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chrislspulaw · 8 months

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ARTICLE 107

The rules provided in Articles 88 and 89 shall also apply to conjugal partnership of gains.

Conjugal Partnership of gains

Often times referred to as the CPG, it is one of the property relations between the spouses, under which the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance, and, upon dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained by either or both spouses shall be divided equally between them, unless otherwise agreed in the marriage settlements.

In other words, the following are placed in common fund:

the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties; and

those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance.

Instances that CPG apply.

It applies only when the future spouses agree to it in the marriage settlement, if any. It also applies to conjugal partnerships of gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of the Family Code, without prejudice to vested rights. This is the default property relationship under the Civil Code, which was changed to that of absolute community of property under the Family Code.

CPG Begins.

Should the spouses agree upon the conjugal partnership of gains, its application shall commence at the precise moment when the marriage is celebrated, exactly like in absolute community of property. What is considered is the hour and not the date of the marriage.

A provision in a marriage settlement that the conjugal partnership automatically be converted into an absolute community on the fifth wedding anniversary will be void because it makes the commencement of the absolute community of property at a time other than the precise moment of marriage celebration.

Article 88

The absolute community of property between spouses shall commence at the precise moment that the marriage is celebrated. Any stipulations, express or implied, for the commencement of the regime at any other time shall be void.(145a)

Can a spouse waive his/her share in the Conjugal partnership property during marriage?

No. Except in case of judicial separation of property, any waiver of rights, shares and effects of the absolute community of property during the marriage can be made.

The same rationale applies to avoid undue pressure and influence exerted upon the weaker spouse who may be persuaded or coerced into parting with his her interests in the conjugal partnership.

Article 89

No waiver of rights, interest, shares, and effects of the absolute community of property during the marriage can be made except in the case of judicial separation of property.

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chrislspulaw · 8 months

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Paraphernal Property

Paraphernal Property is property that solely belongs to either the husband or the wife only. Paraphernal Property is not part of the conjugal property or absolute community property.

If the property regime of the husband and wife is complete separation of property, all properties brought and acquired by each of the spouses before and during the marriage belongs only to either the husband or the wife and not by both of them.

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chrislspulaw · 8 months

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Presumptive Legitime

PRESUMPTIVE LEGITIME -is not defined in the law. Its definition must have been taken from Act 2710, the Old Divorce Law, which required the delivery to the legitimate children of "the equivalent of what would have been due to them as their legal portion if said spouse had died intestate immediately after the dissolution of the community of property." As used in the Family Code, presumptive legitime is understood as the equivalent of the legitimate children's legitimes assuming that the spouses had died immediately after the dissolution of the community of property. Presumptive legitime is required to be delivered to the common children of the spouses when the marriage is annulled or declared void ab initio and possibly, when the conjugal partnership or absolute community is dissolved as in the case of legal separation. Failure of the parents to deliver the presumptive legitime will make their subsequent marriage null and void under Article 53 of the Family Code.

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chrislspulaw · 8 months

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Extrinsic and Intrinsic Validity

Extrinsic validity of a contract refers to formalities and solemnities which must be followed under the law.

From the viewpoint of time: the laws in force at the time the will was made.

From the viewpoint of place/country:

If the testator is a Filipino, he can observe Philippine law or the law of the country where he executes the will.

If the testator is a foreigner living abroad, he can follow the law of his domicile (the country he’s permanently staying in,) the law of his home country or Philippine law.

If the testator is a foreigner in the Philippines, he can either follow the law of his home country or Philippine law.

Intrinsic validity refers to the legality of the contract

From the viewpoint of time: the law in force at the time of the testator’s death governs succession rights.

From the viewpoint of place/country: the national law of the testator governs, regardless of the place the will was executed or where the testator died.

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chrislspulaw · 8 months

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Article 38 of the Family Code

The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy.

Between collateral blood relatives, whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;

Between step – parents and step – children;

Between the parent-in-law and children – in – law

Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;

Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parents and the adopting parents and the adopted child;

Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;

Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter;

Between the adopted children of the same adopter;

Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that person’s spouse or his or her own spouse.

Reason for the prohibition of void marriages.

It is against public policy

Policy of the state to foster a normal, peaceful, and wholesome integral nuclear family unit which would constitute the very foundation of society.

Enumeration on Article 38 is exclusive. What the law does not include, it excludes.

Collateral blood relatives by consanguinity.

Consanguinity is the relationship of person of the same blood or origin.

Marriage between collateral blood relatives up to the 4th Civil degree may disturb the policy of the state. (Genetic Reasons)

Note: Prohibition as regards to collateral blood relatives up to the 4th civil degree does not apply to half-blood relationships. (Law does not provide that they are prohibited).

Adoptive Relationship

The relationship created in adoption is limited to one parent and child.

The adopter cannot marry the following:

1. Adopted

2. Surviving spouse of the adopted

The adopted cannot marry the following:

Adopter

The surviving spouse of the adopter

The legitimate child of the adopter

The other adopted children of the adopter

Intentional killing of the spouses

Basis

To prevent one from killing one’s spouse in order to remarry

To protect the family as well as society

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chrislspulaw · 11 months

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Case Digest for

Alfredo Velayo for vs Shell Company of the Philippine Islands

Facts:

CALI operation's fuel needs were all supplied by the defendant.

The books, of Defendant showed a balance in its favor for goods it sold and delivered to CALI.

The defendant had reasons to believe that the financial condition of the CALI was far from being satisfactory.

The management of CALI informally convened its principal creditors

Mr. Alexander Sycip, Secretary of the Board of Directors of the CALI, informed the creditors present that this corporation was insolvent and had to stop operations. He explained the memorandum agreement executed by... the CALI with the Philippine Air Lines), Inc.

Regarding the proposed sale to the latter of the aviation equipment of the former

Mr. Alexander Sycip was assisted in the explanation by CPA Alfredo Velayo of Washington, Sycip & Company, Auditors of the CALI, who discussed the balance sheets and distributed copies thereof to the creditors present

The said balance sheet made mention of a C-54 plane in the United States, the property now involved in this suit.

After the creditors present knew the balance sheet and heard the explanations of the officers of the CALI, it was their unanimous opinion that it would be advantageous not to present suits against this corporation but to strive for a fair pro-rata division of its assets although the management of the CALI announced that in case of non-agreement of the creditors on a pro-rata division of the assets, it would file insolvency proceedings... the American corporation Shell Oil Company, Inc., filed a complaint against -the CALI in the Superior Court of the State of California, U.S.A. in and for the County of San- Bernardino for the collection of an assigned credit... and a writ of attachment was applied for and issued on the same date against a C-54 plane.

Unaware of Defendant assignments of credit and attachment suit, the stockholders of CALI resolved in a special meeting to approve the memorandum agreement of sale to the Philippine Air Lines, Inc.

The National Airports Corporation learned of the Defendant's action in the United States and hastened to file its own complaint with an attachment against the CALI

The CALI, also prompted by the Defendant's action in getting the alleged undue preference over the other creditors by attaching the C-54 plane in the United States, beyond the jurisdiction of the Philippines, filed a petition for voluntary insolvency.

An order of insolvency was issued by the court which necessarily stayed the National Airports Corporation's action against the CALI and dissolved its attachment thus compelling the National Airports Corporation to file its claims with the insolvency court

After properly qualifying as Assignee, Alfredo M. Velayo instituted this case... against the Shell Company of P. I., Ltd., for the purpose of securing from the Court a writ of injunction... restraining Defendant, its agents, servants, attorneys, and solicitors from prosecuting in and for the County of San Bernardino in the Superior Court of the State of California, U.S.A. the aforementioned Civil Case No. 62576 against the in solvent Commercial Air Lines, Inc.

and as an alternative remedy, that judgment for damages of double the value of the airplane be awarded in favor of the plaintiff against the Defendant, with costs.

The Court rendered a decision... dismissing the complaint

Issues:

Whether the respondent acted in bad faith and betrayed the confidence and trust of the other creditors of CALI by affecting a hasty telegraphic transfer of its credit to the American corporation Shell Oil Company, Inc.?

Ruling:

Defendant, upon learning the precarious economic situation of CALI and that with all probability, it could not get much of its outstanding credit because of the preferred claims of certain other creditors, forgot that "Man does not live by bread alone" and entirely disregarded all moral inhibitory tenets.

The telegraphic transfer made without knowledge and at the back of the other creditors of CALI may be a shrewd and... surprise move that enabled Defendant to collect almost all if not the entire amount of its credit, but the Court of Justice cannot countenance such attitude at all, and much less from a foreign corporation to the detriment of our Government and local business.

ART 19. Any person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performances of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith".

It may be said that this article only contains a mere declaration of principles and while such a statement may be is essentially correct, yet We find that such a declaration is implemented by Article 21... which prescribes the following:

"ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage".

It may be argued that the afore quoted provisions of the Civil Code only came into effect on August 80, 1950, and that they cannot be applicable to acts that took place in 1948, prior to its effectivity. But Article 2252 of the Civil Code, though providing... that:

''Changes made and new provisions and rules land down by this Code which may be prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the old legislation, shall have no retroactive effect.

Implies that when the new provisions of the Code does nor prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the old legislation and it cannot be alleged that in the case at bar Defendant had any vested or acquired right to betray the confidence of the... insolvent CALI or of its creditors said new provisions, like those on Human Relations, can be given retroactive effect.

Defendant schemed and affected the transfer of its credits (from which it could derive practically nothing) to its sister corporation in the United States where CALI's plane C-54 was then situated, succeeding by such swift and unsuspected operation in disposing of said insolvent's property by removing it from the possession and ownership of the insolvent.

Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is reversed and Defendant-Appellee, Shell Company of the Philippine Islands, Ltd., is hereby sentenced to pay to Plaintiff-Appellant, as Assignee of the insolvent CALI, damages.

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chrislspulaw · 11 months

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Case Digest

Globe Mackay and Radio Corp., and Herbert C. Hendry, petitioners,

The Honorable Court of Appeals and Restituto M. Tobias, respondents,

Facts: Respondent Mr. Tobias was employed by the petitioner Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. in a dual capacity as a purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the engineering operation manager.

In 1972 the petitioner discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions for which it lost thousands of pesos.

According to Mr. Tobias, he was the one who discovered the said anomalies and immediately reported them on November 10, 1972, to his immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren, and the petitioner who was then Vice-President and General Manager of Globe Mackay.

On November 11, 1972, one day after the respondent made the report Mr. Ferraren confronted said respondent stating that he was the number one suspect, and ordered him to take one week forced leave, not to communicate with the office, to leave his table drawer open, and to leave the office keys.

On November 20, 1972, when the respondent returned to work, the petitioner went up to him and called him a “crook” and a “swindler”. Mr. Tobias was ordered to take a lie detector test he was also instructed to submit a specimen of his handwriting, signature, and initials for examination by the police investigators to determine his complicity in the anomalies

On December 6, 1972, the Manila police investigators submitted the report clearing Mr. Tobias of participation in the said anomalies.

Not satisfied with the said result, the petitioner hired a private investigator. Then the said private investigator submitted on December 10, 1972, a report finding Mr. Tobias guilty. This report also expressly stated that further investigation was still to be conducted.

On December 12, 1972, the petitioner issued a memorandum suspending Tobias from work in preparation for the filing of criminal charges against him.

On December 19, 1972, another report was submitted reiterating that Mr. Tobias was not in any way involved in the fraudulent transactions also the lie detector test conducted yielded negative results.

Petitioners filed with the city of Fiscal of Manila a complaint for estafa through falsification of commercial documents then amended to just estafa and subsequently filed five criminal complaints four of which were estafa through Falsification of commercial documents while the fifth was for Art. 290 of the RPC(Discovering Secrets Through Seizure of Correspondence). Two of these cases were refiled with the Judge Advocate General’s Office, which, however, remanded them to the fiscal’s office. All of the six criminal cases were dismissed by the fiscal. Petitioners appealed the four of the fiscal’s resolutions dismissing the criminal complaint with the Secretary of Justice, who, however, affirmed their dismissal.

On January 17, 1973, the respondent received a notice from the petitioner that his employment had been terminated effective December 13, 1972. Tobias filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. while on the pendency of the said complaint, both parties agreed to enter into a compromise agreement regarding the complaint for illegal dismissal.

Unemployed, Tobias in search of a job applied with RETELCO(Republic Telephone Company)however petitioner wrote a letter without being discussed that the respondent was dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty.

Private respondent Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners. Petitioner, claiming illness, did not testify during the hearings. The RTC Brach IX Judge Reyes rendered judgment in favor of the private respondent by ordering petitioners to pay him eighty thousand pesos(P80,000.00) as actual damages, two hundred thousand pesos(P200,000.00) as moral damages, twenty thousand pesos(P20,000.00) for exemplary damages, thirty thousand pesos(30,000.00) as attorney’s

fee and costs. The petitioners appealed RTC's decision to the Court of Appeals however the CA affirmed the RTC decision. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration having been denied, the instant petition having been denied. The instant petition for review on certiorari was filed.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent?

Ruling: Yes the petitioners are liable for damages to the private respondent.

The Third Division of the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.

The abusive manner in which that right was exercised amounted to a legal wrong for which petitioners must now be held liable. Moreover, the damage incurred by Tobias was not only in connection with the abusive manner in which he was dismissed but was also the result of several other quasi-delictual acts committed by petitioners.

The nature of the wrongful acts shown to have been committed by petitioners against Tobias is sufficient basis for the award of exemplary damages to the latter.

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chrislspulaw · 11 months

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Case Digests for Article 15 of Civil Code of the Philippines.

Alice Reyes Van Dorn vs Hon. Manuel V. Romillo, Jr. Et. Al.

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

Facts: The petitioner in this case is Alice Reyes, a Filipino citizen, and the respondent is Richard Upton, an American citizen. They were married in Hong Kong in 1972 and have two children from their marriage. They got divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982. The petitioner also remarried in Nevada to Theodore Van Dorn.

On June 18, 1983, the respondent filed a civil case at Regional Trial Court Branch CXV in Pasay City. His claim is that the petitioner's business, the Galleon Shop, located in Ermita, Manila, is a conjugal property. The respondent requested an accounting of the company and asserted his right to manage the conjugal property.

The petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings in Nevada Court and the private respondent acknowledged that he and the petitioner had no community property as of June 11, 1982.

The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case.

Issue: For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines.

Ruling: The most important fact of this case is the divorce of both parties in Nevada Court.

Owing to the nationality principle embodied in Art. 15 of the Civil Code, Only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines provided they are valid according to their national law.

In this case, the divorce in Nevada released the private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American Law.

In pursuant to his national law private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner.

To maintain, as the respondent does, that, under our law, the petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

The Supreme Court grants the petition, and the respondent judge is ordered to dismiss the civil case filed against the petitioner in his court in Civil Case No. 1075-P.

Grace J. Garcia a.k.a. Grace J. Garcia-Recio vs Rederick A. Recio

G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001

Facts: The respondent Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987.

On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court.

On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen.

Petitioner and Respondent were married on January 12, 1994, in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in Cabanatuan City.

Starting October 22, 1995, the petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.

On March 3, 1998, the petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in the court a quo, on the ground of bigamy – the respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It seemed the marriage ended, but not on the basis of any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that is, the respondent's alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on the divorce decree obtained by the respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the marriage; thus, there was no more martial union to nullify or annul. on January 12, 1994.

Issues: Whether the divorce between the respondent and Editha Samson was proven?

Did the trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by the respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson?

Whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry the petitioner?

Ruling: On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:

"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the offense of bigamy."48

This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by the respondent may have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored the respondent's capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.

Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that the respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry the petitioner on January 12, 1994.

Neither can we grant the petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and void on the grounds of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really capacitated to marry the petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree.

WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, we REMAND the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence that conclusively shows the respondent's legal capacity to marry the petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties' marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.

Wolfgang O. Roehr vs Maria Carmen D. Rodriguez, Hon. Judge Josefina Guevara-Salonga, Presiding Judge of Makati RTC, Branch 149

G.R. No. 142820 June 20, 2003

Facts: Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980, in Hamburg, Germany.

On August 28, 1996, a private respondent filed a petition for a declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. On February 6, 1997, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, but it was denied by the trial court in its order dated May 28, 1997.

On June 5, 1997, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was also denied in an order dated August 13, 1997. On September 5, 1997, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. On November 27, 1998, the appellate court denied the petition and remanded the case to the RTC.

Petitioner filed a timely motion for reconsideration on October 19, 1999, which was denied by the respondent judge in an order dated March 31, 2000.

Issues: Whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused her discretion in issuing her order dated September 30, 1999, which partially modified her order dated July 14, 1999.

Whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused her discretion when she assumed and retained jurisdiction over the present case despite the fact that the petitioner had already obtained a divorce decree from a German court.

Ruling: It is clear from the foregoing rules that a judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case that has not yet attained finality. Considering that the private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period, the trial court's decision of July 14, 1999, can still be modified. Moreover, in Sañado v. Court of Appeals,16 we held that the court could modify or alter a judgment even after the same has become executory whenever circumstances transpire rendering its decision unjust and inequitable, as where certain facts and circumstances justifying or requiring such modification or alteration transpired after the judgment has become final and executory17 and when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it.18 In our view, there are even more compelling reasons to do so when, as in this case, judgment has not yet attained finality.

In this case, the divorce decree issued by the German court dated December 16, 1997 has not been challenged by either of the parties. In fact, save for the issue of parental custody, even the trial court recognized said decree to be valid and binding, thereby endowing private respondents the capacity to remarry. Thus, the present controversy mainly relates to the award of the custody of their two children, Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine, to the petitioner.

As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care, and support of the children, must still be determined by our courts.

WHEREFORE, the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, issued on September 30, 1999, and March 31, 2000, are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We hereby declare that the trial court has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who has parental custody, including the care, support, and education of the children, namely Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine Roehr. Let the records of this case be remanded promptly to the trial court for continuation of appropriate proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.

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