعم كافة الجهود الهادفة إلى تعزيز العلاقات والتعاون الثنائي مع الدول الشقيقة والصديقة. والتقى سموه مع حمزة عبدي بري رئيس وزراء جمهورية الصومال الفيدرالية الشقيقة، وياكوف ميلاتوفيتش رئيس جمهورية الجبل الأسود، ورالف جونسالفيس رئيس وزراء سانت فنسنت وغرينادين، ونيكوس كريستودوليدس رئيس جمهورية قبرص. وناقش سمو الشيخ عبد الله بن زايد سبل التعاون الثنائي، والعديد من البنود المدرجة على جدول أعمال الجمعية العامة في دورتها الحالية. والتقى سموه مع مراد نورتلو نائب رئيس الوزراء وزير خارجية كازاخستان، وحسين أمير عبداللهيان وزير خارجية إيران، وتانيا فاجون نائبة رئيس الوزراء وزيرة خارجية سلوفينيا، وبيتر سيراتو وزير الخارجية والتجارة في جمهورية المجر، وخوسيه مانويل ألباريس وزير خارجية إسبانيا. من جانبه، التقى الدكتور أنور بن محمد قرقاش المستشار الدبلوماسي لصاحب السمو رئيس الدولة مع السيد فريدون سينيرلي أوغلو المنسق الخاص لعملية التقييم المستقل المنبثقة عن قرار مجلس الأمن 2679 (2023) بشأن أفغانستان. كما اجتمع مع السيد ديفيد ميليباند الرئيس والمدير التنفيذي للجنة الإنقاذ الدولية. كما التقى مع السيد دانيال بنيام نائب مساعد وزير الخارجية الأمريكي لشؤون شبه الجزيرة العربية. وفي سياق اللقاءات الثنائية اجتمعت ريم الهاشمي وزيرة دولة لشؤون التعاون الدولي مع السيدة سيندي ماكين المديرة التنفيذية لبرنامج الأغذية العالمي. بدوره، واصل الشيخ شخبوط بن نهيان آل نهيان وزير دولة جهود تعزيز العلاقات الثنائية بين دولة الإمارات وشركائها في إفريقيا، وذلك خلال لقاءاته مع عدد من القادة ووزراء الخارجية، حيث اجتمع الشيخ شخبوط بن نهيان مع بولا تينوبو رئيس جمهورية نيجيريا، وروي ألبيرتو دي فيغيريدو سوارس وزير خارجية جمهورية الرأس الأخضر، ولوجن مبيلا مبيلا وزير العلاقات الخارجية لجمهورية الكاميرون، وأوشلجون أجادي باكاري وزير خارجية جمهورية بنين، وعبد الله ديوب وزير خارجية جمهورية مالي، وتيودورو نجويما أوبيانج مانغو نائب رئيس غينيا الاستوائية. من جهته، شارك أحمد الصايغ وزير دولة، إلى جانب ممثلين عن الهند وإسرائيل والولايات المتحدة، في إطلاق مشاريع شراكة «I2U2»، وأيضاً أعلنت المجموعة خلال الحدث انطلاق موقعها الإلكتروني الرسمي الذي سيلعب دوراً محورياً في حشد رأس مال القطاع الخاص، وتحديث البنية التحتية، وتعزيز التقنيات الخضراء. وفي الاجتماع الوزاري غير الرسمي لمؤتمر التفاعل وإجراءات بناء الثقة في آسيا (CICA) قدّم الصايغ مداخلة أكد فيها أهمية العمل المتعدد الأطراف في مواجهة التحديات الإقليمية والعالمية، بما يشمل تمكين المرأة، ومنع التطرف، وتغير المناخ، الذي تواصل دولة الإمارات التصدي له كرئيس لمؤتمر الدول الأطراف في اتفاقية الأمم المتحدة الإطارية بشأن التغير المناخي (COP28)، من خلال تكثيف التعاون الدولي لتحقيق أعلى الطموحات الممكنة، وزيادة تمويل العمل المناخي العالمي، وتعزيز التكيف والمرونة. كما اجتمع الصايغ مع الدكتورة رولا دشتي وكيلة الأمين العام للأمم المتحدة والأمينة التنفيذية للجنة الاقتصادية والاجتماعية لغرب آسيا. من جهة أخرى، شارك خليفة شاهين المرر، وزير دولة، في جلسة الحوار التفاعلية غير الرسمية الرفيعة المستوى بين ترويكا القمة العربية مع مجلس الأمن حول موضوع «التعاون بين الأمم المتحدة وجامعة الدول العربية» الذي نظمته دولة الإمارات بالشراكة مع ألبانيا والجامعة. وأكد المرر في بيان دولة الإمارات خلال الجلسة على ضرورة الأخذ بوجهات النظر ومنها العربية عند التعامل مع القضايا الملحة، وأهمية تفادي الازدواجية في العمل وضمان وحدة الهدف، وحاجة مجلس الأمن إلى تعزيز التنسيق المشترك مع المنظمات الإقليمية مثل جامعة الدول العربية والاتحاد الإفريقي، والتركيز على أن يكون التعاون بين الأمم المتحدة وجامعة الدول العربية منهجياً ومؤسّسياً. وأيضاً، شارك المرر في الاجتماع الوزاري الرفيع المستوى الذي عقدته لجنة الاتصال المعنية بالوضع في الأرض الفلسطينية الذي ترأسته مملكة النرويج. وأشار في مداخلته إلى التحديات والأوضاع الصعبة في الأرض الفلسطينية المحتلة جراء استمرار السلطات الإسرائيلية في الممارسات غير الشرعية، وبسبب الإجراءات الأحادية،

والأوضاع الاقتصادية المتردية، بما يؤكد الحاجة إلى استكشاف سبل لتعزيز التعاون والتنسيق الدولي، من أجل تقديم الخدمات الأساسية في فلسطين، مشيداً في الوقت ذاته بجهود لجنة الاتصال المخصصة في هذا الجانب، ومؤكداً جهود دولة الإمارات في التخفيف من معاناة الشعب الفلسطيني، بما يشمل تقديم مساعدات بلغت أكثر من 750 مليون دولار أمريكي خلال الفترة 2018-2023. كما التقى المرر والسفيرة لانا زكي نسيبة، المندوبة الدائمة لدولة الإمارات لدى الأمم المتحدة، مع السيد تور وينسلاند، منسق الأمم المتحدة لعملية السلام في الشرق الأوسط. المصدر: صحيفة الخليج

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emeriobanque · 1 year

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Alliance I2U2: Pioneering partnerships with innovations and development in food security along with sustainability across the four nations

I2U2 is basically the bloc or grouping of the four nations that came in existence during October 2021. Here, this group includes India, the USA States, the UAE as well as Israel. The key objectives of this group is to simply deepen the technological as well as private-sector collaboration with different nations and handle various challenges of large-scale. On 14th July 2022, the group also issued their statement for the inaugural joint, affirming six focus areas of the areas where member nations would also collectively be ready to prioritise. Such kind of main areas are energy, water, space, transport, food and health.

Site: https://www.emeriobanque.com/news/i2u2-partnerships-for-food-security-and-sustainability-across-four-nations

#economic foundations #Indian economy #trade finance services

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jsbmarketresearch01 · 1 year

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India Introduces Connectivity Project Between New Delhi and the Middle East to Curb China Influence

India Introduces Connectivity Project between New Delhi and the Middle East to Curb China’s Influence in the Gulf

India is preparing to undertake a vital connectivity project to link New Delhi to the Middle East. The country could have initiated the project to combat the growing influence of China in the Gulf areas. The idea of launching a connectivity project that links India to Middle Eastern nations through seaports, rails, and roads happened after the I2U2 group meeting. The group comprises Israel and its member states as well.

Ajit Doval, National Security Adviser of India in the meeting communicated with his counterparts from UAE and US, as well as Mohammed bin Salman, the Saudi Crown Prince. The leaders spoke about rail networks and joint infrastructure projects to connect different countries of the Middle East. Abraham Accords is a Trump-era agreement and I2U2 is a result of it.

The agreement helped in normalizing relations between several Arab countries and Israel, which also made it permissible for the existence of the I2U2 group. As for India, it is supposedly a major power in Asian terrain and has a good record of being an infrastructure provider. The nation has the largest rail system in the world in Asia. India also assists with sharing arrangements for cross-border electricity.

If we consider Saudi Arabia, it is not integrated into the I2U2 group for having no formal relations with Israel. But with the Saudi Crown Prince’s presence, India may participate in waning the influence of China in the Middle East with the connectivity project. Millions of Indians work in the Middle East and send remittances home. The region is also essential for trade interests and thus, becoming crucial for India to focus on it.

Also, China’s BRI (Belt and Road Initiative) investment and the latest strategic agreement with Iran are reasons why India wants to dim the growing influence of its neighbor in the Middle East. Recently, China also facilitated a reconciliation deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran. For India, the benefit lies at both sea and land trade pathways that cover Israel and the United Arab Emirates to Piraeus harbor in Greece, going into Europe.

Visit here for more news: - https://jsbmarketresearch.com/news

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nikologyindia · 1 year

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xtruss · 2 years

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How Two Terrorists, Modi and Bibi, Built a Military Alliance

India and Israel have strengthened their defense ties in recent years—but a new book makes the relationship sound more sinister than it is.

— March 18, 2023 | Foreign Policy | Sumit Ganguly

A Likud Party election banner hanging from a building shows Israeli Terrorist Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu shaking hands with Indian Terrorist Prime Minister Narendra Modi with a caption above reading in Hebrew "Netanyahu, in another league", in Tel Aviv on July 28, 2019. Jack Guez/AFP Via Getty Images

Today, the Indian-Israeli relationship is genuinely multifaceted. It extends from an annual influx of young Israeli tourists who come to India’s west coast beaches to unwind after their required military service to collaborations in drip agriculture to the sale of sophisticated weaponry. In the past several decades the relationship has significantly deepened and broadened, especially under the two right-of-center prime ministers, Narendra Modi and Benjamin Netanyahu.

This close partnership has significant ramifications for regional and global politics. The close bilateral relationship enables both parties to play a wider role in the Middle East, especially in the Persian Gulf. This is increasingly evident from their participation in the new quadrilateral arrangement, the I2U2, designed to limit China’s influence in the region and also to reassure allies of the enduring U.S. commitment to the region.

Historically, the Indian-Israeli relationship was far from close. The Indian nationalist movement was leery of supporting a state established on the basis of a particular religion—wary that it could provide legitimacy to rival Pakistan’s moral foundations. Furthermore, parts of India’s foreign-policy establishment had sympathies for the Arab world borne out of shared anti-colonial sentiments. The political leadership in New Delhi was also sensitive to India’s largest religious minority, Muslims, who were mostly ill-disposed toward Israel.

As a result, during much of the Cold War, following India’s independence in 1947, its relations with Israel were low-key, even clandestine. In 1947, India voted against the U.N. partition plan for the British Mandate of Palestine. After Israel declared independence in 1948, India again voted no on admitting the state of Israel to the United Nations General Assembly, and it only recognized the country in 1950. During the bulk of the Cold War, India, quite deliberately, maintained a studious public distance from Israel. It was only after the Cold War’s end and the Madrid Peace Conference that India normalized its relationship with Israel.

Journalist Azad Essa’s new book, Hostile Homelands: The New Alliance Between India and Israel, argues that India’s growing partnership with Israel is based upon a convergence of ethnonational ideological perspectives. It covers much of what is already known about the evolution of the relationship, and those familiar with the partnership may not find much that is especially novel. Essa nevertheless scours a range of academic and popular sources to construct his key arguments.

Hostile Homelands: The New Alliance Between India and Israel, Azad Essa, Pluto Press, 240 pp., $22.95, February 2023.

“The strengthening of Indian-Israeli ties started before the rise of powerful ethnonationalist governments in the two countries.”

Essa wants to demonstrate in this book that the burgeoning strategic partnership between India and Israel involves the jettisoning of all moral scruples and is increasingly based upon a convergence of ideological proclivities as well as mutually beneficial material ties across a range of areas, from commerce to defense. His argument is only partially accurate, because the strengthening of Indian-Israeli ties had started before the rise of powerful ethnonationalist governments in the two countries.

Despite its reservations toward Israel, India allowed it to open a consulate in Mumbai (then known as Bombay) in 1953; it still showed no interest in having full diplomatic relations with the Jewish state. However, it did rely on Israel for military assistance, albeit in a covert fashion. Eager to break free from its diplomatic isolation in the Middle East, Israel provided critical military supplies to India, starting with the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, aiming to soften India’s diplomatic stance. Israel also came to India’s aid during its wars with Pakistan in 1965 and 1971, although it was kept secret.

While carrying out these surreptitious contacts, India mostly rebuffed closer ties with Israel in public. It was only after the Cold War came to an end—and after the 1991 Madrid Conference, designed to promote political rapprochement between Israel and key Arab states—that India and Israel established full diplomatic relations. Since then, the relationship has been on a steady upward trajectory, regardless of the government in power in New Delhi. But starting in the late 1990s, under right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-dominated governments, relations improved dramatically. Israel, of course, was keen on helping as India was a potentially lucrative market.

This transformation took place under the BJP because, unlike the Congress Party, it did not have the same ideological commitment to the Palestinian cause and the Arab world. Furthermore, it did not have the same concerns about the Muslim electorate in India.

Today, India enjoys a multifaceted relationship with Israel, from extensive tourism exchange to robust arms acquisitions. Since Modi came to power in 2014, India has become far less substantially supportive of the Palestinian cause, even while remaining publicly committed to it. For example, in 2015 and 2016, India abstained from voting on a United Nations resolution that would have referred Israel to the International Criminal Court for alleged war crimes committed during the 2014 Gaza crisis.

Essa’s central argument is that the security partnership between India and Israel has really crystallized in the past decade, especially under Modi—and that it has become more salient because of the emergence of powerful ethnonationalist forces in both countries.

“What the Indian and Israeli governments have in common is their professed hostility toward minority populations.”

This argument, without question, is quite sound. In India, this trend is exemplified by the formation of the Hindutva (literally, “Hinduness”) phalanx under Modi and his coterie. A similar process has taken place in Israel, most recently with the willingness of Netanyahu’s right-wing Likud party to share power with far-right parties, including the ultranationalist and anti-Arab Religious Zionism party.

What the Indian and Israeli governments have in common is their professed hostility toward minority populations: Muslims in India and predominantly Muslim Arabs in Israel. Essa correctly argues that despite making cursory nods toward the preservation of minority rights, both Modi and Netanyahu wish to transform their countries into ethnic democracies that privilege the majority community. This line of reasoning, as far as it goes, cannot really be questioned. As far as the two governments go, this commonality has certainly helped bolster the relationship.

However, there are a host of other claims in Essa’s book—historical and contemporary, large and small—that mar the quality of his analysis and turn the book into a polemic. These claims are not limited to either country, though his assertions about India are especially flawed.

One of the most blatant examples is Essa’s one-sided account of the accession of the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir to India in 1947. He does not mention Pakistan’s blatant complicity in supporting a rebellion against the last ruler of the state, Maharaja Hari Singh.

Instead, Essa trots out the tired Pakistani narrative that the state should have acceded to Pakistan because of its Muslim-majority population. This undermines his argument about the relationship with Israel because India had a fairly robust commitment to secularism in its early days as an independent state. Essa, however, suggests that despite its professed commitment to secularism during the Nehru era, already India had scant regard for the rights of Muslims.

Unfortunately, this is not Essa’s only misleading discussion. In November 2008, members of the Pakistan-based—and Pakistan-supported—Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) militant group launched terrorist attacks against several targets in Mumbai, killing more than 100 people. Yet Essa avoids referring to the members of the LeT as terrorists, preferring to use the term “attackers.”

Nor, for that matter, does he discuss Pakistan’s long-standing policy of using terrorist proxies with deadly effect against India. Essa highlights the 2008 Mumbai attacks to critique India’s decision to turn to Israel for counterterrorism assistance in the wake of its own botched response to the terrorist attack.

Finally, Essa’s book is laden with insinuations and innuendos that do not stand up under closer scrutiny. Rather than acknowledging that countries routinely acquire advanced weapons from any supplier that is willing to provide them at a reasonable cost, he suggests that the booming Indian-Israeli arms-transfer relationship has some sinister design.

Specifically, he focuses on the transfer of electronic sensors that can be deployed along a border to detect infiltrators. Given Israel’s considerable expertise in this area and India’s two-front border problems with Pakistan and China, New Delhi’s decision to acquire these technologies is hardly shocking. When both pragmatic considerations of national security and ideological affinity align, such arms deals become commonplace.

On the other hand, India’s purchase and deployment of domestic surveillance equipment from a private Israeli firm, Pegasus, which came to light in July 2021, does raise serious questions about the Modi government’s commitment to protect the privacy and civil liberties of dissidents and the political opposition in India. Essa briefly discusses this issue and underscores how the acquisition of this technology amounts to yet another example of the scant regard of both governments to civil liberties. Nevertheless, this was a commercial transaction and not a government-to-government technology transfer.

Essa also dwells at some length on pro-Hindutva groups in the United States and their ties to staunch pro-Israeli organizations. These links, no doubt, exist. However, it is far from clear that they are as influential in shaping and bolstering the Indian-Israeli strategic partnership as he suggests. Specifically, he contends that they have developed a cozy relationship of mutual convenience, with each group bolstering ties between right-wing governments in India and Israel.

There is little question that the arc of the Indian-Israeli partnership has undergone a significant transformation under the leadership of Modi and alongside the rise of Netanyahu. The two leaders’ common ethnonational projects have no doubt boosted the growing closeness between the states. It is a pity that Essa’s accurate core argument is diminished by factual elisions and polemical claims.

Books are independently selected by FP editors. FP earns an affiliate commission on anything purchased through links to Amazon.com on this page.

— Sumit Ganguly is a columnist at Foreign Policy and a visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. He is a distinguished professor of political science and the Rabindranath Tagore chair in Indian cultures and civilizations at Indiana University Bloomington.

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mariacallous · 1 year

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Those who believe that the world is moving to a post-Western global order saw their belief confirmed last week. At its annual summit in Johannesburg, the BRICS forum of five major emerging economies—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—announced a major expansion by inviting six new members. In January, the group will add Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. If economic weight is a measure of power, this will be a singularly potent group. Together, the 11 BRICS states will have a higher share of global GDP based on purchasing power parity than the G-7 industrialized countries.

Depending on where you stand, you might celebrate a more powerful BRICS bloc or worry about it—but neither reaction is warranted. An expanded BRICS will not turn the world upside down, nor does it herald the rise of a post-Western global order. Equally outlandish is the claim that BRICS expansion marks a major victory for China, Russia, and their attempts to build an anti-Western bloc among the countries of the global south—or that BRICS is the core of a new Non-Aligned Movement.

All these potential interpretations take little heed of the internal dynamics of an expanded BRICS and their implications. By confusing their hopes and fears about the global order with analysis, the Western commentariat reveals its enormous ignorance about the countries of the global south, their diverse interests, and their engagement with the great powers.

There is no doubt that the sudden clamor for BRICS membership from so many significant countries has colored the analysis. But expanding the list of members does not turn BRICS into a potent bloc. If anything, the expansion only undermines what little cohesion the group had before the expansion.

The growing geopolitical confrontation between China and India already casts a shadow over BRICS and any attempt at creating a cohesive agenda. With new members come new conflicts: Egypt and Ethiopia are fiercely at loggerheads over Nile waters, while Iran and Saudi Arabia are regional foes—notwithstanding their Beijing-brokered attempt to make peace. These and other fault lines will make it much harder to turn the combined economic weight of the BRICS states into an influential political force in global affairs.

Those who think of BRICS as a new Non-Aligned Movement are unintentionally right on one aspect: BRICS will be just as ineffective as the original in turning soaring rhetoric on global issues into concrete, practical outcomes. In pushing for BRICS enlargement, China merely bought itself a bigger talk shop. If Beijing wants to build a bigger anti-Western tent, it can’t do it when the BRICS tent already has so many friends of the United States inside it.

Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE are close U.S. security partners. Even if they have their differences with Washington, they are unlikely to abandon U.S. security guarantees for untested Chinese promises, let alone protection by the formless sack of potatoes that is BRICS. In his address to the Johannesburg summit, Chinese President Xi Jinping called on BRICS nations to “practice true multilateralism” and “reject the attempt to create small circles or exclusive blocs.” Well, India is already part of at least two such “small circles.” One is the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, with Australia, Japan, and the United States; the other is the I2U2 forum that joins India with Israel, the UAE, and the United States. In Johannesburg, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi even called for “resilient and inclusive supply chains,” an obvious euphemism for reducing economic dependence on China.

If China sees BRICS as a forum for expanding its role in the global south, so does India—and, for that matter, the Saudis and Emiratis, who are willing to deploy large chunks of the capital they have accumulated over the decades for economic and political gain in Africa and beyond. In fact, the competition among BRICS countries for global influence is perhaps more consequential for the group than their presumed common interest in countering the West. Instead of shaping a new theater of contestation with the West, the BRICS forum will be a theater of contestation itself.

The smarter policy folks in the West should therefore whine less about the supposed rise of BRICS—and focus instead on the many contradictions within the forum they can exploit.

This is not the first time Russia and China have tried to promote an anti-Western coalition. Indeed, history tells us that Moscow and Beijing overestimate the possibilities for uniting non-Western societies against the West. When hopes for a communist revolution in Germany failed after World War I, the founder of the Soviet Union, Vladimir Lenin, turned to Asia and promised to “set the East ablaze” with revolutions against global capitalism and Western colonial overlords. At the 1920 Congress of the Peoples of the East in Baku, in Soviet-occupied Azerbaijan, the Communist International gathered a colorful but motley group of nationalists, revolutionaries, and religious leaders. Lenin’s effort did not get very far as rising nationalism made Asia inhospitable to Bolshevik ideas.

In the 1960s, Chinese leader Mao Zedong thought he could do the same with his attempt to promote revolutions in Asia; instead, his many failures paved the way for capitalism with Chinese characteristics at home. Soviet leaders Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev tried a different tactic—aligning with nationalists in Africa and Asia against the West. Moscow did seem to gain ground in the global south through the 1970s. At the 1979 summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in Havana, Cuban leader Fidel Castro and his supporters declared that the Soviet Union and its satellites were the so-called Third World’s “natural allies.”

A United States in supposed terminal decline, however, came back swinging in the 1980s to put Moscow on the defensive. Meanwhile, the elites of the global south turned out to be rather clever in using to their advantage the divisions among the West, the Soviet Union, and China. Castro and other leaders’ resounding declaration of friendship with the communist bloc in 1979 has many parallels to China’s expression of its ambitions for BRICS. But just as the Soviet Union ran out of resources to support its large roster of Third World clients in the late 1970s, Xi’s China has also overreached—it is beset by deep economic troubles and has its hands full dealing with pushback from the United States.

Still, last week’s BRICS expansion announcement might serve one useful purpose: telling the West not to take the global south for granted. Sensible Western decision-makers should therefore discard both conservative contempt and progressive condescension—each of which, in its own way, makes it difficult to engage the elites of the global south—and find better ways to reengage developing nations.

The greatest threats to the modern West from the non-Western world came with the rise of nationalism in Asia and Africa. Decolonization and competition with the communist bloc to win friends in the global south helped the West regain ground. After the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, however, the lessons from the Cold War were quickly forgotten, and the West turned to sneering and hectoring the global south. China and Russia moved in, exploiting anti-Western resentment in the global south.

The West can’t sustain its global primacy on the cheap. It needs to come down from the high pedestal it has put itself on since the end of the Cold War and wrestle in the mud with the Chinese and Russian challenge. The West successfully overcame the challenges to its global primacy during a long phase of superpower competition, when it found more cooperative ways to engage non-Western elites. It can do the same again. The BRICS expansion may be a dud, but it is still a warning shot that the West must end its strategic slumber. The global south is waiting.

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