#No Context Crow No. 228

[corvidsofthedeep]

No Context Crow#228: Tangled Up Crows

Artwork by Kari Vick.

[ivenvs3000f24]

6: Unpacking

I like the idea of “unpacking” a quote. I think there’s a kind of beauty in the metaphor. I can picture the quote encased in a suitcase, and see myself carefully taking out each item to lay out and examine.

Edward Hyams, Chapter 7, The Gifts of Interpretation

The first piece of the quote I am drawing out of the suitcase is:

“There is no peculiar merit in ancient things,”

I think this is a bold statement to make. After all, aren’t there certain things we only really value because they are old? A piece of pottery dug up at an archeology site might have been worthless to whoever discarded it, but now warrants a place in a museum. How will this statement be justified in the remainder of the quote?

“but there is merit in integrity, and integrity entails the keeping together of the parts of any whole, and if these parts are scattered throughout time, then the maintenance of integrity entails a knowledge, a memory, of ancient things…”

The “ancient thing” itself is not the valued item, it is the story that it tells. The pottery might have been garbage 3000 years ago, but now acts like a record of the humans who shaped the world we live in now. It says “I was here. I made this. I used this.” Artifacts are valuable because they tell us about the past and how we got to where we are now. For example, piecing together many artifacts can reveal the culture of the people who made them, their technology, and how both have changed throughout history.

“To think, feel or act as though the past is done with, is equivalent to believing that a railway station through which our train has just passed, only existed for as long as our train was in it”

The past shapes the present in so many visible and invisible ways. From the food we eat, to the languages we speak, to our current socio-political climate, everything can be traced backwards. Denying the influence of the past can keep us from moving forward. It can keep us repeating the same mistakes over and over again. And it denies the very real impact that historical events have on people today.

I think this is an especially important conversation to have in terms of reparations. Reparations are defined by the Cambridge English Dictionary as “payment for harm or damage.” In an American and Canadian context, they are mostly used to describe payments by the government to groups that have been wronged by their actions. (By "wronged" I mean: genocide, false imprisonment, enslavement, torture, racist policies, stolen land, and other horrific human rights violations that have occured throughout history.) In particular, there is a call to make reparations to Black Americans who are descendants of enslaved people and those who lived through the Jim Crow era. According to the NAACP: “Worse inequality has only grown since the Great Depression wiped out any gains black people made in the post-civil rights era. Today, without intervention, it would take an African-American household 228 years to build the same amount of wealth as our white counterparts.” The past has an impact on the landscape of today. Reparations do not fix damage caused. But they are steps in the right direction.

However, there are those who argue that past events do not warrant present compensation. The Tulsa Massacre was a horrific 1921 attack by a White mob that killed over 300 people in the mostly Black neighbourhood of Greenwood in Tulsa, Oklahoma (Cabral, 2024; Walker, 2024). The mob not only murdered hundreds with a clear genocidal intent, but also destroyed the once thriving economy of the neighbourhood (Cabral, 2024; Walker, 2024). No one was ever charged, and no survivors have ever received repartitions for the damage caused (Walker, 2024).  

A recent case brought forward by the last living survivors of the Tulsa Massacre was dismissed by a judge who said that “simply being connected to a historical event does not provide a person with unlimited rights to seek compensation” (Cabral, 2024). But the survivors of the massacre were not just “connected” to the historical event. It continues to directly impact them and their decedents’ lives. Denying the impact of these events is, like the quote said, equivalent to pretending that a train station only exists when we pass through it.

In terms of interpretation, this means being aware of the gravity that historical events convey, and the real-world impact they may have on visitors. It means treating history as something ongoing.

[the-archlich]

The Red Crow Campaign (241)

The Red Crow Campaign was Wu’s largest military mobilization during its Chiwu 赤乌 era[1]. While that period saw many raids on Wei’s border territories, none were on the same scale as the campaign in 241, which saw perhaps more than 100,000 men at war. This was Wu’s last major offensive in Sun Quan’s 孙权 lifetime and the first significant invasion that he did not personally oversee. In this context, and given Sun Quan’s advancing age, it can be viewed as a test of how Wu would function without him at the helm.

This campaign is best understood in the context of two operations conducted years earlier, in 237, which saw the same Wei positions under attack by the same Wu commanders. In light of the much larger campaign to come, these can be understood as probing attacks, testing Wei’s defenses and gathering information.

GEOGRAPHY

In the east, operations focused on the regions of Lujiang 庐江 and Huainan 淮南, which were divided between Wei and Wu north of the Huai River 淮水. Lujiang controlled the region between the Huai and Changjiang 长江 rivers, providing the most direct land route from north to south. It also controlled the intermediate reaches of the Changjiang, from the city of Huan 皖,[2] giving it significant strategic value. During Western Han the princedom of Lu’an 六安[3] also existed in this region, but it was absorbed into Lujiang under Eastern Han.[4] This princedom was originally north of Lujiang, bordering Lake Quebei 芍陂.[5]

Control over Lujiang was in dispute since the death of Yuan Shu 袁术 in 199. Many of his followers fled to Liu Xun 刘勋,[6] who Yuan Shu had appointed as his executor of Lujiang. Sun Ce 孙策 defeated Liu Xun to seize Huan[7] and appointed one Li Shu 李术 as the new executor.[8] Li Shu soon killed the Inspector of Yan appointed by Cao Cao 曹操 and gathered local forces against him, although these efforts were stymied by the new inspector Liu Fu 刘馥.[9] After Sun Ce’s death, Li Shu refused to accept Sun Quan’s authority and revolted. Sun Quan requested that Cao Cao let him deal with the rebellion, offering to kill Li Shu as an apology for Li Shu’s earlier aggression. Li Shu asked Cao Cao for assistance against Sun Quan, but Cao Cao sent none. Sun Quan quickly defeated Li Shu and again conquered Huan.[10]

Subsequent years saw a series of small campaigns in the region as Cao Cao and Sun Quan grappled for control. Most of the area was abandoned as the populace fled from the frequent battles. The final result of these conflicts was that Cao Cao and Wei still claimed much of the commandery. Their control extended almost to the very south of the commandery, as far as the city of Juchao 居巢. However Sun Quan and Wu always maintained control over Huan and, from it, the Changjiang.

The region originally known as Huainan became called Jiujiang 九江 during the Former Han dynasty. When Yuan Shu made himself emperor at Shouchun 寿春 he restored the ancient name of the region. Although this change was initially rejected, it eventually gained acceptance. By the time of Wei’s founding, Jiujiang was again known as Huainan. This region contained the eastern end of the land crossing between the Huai and Changjiang, as well as two significant lakes: Lake Chao 巢, divided between Lujiang and Huainan, and Lake Quebei. These lakes and smaller rivers provided a significant routes of transportation and communication between the Huai and Changjiang, and these routes were controlled by the cities of Shouchun and Hefei.[11] Cao Cao and Wei controlled the majority of Huainan after receiving the submission of Yuan Shu’s former officers in 199.[12] However Sun Ce took control of the strategic Liyang 历阳 crossing when he revolted against Yuan Shu in 197[13] and the family appears to have maintained this position.  

In the south, the campaign focused on the area of Xiangyang 襄阳 in the northern part of Nan 南 commandery. This included the twin cities of Xiangyang proper and Fan 樊.[14] Although Cao Cao received control of Nan from Liu Zong 刘琮 in 208, Sun Quan’s forces under Zhou Yu 周瑜 and Cheng Pu 程普 seized the majority of Nan over the next two years, with Cao Cao’s influence limited to the Xiangyang region. The commandery was subsequently granted to Liu Bei 刘备, who tried but failed to extend his control to Xiangyang. After a falling out between Liu Bei and Sun Quan, the Sun family again took control of Nan in 219, though Cao Cao still held Xiangyang. This situation persisted until Jin’s conquest of Wu in 280.

One other position of significance was Zuzhong 柤中. It was located some 150 Han furlongs from Xiangyang, at the border of Shanghuang 上黃. Little is recorded about this location, and it was evidently obscure enough even by the time of Eastern Jin that the Sanguo Zhi commentator Xi Zuochi 习凿齿 included an annotation about its location and the pronunciation of the character 柤.[15] It was attacked by Wu forces in 237, 241, and 246, after which point there is no further mention of it in Sanguo Zhi or Jin Shu.[16] I suspect that it was a military agricultural colony 屯田 established to support the Xiangyang region. It was likely abandoned after the third assault in 246.

PRELUDE

In 237 Wei’s registrar 主簿 of Lujiang Lü Xi 吕习 secretly contacted Wu and offered to go over to them, betraying Lu’an from the inside if they brought an army to claim it.[17] In winter of that year, Sun Quan dispatched Quan Zong 全琮 to take the city.[18] He and Zhu Huan 朱桓 marched on Lu’an, but word of Lü Xi’s plan leaked out and the Wu army had to retreat. Through a rearguard action by Zhu Huan, they were able to withdraw without pursuit.[19]

In the same year, Zhu Ran 朱然 led an attack on Zuzhong, defended by the Wei generals Hu Zhi 胡质 and Pu Zhong 蒲忠, each with several thousand men. When Zhu Ran advanced on Zuzhong, Pu Zhong occupied advantageous terrain, planning to cut off his rear, while Hu Zhi provided support. At the time, most of Zhu Ran’s army was dispersed in raiding parties. Rather than gathering his full strength, Zhu Ran took some 800 soldiers and made a surprise attack on Pu Zhong. Pu Zhong resisted but was quickly defeated, so he and Hu Zhi retreated.[20]

Between these operations and the Red Crow Campaign, there were a number of noteworthy changes in personnel that helped shape the course of events, some of which likely influenced the timing of the campaign.

Wei’s chief commander in the east was Wang Ling 王淩, a long-time veteran. During Cao Pi’s 曹丕 reign he was made inspector of Yan province 兗州刺史 and distinguished himself at Dongpu 洞浦 under Cao Xiu 曹休 during the Great River Campaign (222-223). For this service he became a marquis and a general. Wang Ling then spent some years as inspector of Qing 青州刺史. In 228 he again followed Cao Xiu in attacking Wu and again distinguished himself by helping Cao Xiu fight his way free at Shi’ting 石亭. Afterwards, he was made Inspector of Yu province 豫州刺史. At the start of Cao Fang’s 曹芳 reign, he was made General Who Conquers the East 征东将军 and Marshal of Yang province 都督扬州, in charge of all the eastern armies.[21]

The other Wei commander of significance in the east was Sun Li 孙礼. Another long serving Wei official, he joined Cao Cao’s staff after his capture of You province 幽州 in 206. He held a series of local and commandery appointments over the next several decades and, during Cao Pi’s reign, became a member of the Secretariat and was known for his excellent advice and good sense. When Cao Rui 曹睿 was deathly ill, he chose his close friend Cao Shuang 曹爽 to be regent as Grand General 大将军 and he assigned Sun Li to be his adjutant 长史. However, Sun Li’s strict nature made Cao Shuang uneasy. Cao Shuang soon had him transferred away as Inspector of Yang province 扬州刺史 and General of the Hidden Waves 伏波将军.[2]2

Wang Ling’s counterpart in Wu was Quan Zong. The Quan family was a wealthy clan in Wu 吳 commandery, and they were early supporters of the Sun. This earned Quan Zong appointment as a colonel under Sun Quan, and successful campaigns against the hill tribes in Danyang 丹杨 saw him made a general. Like Wang Ling, he too distinguished himself at Dongpu and Shi’ting. In 229 he was made General of the Guards 卫将军. Quan Zong was also married to Sun Quan’s daughter, Sun Luban.[23]

Also of note was Zhuge Ke 诸葛恪, son of the famous Zhuge Jin 诸葛瑾. From 234-237 he conducted a campaign to pacify the tribes of Danyang which had troubled Wu since the days of Sun Ce. Upon the successful completion of this campaign he was made a marquis and General Who Dominates the North 威北将军, stationed near Huan.[24]

In the south, Wu’s forces were commanded by a number of famous veterans. Most relevant to this campaign was Zhu Ran. His father Zhu Zhi 朱治 served under Sun Jian 孙坚, and Zhu Ran was a childhood friend to Sun Quan. Originally made a minor magistrate, he earned his way up through the ranks and was made a general for his role in defeating Guan Yu 关羽 in 219. On Lü Meng’s 吕蒙 recommendation, Zhu Ran replaced him as the defender of Jiangling 江陵. He distinguished himself against Shu during the Yidu 宜都 Campaign (221-222) and against Wei in the Great River Campaign. In 229 he was made General of the Chariots and Cavalry 车骑将军 and was one of Wu’s highest ranking commanders.[25]

Also participating in this portion of the campaign were the esteemed ministers Zhuge Jin and Bu Zhi 步骘. Zhuge Jin held the title of Grand General and operated out of Wu’s military headquarters Wuchang 武昌,[26] while Bu Zhi was General of the Agile Cavalry 骠骑将军 and stationed in Xiling 西陵.[27]

At the time of the campaign, Wei’s inspector of Jing 荆州刺史 was Hu Zhi, the same man Zhu Ran defeated at Zuzhong in 237. He joined Cao Cao with his friend Jiang Ji 蒋济 and held a series of local and commandery appointments over the next several years. Known for his excellent governance, he was eventually made Inspector of Jing and General of Rousing Might 振威将军 not long before the Red Crow Campaign.[28]

Of arguably the most significance is Sima Yi 司马懿. In terms of military experience, he served as one of Cao Cao’s staff officers for a number of years. He remained in the capital during Cao Pi’s reign, overseeing the government while Cao Pi was on campaigns. Sima Yi saw his first battle against Wu in 226, at the start of Cao Rui’s time. Xiangyang was under siege by Zhuge Jin; Sima Yi led reinforcements to the city and repelled him, for which he was made a general. In 228 and 229 he pacified rebellions in the area around Shangyong 上庸, becoming Grand General. Starting in 230, he shifted his focus to Shu. In 231 he replaced Cao Zhen 曹真 as the commander of the western defenses, defeating invasions in 231, 234, and 235. After this he was transferred to be Grand Commandant 太尉, though he retained military command in the west. In 238 he was transferred to the north and led a successful campaign against Gongsun Yuan 公孙渊 and his fledgling kingdom of Yan 燕. Cao Rui died in 239, only days after Sima Yi’s return from the north. He was given command over the government along with Cao Shuang. Not long after this, he was made Grand Tutor 太傅, though he again retained command over military affairs.[29]

The base of this map came from Rafe de Crespigny’s Generals of the South. I have guessed at likely routes of advance and the locations of Zuzhong and Sanzhou. This map is best understood as a visual aid than a strictly accurate representation.

THE RED CROW CAMPAIGN

In summer of 241, Sun Quan ordered a large invasion of Wei on multiple fronts. Quan Zong led the eastern wing, marching on Huainan. Zhuge Ke was sent to support him with an attack on Lu’an. Zhu Ran led the southern wing, attacking Fan, while Zhuge Jin struck at Zuzhong[30] with Bu Zhi.[31]

Quan Zong’s attack was well-timed. Many soldiers of Yang province were on leave when the invasion began so Wei’s defenses were weak. Quan Zong attacked with an army tens of thousands strong.[32] The exact number is not stated, but Quan Zong commanded 50,000 men in an attack on Lu’an in 233[33] and a similar number in 241 seems likely. The Wu forces enjoyed early success in the field. Quan Zong was able to destroy the government offices in Ancheng 安城 and capture a portion of the population. On this momentum, he advanced to Quebei, where he destroyed the dam.[34]

Quan Zong may have continued to march all the way to Shouchun were it not for Sun Li. Despite his depleted troop numbers, he gathered what few soldiers he could muster and met the Wu army at Quebei. Furious battle ensued and the two fought from day to night. Over half of Sun Li’s officers and soldiers were killed or wounded in the fighting. Sun Li personally charged the enemy lines and beat the drums, engaging the Wu soldiers without any thought of his own safety. It was only through Sun Li’s desperate efforts that Quan Zong’s army was halted.[35]

Sun Li’s heroics bought enough time, and reinforcements from Shouchun soon arrived led by Wang Ling. In the face of these reinforcements, Quan Zong withdrew.[3]6 However, retreat would not be easy for the Wu army. Wang Ling pursued them and was able to trap and kill a general named Qin Huang 秦晃 along with several others.[37] After this, a detachment of Quan Zong’s army led by Zhang Xiu 张休 and Gu Cheng 顾承[38] managed to halt Wang Ling’s pursuit. A separate force under his son and nephew Quan Xu 全緒 and son Quan Duan 全端 forced Wang Ling to retreat entirely.[39]

There is no mention of how Zhuge Ke fared at Lu’an. It is clear that he was not able to capture the city, but his attack may have been a holding action intended to prevent Lu’an from sending aid to Huainan. It can be presumed that retreated at the same time as Quan Zong without incident.

The campaign in the east was short. It began in the 4th month of the year and was ended by the 5th. Though a brief struggle, it was a bloody one. Wei’s casualties were heavy, but it was a loss the state could afford. Matters in the south were not so easily settled.

Zhu Ran surrounded Fan in the fifth month of the year with an army of 50,000 while Bu Zhi and Zhuge Jin engaged Zuzhong.[40] His forces enjoyed initial success in the field, with the subordinate generals Lü Ju 呂据 and Zhu Yi 朱异 capturing the surrounding cities.[41] Hu Zhi feared that Fan would fall, so he gathered lightly armed troops and advanced quickly to relieve the city. Although his officers feared that Zhu Ran was too strong to be defeated, Hu Zhi pressed on. He caught Zhu Ran by surprise and was able to break through the encirclement and enter the city.[42] Through Hu Zhi’s efforts Fan was assisted but far from saved.

When word of the siege reached the capital, Fan had been under attack for a month. Despite being the Grand Tutor and no longer an active general, Sima Yi elected to lead the reinforcements himself. Sima Yi did not believe that a drawn out campaign would be advisable due to the climate, so he brought a elite force of light cavalry rather than a large army. He arrived in the sixth month and quickly began enacting plans to rescue Fan. While some of his soldiers rested from the journey, he selected volunteers who would scale the city walls to assist the defenders inside.[43]

Seeing that Sima Yi was determined to attack, Zhu Ran chose to retreat in the night. Like Quan Zong in the east, though, he did not make it out unscathed. Sima Yi gave pursuit and caught the Wu army at Sanzhou 三州,[44] where he killed and captured many.[45]

As with Zhuge Ke and Lu’an, nothing specific is recorded about the operations at Zuzhong or what became of Zhuge Jin and Bu Zhi. Again, it is likely that theirs was a holding action intended to prevent Zuzhong from rendering assistance to their primary target at Fan.

The Red Crow Campaign was the largest of Wu’s operation since the great campaign of 234 and it was the last major offensive of Sun Quan’s lifetime. It would not be until Zhuge Ke’s invasion 12 years later that the Wu army would mobilize on such a scale again. Subsequent battles between the two rival empires were much more limited, each struggling to gain an advantage over the other with no significant results.

Perhaps the most significant observation from this campaign is a more subtle one involving Wu’s route of advance. In Wu’s previous major offensives (in 215, 230, 233, 234) Sun Quan followed the same route in the east. Beginning from the great harbor at Ruxu, he sailed up the Ru River to Lake Chao. This water route allowed for rapid movement of troops, supplies, and communication. Lake Chao was defended by the great fortress at Hefei, and all of these attacks were stopped by its stalwart defenders. During the Red Crow Campaign, the Wu army abandoned this riverine path and instead followed a land route through Huainan, avoiding Hefei. This proved largely successful, allowing them to approach Shouchun with little opposition. It was a route they intended to use again in 243, and did use in 255, 257, and 263. By contrast, the riverine route was used only twice more, in 253 and 268, to no avail. The Red Crow Campaign proved that the land route was viable and completely shifted the battlefield of the east from the area around Hefei and Lake Chao to Shouchun and Lake Quebei.

Despite seeing an estimated 100,000 or more soldiers on the march the Red Crow Campaign is often overlooked. Many of the Sanguo Zhi biographies of the primary commanders don’t even mention it. This is likely because it accomplished little. Wu’s victories in the field were temporary ones, as were Wei’s in pursuit. No territory changed hands and nothing was truly accomplished. That, however, is exactly why the campaign is important. Over two bloody months, it exemplified the stalemate that had developed between Wei and Wu. Subsequent wars between the two great kingdoms would end the same way, with no significant changes of territory, until Jin’s conquest of Wu nearly 40 years later.

NOTES

1.  238-250 2.  This character is frequently pronounced wǎn, but the period correct reading is huàn. 3.  The character 六 is traditionally pronounced Liù, but in the case of the ancient princedom it is pronounced Lù. 4.  Generals of the South, p. 43 5.  The characters 芍 and 陂 have several alternate pronunciations. In the context of this lake they are pronounced as quèbēi. 6.  Jiāngbiǎo Zhuàn 江表传, SGZ 46.2 7.  SGZ 46.2 8.  Jiāngbiǎo Zhuàn 江表传, SGZ 47 9.  SGZ 15.1 10.  Jiāngbiǎo Zhuàn 江表传, SGZ 47 11.  Generals of the South, p. 44 12.  Jiāngbiǎo Zhuàn 江表传, SGZ 46.2 13.  SGZ 51.6 14.  This city is also called Fancheng ��城; 城 being the generic word for a walled city or town. 15.  The character 柤 is traditionally pronounced zhā.  However, Xi Zuochi’s  Xiāngyáng Jì 襄阳记 states that it should be pronounced zū. 16.  Xiāngyáng Jì 襄阳记, SGZ 56.2 17.  SGZ 56.4 18.  SGZ 47 19.  SGZ 56.4 20.  SGZ 56.2; Chen Shou dates this operation in 242 (Zhengshi 3/Chiqu 5) but Sun Sheng’s commentary to Zhu Ran’s biography makes the convincing argument that the correct year is 237 (Jingchu 1/Jiahe 6). According to his Yìtóng Píng 異同評, the Wèishū 魏書 and Jiāngbiǎo Zhuàn 江表传 both date this attack to 237, as does the Wei portion of the SGZ, while the biographies of Cao Fang and Sun Quan mention no such operation in 242. 21.  SGZ 28.1 22.  SGZ 24.4 23.  SGZ 60.2; Quan Zong’s biography only says that he married a princess but SGZ 50 clarifies the situation. 24.  SGZ 64.1 25.  SGZ 56.2 26.  SGZ 52.3 27.  SGZ 52.4; Xiling was also called Yiling 夷陵. 28.  SGZ 27.2 29.  JS 1 30.  SGZ 47 31.  SGZ 4.1, JS 1 32.  SGZ 24.4 33.  SGZ 60.2 34.  SGZ 47 35.  SGZ 24.4 36.  SGZ 28.1 37.  SGZ 47 38.  These were the son and grandson of the famous minister’s Zhang Zhao 张昭 and Gu Yong 顾雍, respectively. 39.  SGZ 52.2-2 40.  Jìn Jǐ 晋纪, SGZ 4.1 41.  SGZ 54.4, 56.3; These were the sons of Lü Fan 呂范 and Zhu Huan, respectively. 42.  SGZ 27.2 43.  Jìn Jǐ 晋纪, SGZ 4.1; JS 1 44.  Also called Sanzhoukou 三州口. 45.  Jìn Jǐ 晋纪, SGZ 4.1; JS 1