#Afghanistan and CPEC

[darkmaga-returns]

This could set into motion a diplomatic chain reaction that ultimately places huge pressure upon India.

Trump repeated late-February’s plans for the US to restore its military presence at Afghanistan’s Bagram Airbase while addressing US troops in Qatar last week. It was assessed back then that “Trump Will Likely Have To Cut A Deal With Pakistan If He’s Serious About His Afghan Plans”. His rhetoric after the latest Indo-Pak conflict suggests that they might be discreetly negotiating this right now, the overall context of which was elaborated on in this analysis here about why he’s unexpectedly damaging Indo-US ties.

In brief, his newly announced “total reset” with China might presage a comprehensive deal with the People’s Republic that results in the return of Sino-US bi-multipolarity in some form, which some describe as the G2/“Chimerica” scenario. The US’ planned “Pivot (back) to Asia” for more muscularly containing China, in which India is envisaged playing a key role, would therefore lose its importance. That could explain why he seemingly has no compunctions about so deeply offending India nowadays.

Even so, his serious interest in Bagram Airbase is explicitly driven by its proximity to China, thus implying that he’s hedging his bets on any “New Détente” it. At the same time, however, any restoration of the US’ military presence there could also be part of a grand deal with China. This could see the US ramping up military aid to Pakistan on anti-terrorist pretexts, thus helping to secure the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), in exchange for China letting Pakistan facilitate the US’ military return to Afghanistan.

[dainiknavajyoti]

Pakistan, China and Bangladesh joined hands to surround India, going to form a new organization in place of SAARC

Islamabad. China, Pakistan and Bangladesh have together intensified their preparations to surround India by playing a dirty trick. China, Pakistan and Bangladesh have started working on forming a new organization in place of South Asian Association for Cooperation (SAARC). India is a major member of SAARC but due to the dirty activities of Pakistan, it has kept a distance from this organization. 

India has boycotted SAARC since the Uri terror attack. Now talks between China and Pakistan to form a new organization have progressed a lot. Bangladesh was also included in a recent meeting. This meeting took place on 19 June in Kunming, China. According to a report in the Pakistani newspaper Express Tribune, the ultimate aim of this meeting in Kunming was to invite South Asian countries that have been part of SAARC so that they can be included in the new organization. This meeting in Kunming took place after the meeting of China, Pakistan and Afghanistan in May. China now wants to extend CPEC to Afghanistan and is increasing friendship with the Taliban. Read More...

[impaaktmagazine]

Balochistan CPEC Conflict: 5 Strategic Flashpoints | IMPAAKT

In the vast, arid expanses of Balochistan, Pakistan’s largest yet least developed province, lies a geopolitical time bomb. Sandwiched between Iran, Afghanistan, and the Arabian Sea, Balochistan is not just a cartographic footnote in South Asia’s periphery. It is the new epicenter of an unfolding great-power contest, where China's ambitions, Pakistan's insecurities, and India's strategic calculus are colliding like tectonic plates.

The Chinese Stake: Balochistan CPEC and the Maritime Pivot

China has poured billions into Balochistan through its flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), specifically via the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). At the heart of this corridor is the Gwadar Port, a deep-sea marvel that offers China direct access to the Arabian Sea and, by extension, the Persian Gulf. This is not just about trade or infrastructure; it is about reshaping regional influence.

Gwadar is poised to become Beijing’s maritime pearl in the Indian Ocean, an alternative to the chokepoint-laden Malacca Strait, which has long constrained China's energy security. With Chinese naval presence quietly increasing under the guise of civilian projects, Balochistan becomes a linchpin in Beijing’s “String of Pearls” strategy, a network of ports and bases aimed at counterbalancing U.S. and Indian naval power.

But while China builds roads, ports, and pipelines, it also entrenches itself into the region’s security matrix. Reports of Chinese private security contractors operating in Balochistan to protect CPEC assets point to a creeping militarization, one that blurs the line between economic outreach and strategic occupation.

India’s Strategic Dilemma and the Baloch Opportunity

For India, the Chinese deep-state entrenchment in Balochistan is a two-front dilemma: it not only bolsters Pakistan's ailing economy and military posture but also gives China an outpost alarmingly close to India's western shores. As Chinese radar systems and logistics hubs proliferate in Gwadar and beyond, India's security calculus demands a bold response.

Herein lies the realpolitik opportunity for New Delhi—supporting the indigenous resistance to the CPEC model: the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and other local factions that see Chinese presence as neo-colonialism dressed in development. While official policy maintains India’s commitment to regional sovereignty, voices in Baloch circles often cite a "foreign hand" aiding in their visibility and global outreach. The subtle presence of intelligence footprints—deliberate or otherwise—cannot be dismissed entirely.

Over the past decade, India’s strategic community has matured in understanding that asymmetric responses are often more effective than conventional ones. By investing in political narratives, humanitarian visibility, and selective covert engagements, India can increase the strategic cost of China’s presence in Balochistan. Though deniable, such influence campaigns mirror tactics long used by global powers—from Langley to Lubyanka.

Disarming the China-Pakistan Nexus: A Long Game

Disarming Pakistan and China in Balochistan doesn’t require missiles; it requires patience, partnerships, and proxies. India should focus on a tri-pronged approach:

Narrative Dominance: Amplify the voices of Baloch dissent in international forums. Frame Chinese investments as exploitative, resource-draining ventures that disenfranchise locals. The global discourse on debt-trap diplomacy is ripe for this.

Strategic Disruption: Quietly assist Baloch factions, not with weapons, but with intelligence, technology, and diplomacy. Encourage fragmentation within Pakistan’s narrative of a unified state, especially in regions where identity-based resistance thrives.

Regional Counterbalances: Collaborate with Iran and the Gulf states to develop alternate ports and logistics chains. Chabahar, for instance, can be reinvigorated as a direct competitor to Gwadar. India can also deepen strategic dialogues with the West on China’s creeping influence in the Indian Ocean.

The Role of Intelligence: Quiet but Critical

India’s Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) has long understood that influence is often best exercised in silence. While the Pakistani establishment frequently accuses India of fueling Baloch unrest, definitive proof remains elusive—and that’s precisely the point. Strategic ambiguity, when married to tactical precision, is one of New Delhi’s most potent instruments in the shadow war over Balochistan.

Whether it’s mapping Chinese logistics patterns, monitoring PLA security deployments, or amplifying indigenous resistance through covert means, India’s strategic community must remain two steps ahead. The goal is not direct confrontation but attritional contestation—making the cost of Chinese overreach higher than the benefit.

[video width="1280" height="720" mp4="https://impaakt.co/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Video-2-1.mp4"][/video]

While mainstream Indian policy maintains a principled stand on non-interference in Pakistan’s internal affairs, India’s external intelligence agency, R&AW, has long operated within a domain where deniability and deterrence walk hand in hand. In the context of Balochistan, the agency’s activities, though never officially acknowledged, have increasingly become a strategic lever in countering the China-Pakistan nexus.

Pakistan has repeatedly accused India of meddling in Balochistan, most notably after the 2016 capture of Kulbhushan Jadhav, a former Indian Navy officer whom Islamabad claims was working for R&AW. While New Delhi categorically denies these charges, the case revealed one undeniable truth: Balochistan has become a priority in South Asia’s shadow war.

R&AW’s alleged presence in Balochistan is not primarily kinetic; it is informational, psychological, and subversive. Rather than arming rebels or directing operations—methods too risky and traceable—the agency is believed to facilitate the amplification of Baloch grievances, provide strategic intelligence to regional partners, and exploit internal fissures within the Pakistani establishment.

Let’s unpack this further:

1. Intelligence Mapping and Surveillance

R&AW, in collaboration with India's technical intelligence capabilities (such as NTRO), is reportedly focused on monitoring Chinese military logistics, identifying PLA security deployments, and tracking ISI counter-insurgency operations in Balochistan. This intelligence is not only used for situational awareness but also to inform both tactical responses and diplomatic messaging.

2. Influence Operations

Through indirect channels, the agency is believed to support the media visibility of Baloch voices, from diaspora activism in Europe to subtle digital campaigns exposing human rights violations. These influence operations aim to build international legitimacy for the Baloch cause and reframe Chinese presence as exploitative rather than developmental.

In an age where wars are won in information spaces before battlefields, R&AW’s asymmetric toolkit plays a vital role in reshaping global perception around Balochistan.

[video width="1280" height="720" mp4="https://impaakt.co/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Video-3.mp4"][/video]

[video width="1280" height="720" mp4="https://impaakt.co/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Video-4.mp4"][/video]

3. Creating Strategic Distractions for Pakistan

By sustaining a level of insurgency pressure in Balochistan, without overt escalation, R&AW may also be serving a secondary strategic goal: forcing Pakistan to remain internally preoccupied, particularly its overstretched military-intelligence complex. This hampers Islamabad’s ability to act freely on other fronts, including Kashmir, Afghanistan, and its support for proxy elements.

As a result, India is shaping the regional equilibrium not by invasion or occupation, but by calibrated disruption.

4. Network Penetration

Though speculative, it is likely that India’s external intelligence network has penetrated certain financial and political circuits within Balochistan, not for regime change, but for influence modulation. By maintaining assets or informants close to key players (tribal leaders, political exiles, diaspora activists), India ensures early warning and strategic leverage.

Strategic Significance of R&AW’s Engagement

The real value of R&AW’s role lies in its ability to operate in the grey zone, the space between diplomacy and warfare. Unlike conventional military action, which invites retaliation and global scrutiny, intelligence-led operations allow for plausible deniability, strategic ambiguity, and enduring disruption.

Balochistan, due to its ethnic fault lines and history of resistance, offers fertile ground for such an approach. The aim is not full-scale destabilization, but incremental exhaustion of adversaries’ ambitions, particularly China’s expansive footprint and Pakistan’s unyielding grip.

By continuing to engage indirectly, but decisively, R&AW is quietly turning Balochistan into a strategic quagmire for India’s adversaries—a place where economic dreams can sour into insurgent nightmares, and where strategic overreach becomes a liability.

Conclusion: The Battle Beneath the Surface

Balochistan may not dominate global headlines, but beneath its rugged terrain lies a geopolitical contest that could redefine the balance of power in South Asia. As China embeds itself deeper into Pakistan’s most volatile province through CPEC, and as Pakistan tightens its security grip, the region has become a crucible where infrastructure meets insurgency, and development masks dominance.

For India, the challenge is not to match Beijing in brick and mortar but to exploit the very contradictions that come with imposed partnerships and suppressed identities. Balochistan offers New Delhi a rare strategic lever, one that operates in the grey zones of influence, narrative warfare, and deniable action.

This is not a theatre for tanks and troops, but for intelligence, information, and indirect disruption. By amplifying local grievances, supporting regional alternatives like Chabahar, and leveraging covert tools through agencies like R&AW, India can gradually raise the strategic cost of Chinese overreach without crossing the red lines of open conflict.

In this long game, patience is a weapon. Precision is power. And ambiguity is an advantage.

Balochistan will not be “won” in the traditional sense, but it can be shaped. And if shaped wisely, it can become the very place where China's ambitions and Pakistan’s illusions of control begin to unravel, one quiet disruption at a time.

Stay informed with IMPAAKT, your go-to source in the Top Business Magazine category for deep insights on global strategy and market shifts.

#Balochistan CPEC ,Top Business Magazine, IMPAAKT Magazine

[odnewsin]

Strategic Red Flag

In a disconcerting development that could pose a serious threat to India’s strategic interests, Afghanistan has decided to join the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project. The foreign ministers of China, Pakistan and Afghanistan announced this at Beijing last week as part of broader efforts to boost “trilateral” cooperation. India has been opposing the $62 billion CPEC project because it…

[theincpost]

CPEC Crosses a Dangerous New Line—and India Is Not Having It

In a move laden with geopolitical consequences, China and Pakistan have agreed to expand the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) into Afghanistan, a development that could reshape power dynamics in South and Central Asia. The announcement came after a high-level trilateral meeting in Beijing involving Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar, and Afghanistan’s…

[sabairshad]

Quetta vs Islamabad: A Comparative Insight into Two Key Pakistani Cities

Quetta and Islamabad are two of Pakistan's most prominent cities, each offering unique experiences, culture, and development trajectories. Whether you're considering travel, relocation, investment, or simply exploring Pakistan’s diverse regions, understanding the differences between Quetta and Islamabad can help guide your decision. This article offers an SEO-optimized comparison of Quetta vs Islamabad, covering geography, climate, economy, education, tourism, and lifestyle.

Geographical and Climatic Differences

Quetta, the provincial capital of Balochistan, is nestled in a mountainous valley near the Afghan border. Known as the “Fruit Garden of Pakistan,” Quetta stands at an altitude of 1,680 meters (5,510 feet), making it one of the highest cities in Pakistan. The city experiences cold winters and mild summers, with occasional snowfall, especially in the surrounding hills.

Islamabad, on the other hand, is the capital city of Pakistan, located in the northern region of Punjab. It is part of the Islamabad Capital Territory and sits at the foothills of the Margalla Hills. Islamabad enjoys a moderate climate with hot summers, monsoon rains, and cold winters, but generally offers a more temperate environment than Quetta.

Economic Landscape: Islamabad vs Quetta

Islamabad is Pakistan’s political and administrative hub, home to government institutions, foreign embassies, and multinational corporations. Its economy is service-oriented, with a strong emphasis on IT, education, real estate, and public administration. The city offers greater job opportunities, higher wages, and better infrastructure than most other cities in Pakistan, including Quetta.

Quetta’s economy, while less developed, is crucial for regional trade, especially with Afghanistan and Iran. It serves as a center for agricultural trade, especially fruits, nuts, and livestock. Due to its strategic location, Quetta also holds importance for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). However, infrastructure development and security challenges have limited its economic growth compared to Islamabad.

Education and Healthcare

Islamabad boasts some of the best educational institutions in Pakistan, including Quaid-i-Azam University, NUST, and international schools and colleges. Its healthcare infrastructure is also more advanced, with top hospitals like PIMS and Shifa International serving the population.

Quetta, while home to institutions like University of Balochistan and Bolan Medical College, faces challenges in access and quality of education and healthcare. However, efforts are underway to improve facilities as part of larger development initiatives in Balochistan.

Tourism and Lifestyle

When it comes to tourism, Islamabad wins with its green parks, scenic hiking trails, Faisal Mosque, and modern shopping centers. The city’s layout, cleanliness, and security make it attractive for both local and international tourists.

Quetta offers a more rugged, culturally rich experience. Ziarat, the nearby hill station and the residence of Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, is a key tourist attraction. The unique Pashtun culture, traditional bazaars, and natural beauty of Balochistan’s terrain provide a stark contrast to Islamabad’s modern appeal.

Conclusion

In the Quetta vs Islamabad comparison, both cities hold significance in different ways. Islamabad stands out for its modernity, infrastructure, and international appeal, while Quetta offers cultural richness and strategic importance in regional trade. Your choice between the two depends on whether you prioritize development and amenities or tradition and untapped potential.

Would you like a visual infographic comparing the two cities?

[milfstalin]

Is Pakistan about to join the BRICS in earnest? Is it stepping off its US-centric trajectory and reassessing its foreign policy priorities in response to Washington’s increasing interest in cozying up to India – or is there a tactic in play to force the Americans to revert attention back to Islamabad?

Experts and scholars believe that Pakistan is walking a tightrope and cannot afford to rock the boat right now, especially when it finds itself in dire need of financial support from its traditional partners. This is a critical moment for the economically depleted South Asian nuclear power. By all accounts, the US appears to have moved on from this relationship – for one, it no longer relies on Pakistan's assistance since pulling out of Afghanistan following a deal with the Taliban in Doha. 

[...]

Officially, Islamabad announced it applied for BRICS membership in late 2023. While confirming the move, the Pakistan foreign office described BRICS as an "important group of developing countries" and hoped that by joining the alliance, Pakistan could play an important role in furthering international cooperation and revitalizing “inclusive multilateralism.”

Even though Indian officials did not publicly react to Islamabad's declaration, Pakistan may face tough resistance from some founding BRICS members, including India, which, according to Mushahid Hussain Sayed, chairperson of Pakistan Senate’s foreign affairs committee, may play a "spoiler" over Pakistan's application for membership. Not that this is something new.

[...]

"The US reacted sharply to Imran Khan's visit to Russia in 2022, but a decade ago, the US and its NATO allies preferred to ignore the country's rebalancing efforts with China and Russia—two rising powers in the region—because at that time relations with Pakistan were critical for their supplies in Afghanistan," Tahir Khan, a geopolitical analyst and expert on Afghanistan, tells The Cradle.

Khan says the US began to exert pressure on Pakistan to roll back its policy toward China and Russia shortly after its withdrawal from Afghanistan. Following the April government change in Islamabad, he adds, Pakistan has shown greater caution in terms of its relations with China and Russia:

"The perception of policy change in Pakistan does not hold water in the context of the lukewarm progress of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), Islamabad's inability to address China's security concerns, deteriorating Pakistan-Afghan relations, and Pakistan's utter failure to match China's increasing thrust on investment and economic linkages with Afghanistan." 

Khan adds that engagement with Russia has remained dormant following unverified reports about Pakistan's weapon linkages with Ukraine. “On the contrary, Pakistan’s archrival India has done its balancing act more effectively than Pakistan."

The US State Department imposed sanctions on a Chinese research institute and several additional companies on 13 September, a move that appears to be a part of a continuous effort to exert pressure on both China and Pakistan. The US claimed that these companies were involved in supplying Pakistan's ballistic missile program.

Pakistan's Foreign Office vehemently denounced the US action as unfair and politicized, responding in a tone never heard before. In a statement on Saturday, September 14, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Mumtaz Zehra Baloch claimed that the US had listed several commercial entities last year “merely on suspicion” because the items for which the companies were sanctioned were not listed under any export control regime, and they considered them sensitive under broad, catch-all provisions.

Without naming India and Israel, Baloch wrote, “It is well known that some governments have readily bypassed licensing restrictions for advanced military technologies to their favored states while claiming stringent nonproliferation laws for others." Baloch said US sanctions were "double standards and discriminatory" and "undermine the legitimacy of global nonproliferation regimes, raise military asymmetries, and jeopardize world peace and security."

How much longer will Islamabad tread water with Washington before switching sides to save itself? This is the very same sort of treadmill that countries like China, Russia, and Iran walked – all of them, at some point or other, sought to trust US goodwill before realizing that Washington had none in stock.

22 Sept, 2024

[liamhen5]

Strategic Dynamics of Chabahar and Gwadar Ports: The Role of Private Indian Companies and Cargo Berths

Introduction

Iran Chabahar Port in southeastern Iran and Gwadar Port in southwestern Pakistan are two strategic maritime gateways in the region, each backed by different international stakeholders with varied geopolitical and economic interests. Chabahar, with substantial investments from private Indian companies, and Gwadar, heavily financed by China, are pivotal in the emerging trade and transport networks of the region. This essay delves into the significance of Chabahar Port, the involvement of Indian private companies, its comparison with Gwadar Port, and the role of cargo berths in these ports.

Chabahar Port: A Strategic Asset

Chabahar Port, situated on the Gulf of Oman, is Iran's only oceanic port, providing direct access to the Indian Ocean. This geographical advantage makes it a strategic asset for Iran, enabling it to bypass the Strait of Hormuz, a narrow passage that has historically been a chokepoint for global oil supplies. The port serves as a crucial link in the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), aiming to connect India, Iran, Afghanistan, and Central Asia through a multi-modal network of ship, rail, and road routes.

For India, Chabahar offers a direct route to Afghanistan and Central Asia, bypassing Pakistan. This not only enhances India's trade potential but also solidifies its strategic footprint in the region. The development of Chabahar Port is seen as a counterbalance to China's investment in Gwadar Port under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

Role of Private Indian Companies

Private Indian companies have been instrumental in the development and operationalization of Chabahar Port. The involvement of these companies reflects India's commitment to enhancing regional connectivity and its strategic interests in the region.

India Ports Global Limited (IPGL): A consortium of private and public sector companies, IPGL is at the forefront of India's engagement with Chabahar. In 2016, IPGL signed an agreement to equip and operate two terminals and five berths at Chabahar Port. This marked a significant milestone in Indo-Iranian cooperation.

Infrastructure Development: Indian firms such as IRCON International and KEC International are involved in constructing and upgrading the infrastructure around Chabahar, including the rail link from Chabahar to Zahedan, which connects to the Iranian national railway network and further into Afghanistan and Central Asia.

Cargo Handling and Logistics: Indian logistics companies are setting up supply chains to manage the flow of goods through Chabahar. This includes developing specialized cargo berths to handle various types of cargo efficiently, thereby increasing the port's operational capacity.

Investment in Industrial Zones: Private Indian firms are also exploring investment opportunities in the Chabahar Free Trade Zone (FTZ), which aims to attract foreign investment and foster industrial growth. This includes establishing manufacturing units, warehousing, and distribution centers.

Gwadar Port: A Chinese Foothold

Gwadar Port, located on the Arabian Sea in Pakistan, is a cornerstone of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Developed under the auspices of the CPEC, Gwadar provides China with a strategic outpost to secure its maritime trade routes and energy supplies. The port is intended to serve as a major transshipment hub, facilitating trade between China, the Middle East, and Africa.

Comparison Between Chabahar and Gwadar Ports

While both Chabahar and Gwadar Ports aim to enhance regional connectivity, their strategic orientations and developmental trajectories are distinct.

Geopolitical Context: Chabahar is central to India's strategy to access Central Asia and Afghanistan, circumventing Pakistan. Gwadar, conversely, is a linchpin of China's BRI, aimed at securing an overland route to the Arabian Sea, reducing reliance on the Malacca Strait.

Development and Investment: Gwadar has seen rapid development, with substantial Chinese investments leading to the construction of modern port facilities, an international airport, and supporting infrastructure. Chabahar's development, although progressing slower due to international sanctions on Iran, has gained momentum with Indian investments, particularly in port infrastructure and connectivity projects.

Strategic Rivalry: The development of these ports underscores the strategic rivalry between India and China. Chabahar provides India with a counterbalance to China's presence in Gwadar. This competition is reflected in the investment patterns, with each port receiving significant attention from its respective backers.

The Role of Cargo Berths

Cargo berths are critical components of port infrastructure, facilitating the loading, unloading, and storage of goods. Both Chabahar and Gwadar Ports have been developing specialized cargo berths to enhance their operational capacities.

Chabahar Port: The development of five new cargo berths at Chabahar by Indian companies has significantly increased the port's handling capacity. These berths are designed to accommodate various types of cargo, including bulk, container, and general cargo. The efficient handling of cargo at these berths is essential for reducing turnaround times and enhancing the port's attractiveness to traders.

Gwadar Port: Gwadar features multiple deep-water berths capable of handling large container ships. The port's design includes specialized berths for oil tankers, bulk carriers, and container vessels. These facilities are crucial for Gwadar's ambition to become a major transshipment hub in the region.

Economic and Strategic Implications

The development of Chabahar and Gwadar Ports has far-reaching economic and strategic implications for the region.

Regional Connectivity: Both ports aim to enhance regional connectivity by providing alternative trade routes. Chabahar's link to Afghanistan and Central Asia through the INSTC can significantly reduce transit times and costs for Indian goods. Gwadar, on the other hand, offers China a shorter route to the Middle East and Africa.

Economic Growth: The development of port infrastructure and associated industrial zones is expected to spur economic growth in the surrounding regions. This includes job creation, increased trade volumes, and the development of ancillary industries.

Geopolitical Influence: The strategic investments in these ports reflect the broader geopolitical contest between India and China for influence in South Asia and beyond. Chabahar strengthens India's position in Afghanistan and Central Asia, while Gwadar enhances China's influence in the Arabian Sea and the Middle East.

Security Considerations: The military potential of these ports cannot be ignored. Both ports have the potential to serve as naval bases, enhancing the maritime capabilities of their respective backers. This adds a layer of security dynamics to the strategic rivalry in the region.

Conclusion

The development of Chabahar and Gwadar Ports represents a significant shift in the geopolitical and economic landscape of the region. Chabahar, with substantial involvement from private Indian companies, offers India a strategic foothold in Afghanistan and Central Asia, countering China's influence through Gwadar. The role of cargo berths in both ports is pivotal in enhancing their operational efficiency and attractiveness to global traders. As these ports continue to develop, their impact on regional trade, connectivity, and geopolitics will become increasingly pronounced, shaping the future of South Asia and beyond.

[pakistanweekly]

China asks Pakistan to protect its workers after slew of terrorist attacks

China made a harsh allure that the specialists who are designated for China Pakistan Monetary Passage (CPEC) ought to be shielded by the Pakistani government from dread assaults. It was passed on to the Pakistani appointment, co-led by Pakistan's Delegate Top state leader and Unfamiliar Pastor Ishaq Dar and Chinese Unfamiliar Priest Wang Yi, during the fifth round of the discourse between the unfamiliar clergymen of the two nations.

This comes directly following the continuous dread assaults occurring nearby and in northern Pakistan where crafted by CPEC is being completed.

In Walk, five Chinese and one Pakistani nationals were killed in a fear monger assault on their vehicle of the Dasu Hydropower Task embraced by a Chinese organization in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Territory.

Wang told Dar that China trusts that Pakistan will keep on doing its utmost to guarantee the wellbeing of Chinese faculty, undertakings and organizations in the nation and kill the concerns of Chinese endeavors and workforce.

Dar said Pakistan is completely dedicated to bringing the organizers, agents and culprits of this appalling assault to equity.

Pakistan says it has a 12,000-in number para-military power to safeguard the Chinese specialists. Wang has guaranteed help to desperate Pakistan, saying China won't falter in that frame of mind to extend collaboration with the all-weather conditions partner.

The different sides swore to upgrade sober minded collaboration in different fields, the Xinhua report said, without giving subtleties. Wang noticed that China and Pakistan are all-climate vital agreeable accomplices.

Throughout the long term, Pakistan has solidly stuck to the one-China rule and offered China significant help without reservation on issues concerning China's center advantages, he said.

China likewise immovably upholds Pakistan in shielding public power, freedom and regional uprightness and in assuming a greater part in worldwide and territorial undertakings, he added.

China will pool endeavors to advance the development of an overhauled rendition of the CPEC, he said.

Tending to a joint news meeting with Wang in Beijing after talks, Dar said the different sides consented to speed up the execution of the ML-1 railroad line project, the Gwadar Port Turn of events and the realignment of Stage 2 of the Karakoram Thruway. He said it was likewise consented to fortify collaboration in agribusiness, mining, minerals, energy, IT, and modern areas.

Discussing Afghanistan, he said both Pakistan and China are consistent that a tranquil, steady, joined together, completely safe Afghanistan is crucial for the turn of events, network and flourishing of the district.

"We are worried about the presence of psychological oppressor substances working in Afghanistan and call upon the Afghan-break government to make tenable and unquestionable moves against such components, utilizing Afghan soil to compromise harmony and dependability of the adjoining nations," he said.

Prior reports said in the Essential Discourse the different sides will exhaustively audit respective relations including monetary and exchange participation; undeniable level trades and visits; upgradation of the CPEC future availability drives and the international circumstance.

Dar additionally held chats with Liu Jianchao, Priest of the Worldwide Branch of the Socialist Faction of China (IDCPC), and examined speeding up the CPEC projects.

They examined plans for the realignment of the Karakorum Parkway interfacing the two nations other than speeding up the advancement of CPEC projects hit by late advancement, upgradation of the Karachi-Peshawar rail route task and improvement of the Gwadar Port overseen by Chinese firms.

[presssection]

“Impact of Regional Politics on Developing Countries like Pakistan: Opportunities & Challenges”

Regional politics plays a pivotal role in shaping the trajectory of developing countries, and Pakistan is no exception. As a nation located in a geopolitically complex region, Pakistan faces both opportunities and challenges arising from regional politics.

Participation in regional initiatives, such as trade agreements, economic corridors, and investment partnerships, can foster economic growth and development. Regional politics can create significant economic opportunities for developing countries. For instance, Pakistan's involvement in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has the potential to transform its infrastructure, enhance connectivity, and attract foreign direct investment. By leveraging regional partnerships, developing countries can tap into new markets, expand trade networks, and diversify their economies.

It wouldn’t be untrue stating that regional politics also present security challenges for developing countries. Proximity to conflict zones and regional rivalries can pose risks to peace and stability. Internal security threats, cross-border tensions, and proxy conflicts can strain resources and hinder development efforts. Developing countries like Pakistan must navigate complex security dynamics, balance regional alliances, and invest in robust security measures to safeguard their national interests and ensure the well-being of their citizens.

Building alliances, promoting dialogue, and resolving conflicts through diplomatic means are crucial in maintaining regional stability, hence, the phenomenon necessitates active diplomatic engagements for developing countries. Pakistan has played a significant role in facilitating peace processes in neighboring Afghanistan and engaging in regional forums such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) to address shared challenges. Strengthening diplomatic ties and pursuing cooperative approaches can contribute to peace-building efforts and foster regional cooperation.

The significance of regional politics in fostering socio-cultural exchanges among developing countries cannot be denied. Shared historical, linguistic, and cultural ties can form the basis for people-to-people interactions, tourism, and cultural exchanges. These interactions enhance mutual understanding, promote cultural diversity, and create opportunities for collaboration in areas such as education, arts, and sports. Developing countries like Pakistan can leverage regional cooperation to promote cultural heritage, strengthen social bonds, and foster a sense of shared identity among nations.

Regional politics has a significant impact on humanitarian cooperation in developing countries. Natural disasters, refugee crises, and health emergencies often require collective responses from neighboring nations. Regional cooperation enables sharing of resources, expertise, and best practices to address humanitarian challenges effectively. It allows developing countries to pool their efforts, coordinate disaster response, and aid vulnerable populations. Collaboration in humanitarian endeavors strengthens solidarity among nations and demonstrates the importance of collective action in times of crisis.

The impact of regional politics on developing countries like Pakistan is multifaceted, presenting both opportunities and challenges. By actively engaging in regional initiatives, developing countries can harness economic opportunities, strengthen diplomatic ties, promote socio-cultural exchanges, and enhance humanitarian cooperation. However, they must also navigate security challenges, mitigate conflicts, and balance diverse interests to ensure their national security and sustainable development.

For developing countries like Pakistan, effective engagement in regional politics requires strategic decision-making, diplomatic acumen, and a focus on national interests. By leveraging regional partnerships, fostering dialogue, and pursuing cooperative approaches, developing countries can navigate the complex regional landscape and create a conducive environment for peace, stability, and socio-economic progress.

As regional dynamics continue to evolve, developing countries must remain proactive, adaptable, and resilient in their approach to regional politics. Embracing opportunities and effectively addressing challenges will pave the way for inclusive growth, regional integration, and a prosperous future for developing nations.

Asia Rahman Khan Lodhi                [Consul Press at the Consulate General of Pakistan, Hong Kong (SAR) & Macau (SAR)]

[darkmaga-returns]

Here’s the full interview that I gave to VOA China’s FM Shakil on this subject, excerpts of which were published in their report on 8 December titled “中国在巴基斯坦和阿富汗之间进行调解以保护自身利益能成功吗？”

1. What is your perspective on China's particular interests in Afghanistan and the motivations for its enduring initiatives to foster peace and stability in the region?

China envisages expanding the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) northward into Afghanistan and thenceforth to the Central Asian Republics in order to breathe new life into this stalled megaproject, but its plans are impeded by very tense Afghan-Pakistani ties. These tensions are due to the worsening security dilemma between them over the Afghan Taliban’s (“Taliban”) suspected patronage of the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP, “Pakistani Taliban)” and their fears of Pakistan moving closer to the US.

Islamabad considers the TTP to be a terrorist group, as does Washington, while Kabul is concerned that Pakistan might allow the US to use its airspace for carrying out anti-terrorist strikes in Afghanistan. Given their conventional military asymmetry, the Taliban might be relying on the TTP as an unconventional means for restoring balance with Pakistan. The TTP, however, is also suspected of allying with Baloch militants like the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) that Pakistan, China, and the US consider to be terrorists.

These same terrorist-designated militants have ramped up attacks since August 2021, specifically targeting Chinese workers and CPEC-related investments. From China’s perspective, helping to alleviate the Afghan-Pakistani security dilemma could lead to less attacks against its nationals and projects, thus enabling CPEC’s revival in Pakistan and its potential expansion to Afghanistan if bilateral ties improve. Seeing as how CPEC is the Belt & Road Initiative’s (BRI) flagship project, this is very important for China.

[pdj-france]

KHAR, Pakistan (AP) – Un kamikaze s'est fait exploser lors d'un rassemblement politique dans un ancien bastion de militants du nord-ouest du Pakistan à la frontière de l'Afghanistan dimanche, tuant au moins 44 personnes et en blessant près de 200 lors d'une attaque qui, d'après un haut responsable, était destinée affaiblir les islamistes pakistanais. Le district de Bajur, proche de la frontière afghane, était un bastion des talibans pakistanais – un proche allié du gouvernement taliban afghan – avant que l'armée pakistanaise ne chasse les militants de la région. Les alliés de l'ecclésiastique pakistanais extrémiste et chef du parti politique Maulana Fazlur Rehman, dont le Jamiat Ulema Islam soutient généralement les islamistes régionaux, se réunissaient à Bajur dans une salle proche d'un marché à l'extérieur de la capitale du district. Les responsables du parti ont annoncé que Rehman n'était pas au rassemblement, par contre les organisateurs ont ajouté des tentes car de nombreux partisans se sont présentés et des volontaires du parti avec des matraques aidaient à contrôler la foule. Les responsables annonçaient l'arrivée d'Abdul Rasheed, un dirigeant du parti Jamiat Ulema Islam, quand la bombe a explosé durant l'un des attentats les plus sanglants au Pakistan ces dernières années. La police provinciale a indiqué dans une déclaration que l'attentat a été perpétré par un kamikaze qui a provoqué exploser son gilet explosif près de la scène où étaient assis plusieurs hauts dirigeants du parti. Il a annoncé que les premières enquêtes suggéraient que le groupe État islamique – qui opère en Afghanistan et est un adversaire des talibans afghans – serait peut-être derrière l'attaque, et des officiers enquêtaient toujours. "Il y avait de la poussière et de la fumée autour, et j'étais sous des blessés d'où je pouvais à peine me lever, seulement pour voir le chaos et des membres éparpillés", a annoncé Adam Khan, 45 ans, qui a été projeté au sol par l'explosion vers 4 pm et atteint d'échardes à la jambe et aux deux mains. Les talibans pakistanais, ou TTP, ont annoncé dans une déclaration envoyé à l'Associated Press que l'attentat visait à dresser les islamistes les uns contre les autres. Zabiullah Mujahid, un porte-parole des talibans afghans, a annoncé sur la plate-forme de médias sociaux X, anciennement dénommée Twitter, que "de tels crimes ne peuvent en aucun cas être justifiés". La prise de pouvoir des talibans afghans en Afghanistan à la mi-août 2021 a enhardi le TTP. Ils ont unilatéralement mis fin à un accord de cessez-le-feu avec le gouvernement pakistanais en novembre et ont intensifié leurs attaques dans tout le pays. LIRE LA SUITE : Les talibans mettent fin au cessez-le-feu avec le gouvernement pakistanais et ordonnent de nouvelles attaques dans tout le pays L'attentat a eu lieu quelques heures avant l'arrivée du vice-Premier ministre chinois He Lifeng à Islamabad, où il devait participer à un événement marquant la décennie du corridor économique sino-pakistanais, ou CPEC, un programme tentaculaire dans lequel Pékin a investi des milliards de dollars. Au Pakistan. Ces dernières semaines, la Chine a aidé le Pakistan à éviter un défaut de paiement souverain. Toutefois, certains ressortissants chinois ont aussi été ciblés par des militants dans le nord-ouest du Pakistan et ailleurs. Feroz Jamal, le ministre provincial de l'Information, a annoncé à l'Associated Press que jusqu'à dernièrement, 44 personnes avaient été « martyrisées » et près de 200 blessées dans l'attentat. L'attentat à la bombe était l'une des quatre pires attaques dans le nord-ouest depuis 2014, quand 147 personnes, pour les nombreux écoliers, ont été tuées dans une attaque des talibans contre une école gérée par l'armée à Peshawar. En janvier, 74 personnes ont été tuées dans un attentat à la bombe dans une mosquée de Peshawar. n février, plus de 100 personnes, pour les nombreux policiers, sont mortes dans un attentat à la bombe contre

une mosquée à l'intérieur d'un complexe de haute sécurité abritant le siège de la police de Peshawar. Le Premier ministre Shehbaz Sharif et le président Arif Alvi ont condamné l'attaque et ont demandé aux responsables de fournir toute l'assistance possible aux blessés et aux familles endeuillées. Sharif plus tard, lors d'un appel téléphonique à Rehman, le chef du JUI, lui a transmis ses condoléances et lui a assuré que ceux qui avaient orchestré l'attaque seraient punis. L'ambassade des États-Unis à Islamabad a aussi condamné l'attaque. Lors d'une annonce sur la plateforme de médias sociaux X, anciennement dénommée Twitter, elle a exprimé ses condoléances aux familles et aux proches des victimes tuées dans l'attaque. Maulana Ziaullah, le chef local du parti de Rehman, était parmi les morts. Les dirigeants du JUI Rasheed et l'ex législateur Maulana Jamaluddin étaient aussi sur scène mais s'en sont sortis indemnes. Rasheed, le chef régional du parti, a annoncé que l'attaque était une tentative de retirer JUI du terrain avant les élections législatives de novembre, mais il a annoncé que de telles tactiques ne fonctionneraient pas. L'attentat à la bombe a été condamné dans tout le pays, les partis au pouvoir et d'opposition présentant leurs condoléances aux familles de ceux qui sont morts dans l'attaque. Rehman est considéré comme un religieux pro-talibans et son parti politique fait partie du gouvernement de coalition à Islamabad. Des réunions sont organisées dans tout le pays pour mobiliser les alliés en vue des prochaines élections. "Beaucoup de nos camarades ont perdu la vie et beaucoup d'autres ont été blessés dans cet incident. Je demanderai aux administrations fédérale et provinciale d'enquêter pleinement sur cet incident et de fournir une indemnisation appropriée et des installations médicales aux personnes touchées », a annoncé Rasheed. Mohammad Wali, un autre participant au rassemblement, a annoncé qu'il écoutait un orateur s'adresser à la foule quand l'gigantesque explosion l'a momentanément assourdi. "J'étais près du distributeur d'eau pour aller chercher un verre d'eau quand la bombe a explosé, me jetant au sol", a-t-il raconté. "Nous sommes venus à la réunion avec enthousiasme mais nous nous sommes retrouvés à l'hôpital en voyant des pleurs, des blessés et des parents en sanglots emportant les corps duurs proches." Riaz Khan a rapporté de Peshawar. L'écrivain d'Associated Press, Munir Ahmad, a contribué depuis Islamabad.

[prayagraj]

#Pakistani new FM offers dialogue to #India, wants to visit #Afghanistan #ISLAMABAD, Aug. 20 : Pakistan's new #ForeignMinister #ShahMehmoodQureshi on Monday offered dialogue to neighboring India as he insisted that bilateral engagement is the best option to find out solution to problems. India had suspended bilateral dialogue with Pakistan in April 2016 after an attack on an #Indian air base in January, which #Delhi blamed on Pakistan-based militants. Pakistan had denied any involvement and offered cooperation in an investigation. #Qureshi told reporters that the Foreign Ministry has received a letter of felicitations for #PrimeMinister #ImranKhan from Indian Prime Minister #NarendraModi, in which he has called for resolving disputes through bilateral talks and indicated the beginning of talks between the two countries. "This is a positive development. There is a need for continued and uninterrupted dialogue with India," the foreign minister said, adding that Pakistan and India cannot afford any adventurism. Pakistan and India have fought three wars, two over #Kashmir, since their independence from the British colonial rule in 1947. On Afghanistan, #Qureshi said he wants to pay first visit to Afghanistan with a message of goodwill and friendship, and will soon speak with his Afghan counterpart on the phone to decide date for the visit. "Pakistan and Afghanistan are inter-linked. I want to tell Afghans we need each other. I will travel to Afghanistan with a solid message to work together for peace and stability in both countries and the region," he said.Responding to a question about China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (#CPEC), the top diplomat said the new government will pursue the project, which he described as a "game changer." He said he will discuss with his #Chinese counterpart about the future initiatives to be undertaken under CPEC for socio-economic development of the country. Qureshi said Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf had supported #CPEC when it was in the opposition. To a question about relationship with the #UnitedStates, the foreign minister said he will listen to the U.S. concerns and also put before them Pakistan's viewpoint.

[liamhen5]

Iran's Chabahar Port: Strategic Importance and the Role of Private Indian Companies

Introduction

Iran Chabahar Port, located in southeastern Iran on the Gulf of Oman, holds significant strategic and economic importance for the region. As the only Iranian port with direct access to the Indian Ocean, Chabahar serves as a crucial gateway for trade between Iran, India, and Afghanistan. The development of this port has been significantly influenced by the involvement of private Indian companies, which have invested in various infrastructure projects. This essay explores the strategic relevance of Chabahar Port, the involvement of private Indian companies, and how it compares with Pakistan's Gwadar Port.

Strategic Importance of Chabahar Port

Chabahar Port's strategic significance lies in its location and its potential to enhance regional connectivity. It provides a shorter and more economical route for trade between India, Iran, and Afghanistan, bypassing Pakistan. This is particularly important for India, which has long sought to establish a trade corridor to Central Asia that avoids reliance on its western neighbor.

The port's development is also part of Iran's broader strategy to diversify its trade routes and reduce dependency on the Strait of Hormuz, a critical chokepoint for global oil shipments. By bolstering Chabahar, Iran aims to attract more regional and international trade, enhancing its geopolitical standing.

Involvement of Private Indian Companies

India's involvement in Chabahar Port is driven by both strategic and economic interests. Private Indian companies have played a crucial role in the port's development. In 2016, India Ports Global Limited (IPGL), a consortium of Indian companies, signed an agreement to equip and operate two terminals and five berths at Chabahar Port. This agreement marked a significant step in enhancing India-Iran economic ties.

Several private Indian companies have been involved in various aspects of the port's development:

Infrastructure Development: Companies like IRCON International and KEC International have been involved in building and upgrading infrastructure, including rail links connecting Chabahar to the Afghan border and further into Central Asia.

Cargo Handling: Indian firms are engaged in managing cargo handling operations, ensuring the smooth transit of goods through the port. This includes the development of specialized cargo berths to handle different types of goods efficiently.

Logistics and Supply Chain: Private logistics companies from India are establishing supply chain networks to facilitate seamless trade through Chabahar. These networks include warehousing, transportation, and distribution services.

Economic Implications for India

For India, Chabahar Port offers a direct and reliable route to Afghanistan and Central Asia, reducing transport costs and transit times. This is particularly beneficial for the export of goods such as pharmaceuticals, textiles, and agricultural products. The port also opens up new markets for Indian goods, fostering economic growth and strengthening trade ties with landlocked Afghanistan.

Moreover, the port serves as a counterbalance to China's influence in the region, particularly through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the development of Gwadar Port in Pakistan. By investing in Chabahar, India aims to secure its strategic interests and enhance its regional connectivity.

Comparison with Gwadar Port

Chabahar Port is often compared with Pakistan's Gwadar Port, which is located about 170 kilometers to the east. Gwadar, developed with significant Chinese investment, is a key component of the CPEC and is intended to serve as a major transshipment hub in the region.

Strategic Objectives: While both ports aim to enhance regional connectivity, their strategic objectives differ. Gwadar is central to China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and aims to provide China with a shorter route to the Arabian Sea, bypassing the Malacca Strait. In contrast, Chabahar is primarily driven by India and Iran's desire to enhance trade with Afghanistan and Central Asia, bypassing Pakistan.

Infrastructure and Development: Gwadar has seen substantial Chinese investment, leading to rapid development and modernization. Chabahar, on the other hand, has progressed more slowly, partly due to international sanctions on Iran. However, the involvement of Indian companies is accelerating its development.

Regional Impact: Gwadar's development has geopolitical implications, particularly concerning China-Pakistan relations and their stance towards India. Chabahar's development strengthens India-Iran ties and enhances India's influence in Afghanistan and Central Asia, providing a strategic counterweight to Gwadar.

Future Prospects

The future of Chabahar Port looks promising, with several projects in the pipeline to enhance its capacity and connectivity. Key future developments include:

Rail Connectivity: The completion of the Chabahar-Zahedan railway, which connects the port to Iran's national rail network, will significantly boost trade. This rail link is expected to extend to Afghanistan and further into Central Asia, facilitating smoother transit of goods.

Free Trade Zone: The establishment of a free trade zone (FTZ) around Chabahar Port will attract foreign investment and promote industrial development. This FTZ is expected to house manufacturing units, logistics hubs, and service providers, creating job opportunities and boosting the local economy.

Increased Trade Volume: As sanctions on Iran ease and the regional security situation improves, Chabahar is expected to handle a greater volume of trade. This will enhance the port's economic viability and contribute to regional economic growth.

Collaborative Projects: India and Iran are likely to collaborate on further infrastructure projects, including the development of additional berths, warehouses, and cargo handling facilities. These projects will enhance the port's capacity and efficiency, making it a more attractive option for traders.

Conclusion

Chabahar Port represents a significant strategic and economic asset for Iran, India, and the broader region. The involvement of private Indian companies has been instrumental in its development, enhancing regional connectivity and trade. While challenges remain, particularly in terms of geopolitical tensions and infrastructural development, the future prospects for Chabahar are bright. As the port continues to develop, it will play a crucial role in shaping the economic and strategic landscape of the region, providing a valuable counterbalance to Gwadar Port and enhancing India's influence in Afghanistan and Central Asia.