#'Without one overriding factor - the actions of Richard Duke of Gloucester after he took the decision to make himself King Richard III -

[wonder-worker]

Didn't edward iv leave his brother Richard in lots of financial difficulties though?

No, he did not. I really don't know where this myth has originated from other than the persistent need to victimize Richard.

Firstly, Edward IV didn't leave Richard anything. Whatever he left was for his own son and heir, Richard's nephew, who Richard usurped.

Secondly, Edward IV was literally one of the rare few medieval kings of England to die solvent. He had managed to break the vicious cycle of plummeting debt and inefficiency that had plagued pretty much every single ruler till then. It doesn't really matter how much money the crown actually had left at the time of his death*, because the fact that he died solvent meant that whoever his successor was (in this case, Richard III), they were going to begin their reign with a financial advantage that no English monarch had enjoyed for the past 200 years. I don't know Richard's fans have convinced themselves that he inherited financial difficulties instead.

As stated by David Horspool, Richard's own historian:

"(Richard III) would try to differentiate himself from his brother, whose ‘unlawful invencions and inordinate covetise, ayenst the lawe of this roialme’ he would later denounce in an Act of Parliament. In fact Edward had managed to set royal finances back on an even keel after the disastrous waste and inefficiency of Henry VI (and all former kings post Henry II), Richard was, initially, the beneficiary of the better practise instituted by Edward IV.”

(The contemporary Croyland Chronicle mentions a main reason that Richard was better prepared to defend his kingship was "because of the treasure which he had in hand—since what King Edward had left behind had not yet all been consumed". They may have exaggerated the money Edward left behind, but either way it shows how contemporaries were aware of Richard's comparative advantages. It's highly ironic that what should have been used to uphold Edward's son was now being used to uphold his son's usurper instead).

Thirdly, Edward IV had presided over a highly effective and innovative combination of financial policies. These included the elevation/increase of royal chamber finance, the enlargement of the crown lands (Steven Gunn calls it "the most extensive royal demesne in medieval English History"), and an increase in royal feudal rights towards the end of his reign, among others**. Most importantly of all, he was actually successful, meaning that whoever followed him would have the huge benefit of having his established and well-attested precedent to continue from. Indeed, Charles Ross has noted how "Henry VII had the great advantage of being able to build upon the foundations laid by his father-in-law". Richard III, who seized the throne just a few months later, would have had the same advantages, as Horspool also notes.

Richard III, in fact, seems to have (temporarily) reversed some of his brother's well-established policies which could be used to gain money. Eg: he abolished benevolences; and he repealed Edward IV's newly established wardships and marriages act in the Duchy of Lancaster "notwithstanding that he conceiveth the said act to be to his great profit … having more affection to the common weal of this his realm and of his subjects than to his own singular profit". If you deliberately reverse policies with immense potential for revenue-raising, I don't know how you can then go on to complain that your brother left you nothing.

In conclusion: no, Edward IV did not leave Richard in financial difficulties. If anything, he left Richard with financial advantages that no king had had in over 200 years.

(Also, just to clarify: the Woodvilles did not steal the treasury. We know for a fact that Elizabeth Woodville did not have any money in sanctuary. The story of a theft was only mentioned by Mancini and either originated in gossip or, more likely, from Ricardian propaganda aiming to vilify them in 1483 by positioning them against the crown.)

*We know for a fact that Edward IV died solvent, but from what I understand, the exact money he had is impossible to know because of his missing chamber records. Contemporaries like Croyland did believe he had substantial money and treasure; on the other hand, Rosemary Horrox has analyzed how his cash reserves were probably relatively low due to international conflicts the previous two years. Either way, like I said, the main thing is that he was the first king in over 200 years to die solvent, which was massively advantageous to his successor. **While his policies were clearly innovative, they weren't all completely original. However, their combination certainly was; they were modified to actually work better; and they were initiated from the beginning of his first/second reign and widespread across the royal lands (rather than in smaller pockets), meaning that they were clear systematic policies. They were also, like I mentioned, actually successful - meaning that they would be the proven precedent that his successors would turn to.

[wonder-worker]

"The feast of the Nativity of Saint John the Baptist being appointed as the day upon which the coronation of the king [Edward V] would take place without fail, all both hoped for and expected a season of prosperity for the kingdom."

— Excerpt from the Croyland Continuator / David Horspool, Richard III: A Ruler and Reputation

Even though Edward IV’s death was unexpected, after twelve years of peace there need not have been too much of a sense of foreboding about the succession. The great dynastic wound from which the Wars of the Roses had grown had not so much been healed as cauterized by the extinction of the House of Lancaster. There was no rush for London, as had happened in earlier, disputed successions. The royal party didn’t set out from Ludlow for ten days after hearing the news of Edward IV’s death, while Richard took his time, too. And the new king had [his mother the dowager queen and] two uncles to support him: his mother’s brother, the sophisticated, cultured, highly experienced Earl Rivers; and his father’s, the loyal and reliable Duke of Gloucester, to whom Edward IV had entrusted unprecedented power and vital military command.

... [Richard of Gloucester] had achieved his goal by a mixture of luck and ruthlessness, and if he made it appear, or even believed himself, that destiny played a part, this only made him a man in step with his times. Modern historians have no time for destiny, but sometimes the more ‘structuralist’ interpretations of the events surrounding the usurpation can come close to it. When we read that ‘the chances of preserving an unchallenged succession were . . . weakened by the estrangement of many of the rank-and-file nobility from . . . high politics, which was partly a consequence of the Wars of the Roses and partly of Edward IV’s own policies’, it is hard not to conclude that an unforeseeable turn of events is being recast as a predictable one. But without one overriding factor – the actions of Richard, Duke of Gloucester after he took the decision to make himself King Richard III – none of this could have happened. That is, when the same author concedes ‘Nor can we discount Richard’s own forceful character’, he is pitching it rather low*.

Edward IV had not left behind a factional fault line waiting to be shaken apart. Richard of Gloucester’s decision to usurp was a political earthquake that could not have been forecast on 9 April, when Edward died. After all, Simon Stallworth did not even anticipate it on 21 June, the day before Richard went public. We should be wary of allowing hindsight to give us more clairvoyance than the well-informed contemporary who had no idea ‘what schall happyne’. This is not to argue that Richard’s will alone allowed him to take the Crown. Clearly, the circumstances of a minority, the existence of powerful magnates with access to private forces, and the reasonably recent examples of resorts to violence and deposition of kings, made Richard’s path a more conceivable one. But Richard’s own tactics, his arrest of Rivers, Vaughan and Grey, the rounding up of Hastings and the bishops, relied on surprise. If men as close as these to the workings of high politics at a delicate juncture had no inkling of what might happen, the least historians can do is to reflect that uncertainty [...].

(*The author who Horspool is referencing and disagreeing with is Charles Ross)