#Grant Writ of Prohibition

[seemabhatnagar]

Business Visa is not meant for collecting Funds

Randa Chehab v. Union of India & Others

WP © 1250/2023

Before Delhi High Court

The Writ was dismissed on 18.12.2023 by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Subramonium Prasad J as petitioner failed to establish violation of her right.

The petitioner a US citizen has challenged her deportation (before Delhi High Court) by the Bureau of Immigration from Trivandrum, Kerala Airport on 28.11.2022 as being arbitrary, unreasonable, illegal and unconstitutional.

Notice was issued to the Union of India on 01.02.2023.

Status Report was filed by the Counsel of Union of India.

The Status Report discloses that the Petitioner was issued the following visas by the Consulate General of India, San Francisco, i.e., T-1 Visa No. VK 0275900 valid from 31.03.2017 to 30.03.2027; and B-1 Visa No. VK 3934693 valid from 20.06.2019 to 19.06.2024.

The Petitioner again applied for a tourist visa on 15.12.2022 which was rejected as her name was found in the adverse/banned list entry of the Ministry of Home Affairs.

The Status Report revealed that the name of the Petitioner has been blacklisted at the behest of Foreigners Regional Registration Office (FRRO), Trivandrum as she was involved in public fund collection while visiting on a business visa which is not permitted.

It is stated that as of today there is an adverse entry report against the Petitioner.

General policy guideline to Indian Visa

When a person is granted a business visa, the purpose is to attend business meetings and technical meetings and funds cannot be collected for the said purpose.

Submission of the Counsel of the petitioner

The Petitioner has been involved in charitable activities and is collecting public funds for the purpose of a charity, and this cannot be said to be unlawful.

The Petitioner has rendered yeomen's services when cyclone Amphan in 2020 struck in eastern India and she has since been closely associated with various charitable activities.

In this backdrop, it is not wrong to collect funds.

Petitioner holds a valid tourist visa and as a tourist visa holder, she can be permitted to come to India.

Petitioner has come to India numerous times and the reason for blacklisting is completely arbitrary.

Submission of the Counsel of the State

Section 3 of the Foreigners Act gives the power to the Central Government to make provisions either generally or for all foreigners prohibiting, regulating or restricting the entry of foreigners into India or their departure from India.

Issue

Whether the violation of the conditions of the business visa can be a sufficient reason for deportation and blacklisting of the Petitioner?

Law

Collecting money ostensibly for charitable activity is not permitted when a foreigner comes to India on a business visa.

Since the Petitioner has admittedly acted contrary to what is permitted, the decision taken by the authorities to blacklist the Petitioner cannot be said to arbitrary and as such requiring any interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Observation of the Court

It is well settled that a Writ Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India only where there is a violation of a right.

In the absence of any right, a writ cannot be issued.

Since the Petitioner has not been able to establish violation of any rights granted to the Petitioner, this Court is not inclined to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to interfere with the decision taken by the authorities.

Order

Writ Petition is dismissed.

Seema Bhatnagar

[paolawdiary]

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209

THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

TITLE II

LEGAL SEPARATION

ARTICLE 58. An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition. (103)

EXPLANATION:

The basic purpose of the law in suspending the trial of an action for legal separation for six (6) months is to give place for a possible reconciliation. If there's a reconciliation before the trial, the court can dismiss the action for legal separation. Also, even if there's already a judgement, the court can still set aside the degree of the legal separation. In the case of Araneta vs. Conception, the court emphasized the suspension period as a cooling-off period. The case revolves around the issue on whether or not the rule for six (6) months suspension period for the hearing of an action for legal separation, preclude the court to try and act on the Omnibus petition for the support and custody of the children.

CASE DIGEST: ARANETA VS. CONCEPTION I G.R. No. L-9667 |  July 31, 1956 | LABRADOR, J.

FACTS:

Luis Araneta (petitioner) filed for legal separation from his wife Emma Benitez Araneta on the ground of adultery. Emma filed an omnibus petition to secure custody of their children and a monthly support of. The respondent judge Concepcion granted the omnibus petition. He refused to reconsider so Luis Araneta filed with the court a petition for certiorari and mandamus to compel the respondent judge to both parties to submit evidence before deciding for the omnibus petition. The court granted a writ of preliminary injunction against the order of the judge. The Respondent Judge’s reason for refusal for the request for the presentation of evidence to be allowed before deciding was because it is the prohibition contained in Art. 103 of the Civil Code. This reads: “An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition.” The respondent Judge interpreted the provision by saying that every single step it should take within the period of six months above the stated should be taken toward reconciling the parties. Admitting evidence now will make the reconciliation difficult if not impossible. The children must be given custody for him or her who by family custom or tradition is the custodian of the children. The court should ignore the defendant had committed any act of adultery or the plaintiff, any act of cruelty to his wife. The status quo of the family must be restored as much as possible. In a typical Filipino family, it’s the wife/mother who keeps the children in her company or custody.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the presentation of evidence as petitioned by the husband is needed in determining the custody of the children.

RULING:

YES, The six month period fixed in Art. 103 of the Civil Code is evidently intended as a cooling off period to make possible reconciliation between the spouses. However, it does not have the effect of overriding other provisions such as the determination of the custody of the children and alimony, and support according to the circumstances. The law expressly enjoins that these should be determined by the court according to the circumstances. If these are ignored, rank in justice may be caused. The determination of the custody of the children should be given and effect and force provided it does not go to the extent of violating the policy of the cooling off period which means that the evidence will not be the cause of the separation.

Source:

Family Code of the Philippines (2022); Judge Ed Vincent S. Albano , Ed Vincent A. Albano, Jr.

https://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1987/07/06/executive-order-no-209-s-1987/

https://chanrobles.com/cralaw/1956julydecisions.php?id=269

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0 notes

[juztize]

Case Digest (NewCivilCode)

G. R. No. L-7817 October 31, 1956

ALFREDO M. VELAYO, in his capacity as Assignee of the insolvent COMMERCIAL AIR LINES INC. (CALI),

Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.

SHELL COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLAND, LTD.,

Defendant-Appellee

FELIX, J.:

A moral wrong or injury, even if it does not constitute a violation of a statute law, should be compensated by damages. In this case, the defendant clearly acted in bad faith when it schemed and effected the attachment of the C-54 plane of its debtor CALI by assigning its credit to its sister company in the US. Therefore, the defendant is liable to pay damages.

FACTS:

In 1948, the Commercial Air Lines, Inc., (CALI), is a corporation duly organized and existing in accordance with the Philippines laws, with offices in the City of Manila and previously engaged in air transportation business. The Shell Company of the P. I., Ltd., defendant-appellee, a corporation organized under the laws of England and duly licensed to do business in the Philippines, with principal offices at the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank building in the City of Manila.

The defendant was a supplier of fuel since the start of CALI’s operations, Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald, its Credit Manager who extended credit to CALI, was in charge of the collection thereof. As of August, 1948, the books of the Defendant showed that CALI had a balance of P170,162.58, and as partial settlement of their accounts, Mr. Alfonso Sycip, CALI’s President of the Board of Directors offered to Mr. Fitzgerald, the CALI’s Douglas C-54 plane, located in California. However, defendant declined as it thought that CALI had sufficient money to pay its debt.

CALI called upon informal meeting to its creditors and informed them that CALI was in a state of insolvency and had to stop operation. In that meeting, the creditors agreed to appoint representatives to a working committee that would determine the order of preference as to how each creditor should be paid. They also agreed not to file suit against CALI but CALI did reserve that it will file insolvency proceedings should its assets be not enough to pay them up.

Shell Company was represented by a certain Fitzgerald to the three man working committee. Later, the working committee convened to discuss how CALI’s asset should be divided amongst the creditors but while such was pending, Fitzgerald sent a telegraph message to Shell USA advising the latter that Shell Philippines is assigning its credit to Shell USA in the amount of $79k, thereby effectively collecting almost all if not the entire indebtedness of CALI to Shell Philippines. Shell USA got wind of the fact that CALI has a C-54 plane is California and so Shell USA petitioned before a California court to have the plane be the subject of a writ of attachment which was granted.

Meanwhile, the stockholders of CALI were unaware of the assignment of credit made by Shell Philippines to Shell USA and they went on to approve the sale of CALI’s asset to the Philippine Airlines. In September 1948, the other creditors learned of the assignment made by Shell. This prompted these other creditors to file their own complaint of attachment against CALI’s assets. CALI then filed for insolvency proceedings to protect its assets in the Philippines from being attached. Alfredo Velayo’s appointment as CALI’s assignee was approved in lieu of the insolvency proceeding. In order for him to recover the C-54 plane in California, it filed for a writ of injunction against Shell Philippines in order for the latter to restrain Shell USA from proceeding with the attachment and in the alternative that judgment be awarded in favor of CALI for damages double the amount of the C-54 plane. The C-54 planewas not recovered. Shell Company argued it is not liable for damages because there is nothing in the law which prohibits a company from assigning its credit, it being a common practice.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendant Shell Company of the P. I., Ltd., taking advantage of its knowledge of the existence of CALI’s airplane C-54 at the State of California, U. S. A. and their financial situation.

Whether or not Defendant may be made under the law to answer for the damages and if so, what should be the amount of such damages.

RULING:

YES. The Defendant took advantage of its knowledge of the existence of Airplane C-54 at the California and financial situation of the CALI.

Because of its action assigning the credit in favor of a sister Shell Company in the USA, and the court action involving the plane has cause delay on the sale of the plane, thus the other creditors have suffered because they could not be paid. The defendant did not show good faith, and honesty. Art 19. of the Civil Code said, “Any person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performances of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith".

It may be said that this article only contains a mere declarations of principles and while such statement may be is essentially correct, yet we find that such declaration is implemented by Article 21 and sequence of the same Chapter which prescribe the following: "Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage".

Now, Article 23 of the Civil Code goes as far as to provide that: "Even if an act or event causing damage to another’s property was not due to the fault or negligence of the defendant, the latter shall be liable for indemnity if through the act or event he was benefited." It supports the argument that even assuming Shell is not liable for taking advantage of situation of the airlines, it was nevertheless benefitted when its assigned credit to its sister company in the U. S. The Defendant should be liable for indemnity for acts it committed in bad faith and with betrayal of confidence. Shell was ordered to pay damages at double the value of the airplane.

[marisatuito]

Velayo v. Shell Philippines

FACTS: Prior to 1948, Commercial Airlines (CALI) owed P170k (abt. $79k) to Shell Company. CALI offered its C-54 plane as payment to Shell Company (the plane was in California) but Shell at that time declined as it thought CALI had sufficient money to pay its debt. In 1948 however, CALI was going bankrupt so it called upon an informal meeting of its creditors. In that meeting, the creditors agreed to appoint representatives to a working committee that would determine the order of preference as to how each creditor should be paid. They also agreed not to file suit against CALI but CALI did reserve that it will file insolvency proceedings should its assets be not enough to pay them up. Shell Company was represented by a certain Fitzgerald to the three man working committee. Later, the working committee convened to discuss how CALI’s asset should be divided amongst the creditors but while such was pending, Fitzgerald sent a telegraph message to Shell USA advising the latter that Shell Philippines is assigning its credit to Shell USA in the amount of $79k, thereby effectively collecting almost all if not the entire indebtedness of CALI to Shell Philippines. Shell USA got wind of the fact that CALI has a C-54 plane is California and so Shell USA petitioned before a California court to have the plane be the subject of a writ of attachment which was granted.

Meanwhile, the stockholders of CALI were unaware of the assignment of credit made by Shell Philippines to Shell USA and they went on to approve the sale of CALI’s asset to the Philippine Airlines. In September 1948, the other creditors learned of the assignment made by Shell. This prompted these other creditors to file their own complaint of attachment against CALI’s assets. CALI then filed for insolvency proceedings to protect its assets in the Philippines from being attached. Alfredo Velayo’s appointment as CALI’s assignee was approved in lieu of the insolvency proceeding. In order for him to recover the C-54 plane in California, it filed for a writ of injunction against Shell Philippines in order for the latter to restrain Shell USA from proceeding with the attachment and in the alternative that judgment be awarded in favor of CALI for damages double the amount of the C-54 plane. The C-54 plane was not recovered. Shell Company argued it is not liable for damages because there is nothing in the law which prohibits a company from assigning its credit, it being a common practice.

ISSUE: Whether or not Shell is liable for damages considering that it did not violate any law.

HELD: YES.   The   writer   of   this   decision   does   not   entertain   any   doubt   that   the Defendant — taking advantage of his knowledge that insolvency proceedings were   to   be   instituted   by   CALI   if   the   creditors   did   not   come   to   an understanding as to the manner of distribution of the insolvent asset among them,   and   believing   it   most   probable   that   they   would   not   arrive   at   such understanding as it was really the case — schemed and effected the transfer of its sister corporation in the United States,

Where CALI’s plane C-54 was by that   swift   and   unsuspected   operation   efficaciously   disposed   of   said insolvent’s property depriving the latter   and   the   Assignee that   was   latter appointed,   of   the   opportunity   to   recover   said   plane.   In   addition   to   the aforementioned Section 37, Chapter 2 of the PRELIMINARY TITLE of the Civil Code, dealing on Human Relations, provides the following: "Art   19.   Any   person   must,   in   the   exercise   of   his   rights   and   in   the performances   of   his   duties,   act   with   justice,   give   everyone   his   due   and observe honesty and good faith”. It may be said that this article only contains a mere declarations of principles and while such statement may be is essentially correct, yet we find that such declaration is implemented by Article 21 and sequence of the same Chapter which prescribe the following: "Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage”. Now, if Article 23 of the Civil Code goes as far as to provide that: “Even if an act or event causing damage to another’s property was not due to   the   fault   or   negligence   of   the   defendant,   the   latter   shall   be   liable   for indemnity if through the act or event he was benefited. “with mere much more reason the Defendant should be liable for indemnity for acts it committed in bad faith and with betrayal of confidence.

[hermosa-oblicon24]

VELAYO v. SHELLG.R. No. L-7817. October 31, 1956

Ponente: FELIX, J.

Facts: Prior to 1948, Commercial Airlines (CALI) owed P170k (about. $79k) to Shell Company.   CAL   offered its   C-54   plane as payment to   Shell   Company   (the plane was in California) but Shell at that time declined as it thought CALI had sufficient money to pay its debt. In 1948 however, CALI was going bankrupt so it called upon an informal meeting of its creditors. In that meeting, the creditors agreed to appoint representatives to a working committee that would determine the order of preference as to how each creditor should be paid. They also agreed not to file suit against CALI but CALI did reserve that it will file insolvency proceedings should its assets be not enough to pay them up. Shell Company was represented by a certain Fitzgerald to the three-man working committee. Later, the working committee convened to discuss how CALI’s asset should be divided amongst the creditors but while such was pending, Fitzgerald sent a telegraph message to Shell USA advising the latter that Shell Philippines is assigning its credit to Shell USA in the amount of$79k, thereby effectively collecting almost all if not the entire indebtedness of CALI to Shell Philippines. Shell USA got wind of the fact that CALI has a C-54 plane in California and so Shell USA petitioned before a California court to have the plane be the subject of a writ of attachment which was granted. Meanwhile,   the stockholders of CALI   were unaware of the assignment of credit made by Shell Philippines to Shell USA and they went on to approve the sale of CALI’s asset to the Philippine Airlines. In September 1948, the other creditors learned of the assignment made by   Shell.   This prompted these other creditors to file their own complaint of attachment against CALI’s assets. CALI then filed for insolvency proceedings to protect its assets in the Philippines from being attached.   Alfredo Velayo’s appointment as CALI’s assignee was approved in lieu of the insolvency proceeding. In order for him to recover the C-54 plane in California, it filed for a writ of injunction against Shell Philippines in order for the latter to restrain Shell USA from proceeding with the attachment and in the alternative that judgment be awarded in favor of CALI for damages double the amount of the C-54 plane. The C-54 plane was not recovered. Shell Company argued it is not liable for damages because there is nothing in the law that prohibits a   company from assigning its credit, it is a common practice.

Issue: WON Shell is liable for damages considering that it did not violate any law.

Held: YES.   The writer of this decision does not entertain any doubt that the Defendant — taking advantage of his knowledge that insolvency proceedings were to be instituted by CALI if the creditors did not come to an understanding as to the manner of distribution of the insolvent asset among them,   and believing it most probable that they would not arrive at such understanding as it was really the case — schemed and effected the transfer of its sister corporation in the United States, where CALI’s plane C-54 was by that swift and unsuspected operation efficaciously disposed of said insolvent’s property depriving the latter and the Assignee that was latter appointed,  of the opportunity to recover said plane.   In addition to the aforementioned Section 37, Chapter 2 of the PRELIMINARY TITLE of the Civil Code, dealing with Human Relations, provides the following: "Art 19. Any person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performances of his duties, act with justice,  give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith". It may be said that this article only contains a mere declaration of principles and while such a statement may be essentially correct, we find that such declaration is implemented by Article 21 and the sequence of the same Chapter which prescribes the following: "Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage".

Now, Article 23 of the Civil Code goes as far as to provide that: "Even if an act or event causing damage to another’s property was not due to the fault or negligence of the defendant,   the latter shall be liable for indemnity if, through the act or event, he was benefited. With much more reason the Defendant should be liable for indemnity for acts it committed in bad faith and with betrayal of confidence.

[top-property-lawyers]

What To Do When False Fir Has Been  Filed Against Me ?

First Information Report also known as FIR for short, is the first document which is prepared in a criminal proceeding as mentioned under Section 154(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 . FIR is a written document about the commission of a cognizable offense which has been provided to the police by the victim or any other person who has information about the commission of a cognizable offense. FIR could only be lodged in case of cognizable offenses which have been defined under Section 2(c) of the CrPC and the list of such offenses has been laid down under Schedule I of the CrPC.

Remedies against a false FIR.

The victim has been given certain remedies so that they can pursue the proper legal action against the person who filed a fraudulent police report.

Remedy before an arrest is made:-The victim against whom false FIR has been filed can apply for bail before the Sessions Court or  High Court as per Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, before the arrest of the victim has been made in such case. The above mentioned section of the CrPC provides for an ‘Anticipatory Bail’ and the objective behind such provision is that no person would be humiliated or harassed so as to satisfy any kind of personal vendetta or grudge of the complainant. Certain factors are to be taken into consideration by the Court when deciding if Anticipatory bail should be granted or not and appropriate conditions could also be imposed on the victim by the Court in case such bail is granted.

However, the above section cannot be invoked after the victim has been arrested and in  such a situation, to be released on bail, the victim would have to seek remedy under Se tion 437 of Section 439 of the CrPC.

Remedy after an arrest is made or after the charge sheet has been file before the court:-After obtaining Anticipatory Bail or after being arrested and filing of the charge sheet by the police, the next step for the victim is to approach the High Court by filing an application for quashing false FIR or to file the writ of prohibition or the writ of mandamus.

The victim of a false FIR can apply to the High Court as per Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to get  the false FIR lodged against him/her quashed.

Stages when the application under Section 482 could be filed

Before the charge sheet has been filed: The High Court of the respective state can quash an FIR in case an application for quashing the same has been filed by the victim under Section 482 of the CrPC before it. When the false FIR is against the principle of natural justice and hence causing a grave miscarriage of justice to the victim, the High Court can quash it and also has the power to reprimand the police officer or issue certain directions to such officer.

After the charge sheet has been filed:-After the police have filed the charge sheet on the basis of a false FIR and before the commencement of the trial, the victim as provided under Section 227 of the CrPC can file a ‘Discharge Application’ in order to get discharged from the offense the victim has been charged which are based on the frivolous FIR lodged against him.

Following the start of the trial or while it is still pending:-When the Sessions Court denies the victim's request for a discharge made pursuant to Section 227 of the CrPC, charges are laid, and the trial is underway, an application for the accused's acquittal may be made pursuant to Section 232 of the CrPC.

Grounds on which a victim of the false FIR can approach the High Court for quashing it.

The following grounds could be used by the victim based on which, he/she can go to the High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC, for quashing the false FIR:

The acts or omission based on which the First Information Report (FIR) has been filed do not constitute an offense

The offense for which the FIR has been lodged, never took place.

Baseless allegations without any reasonable ground to prove an offense against the victim are present in the FIR

Conclusion

Getting justice and to save oneself from a false FIR is an extremely important step for a person falsely accused in the criminal justice system. Upon arrest or even anticipation of an arrest, the first step for any person would be to hire the services of an experienced lawyer, who can help advise and guide the accused with the process of obtaining a bail and any further actions required to be taken.

Lead India offers you a team of experienced lawyers who have been successfully handling cases related to civil as well as criminal matters. Thus, if you wish to talk to a lawyer or seek free legal advice, or even for a matter related to civil law, if you wish to talk to Property Lawyers In Delhi, Property Lawyers In Kolkata, Property Lawyers In Bangalore or in your city, you may contact us.

SOURCE:-

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Property Lawyers In Bangalore, Property Lawyers In Delhi, Property Lawyers In Kolkata.

[attorninong]

Book IV - Obligations and Contracts - Title I - Obligations

Chapter 3 Different Kinds of Obligations

Art. 1183. Impossible conditions, those contrary to good customs or public policy and those prohibited by law shall annul the obligation which depends upon them. If the obligation is divisible, that part thereof which is not affected by the impossible or unlawful condition shall be valid. The condition not to do an impossible thing shall be considered as not having been agreed upon. 

______________________________________________________________

This article applies only where the impossibility existed at the time it was created. If the impossibility arise after the obligation was created, this does not apply. The impossible condition is present if the obligation cannot be possibly performed physically or legally. 

Physical impossibility are in the nature of things that are non-existent or cannot be done. Example, A will pay B P100,000 if he can catch a unicorn and bring it to A.

Legally impossible conditions are illegal and illicit circumstances that are contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Example is for a person to kill someone in exchange of a sum of money as a condition.

Effect of Impossible Conditions

1. Conditional Obligation Void. Impossible conditions nullify the obligation that depends upon them. Both the obligation and the condition is void, for the reason that the obligor is aware that his obligation cannot be fulfilled and that he has no intention of fulfilling his obligation.

(2) Conditional obligation valid. — If the condition is doable and can be fulfilled physically and legally.

 (3) Only the affected obligation void. — If the obligation is divisible, the portion not affected by the impossible condition will stand. 

EXAMPLE: “I will give you P10,000.00 if you sell my land, and a car, if you kill Pedro.” The obligation to give P10,000.00 is valid but the obligation to give a car is void because it is dependent upon an impossible condition.

(4) Only the condition void. — If the obligation is a pre-existing one, and is not dependent on the fulfillment of the impossible condition, for it exist, only the condition is void. 

EXAMPLE: D incurred an obligation in the amount of P10,000.00 in favor of C. If C later agreed to kill X before D pays him, the condition “to kill X” is void but not the pre-existing obligation of D “to pay C.”

Case Luneta Motor Co v Abad

Facts

Luneta Motor Co filed a suit against Federico Abad, and asked for a writ to attach Abad’s properties. The writ was granted, but Abad asked for its cancellation, and for this purpose offered a bond, secured by two sureties. The bond contained a statement that in case Luneta Motor should WIN, the sureties would answer for Abad’s liability. Because of this bond, the writ was dissolved. Later,  Abad died which cause the case to be dismissed.

Issue

Whether or not Luneta Motor can recover the amount owed through the sureties?

Held

The obligation of the sureties, under the counterbond, is subject to the condition that when the plaintiff recovered judgment, they shall deliver the property so released to the officer of the court for the payment of said judgment or in default thereof, pay its full value to the plaintiff. This condition has become a legal impossibility, for no judgment can be recovered by the plaintiff in the case which should be dismissed under section 119 aforementioned. Therefore, the obligation dependent upon this condition must be deemed extinguished, according to article 1116 of our Civil Code.

[rdpunzalan]

Article 176 of the Family Code

Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force.

CASE DIGEST:

G.R. No. L-46729. November 19, 1982. LAUSAN AYOG, BENITO AYOG, DAMASO AYOG, JULIO AYOG, SEGUNDA AYOG, VICENTE ABAQUETA, BERNANDINO ADORMEO, VIDAL ALBANO, FELICIANO ARIAS, ANTONIO BALDOS, MAXIMO BALDOS ROMERO BINGZON, EMILIO CADAYDAY, FRUCTUOSO CHUA, SR., HERACLEO CHUA, GUILLERMO DAGOY, ABDON DEIMOS, NICASIO DE LEON, JULIANA VDA. DE DIANNA, DEMOCRITO DEVERO, ALFREDO DIVINAGRACIA, ESTEBAN DIVINAGRACIA, LEODEGARDIO DIVINAGRACIA, NELLO DIVINAGRACIA, MERQUIADES EMBERADOR, JESUS EMPERADO, PORFERIO ENOC, SOFRONIO ENOC, RAFAEL GAETOS, NICOLAS GARLET, TRINIDAD GARLET, FORTUNATA GEONZON, NICOLADA NAQUILA, TORIBIO NAQUILA, EFREN OKAY, ELPIDIO OKAY, SR., DIEGO ONGRIA, ERNESTO PEÑARES, VICENTE PATULOT, IGNACIA RIBAO, JUANO RICO, JESUS ROSALITA, ARMANDO TANTE and ANSELMO VALMORES, Petitioners, v. JUDGE VICENTE N. CUSI, JR., Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch I, PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF DAVAO, and BIÑAN DEVELOPMENT CO., INC., Respondents. MINISTER OF NATURAL RESOURCES and DIRECTOR OF LANDS, intervenors. Marcelino C. Maximo, Enrique S. Empleo and Carlito H. Vailoces for petitioners Levi Damaso for respondent Biñan Dev’t. Co.

Facts:

Following a bid, the Director of Lands awarded the contract to Bian Development Co., Inc. on January 21, 1953. based on the sales application it submitted in 1951

Some people who lived on the lot protested the transaction. The Director of Lands ordered the tenants to leave the lot and remove their modifications in his decision of August 30, 1957, dismissing the protests.

He issued a writ of execution, but the protestants disobeyed it by remaining on the property.

The corporation filed an action publica (ejectment suit) against the claimed tenants on February 27, 1961 in the Court of First Instance of Davao because they refused to leave the property.

Only on August 14, 1975, or more than thirteen years later, was Sales Patent No. 5681 granted to the corporation for that lot.

The corporation submitted a request for execution when the trial court was given a new copy of the record. The defendants opposed the motion. They argued that the Constitution's adoption, which went into force on January 17, 1973, was a supervening reality that made it illegal to carry out the lower court's decision. They referred to the previously mentioned constitutional provision that states "no private business or association may retain alienable lands of the public domain unless by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area."

Issues:

The Director found that the protestants (defendants in the 1961 ejectment suit, some of whom are now peti­tioners herein) entered the land only after it was awarder to the corporation and, therefore, they could not be re­garded as bona fide occupants thereof. The

Director characterized them as squatters. He found that some claimants were fictitious persons

We hold that the said constitutional prohibition has no retroactive application to the sales application of Biñan Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired a vested right to the land applied for at the time the 1973 Constitution took effect.

Ruling:

That established right must be honored. It was untouchable under the new Constitution. Private corporations are permitted to purchase public agricultural properties up to 1,244 hectares under Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution. The constitutional law notion of vested rights prohibits the petitioners' prohibition action.

Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur. Escolin, J., took no part.

[orfealfonso]

FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

TITLE II: LEGAL SEPARATION

ARTICLE 55 and 58

Support pendente lite can be availed of in an action for legal separation and is granted at the discretion of the judge. If tge petitioner finds the amount of support pendente lite ordered as too onerous, he can always file a motion to modify or reduce the same.

Araneta vs. Conception

G.R. No. L-9667

July 31, 1956

Facts:

Luis Araneta filed for legal separation from his wife Emma Benitez on the ground of adultery.Emma filed an omnibus petition to secure custody of their children and a monthly support of 5,000. The respondent Judge Concepcion granted the omnibus petition.He refuses to reconsider, so Luis Araneta filed with the court a petition for certiorari and a mandamus to compel the respondent Judge to require both parties to submit evidence before deciding for the omnibus petition.

The court granted a writ for preliminary injunction against the order of the judge. Respondent Judge reason for refusal for the presentation of evidence to be allowed before deciding was because it is the prohibition contained in the article 103 of the Civil Code.This reads" An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of petition ",. The respondent judge interpreted the provision by saying that every step it should take within the period of six months above stated should be taken toward reconciling the parties. Admitting evidence now will make reconcilliation difficult if not possible . The children must be given for custody to him or her who by family custom and tradition is tbe custodian of tge children. Tge court should ignore that defendant had committed any act of adultery or the plaintiff, any act of cruelty to his wife. The status quo of tge family must be restored as much as possible.In a typical Filipino family, its tbe mother/wife who keeps children in her company and custody.

Issue:

Whether or not presentation of evidence as petitioned by the husband is needed in determining tge custody of the children

Held:

Yes, the writ prayed is hereby issued and the respondent judge or whosoever takes his place is ordered to proceed on the question of custody and support pendente lite in accordance with his opinion.

The period of six months fix therein (article 103 Civil Code) is evidently intended as a cooling off period to make possible reconciliation between the spouses however, it does not have the effect of overriding the other provision such as the determination of the custody of the children and alimony and support pendente life according to the circumstances. If these are ignored or the court close their eyes to actual facts, ranked in justice may be caused. The determination of the custody and alimony should be given effect and forced provided it does not go to the extent of violating the policy of the cooling off period. That is, evidence not affecting the cause of separation, like the actual custody of the children, the means of conducive to their welfare and convenience during the pendency of the case, these should be allowed that the court determined which is best for their custody.

[rosevjuniosa83]

TITLE VIII - SUPPORT

Santos Vs. Sweeney

Facts :

🔸The Atty. of Serviliano Lanzuela Santos, has presented a petition in which he prays that the writ of prohibition was issue.

🔸He also stated that the court declare Hon. Judge John C. Sweeney of CFI exceeds his jurisdiction by attempting to compel him to pay Graciana Nemedes an alimony in sum of 100 pesos and 50 for the suppprt of each one of her two children which have to pay in advance every month, and futher to pay the sum of 200 dollar to attorneys for plaintiff as part of payment of his fees.

🔸Atty. G. E. Campbell appeared for the respondent judge of CFI, in which he states that the judgement of Hon. Sweeney is based upon one of the grounds which authorize of allowance of alimony and support while in pendente lite.

ISSUE:

Won Judge Sweeney of CFI exceeded his jurisdiction by compelling the petitioner to pay alimony and to Graciana Nemedes and support to her children.

RULING:

No, the judge do not exceeded in his jurisdictional capacity.

The court ordered the petitioner to pay alimony during the pendency of the divorce suit in the court. Art. 68 of the civil code provides that after a complaint for divorce has been filed and admitted, certain actions has to be taken by the court including the allowance of alimony for the woman and the children as not in the possession of their father. Thus the judge decision for the payment of alimony and support to the woman and her children was fair, consequently the relief prayed cannot be granted.

[gabrieloraiz]

MARRIAGE

Article 196. Brothers and sisters not legitimately related, whether of the full or half-blood, are likewise bound to support each other to the full extent set forth in Article 194, except only when the need for support of the brother or sister, being of age, is due to a cause imputable to the claimant’s fault or negligence. (291a)

YANGCO v. ROHDE

FACTS:

Petitioner Luis Yangco filed writ of prohibition in the Supreme Court, alleging that complaint had been filed by Victorina Obin against the petitioner praying that she be declared the lawful wife of the said Yangco, and that she be granted a divorce, an allowance for alimony, and attorney's fees during the pendency of the suit. Complaint was filed before Respondent Judge Rohde, of the CFI of Manila, who then overruled the demurrer filed by the petitioner, stating he is of the opinion that petitioner’s marriage with Victorina is valid. Petitioner denies this. Respondent then ordered petitioner to pay the plaintiff, in advance, a monthly allowance of 250 Mexican pesos from and after the 11th of March last past, and to pay on the 1st day of August following all accrued allowances, in addition to the allowance for the said month, amounting to the sum of 1,500 pesos. Petitioner claims that he would be unable to earn back the sum he’s being compelled to imburse, and that he’s been deprived of right of appeal or any plain, speedy, or adequate remedy. He prays to reverse respondent’s judgement, and to prohibit respondent from compelling him to pay Victorina the said sum. 

 Respondent filed a demurrer on the following ground: (1) That this court is without jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the action; (2) that the petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

ISSUE:

1. WON Respondent Judge was right to act on the assumption that their marriage was valid.

2. WON Respondent Judge was right to compel Petitioner to pay the sum. 

3. Does Victorina Obin has the right to obtain an allowance for alimony?

HELD:

1. No. He said himself that the status of validity of the marriage was “not clear or free from doubt”.

 2. No. Art 143 of the Civil Code cited by the respondent judge himself states the right to support is granted: (1) to spouses inter se; (2) to legitimate descendants and ascendants inter se; (3) to parents and certain legitimated and acknowledged natural children; (4) to other illegitimate children, and (5) to brothers and sisters. Present in all these cases is a civil status or a juridical relation which is the basis of the action for support. In the case at bar the civil status that should be the basis of the action for support is marriage, which must be duly proven in the manner provided for by Art 53: Marriages celebrated before the operation of the Code, must be proven by the canonical certificate. Further, under Art 1591 of the old Code any person believing himself entitled to that provisional alimony or support was required to file with the complaint documents proving conclusively the title by virtue of which the same was sued for. The judge, under article 1592, could not admit the complaint unless the documents referred to in the preceding article were submitted. Thus, as the evidence is lacking, a suit of alimony could not have prospered based on Respondent Judge’s opinion alone.

3.  Victorina has no right to claim allowance for alimony.

[seemabhatnagar]

‘Criminal Background Checks for new applicants joining Legal Profession: A Necessity of the present time’

Pawan Kumar Dubey v. State of UP & 3 others

WP 42619/2023

Before High Court of Allahabad

Disposed of on 21.12.2023 by the Division Bench of Hon’ble Mr. Justice Saumitra Dayal Singh J & Hon’ble Mr. Justice Vinod Diwakar J with direction to the Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh to undertake and complete the disciplinary proceedings expeditiously in accordance with law.

Fact:

Petitioner-Pawan Kumar Dubey has made complaint before Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh against the private-respondent with respect to concealment of vital information regarding pendency of fourteen criminal cases, of which he has been convicted in four cases.

By concealing that information, the respondent has obtained a license to practice law.

The complaint is pending with the Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh since 25.9.2022.

Much time has passed, appropriate action should have been taken thereon, by now.

Observation of the Court

It is alarming to note that person carrying criminal history of fourteen cases, of which he has already been convicted in four cases, has obtained license to practice law.

Such license if allowed to continue, may cause harm to the society in general and the legal fraternity in particular.

The Advocates Act prohibits admission of such person with criminal background to practice law.

Bar Council ought to have developed a procedure to ensure that all fresh applications received for grant of license are subjected to police verification procedure in a time bound manner.

All applicants, who may be facing criminal charges and/or may have been convicted are bound to inform the Bar Council at the stage of making their applications as to pendency of such cases and/or existence of any order of conviction.

If such material particulars are not disclosed by an applicant, his application may be rejected at the threshold.

 It is surprising that the Bar Council has yet not evolved a procedure to enforce its own law.

      Direction:

The High Court disposed of the Writ Petition with a direction to Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh to undertake and complete the disciplinary proceedings brought by the petitioner as expeditiously as possible, preferably, within a period of three months, in accordance with law.

Respondents were directed to ensure appropriate police report is called from the concerned Police Stations with regard to all pending and fresh applications for issuance of license for practice.

Such due diligence procedure would ensure that a person who may carry a criminal history and who may conceal that information, be prevented from misleading the Bar Council in obtaining a license.

A provisional license issued pending an adverse police report may be cancelled upon such report being submitted.

Seema Bhatnagar

[newjerseyprelawland-blog]

303 Creative LLC V. Elenis: When Public Accommodations And Speech Intersect

By Emily Gill, Rutgers University–New Brunswick Class of 2026

December 11, 2022

In 2012, Lorie Smith, a Colorado resident, started her website design company, 303 Creative, where she offers custom design services to various clients, from roofing companies to state senators [1]. Ms. Smith wanted to expand her services to include wedding websites, which she would only have available to heterosexual couples due to her religious beliefs. She planned to put a statement explaining that on her website; however, under the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA), she was not allowed to do this, as the statute prohibits public accommodations from discriminating against individuals based on protected characteristics [2]. Ms. Smith filed her initial complaint against Aubrey Elenis, the Colorado Civil Rights Division Director, in 2016, stating that her First Amendment rights were violated as she was compelled to speak a message she morally objected to. At both the district court level and appellate court level, it was decided that the CADA's prohibition of discrimination was, in fact, constitutional [3]. In mid-2021, the plaintiffs petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which the supreme court granted in February 2022.

The supreme court heard the oral argument on December 5, 2022, where it was asked if the compulsion of an artist to speak or stay silent due to the CADA violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. First, the Court heard the argument of the petitioner, who was represented by Kristen Kellie Waggoner, the CEO, President, and General Counsel of the Christian-oriented organization Alliance Defending Freedom. 303 Creative is considered a public accommodation under the CADA, which is why it was prohibited from creating wedding websites that discriminate against same-sex couples. Waggoner argues that if Ms. Smith is forced to create wedding websites for same-sex couples, she is being compelled by the government to endorse these unions, which directly violates the First Amendment. Justice Sonia Sotomayor raised the point that a wedding website is not an endorsement of a union, but an announcement, meaning the government is not compelling her to make a statement she disagrees with [4]. Waggoner's other key point is that message outweighs status. She gave the example of the websites of a heterosexual couple and a same-sex couple, both having the sentence "God bless this marriage," and argued that the context gives the line different meanings [5].

If 303 Creative was to sell the same product to a same-sex couple that it sold to a heterosexual couple, the message it would be sending would be very different and thus be forcing Smith to express an idea she disagrees with. She finished her argument by stating that "when there's an overlap between message and status, message does win." Second, the Court heard the argument of the respondent, who was represented by Eric R. Olson, the Solicitor General of Colorado. His argument focused primarily on the existence of 303 Creative as a public accommodation to explain why their discrimination was prohibited. As a public accommodation, "The company can choose to sell websites that only feature biblical quotes describing a marriage as between a man and a woman... [but] company just cannot refuse to serve gay couples, as it seeks to do here." [6] Justice Clarence Thomas raised the question of what happens in the intersections of public accommodation and speech or expression, to which Olson responded that there is no framework stating that businesses "except those engaged in expressive conduct" cannot discriminate.

Essentially, Ms. Smith can say on her website that marriage is only between a man and a woman, but she cannot refuse to sell these websites to same-sex couples. Lastly, the Court heard an amicus curiae in support of the respondent, Brian H. Fletcher, the former Solicitor General of the United States. Fletcher's argument revolved primarily around the fact that 303 Creative is a public accommodation and that this was status-based discrimination. He states that in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, "the Court… said refusing to serve for same-sex marriages is discrimination against…gays and lesbians because status and conduct is inextricably intertwined." [7] He also stated that the Court has upheld the government compulsion of speech in the past, such as in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. In Rumsfeld, law schools were forced to communicate military announcements and the location of military recruiters, even though they had sincere beliefs against it [8]. Fletcher argues that Rumsfeld is very similar to this case and that Ms. Smith should therefore be required to communicate the message (the announcement of same-sex marriages) even if she has objections. The decision of this case will most likely not be announced until sometime in 2023, but the outcome will be significant. If decided in favor of 303 Creative LLC, similar arguments may be used to justify discrimination against people of color or individuals with disabilities, which would be detrimental to the lives of many Americans.

______________________________________________________________

[1] Smith, Lorie. “Portfolio.” portfolio - 303 Creative, 2022. https://303creative.com/portfolio/.

[2] "303 Creative LLC v. Elenis." Oyez. Accessed December 5, 2022. https://www.oyez.org/cases/2022/21-476.

[3] “303 Creative V. Elenis.” 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis | Alliance Defending Freedom, 2022. https://adflegal.org/case/303-creative-v-elenis.

[4] "303 Creative LLC v. Elenis." Oyez. Accessed December 5, 2022. https://www.oyez.org/cases/2022/21-476.

[5] "303 Creative LLC v. Elenis." Oyez. Accessed December 5, 2022. https://www.oyez.org/cases/2022/21-476.

[6] "303 Creative LLC v. Elenis." Oyez. Accessed December 5, 2022. https://www.oyez.org/cases/2022/21-476.

[7] "303 Creative LLC v. Elenis." Oyez. Accessed December 5, 2022. https://www.oyez.org/cases/2022/21-476.

[8] "Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc." Oyez. Accessed December 8, 2022. https://www.oyez.org/cases/2005/04-1152

[dwellordream]

“It is unlikely that any king ever received more valuable assistance from his mother than did Richard from Eleanor. The new English monarch empowered her to hold England until he could arrive to take charge himself, and as a crowned queen she symbolized lawful royal authority in the kingdom until his arrival for his coronation. With her strong personality, she could dominate royal officials and assure administrative continuity. Although official records fail to reflect Eleanor’s efforts on Richard’s behalf, contemporary writers vividly depict her exertions. 

One chronicler wrote, “Queen Eleanor, who for many years had been under close guard, was entrusted with the power of acting as regent by her son. Indeed, he issued instructions to the princes of the realm, almost in the style of a general edict, that the queen’s word should be law in all matters.” He concluded, “To make up for his many excesses, [Richard] took care to show his mother all the honor that he could, that by obedience to his mother he should atone for the offenses committed against his father.” Although Eleanor’s position in England’s government was not comparable to that of Philip II’s mother in France, who was proclaimed official regent while her son was away on crusade, she swiftly exerted herself on Richard’s behalf, securing the kingdom for him and remedying the late king’s abuses. 

Representing royal power, she gave legitimacy to the authority of the experienced and capable chief justiciar Ranulf de Glanvill, and his writs sometimes stated their authorization “by the queen’s precept.” The respect given Eleanor as queen-mother would give her a prominent part in English politics during the turbulent years of 1190–94, when the kingdom was threatened by her younger son John, count of Mortain, and by the Capetian king. She was a prominent force in England, enforcing royal directives, prohibiting a papal legate from entering the kingdom, attesting royal charters, and attending gatherings of the king’s great council.

…A chronicler described Eleanor after her release from captivity: “Circulating with a queenly court, she set out from city to city and castle to castle just as it pleased her.” The chronicler must have chosen the uncommon term “queenly court” instead of “royal court” purposely to draw attention to the extraordinary sight of a female exercising royal authority. The queen sent representatives to all the counties of England to take free men’s oaths of fidelity to their new king. These royal agents were ordered to release captives imprisoned by the king’s will alone, not by the law of the realm, and also those held for offences against the arbitrary forest law, while those lawfully imprisoned were to be released once they found sureties for their appearance at trial. 

The chronicler continued, commenting, “In her own person she demonstrated how grievous unjust imprisonment was for men, and how release aroused in them joyful revival of spirits.” He added that Eleanor freed prisoners because her own experience had taught her that “confinement is distasteful to mankind, and that it is a most delightful refreshment to the spirits to be liberated therefrom.” Certainly Eleanor could feel for those arbitrarily imprisoned by her late husband, but her proclamation was not a general amnesty emptying the jails, for conditions for prisoners’ release were specific and consistent with legal principles and practices. The monastic writer William of Newburgh, nonetheless, was disgusted that freeing them had unleashed “these pests” back onto society only to terrorize decent subjects more confidently in the future. 

Another chronicler commented more favorably, recognizing her action as redressing Henry II’s despotic deeds. She curbed “the depredations of those . . . charged with the care of the forests, intimidating them with the threat of severe penalties”; he also hails her ending of Henry’s habit of housing his horses in the stables of abbeys, remarking that she “distributed them with pious liberality.” Although Eleanor’s first concern in the weeks after Henry’s death was assisting Richard’s smooth accession to England’s throne, she did not forget a widow’s duty to provide prayers for her departed husband’s soul. She assigned income of the vacant bishopric of Winchester as alms on Henry’s behalf and also made grants to the nuns of Amesbury and to the Carthusian brothers for his soul.

In old age, Eleanor was finally fulfilling the role that her English subjects considered proper for their queens, tempering the king’s harsh rule with mercy and busying herself with spiritual matters. Eleanor met Richard at Winchester soon after his landing at Portsmouth on 13 August 1189 to join his entourage. When he learned that English castles on the southern frontier of Wales were being attacked by the Welsh, his first impulse was to march immediately to their relief, but heeding his mother’s counsel, he continued on his way to Westminster for his coronation. In preparation for the queen-mother’s participation in the coronation festivities, over £100 was spent on clothing, furs, horses and their harness, and other items to ensure that she and her entourage made an appropriately splendid impression. 

Her household now included a number of noble maidens in her care, among them Alix of France, Richard’s long-suffering fiancée and victim of Henry II’s lust; Count John’s betrothed, Isabelle, daughter of the deceased earl of Gloucester; and Denise of Déols, heir to the lordship of Berry and soon to be the bride of Andrew of Chauvigny, one of Richard’s Poitevin stalwarts. Andrew had ties of kinship with Eleanor through her Châtellerault ancestors, and his kinsmen had supplied officials for the counts of Poitou. Bernard de Chauvigny had served as the queen’s chamberlain during her first years in England, and Richard as count of Poitou had made Geoffrey de Chauvigny his chamberlain.

Eleanor acknowledged her ties to both Andrew and Denise by attending their wedding at Salisbury. Richard took care to ensure that his mother had adequate wealth for maintaining a standard of living appropriate for a great queen, although as duchess of Aquitaine she was already rich and powerful in her own right. The division of the duchy’s resources between Richard and his mother is unclear, but Eleanor evidently felt no constraint on making grants from Poitou’s revenues. As duke of Normandy, Richard granted his mother income from some Norman administrative agencies.

…In spring 1190, after Richard had crossed to Normandy, he summoned his mother, his brother John, his illegitimate brother Geoffrey Plantagenet, and several bishops to a great council at Nonancourt. This council’s purpose was to lay out plans for governing the new king’s lands during his expedition to the Holy Land, and he provided funds for his mother’s travel. Richard had taken the cross in 1187, and it is his leadership of the Third Crusade, 1190–92, that makes him the best known of all medieval English monarchs. 

During Eleanor’s voyage across the Channel her mind must have turned to her own hardships endured on the Second Crusade more than forty years earlier, and her memories would have aroused fears for her son’s safety. Making the crossing with Eleanor were noble maidens in her entourage, among them her granddaughter Eleanor of Brittany, the unfortunate Alix of France, and the daughter of the countess of Eu. Also traveling with her was a great lady, Hawise, countess of Aumale, Normandy, lady of Skipton and Holderness in northern England, and the widow of the earl of Essex. A strong-willed lady similar to the queen-mother, a contemporary described her as “a woman who was almost a man, lacking nothing virile except the virile organs.” 

Richard aimed to give her in marriage to William de Forz, one of his faithful knights in Poitou and a descendant of functionaries in the service of Eleanor and her predecessors. At the Nonancourt council, the new king made provision for his sole surviving brother during his absence on crusade. He handed over to John control of six shires in England and the county of Mortain in Normandy, and he confirmed his title of lord of Ireland, making him a dangerously overmighty subject in the British isles. Richard’s generosity to John in his strongly governed kingdom and his wealthiest French province gave his brother scope for causing trouble, although the king apparently felt confident that his weak character left him incapable of causing serious mischief. 

Establishing the new count of Mortain in so powerful a position led some of Richard’s subjects to surmise that he did not expect to return from his crusade, and they feared that if he did, “His brother, already no less powerful than he and eager to rule, would defeat him and drive him out of the kingdom.” Richard’s lavish grants to John seemed an implicit declaration of his intent that John should be his heir in case of his death overseas. He saw that an explicit statement, however, would have encouraged the count’s bad behavior, as Henry II’s unhappy experience with Young King Henry had shown. 

The Lionheart perhaps expected that two checks would discourage his brother from doing harm. One was their mother Eleanor’s influence, and the other was John’s oath to remain outside England during his brother’s absence from the kingdom, but neither worked as expected. First, Eleanor was away from England for several months in 1190–91, accompanying Richard as far as Chinon in Anjou, then crossing Aquitaine to Spain and across the Midi to conduct Richard’s bride to his camp at Messina in Sicily, where he was wintering before sailing to the Holy Land. 

The second precaution, Count John’s promise at Nonancourt not to return to England for three years, was soon undone apparently through Eleanor’s pressing Richard to free him from his oath. She hardly knew her youngest son, who had grown up during her long captivity, and like Richard, she underestimated his capacity for trouble-making, or perhaps she expected that John’s awareness of his advantage as Richard’s presumed heir would induce him to behave himself. In fact, John surfaced “in active mischief” once his mother was far from England on her long journey to Spain and Sicily, although open moves against the regency government would begin only after he heard of his brother’s formal declaration of young Arthur of Brittany as heir late in 1190.

Once the queen-mother returned to the Anglo-Norman realm in 1191 she exerted her maternal pressure on her last-born son, succeeding in preventing him from rushing off to join Philip II following the French king’s premature return from the crusade in anger and frustration at Richard. At Nonancourt, the Lionheart named two chief justiciars to govern England jointly in his absence, but this scheme promptly collapsed on the death of one of them, William de Mandeville, earl of Essex. The king then began tinkering with his plan that ultimately would leave one of the co-justiciars, William Longchamp, bishop of Ely, solely in charge of the kingdom. Longchamp’s power rested on his control over the royal seal as royal chancellor, a sign of Richard’s confidence that in effect handed over to him the administration of the realm. 

By limiting authority of the other co-justiciar, the bishop of Durham, to the north of England, Richard had given Longchamp an excuse to exclude him from Westminster, the center for royal administration. Finally in June 1190, Richard acknowledged Longchamp’s supremacy, declaring him chief justiciar of all England. On the same day that the king’s letter arrived, news came that the pope had conferred on Longchamp spiritual authority over the Church in the island kingdom as papal legate. One chronicler’s claims that Longchamp had “three titles and three heads” and that he had become “Caesar and more than Caesar” ring true.

Apparently Richard’s trust either created or encouraged an arrogance and ambition within his chancellor that would ultimately bring him to ruin. The issue of Richard’s marriage was doubtless a topic for discussion during the Nonancourt conference. It may have been at that time that he revealed to his mother his plan to marry Berengaria of Navarre, and he requested her to travel to Spain and bring his bride to him in Sicily. Among Eleanor’s weightiest concerns was the Lionheart’s marriage and the birth of a son and heir that would ensure dynastic continuity and preserve the unity of the Plantagenet holdings. She knew well the many dangers that lay ahead for a crusader king. 

Years earlier, Richard had been betrothed to Alix, daughter of Louis VII and half-sister of Philip II, but he had always balked at wedding the Capetian princess, probably because of his belief that his own father had seduced her. Despite Eleanor’s anxieties, Richard himself showed few worries about the succession, confident that he would survive the dangers of an expedition to the Levant and live long enough to sire heirs. His mother was wary of the potential heirs to Richard—his sole surviving brother, John, count of Mortain in Normandy; her grandson Arthur of Brittany; and Richard’s half-brother Geoffrey Plantagenet, a cleric in minor orders. 

At Messina in Sicily, before sailing for the Holy Land, the Lionheart would name his nephew, Arthur of Brittany as his heir. Eleanor considered the child Arthur unacceptable because of the ferocious hostility of his Breton mother toward her Plantagenet in-laws. Eleanor can hardly have had much sympathy for Geoffrey, her late husband’s beloved bastard son, and she opposed Richard’s honoring his father’s wishes by naming him archbishop of York. Before Geoffrey could be consecrated, he had to take priestly vows, making him less credible as a potential king, and like John, he was barred from entering the kingdom for three years. 

Notwithstanding any doubts that Eleanor harbored about her youngest son’s character, she apparently viewed him as the sole suitable successor to the English throne should Richard die without direct heir, and possibly her insistence that Richard release John from his obligation of remaining outside the kingdom reflects her concern for his succession. A chronicle from the crusader kingdom maintains that Eleanor was the instigator of Richard’s marriage to Berengaria because her hatred and resentment of the king of France and his offspring led her to prevent at any price her son’s marriage to a daughter of Louis VII. This work is a continuation of William of Tyre’s chronicle that had recorded the Antioch affair that had brought public attention to Eleanor’s troubles with her first husband. 

It is unlikely, however, that Richard Lionheart was “bullied into marriage by his formidable mother” or that she can be credited with negotiating his marriage to Berengaria of Navarre. Despite Eleanor’s feelings about Richard’s choice of a bride or her fears for the succession, her son’s marriage to a princess from the Pyrenean kingdom must be seen as his own plan.  Allying himself with Berengaria’s father, King Sancho VI (d.1194), and her brother, the future Sancho VII, formed part of a program for stabilizing Gascony. Richard saw the match as “an ingenious diplomatic device . . . in order to cut his way through a thicket of political problems,” probably proposed by him as early as February 1190 at a great council of the Gascon nobility at La Réole.”

- Ralph V. Turner, “The Queen-Mother: Richard’s Reign, 1189–1199.” in Eleanor of Aquitaine: Queen of France, Queen of England

[johndeka]

The CRC for prohibition against respondent

Procedural Posture

 Petitioner creditor sought a writ of prohibition against respondent, the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco (court), from proceeding upon a voluntary petition in insolvency by a foreign corporation (corporation).

 Overview

 The creditor sold drilling equipment to the corporation and it was secured by a promissory note. The corporation was not registered with the California Secretary of State nor did it have a registered agent in California. The creditor filed an action with the court and caused a writ  PC 220 Assault with Intent to Commit a Felony of attachment to be issued against the drilling equipment. While the equipment was in the sheriff's possession, the corporation filed a petition for voluntary insolvency. The court declared the corporation to be insolvent and appointed the sheriff to act as the receiver for all of the corporation's property, including the drilling equipment. The creditor filed a petition for a writ of prohibition against the court from proceeding upon the petition for voluntary insolvency. The creditor claimed that the corporation was not a resident of the State of California and that it could not avail itself to the protection provided in California's Insolvency Law. The court agreed with the creditor's claim. The court found that the corporation was not a resident of the State of California and that it was not entitled to the protection afforded to California residents under the Insolvency Law.

 Outcome

 The court granted the creditor's petition for a writ of prohibition against the court from providing the corporation with protection to the corporation under California's Insolvency Law.

 Procedural Posture

 Defendant was convicted for six counts of first degree murder under Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)), for multiple charge of burglary and attempted burglary under Pen. Code, § 459, and one count of rape under Pen. Code, § 261. The jury found true special-circumstance and knife-use allegations under Pen. Code, §§ 190.2, 12022. The Superior Court of San Diego County, California, imposed a judgment of death. Appeal was automatic.

 Overview

 Defendant, an African-American man, was convicted for a series of six similar murders of young White women over a period of a year. The reviewing court affirmed, holding, among other things, that: (1) extensive pretrial publicity did not necessitate a change of venue, even though the crimes were of a nature that might arouse racial animus, because most news reports were neutral and were not published immediately before trial; (2) there was no error in permitting an FBI special agent to testify that common marks among the homicides indicated that they were committed by the same person; (3) the right to a public trial was not infringed by a limited closure of the courtroom during a special agent's testimony regarding a crime scene in a murder committed subsequent to defendant's arrest that remained under investigation; and (4) no prejudicial error occurred when the jury viewed a 25-minute interview of a victim that had been videotaped a few months prior to death. The tape was not an emotional tribute, did not display the victim at home or with family, and did not include images of her as an infant or young child. The setting was an interview in a neutral television studio.

 Outcome

  The court affirmed the judgment in its entirety.

[ask-jumblr]

Goy Asks For Help Un-Fucking a Video Game

The game in question is “Crusader Kings 2: After the End,” which takes place in a post-apocalyptic North America which has regressed to a medieval state due to a deliberately-unspecified global disaster some six centuries ago.

Its an overhaul mod, with “Crusader Kings 2″ being the base game which takes place in the actual middle ages, but I’m only concerning myself with “After The End.” For clarity’s sake, I’ll be referring to the base game, which I will not be concerning myself with altering, as “CK2,″ and I will refer to the mod, which I am altering, as “AtE.”

So CK2 has a lot of baked in Cultural Christianity, much of which is carried over to AtE. I am creating a Submod, and as part of that I want to get AtE’s depiction of Judaism to be less, you know, christian. I want to carve out the ingrained antisemitism so that neither I, nor any Jewish players of the game, will have to look at it anymore.

I’ll be cutting this post up into several parts, each one dedicated to what I, as a gentile, think is probably an issue with the way the game portrays Judaism and my best idea of how to fix it. I’m posting this here with the hope of being corrected about everything I’m definitely getting wrong, and help figuring out how to go about actually fixing things.

Mod of @ask-jumblr briefly interjecting: (1) Putting the rest below the cut so this doesn’t clog dashes, and (2) submission is from @frustratedasatruar because tumblr doesn’t credit submissions once they’re posted.

Part 1: Orthodox, Reform, and… Meshichist?

So the way CK2 handles religion is cut up into a few tiers. The largest categories are the so-called Religious Groups, such as “Christian” or “American-Native” or “Muslim.” Judaism comprises one of these groups.

Then there’s the Heresy mechanic, which exists with the intent to model Catholicism’s whole snake-eating-its-own-tail thing with them, especially back in the middle ages. The way the mechanic works is that you’ve got one Religion that is considered the “main” religion with several others associated with it which vie for control. If things are shaky for the main religion, members of that faith may be prompted to join one of the Heretical movements.

I actually think the way AtE applies this mechanic to Judaism is fairly representative in practice. “Orthodox” is granted the position of main religion, with Reform relegated as a Heresy. But! Both Orthodox communities and Reform communities are scattered across the map at the start of the game. Further, Orthodoxy’s position at game-start is very fragile, so a Reform player can fairly simply supplant them as the dominant branch without even needing a military confrontation with any Orthodox factions.

This combination of factors creates a situation where Jewish communities within the game can ebb and flow between the different sects over time, which wouldn’t be possible if the two religions weren’t tied together with the Heresy mechanic.

One problem though, at least as far as I can see; there’s a third sect in the mix. Again, I’m a gentile, so correct me if I’m wrong, but its really weird for the Meshichists (explicitly the people who believe this man to be the Moshiach) to be depicted as a major faction within Judaism, literally on par with Orthodox and Reform, right?

As far as I, as a gentile, can tell from my research on this subject, the Meshichists are a subset of Chabad, which is itself a subset of Hasidic Judaism, which is a subset of Haredi Judaism, which has a complicated relationship with Orthodox Judaism.

So, assuming I’m not out of place in my assessment that the Meshichists are the odd man out, my question is if I should simply remove them from the game, leaving in-game Judaism to Orthodox and Reform. Or if I should replace them with a different third faction, and if so whom? I understand that Conservative Judaism is another major faction, but I know absolutely nothing about them, including how I would distinguish them from Orthodox.

Help, please.

Part 2: Zealous/Cynical

So CK2, as mentioned, has a lot of structural Cultural Christianity.

Individual characters in the games, that is to say Rulers or associated courtiers, have a list of traits, each one modifying their aptitudes and how the AI will direct them. Things like “Gluttonous,” “Charitable,” “Craven,” “Shrewd,” and so on. There’re hundreds of them.

Some of these traits are set as opposites of one another, which means that if a character has one the game won’t allow them to have the other. You cannot be both “Just” and “Arbitrary,” that sort of thing.

Further, one trait can have more than one opposite. “Slow,” “Quick,” and “Genius,” are all inter-incompatible, for example.

Which brings me to the Zealous and Cynical traits.

Their descriptions are thus:

Zealous: This character burns with religious fervor and cannot tolerate heretics, infidels, or heathens.

Cynical: This character is a cynical unbeliever, disliked by the clergy but good at intrigue.

I’ll shy away from describing their exact in-game modifiers and just leave it that Zealous is considered an overall very desirable trait, while Cynical is undesirable unless you’re playing a spymaster. Zeal makes you more popular with priests of your religion, while cynicism makes you commensurately less popular with the same.

Furthermore, unlike Cynical, being Zealous also precludes you from having any of the “Sympathy for [Insert Other Religion Group]” traits.

Now as I understand it, Judaism rather encourages questioning everything, which feels like a third pole on that little alignment graph. I’m essentially asking if I should try and create a “Pious Skepticism” trait to represent Jewish characters who don’t mindlessly-accept-writ-dogma-and-hate-unbelievers but also aren’t unbelievers themselves, while at the same time arguing with and about established scripture.

This hypothetical “Pious Skepticism” trait, name subject to change, would also allow for characters to be both on good terms with religious authorities and still have access to the Sympathy traits.

I feel like the current system of Zealous/Default/Cynical probably doesn’t represent the Jewish experience, but as a gentile I obviously need advisement to be sure.

TLDR: I feel like CK2 lacks a way to represent the whole arguing-about-everything thing that, at least from what I’ve read following Jewish blogs, is considered so important to your community. Then as an addendum on that point, is my proposed solution of making a new trait to represent it, and slotting it into the zealous/cynical dynamic.

Part 3: Depicting Antisemitism in the Game

CK2 has a limited system for dynamically depicting sexism. For what I feel pretty safe to assume are reasons regarding processing power, the degree of sexism within your in-game territory is boiled down to the “Status of Women” modifier in your nation’s lawcode, with five options.

“Traditional: Women are prohibited from holding all [government] positions. Some government types will be restricted to Agnatic inheritance law.”

“Marginal: Women are allowed to hold some power, occupying background positions behind the people in charge.”

“Significant: Women have been granted official power and are allowed to hold public offices.”

“Notable: Restrictions on female power have been officially repealed. All career paths are open for prominent women.”

“Full: Powerful legislation removing old restrictions has finally had the effect of affecting the general opinion on women in positions of power across society.”

These laws are pegged to different benchmarks in the game’s technological progression system, which has the effect of spacing out the reforms over the coarse of your game.

As you try and move women’s rights forward, powerful men in your nation will fight you tooth and nail to prevent that from happening.

As things stand in the game, antisemitism is represented as identical to every other form of xenophobia. Which obviously downplays the the shear length and breadth of impact antisemitism has on society.

Essentially, my notion to represent the special form of bigotry that is antisemitism is to apply a similar system to the one already applied to sexism.

In the sexism system, your nation is quantifiably better off for every step further you advance down the road to equality. The only real reason not to pursue equality is the hope of placating powerful special interests within your state who want a larger slice of the pie for themselves or have other ideological motivations, at the expense of weakening your nation as a whole.

Which I think would be a pretty good angle for representing antisemitism. I’m not advocating for a 1=1 switchover from the sexism system, of course, indeed one of the things I’d want help with is determine what the five stages would be in a similar antisemitism system.

Anyway, for all that this system is really incapable of handling the magnitudes of sexism or antisemitism, its something I can implement without crashing the game and, I think, a significant improvement over the current situation.

But before I started into the in-depth process of trying to code this, I wanted to seek out some Jewish voices to run my thoughts by first.

Part 4: Ethnoreligion

CK2 has a very christian perspective on the relationship between culture and religion, to the extent that I as a pagan am repeatedly jarred by it. And I’ve learned that Judaism’s view of the subject is even less like that of the christians. Making it, I presume, a bigger problem with the game.

So in the game culture and religion are considered completely distinct from each other, the conversion of one not having any effect on the state of the other. The only direct connection of any kind that I know of honestly just makes the problem worse: if you find yourself in control of a county which is both a different religion and culture from your own, you must actively convert the religion before it will be possible for culture to passively convert.

Which can result in situations which, given my knowledge that Judaism is specifically an ethnoreligion, are very strange. Like Anabaptist Yiddish counties.

Or the way any prospective Jewish rulers, if they want to ensure a firmer political position in a majority-gentile kingdom (if they manage to establish such a thing), demographic shift is fastest achieved not by, say, some mechanism to attract Jewish immigrants from neighboring countries, but by relentlessly proselytizing until the goyim convert, and only then the process of cultural shift may start.

Can you tell that this system was designed for the catholics.

I’m not really sure what exactly I could do to fix this, but I believe I can:

Disable the proselytizing mechanic for Jewish characters. I’d need to replace it with a “dispatch debate team,” or something, mechanic so that Jewish players won’t be left helpless in the face of grassroots Heretic movements.

Code a new system for gentile-counties-with-Jewish-rulers to passively convert culture and religion at the same time, but at a slower pace. And maybe, if I’m feeling ambitious overconfident, some mechanic by which you can try to inspire immigration by Jewish populations, potentially causing a brain-drain in nearby Kingdoms if you invest enough into it.

Create an opposite system, so that if a county of both Jewish religion and culture is converted to a different religion group, the county’s culture will autoswitch to an off-brand version of itself. If I’m feeling cheeky, I’ll call the off-brand culture “Goyim” or something.

I think that these three things in conjunction with each other would adequately solve the problem.

But, you know, I don’t know, because I’m not Jewish.

Part 5: Education

The game’s current system has it that as a monarch you can offer your vassals to have their children educated in your court, which usually results in them adopting your culture and religion if they haven’t already.

I feel like Jewish rulers would be less blaze about that than everyone else. Because, you know, experience. I want to set things so that Jewish rulers will either auto-decline those offers or maybe set it so Jewish characters are ineligible for the events that cause culture/religious conversion during childhood. I don’t really need a perfect solution, I just want to stop the phenomena of the idiot AI selling out to the big homogenizing power every single time.

Unless I shouldn’t do that, and I should leave things as is for whatever reason, or do some completely third thing.

Part 6: Logo

So in CK2, religions have their own individual logos so you can tell at a glance what religion a character is affiliated with. Heresies of the same main religion share a logo between each other, which will be a red version of the main religion’s logo.

Should a Heresy grow powerful enough to usurp the main religion’s position, the former-Heresy will get the full color version and the former-main-religion will get the red version.

Long story short, Judaism is represented by a Menorah. Because I learned that gentiles massively over inflate how important Hanuka actually is, I was wondering if that was a good pick, or if it should be replaced with the Star of David, or some other third thing.

Part 7: Terminology

This one is essentially Part 6: Part 2. The game has a shorthand way of copy-pasting in default terms from the different religions, so that a generic piece of in-game text can vaguely refer back to the character’s religion without needing to be rewritten for each religion.

For reference, here’s what that looks like for the christians:

Scripture Name = The Bible Priest Title = Priest High God Name = God God Names = God, The Lord, Jesus, The Blessed Virgin Evil God Names = Satan, Lucifer, The Devil

So in-game text in various places will be coded to say something like “We found a secret chest of gold, praise [Insert=god_name]!” and the game will insert something from the appropriate category at random.

You’ve probably guessed where I’m going with this: as a gentile, I want to double check that the terminology assigned to Judaism is actually appropriate.

However, as the game’s name lists for the three “god” categories drops several names I don’t recognize, and I know that Judaism is against copying certain things in this regard down, to be safe I’m not going to post the specific list unless asked. Instead, I’m just going to ask how those three categories should be filled out.

What I assume to be safer to directly repeat is that the priest title for Judaism is entered as “Rabbi,” and the scripture name is listed as “The Torah.” At least as a gentile, the only question that leaps out to me between the two of those is if “The Torah” might be better switched to “The Tanakh.”

End:

Thank you all in advance for your patience and assistance! I will of course answer any questions.

My thanks to @queerdo-mcjewface, @terulakimban, @miriams-well-of-jewish-thoughts, and @hermione-walked-out-of-a-yeshiva for helping me already when I couldn’t figure out how to submit this Ask.